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Univebsitv Press \Vi 

Amen Coknkr, E.C. 






EDWARD A. FKEEMAN, M.A., Hon. D.(H.., LL.1>. 














[All righU reverted] 



Kn HHtmoriam 










TH' 'eternal strife' whose ISLAND-FIELDS HE SOUGHT 







A. J. E. 



rriHE untimely death of Mr. Freeman at Alicante 
-*- on March 1 6, 1 892, left his great work on Sicilian 
History still unfinished. Considerable fragments, 
however, of its continuation remained in manuscript, 
sufficient when put together to fill more than one 
volume. Of these a fairly consecutive part extends 
from the beginning of the tyranny of Dionysios to 
the death of Agathokl^s ; another contains the 
Roman Conquest of Sicily; a third the Norman. 
It has been thought desirable that these should see 
the light. 

By the force of circumstances, and the personal 
relation in which I stood to the author, the publica- 
tion of the fourth volmne of the History of Sicily, 
which continues the story of Dionysios, begun in 
the preceding volume, and carries on the narrative 
to the death of Agathokl^s, has devolved on myself. 
For one not professedly a historian, and hitherto 
content with the hiunbler walks of antiquity, such 
a task was necessarily an arduous one. But it was 
a task that piety could not refuse. Such qualifica- 
tions as I have are a fairly intimate knowledge of 


the sites, derived from repeated visits to the island, 
which I have traversed on foot from sea to sea; 
some special researches in the field of Sicilian 
archaeology and numismatics ; and something, per- 
haps, of personal tradition. 

It has been necessary to fiU many gaps existing 
in the text, and to supply by far the greater part 
of the notes. Thanks to the kindness of Mr. Fisher 
Unwin I have been able to bridge over the gaps 
in the narrative by the insertion of passages from 
Mr. Freeman's small " Story of Sicily," and, although 
the accounts thus derived were necessarily of a 
summary character, they have at least the great 
advantage of showing the line that Mr. Freeman 
would have taken had he lived to complete these 
portions of his greater history in extenso. In cases 
again where subjects — as it seemed to me, indis- 
pensable — were not to be found treated either in this 
source or in the MS. itself, I have endeavoured to 
supply the deficiency either by the insertion of 
more copious foot-notes, or by means of supplements 
placed at the end of the chapters that they illus- 
trate. Thus I have thought it desirable to give 
a general view of the Monarchy of Dionysios and 
the extent of his dominions ; a detailed account of 
his Adriatic Colonies ; and an examination of his 
financial expedients, especially in the new light 
thrown on them by recent numismatic discoveries. 
I have also devoted separate essays to numismatic 
illustrations of the careers of Timole6n and Aga- 
thoklfis, to which a plate has been annexed; and 


have di-awn up maps of the dominions and depen- 
dencies of Dionysios, of the sites of Motya and 
Lilybaion, and of the African provinces of Carthage, 
which were the field of Agathokl^s' campaigns. 

The notes have been a considerable labour. The 
places to be annotated were indeed marked in the 
MS., but in the great majority of cases not only 
had no attempt been made by the author to supply 
the notes themselves, but no indication was given 
of the references to be made. In compiling them 
I have endeavoured where possible to supplement 
the sources made use of in the text by the indi- 
cation of fresh material or of more recent criticism. 
It has moreover from time to time been necessary 
to make use of the notes as a vehicle for conveying 
dissent from the views expressed in the text. It 
must be constantly borne in mind in this connexion 
that, though, on the whole, the work in its present 
form seems to be such as Mr. Freeman when he 
wrote it desired to set before the public eye, there 
is no part that he might not have revised or 
modified had fresh evidence bearing on the points 
at issue come under his notice. He was himself 
accustomed to re-write large passages of his works : 
and his mind was always open to fresh lights. 

But, although in the notes I have ventured here 
and there to adduce evidence for a difierent view 
from that expressed in the text, I have, except in 
the case of obvious verbal slips, regarded the text 
itself as sacred. I have altered nothing, and I have 
taken away nothing. I have moreover been careful, 


except when occasionally it has been necessary to 
insert a few words to complete the sense, to add 
nothing of my own. All such small insertions as it 
was requisite to make, together with my own notes 
and supplements, are easily distinguishable by their 
being placed within square brackets. 

My special thanks are due to Professor Holm and 
Mr. F. Haverfield for looking over my proofs and 
for many useful hints. In the earlier part I re- 
ceived valuable help in the correction of proofs and 
the verifying of references from my beloved wife, 
Mr. Freeman's eldest daughter, whose constant de- 
votion had rendered the same services to her father 
during his lifetime. But, within a year of his own 
death, she too was gathered to the father she so 
truly loved, and the rest of my work, such as it is, 
has been done without that help and without that 
en couragement . 

Arthur J. Evans. 




TBI TTSANirr OF DIONTBIOS. B. C. 405 — 367. 

R* c. 405 DionysioB lord of Syracnse ; compared with Arta 
zerxes ; forerunner of Macedonian kings 
Body-guard, badge of tyranny 
Dionyiios tyrant in fact not in title 
Periods of Dionysios* reign 


§ I. The EstMiihrnent of the Power of Dionyeios in Sieily. 

B.C. 405-397[398]. 

Ortygia made tyrant's castle 
The New Citisens .... 
B. c. 404 — 403 Dionysios breaks treaty with Carthage 

War with Sikels .... 

Siege of Herbessus and mutiny in Dionydoe* army 

B. 0. 403 Dionydos besieged in Syracuse 

Counsels of HelOris and Polyzenos; pretended 

negotiations .... 
Arrival of Campanian allies 
Victorious sally ; clemency of Dionysios . 

B. c. 40 a Campanian settlement at Entella . 

Affairs in Old Greece ; Sparta and Corinth 
Alliance between Sparta and Dionysios ; interven 

tion of Arlstos .... 
Dionysios plans recovery of Leontinoi, but post 

pones it . 
Aitna taken 

Campaign against Henna ; its politics 
Dionysios enters Henna as deliverer 
Unsuccessful attack on Herbita 
Katand and Naxos betrayed to Dionysios . 


I — 10 


II — 12 



15— »6 

16 — 22 

19 — 20 


21 — 22 

2 .^—24 
23 — 26 

26 — 27 






Katan6 given to Gampaniani 

Noxoe destroyed .... 

Leontines transferred to Syracuse . 

Foundation of Ala^8a by ArchOnidds of Herbita 

Fortification of Syracuse by Dionynos 

Wall of DionysioB round Epipolaa 

Castle of Eoryiilos .... 

Southern wall of Epipolai . 

Predominant position of Syraouse . 

Messana and Rhdgion allies against Dionysios 







§ a. The First Punie War of Dionynos, [b. c. 398.] 

B. C. 402 
[B. C. 398] 

[B.C. 397] 

Military and naval preparations of Dionysios 

Syracuse greatest city of Greece and Europe 

Expedition against Motya . 

Siege of Motya .... 

Mole of Dionysios .... 

Dionysios repulsed at Segesta and Entella 

Himilkdn's descent on Great Harbour of Syracuse 

Himilkdu's naval diversion at Motya : faik 

Symcusan fleet dragged across isthmus 

Assault on walls of Motya ; moving towers 

Defence of Motya .... 

Desperate struggle within the walls 

Night surprise and capture of Motya 

Massacre and plunder of Motyans 

Crucifixion of Greeks in Carthaginian service 

Dionysios retunui to Syracuse 

Motya garrisoned by Sikels 

Fresh expedition of Himilkdn 

Dionysios returns to Western Sicily 

Ineffectual blockade of Segesta 

Himilkdn sails to Panormos 

Fifty tRinsports sunk by Leptinds 

Himilkdn lands at Panormos ; his successful cam 

paign in the W^eet ; retakes Motya and Eryx 
Dionysios raises siege of Segesta and retreats to 

Lilybaion founded by Hhuilk6n 
Motya deserted 
Site of Lilybaion . 
Marsala and remains of Lilybaion 
Ancient haven of Lilybaion 
Himilkdn's expedition to N. E. Sicily 
Starts from Panormos 

61 — 64 






78— 8a 






89 — 91 

91 — 92 


94 — 101 

99 — 100 

loi — 105 



[B. C. 397] 

Tresto lliennai and Cephalcediam friendly 

Advances on Messana ; encamps on Peldris 

Takes Messana by assault . 

Allied with Sikels ; marches on Syracuse . 

Himilkdn settles Sikels at Tauromenion . 

Site of Tauromenion ; Taormina . 

Two Akropoleit of Tauromenion . 

Defensive preparations of Dionysios 

Leontinoi fortified .... 

Campanians settle in Aitna 

Dionysios marches to Katand 

Messana destroyed by Himilkdn 

Himilkdn advances against Dionysios 

Eruption of JRinti .... 

Sea-fight off Katand ; Leptinds defeated by Magdn 

Dionysios fallM back on Syracuse . 

Defection of Sikeliots 

Land-foroes of Himilkdn reach Katand 

Imminent danger of Syracuse 

Appeal of Dionysios to Corinth 

Carthaginian fleet enters the Great Harbour 

Himilkdn*s headquarters at Olympieion . 

Syracusan territory ravaged 

Temple of Ddmdtdr and Kord plundered by Himil 

k6n ..... 

The Goddesses avenged 
Forts built on Pldmmyrion by Himilkdn • 
Arrival of Peloponnesian contingent 
Naval victory of Syracusans 
Debates in Syracusan Assembly; speech of 

Theoddros .... 

Pharakidas supports Dionysios 
Dionysios dissolves the Assembly . 
Popular demeanour of Dionysios . 
Outbreak of pestilence in Carthaginian camp 
Dionysios attacks Carthaginians by land and sea 
Masks real attack by feint 
Capture of Carthaginian forts 
Sea- victory in bay of Daskdn ; destruction of 

Punic fleet .... 

Exultation of Syracusans . 
Treasonable compact between Dionysios and 

Himilkdn .... 

Himilkdn and Carthaginian citizens allowed to 

escape ..... 
Rout and slaughter of the Punic mercenaries 
Iberians taken into pay of Dionysios 


106 — 107 


109 — 112 



113— 114 



117— 118 












129 — 132 

135— '36 



138— 141 






[B.C. 397] 


Rising of African lubjecti and allieB against 

Carthage ..... 145 

Expiatory cult of Ddmfitdr and Elor6 instituted at 

Carthage ....*. 146 — 147 

Carthaginian dominion again confined to W. Sicily 147 

Sikeliot Greeks dependants of Dionysios . 148 

§ 3. From the First to the Second Punic War of DionyHoa. 

B. c. 39<^393* 
Policy of Dionysios towards Carthage ; difficulties 

of his position ..... 
Suspected mercenaries settled at Leontinoi 
Me»8ana rebuilt by Dionysios; re-peopled from 

Lokroi and Medma, and Messanians from Pelo- 

ponnese ..... 
Spartan intervention against Messanians of Pelo- 

ponnese . • . . • 

B. c. 395 They are settled at Dionysios' new foundation of 

Tyndaris .... 

Site of Tyndaris ; its flourishing career and ruins 
Hostility of Rh6gion ; Rhdgines found Mylai 
Exiled citizens of Nazos and Katand settled at 

Mylai ..... 
Bhdgines under Heldris besiege restored Messana 
Bhdgines defeated and Mylai taken 
Sikel campaign of Dionysios 
He takes Morgantina, Cephaloedium and Solous 
Henna taken by Dionysios . 
Treaties with Agyris of Agyrium and D&m6n of 

Centuripa . . . . • . 160 

Flourishing state of Agyrium . . . 161 

Treaties of Dionysios with Herbita and Assorus 162 

Peace with Herbessus .... i6a 

Siege of Tauromenion by Dionysios . . 163 — 167 

Repulse of Dionysios .... 166 — 167 

Revolt of Akragas and Messana . 167 

% 4. The Second Punic War of DionyHoe, B. c. 392 

B. 0. 39 a Expedition of Magdn against Messana 
Magdn defeated by Dionysios 
Fresh Carthaginian expedition under Magdn 
Agyris of Agyrium allied with Dionysios . 
Mngdn makes peace with Dionysios 
Terms of peace with Carthage 
Sikels subject to Dionysios 
Dionysios occupies Tauromenion . 
Plants mercenaries there . 









169 — 171 







8 5. 

B.C. 391. 

B. a 390 

B.O. 389 

B. C. 387 

B. 0. 384 
B. C. 367 

B. 0. 389 

From the Second to the Third Punic War of Dionytios. 

B. 0. 393—383. 

Dionjaioe tuniB against Bhdgion . 

Siege of Rh^on ; naval defeat of Dionynos 

Dionysiofl returns to Sjmouse 

Allianoe with Lucanians ; they attack Thourians 

Thourians invade Lacania 

Defeated Thourians received by Leptinte and 

ransomed .... 

Leptinds disgraced by Dionysios . 
Campaign of Dionysios against Italiot league 
He attacks Kauldnia 

Erot6n takes lead among Italiots ; Hel6xis general 
Battle of the Elleporos ; HelOris slain 
Defeat of Italiots ; demency of Dionysios 
Golden crowns voted Dionysios by Italiot cities 

they conclude treaties with him 
Kauldnia taken and given to Lokrians 
Benewed attack on Rhdgion 
Siege and capture of Rbdgion 
Cruel treatment of its general Phytdn 
Embassy of Dionysios to Olympic festival 
Dionysios wins prize for tragedy at L^naia 
Banishment of Philistos 
Plato at Court of Dionysios 
Plato sold as a slave by Dionysios . 
Philozenos sent to the stone-quarries 
Adriatic colonies of Dionysios 
Alliance with Molottian prince 
Temple of Agylla plundered 196 — 


B.C. 383 
[B. C. 378] 

The Third Punic War of Diont/sios. B. c 

Dionysios begins Third Punic War 
Victory of Dionysios ; Magdn killed 
Peace with Carthage 
Carthage recovers Halykos frontier 
Kas Melkart and Thermai Carthaginian 
Tolerant policy of Mag6n . 





19a — 
























§ 7. From the Third to the last Punic War of Dionysios. 

B. C. [378—368]. 

Dionynoe takes Krotdn 202 

Plans wall across Isthmus of SquiUaoe . 203 

B. c. 369 Helps Sparta with mercenaries . 204 

B. a 399 — 367 Honorary decrees to Dionysios by the Athenians . 204 — 205 

VOL. IV. ' b 




§ 8. The last Punic War of Dionytioi, B. c. 568. 

B. c. 368 DionysioB invades Carthaginian dominion in 
Weitem Sicily .... 

He takes Selinous, Entella, and Eryx 

Besieges Ulybaion .... 

Uses haven of Eryx — Drepanon . 

Siege of lilybaion raised 

Syraousan fleet sails away from Lilybaion . 

Sea-viotoiy of Himilk6n at Drepanon 

Fresh peace with Carthage 
B. c. 367 Death of Dienysios 

205 — 206 



[SUPPLSMENT I (Jby the Editor). 

The Monarchy of Dionydos ; with a map of his 
dominions] ..... 211 — 219 

[Supplement TL (by the Editor). 
Tlie Adtiatic Colonies of Dionysios] 

. 220 — 229 

[SOPPLEMEKT III (by the Editor). 
The Finance and Coinage of the Elder Dionysios] 230 — 2,^8 


THE DELIYEBEBS. B.C. 367 — 3 1 7. 

B. c. 367 Situation on death of elder Dionysios 
Feeble character of Dionysios II . 
His accession ratified by Assembly 
Peace concluded with Carthaginians and Lu 
canians ..... 



B. c. 357 

§ 1. Di6n, 

Historian Philistos ; adviser of Dionysios II 

Di6n's Platonic notions of government 

Plato invited to Dion3'sios* court . 

Didn banished .... 

Plato's relations with Dionysios . 

DiOn in Old Greece ; plots agrainst Dionysios 

Di6n*s expedition to deliver Syracuse 

Didn reaches Pachynos 

His ships driven to Africa . 

Didn lands at Hdrakleia Mind.i 

Friendly attitude of Carthaginian governor 





247 — 260 


25 » 



Didn*8 march on Syracnse ; his Sikeliot recrnits 

The newB sent to Dionysios ; delayed in delivery 

Didn reaches Akrai 

Campanian mercenaries drawn away from Epipolai 

Didn reaches ford of Anapos 

His sacrifice to the Anapos 

Triumphal advance on SyraouRe 

Rising of Syracusans 

Dionysios' forces withdraw to Epipolai 

His governor Timokratds flies ', 

Syracuse free ; spies beaten to death 

Didn enters Syracuse 

He addresses the Assembly 

Twenty generals chosen 

Epipolai taken ; island walled off . 

Return of Dionytdos to Ortygia 

Unpopular attitude of Di6n ; Dionysios profit 

by it . 
Unsuccessful onslaught on Didn*s wall 
Dionyuos intrigues against Didn . 
Hdrakleidte* rivalry with Didn 
fleet of Phiiistos returns to Sicily . 
Philistos defeated at sea by Hdrakleidds; his 

cruel death .... 

Dionysios leaves Ortygia . 
B. c. 356 Didn deprived of his generalship ; withdraws to 

Leontinoi .... 

Siege of Ortygia continued by Syracusans 
Garrison of Ortygia votes for surrender 
Arrival of Nypsios ; further resistance resolved on 
Sea-victory of Hdrakleidds; and consequent 

carouse ..... 
Successful sally of Nypsioe 
Nypsios master of Agora and lower Aohradina 
Sack of Agora by Nypsios . 
Syracusans send envoys to recall Didn 
Didn and Peloponnesians march back firom Leon 

tinoi ..... 
Sack and massacre renewed and Syracuse systema 

tically fired .... 
Didn re-enters Syracuse and clears Achradina 
Didn raises trophy in Agora 
Didn and Hdrakleidds 
Didn recovers Ortygia 
Aristocratic government of Didn 
Murder of Hdrakleidds 
B.C. 354, June Murder of Didn .... 






- 257 




259 — 260 

261 — 262 


263 — 264 

264 — 265 



267 — 268 

268 — 269 


269 — 270 

270 — 271 

270 — 271 





283 --284 




§ a. Tauromenum rrfounded hy Andromaekos. 



Colony of elder Dionymoe at Tauromenion 
Nazian exiles settled at Tauramenion by Andro- 

machoB . . . ... . a86 — 287 

Cult of ApollAn Arch^get^ at Tauromenion . 288 

Later history of Tauromenion 288 — 289 

Site and remains of Tauromenion . 289 — 290 

§ 5. Period of eonfugion at Syracutefrom DiMs death to the coming of 

TimoMt^, B, 0. 354— 344. 

B< c 354—353 Reign of Kallippos at Syracuse 
B. 0.353 — 351 Hipparinos tyrant . 
B. c. 351 — 346 Nysaios tyrant 

B. 0. 346 Restoration of Dionysios II. 

Distracted state of Syracuse and Sicily 

Hiketas chosen general 

291 — 292 

• 393 

§ 4. Timole^. b. 0. 544—338. 

Earlier history of TimoleOn 
B. 0. 344 He is sent by Corinthians to deliver Syracuse 

Voyage of Timoledn 

Lands at Rh6gion ; embassy from Hiketas 

Eludes Carthaginian fleet . 

Lands at Tauromenion 

Punic envoys at Tauromenion; their dialogue 
with Andromachos 

The Sicilian tyrants 

Mamercus of Katand 

Timoledn at Tauromenion . 

Invited to Hadranum 

Hadranum and its Fire«god 

March of Timoledn to Hadranum . 

Defeats Hiketas at Hadranum ; aided by Ha- 
dranus ..... 

Attempt on Timoledn's life at Hadranum; frus- 
trated ..... 

Dionysios II. surrenders to " the Corinthians " 

Dionysios exiled to Corinth ; anecdotes of his 
retirement .... 

Reinforcements for Timoledn arrive from Corinth 

Tinioledn*s struggle against Hiketas and Magdn 

MagOn sails back to Carthage ; his suicide 
B. c. 343 Timoledn defeats Hiketas at Syracuse 

Raises tyrant's castle in Ortygia . 


298 — 299 










Re*oolozuae« Syracuse and other Sicilian dtiee 

New legislation at SjraouBe 

Tiuoledn'i campaign against the tyrants; sub 

mission of Hiketas 
B. c. 343—543 Baid into the Carthaginian dominion 

Carthage allies herself with Hiketas; Hann6n'i 

expedition .... 

Defeat of Galarians 
Carthage stirred to supreme effort . 
B< c. 339 Despatches great expedition under Hamilkar and 

Asdrubal .... 

CarUiAginian fleet arrives at Lilybaion 
Timole6n marches against the invaders 
Insubordination of mercenaries; withdrawal of 

Thrasios and his band . 
Carthaginian camp on the Krimisos 
Military assembly summoned by Timoledn 
The Greek advance 

Omens of the Celery and the two Eagles . 
Greeks gain hill-top 
Punic army crosses Krimisos 
The Sacred Band of Carthage 
Timoledn's attack ; impeded by war-chariots 
Charge of Hmoledn ; resistance of Sacred Band 
Carthaginian rear-guard crosses Krimisos . 
Storm bursts in face of Carthaginians 
Bout of the Carthaginians . 
Numbers drowned in torrent ; Carthaginian losses 
Spoils and trophy of victory 
Timoledn compared with Alexander 
Krimisos and Himera 
Transient effects of victory 
Bevolt and death of Hiketas nnd Mamercus 
Hippdn executed by Messanians 
Peace with Carthage 
Bemaining t3rrant9 put down 
Campanians of ^tna destroyed 
Gela, AkragaSy and Kamarina re-colonised 
^' c. 338 Abdication of Timole6n , 

Timoledn as a private citizen 
B. c. 336 Death and ftmeral of Timole6n 

Effects of example of Di6n and Timoledn . 
Archid&moe of Sparta 
Alexander the Molottian . 
Tinioledn compared with Archidamos 
Macedonian Age of the Deliverers; Greek in 

fiuence in East and West contrasted 



3"— 313 













?3<>— 337 






Failure of Greek action in the West 

Sicilian princes fail to achieve Italian dominion 

Timoledn as a champion of Hellas . 

[Supplement IV {by the Editor). 
Numismatic lights on the Sicily of Timoledn] 






Transient results of Timo1edn*s woric of liberation 356 

Agathoklds contrasted with Dionysins . "356 — 557 

§1. RUt of AgathohUf. 

B. c. 361 Agathokl^ bom at Therma ; his childhood 

B* c. 343 Brought by his &ther to Syracuse ; becomes a 

potter ..... 
State of Syracuse .... 
Changed attitude of Carthage ; largely Hellenized 
Syracusans help Krotdn against Bruttians 
Hdrakleidds and Sddstratos ; the Six Hundred 
Syracuse still formally democratic . 
Wars among Sicilian cities 
Agathokl^ serves against Akragas 
His marriage ; serves against Bruttians 
His brother Antandros Stratdgos . 
Unsuccessful agitation of Agathoklds against the 

generals ..... 
He fails to seize Krotdn ; in Tarantine service 
Helps Rlidgiou against Syracuse . 
Recalled by Syracusans 
Stratagem of Agathoklds at Gela . 
Agathoklds suspected of aiming at tyranny 
Escape of Agathoklds from assassination • 
Political changes at Syracuse 
Agathoklds attacks Syracuse 
Restored by Hamilkar*s mediation 
Syracuse under Carthaginian influences ; Haniil- 

kar*s work of reconciliation 
AgathokUs swears the Great Oath 
Compared with Louis Napol^n . 
Made general and guardian of the peace . 











364— 3^5 













§ 2. AgatMcUt heeomes Tyrant qfSyracuie, 

B. c. 317 Seoesnon of opponents 

Massacre planned and executed by Agatliokl^s 
Deinokratte pardoned 
The Assembly summoned . 
Agathoklte made sole general 
Blackness of Agathoklds' procedure 
Agathoklte as tyrant ; compared with Dionysios 
Dispenses with body-guard 
His popular bearing 










S 3. Wars 0/ AgaihokUi against Sikeliot Cities and Carthaginians. 

B. 0. 311 Centuripa garrisoned by Agathoklds; appeals to 

Akragas ..... 385 

Abortive attempt to free Centuripa 385 

Massacre at Centuripa .... 386 

Punic ships enter Great Harbour . 386 

Revolt of Galaria ..... 387 

Deinokratds marches to relief of the GaUrians ; is 

defeated by Agathoklds .... 387 

Agathoklds turns against Akragas and Cartha- 
ginians ...... .^88 

Hamilkar at Eknomos .... 388 

March of Agaihoklds on Eknomos . 389 

Military preparations of Carthage 390 

Punic fleet destroyed by a storm ; Sicilian levies . 390 

Agathoklds surprises Gela .... 390 

§ 4. BattU qfthe Himeras, B. 0. 310. 

The opposing forces on the Himeras 
June, B. 0.310 Battle of the Himeras 

The Balearic slingers decide the day 
Carthaginian reinforcements brought up ; rout of 

the Greeks .... 

Greatness of the disaster • 

Movements in Greek Sicily against Agathoklte 
Agathoklds marches to Grela 
Hamilkar allies himself with Greek cities 
Libyan squadron annihilated in Gela 
Hamilkar turns away from Gela . 
Hamilkar^s alliance sought by Sicilian Greeks 

§ 5. AgaikoJcUs in Africa. 

Agaihoklds returns to Syracuse 
Aug.i5,B.c. 310 Sets sail for Africa 






B. C. 309 


Landing of Agftthoklds near Cape Bon 

Sacrifice to Ddmdter and Persephond 

Burning of the ships and devotion of them to the 

Nether Goddesses 
March on Megalopolis 
Plunder of Carthaginian territory . 
March of Agathoklds on Tunde fTuniB) 
Tunis and Carthage 
Tunis taken by Agathoklds 
Agathoklds at Tunis 
Defeat of the Carthaginians 
Human sacrifice of Carthaginians to Moloch 
Braieii prows of Agathoklds' ships shown 

trophies by Carthaginians ; dismay at Syracuse 
Exile of disaffected Syracusans 
They are kindly received by Hamiikar 
Syracusans reject summons to surrender . 
Vessel of Agathoklds brings news of his victory 

escaping Punic guard-ship . 

Elation of Syracusans at news 
Hamilkar's assault on Syracuse repulsed . 
Agathoklds captures places round Carthage 
Fortifies camp near Tunis . 
Tidces Neapolis .... 
Besieges Hadrumetnm 
Carthaginian diversion against Tunis 
Alleged stratagem of Agathoklds . 
Surrender of Hadrumetum ; Thapeos stormed 
Agathoklds marches inland 
Return of Agathoklds to Tunis 
Defeat of Carthaginians ; and of libyans . 


401 — 402 







4"— 413 



414— 4^*? 






420 — 421 





§ 6. Hamilkar*t Assault on Syracuse. 

B. 0.409 Hamiikar joined by Deinokratde . . 423 
Campaign of Hamiikar and allied Greeks against 

Syracuse ... . . . 424 — 425 

March of Hamiikar on Syracuse ; assault planned 

on Epipolai . . . * . 425 

Syracusans reinforce garrison of Eury&los . . 426 — 427 

Assault on Epipolai repulsed . 428 

Hamiikar taken prisoner 428 

Barbarous execution of Hamiikar by Syracusans . 429 

Head of Hamiikar sent to Agathoklds 429 

The war in Africa ..... 439 — 430 

Hamilkar*s head shown to the Cai-thaginians 430 










§ 7. The Akragantine Alliance. 

Breftch between Carthaginians and Greek alliea 

DeinokratdB general 

Independent action of Akragas; her liberating 

mission ..... 
Allied cities under Akragantine hegemony 
Help demanded by Gela against AgathoklSa 
Gela set free ; also Henna and Herbessus . 
Syracusans occupy Echetla 
Xenodikos and allies take Echetla . 
Three-cornered warfare m Sicily ; Syracusans 

Akragantines, and Carthaginians 
Xenodikos invades the Carthaginian Dominion 
Hdrakleia Minda freed by Akmgantines . 
Syracuse blockaded by Punic fleet 
Sea*figbt off Megara 

§ 8. EvenU in Afl'ica, to the Kivgthip of AgathoklU 

Mutiny in camp quelled by Agathoklds 
Defeat of Carthaginians 
B. c. 308 March of OpheUaa from Kyrdnd . 
Murder of Ophelias 
[b. 0. 0. 304] Agathokldd King • 

§ 9. Overthrow of Akragantine Alliance. 

Xenodikos marches against Syracuse 445 

Akragantine* defeated .... 445 

Break-up of Akragantine alliance . . 4-16 

§ 10. AgathokUs in Sicily, 

B. c. 30S ftetum of Agathoklds to Sicily . . . 446—447 
Invades Carthaginian Dominion ; capture of Hera- 

kleia ...... 447 

March to Therma ..... 447 — 448 

Agathoklds takes Cephalosdium . 448 

Repulsed at Centuripa .... 449 

Takes ApoUonia and massacres the citizens 449 

Deinokrat^ heads movement against Agathoklds 449 — 450 

Bepeated victories of Deinokratds . 451 

Xenodikos at Akragas .... 45^ 

Akragas attacked by Leptinds 45^ 

Defeat and exile of Xenodikos . 45' 

§ 1 1. Last African Expedition of AgathohUs, B. c. 307. 

Punic fleet defeated before Syracuse . 453 

B. c. 307 Agathoklds sails for Africa . 453 

Mutiny in Agathoklds* camp . 454 

Nov.i B. c. 307 Agathoklds returns to Sicily . . 454 




§ 1 2. The MoMoerei of AgathokUs at Segesia and Syracuse, b. c. 306. 

B. 0. 306 The massaore at Segesta .... 456—458 

Unheard-of barbarity of Agathokl^ . 456 — 457 

Fate of lurvivora . . . . 457 

Unfisished temple at Segesta . . 458 

Elymian Segesta wiped out ; becomes Dikaiopolis 458 — 459 
Agathoklda masaacreB the kinsfolk of his African 

troops ...... 459 

§ 13. AgathokW decdingt wiih DeinokraUs. B. c. 306 — 305. 

B. c. 306 Deinokratds chief opponent of Agathoklds . 461 

Revolt of Pasiphilos . . . 461 

Terms proposed by Agathokl^s to Deinokrat^ . 462 — 464 

Peiplexity of DeinokratSs .... 464 

B. c. 305 Treaty of Agathoklds with Carthage . 465 

Price of concessions to Carthage . . . 465 
Agathoklds marches against Deinokratds; battle 

ofTorgion ..... 466 — 467 
Desertion in ranks of DeinokratSs ; victory of 

Agathoklds ..... 467 
Perfidious massacre of prisoners ; reconciliation 

with Deinokratds .... 468 

§ 14. The Later Tears of Agatfiohlis. B. c 304 — 289. 

Syracuse and Borne .... 469-471 

Agathoklte at Taras . 471 

Kle6nymo8 of Sparta . . . 472 

B. c. 303 Klednymos called in by Tarantines against Lu- 

canians ...... 473 

Peace between Taras and Lucanians; Romans 

probably included .... 474 

Klednymos ruins the Metapontines . 475 

Plans a descent upon Sicily . . 475 

Unsuccessful attack on the Veneti by Klednymos 476 

B. c. 303 He seizes Korkyra .... 476 

Disastrous Italian campaign of Klednymos 477 

B. c. 300 Agathoklds seizes Korkyra . . . 478 — 479 

Agathoklds returns to Italy . . 480 

Mutiny of Ligurian and Etruscan mercenaries 480 

Marriage of Agathoklte with Theoxena . 48 1 

His daughter T<anassa married to Pyrrhos 481 

Agathokl6s captures Krotdn . . . 482 

Called in by the Tarantines . 482 

Bmttian campaign of Agathoklds . 483 

Eresh AMcan expedition planned by Agatboklds 484 



Bebellion of ArchagathoB .... 

Agathoklds poisoned by Main6n 
Holds Assembly for the last time . 
Syracusan Assembly addressed by dying Aga- 
tboklds ...... 

His political testament .... 

[SupPLEMBNT V (by the Editor). 

The ** Despots' Progress *' on the Coinage of Aga- 
thokl6s] ...... 







I. The Authorities for the reign of Dionysios . 

II. The Debate in the Council of Dionysios 

HI. The Site of the Hexapyla 

IV. The Foundation of Tauromenion 

V. The Carthaginian Encampment before Syracuse 

VI. Hiketas after his lues of Syracuse . 

VII. The Rise of Agathoklds 

VIII. The Occupation of Korkyra by Klednymos and 

Agathoklds . . . . . 


5"— 514 



1. Syracuse under Dionysios .... 

2. Motya and Lilybaion (by the Editor) 

3. Dominions of Dionysios in B. 0. 379 (by the Editor) 

4. The Carthaginian Home-Lands, to illustrate the campaigns 

oi Aga^iiokl^ (by the Editor) . . . . 

Numismatic Plate (by the Editor) 














B.C. 405-3^7^- 

THE power of Dionysios cannot be looked on as fully Dionysioa 
established^ or his reign as actually beginning, till gJ^^g^ 
the conclusion of his first treaty with Carthage. In that 
he for the first time appears as an acknowledged potentd.te,| 
treated as such by foreign powers. By whatever means 
and under whatever forms, he was now lord of Syracuse, 
and henceforth he acts as such at home and abroad. Both 
at home and abroad he has enemies to strive against ; once 
and again his power seems on the point of crumbling 
away; but it never actually fails him ; he remains master 

^ Regarding the authorities for this period Mr. Freeman in his Story of 
Sicily (p. 156) expresses himself as follows : ** The main authority for the 
reign of BionysioB is still the n^rratiye of Dioddros. This part of his work 
is of very different degrees of yalueb Some parts are yery good and full, 
evidently reproducing older writers, largely Philistos. In other parts he 
is very meagre and confused, and towards the end of the tyrant's life he 
tells ns very little. We have also a little really contemporary matter 
firom two Attic writers, the orator Lysias and the pamphleteer -Isokratds. 
There is also a series of letters attributed to the philosopher Plato, dealing 
largely with Syracnsan affairs, beginning in Dionysios' time. There is no 
reason to think they were really written by Plato ; but they were most 
likely written by some one of his school not long after ; so they may weU 
give us Plato's views of things. Plutarch's life of Di6n also begins in 
Dionysios* time. The fame of the tyrant was so great that the references 
to him and stories about him in later writers are endless, almost equal to 
those about Phalaris. And we begin to have some documentary evidence, in 
the form of Attic inscriptions with decrees in honour of Dionysios. But we 
unluckily have no documents from Syracuse of his age." (See Appendix L) 

-/' VOL. IV. B 


CHAP. z. * of Syracuse^ master of much more than Syracuse^ nearer 
than any man had ever been before him to being master 
of all Sicily. That position he never really reached; 
but he was Hl:d of so large a part of Sicily^ lord of so 
nearly the whole of Greek Sicily, he spread his power so 
far beyond the bounds of Sicily, that it is not wonderful 
if to many, both in his own day and in after-times, he 
Dionysios 43eemed to be lord of the whole island. His power was 
xerzes. ^^^^ ^ ^^ never before been seen in the Greek world ; 
the one thing that was like it lay beyond that world. In 
his own day Dionysios was looked on, both by friends and 
by enemies, as, if not altogether the fellow of the Great 
King, yet as second to him in a competition in which there 
^^ was no third. The lord of Syracuse and the lord of Susa 

were, on one side, looked on as the two among mortals 
who were lifted up most highly above their fellow-men ; 
they were, in the vulgar reckoning of happiness, the hap- 
piest of mankind, the two who had the fullest means of 
carrying out every wish and gratifying every desire^. 
From another side they were looked on as the two most 
dangerous enemies of Greece and her freedom; between 
Dionysios on the West and Artaxerxes on the East free 
Greece is henmied in within very narrow bounds, and is 
threatened even within those bounds*. And ass^redly, 
even in Sicily itself, there is one side of Dionysios in 
which he distinctly appears as an enemy of Greece and 

[^ This comparison was made by PolyarcboB to Archytas of Taras. It is 
quoted by AtbSnaios (xii. 545, 546) from AriatozenoB* life of Arcbytas. 
For tbe preeminence of Dionysios and tbe Perrian King, ol Diod. zy. 23 ; 
ol fiiyurroi rw t6t€ SwaffTwv, kiyw di rdr UtpaSfy fituriKia /rcU t6v JUxtkUxs 
Zw&ffTfjv Atov^aicv.] 

[* Scbol. ad Aristid. PanAth. i. (p. 177 Jebb) ; cvtos yip (Atovvcios) ^k$i 
fiov\6fi(vo9 /jikv r^ (Tx^/juiti Aaietiai/iovtou fiorfi^^tu itark *h$ijvaioiv, rg ^ 
iXfjOtif:^ fiov\6fJi€yos r^v 'EXXdSa fxcTct rod Uipaov fitpitraffOcUf Itctivov drjKdf- 
aavroi atrrf, dn "Etpppos IcToptt. The Adriatic plantations of DionyBios and 
the alliance he formed with the Molottians and Sonth lUyrians look as if he 
harboured designs of dominion in Old Greece as well as in Sicily and Italy.] 


of Greek life. He is not the first Greek ruler, not the chap, x. 
first lord of Syracuse, to destroy Greek cities ; vGelon had 
done that before him \ But he is surely t^e first Greek Dionysios 
ruler to turn Greek cities; emptied of llieir Greek in- rum^ of 
habitants, into dwelling-places of barbarians. This we 5^® ^^ 
shall, as we go on, find Dionysios doing in more forms 
than one. But we may say that^ even in this matter^ if 
he sinned against Greece^ he did not sin against Europe. 
In this matter he looks backward and forward ; commonly 
the enemy of the older inhabitants of the island^ he some- 
times acts as their friend^ and^ in one way or another^ in 
peace and wai*^ his reign is a marked time in the process 
of bringing the Sikels, as adopted and assimilated Greeks^ 
within the Hellenic pale. On the other hand^ by the 
settlement of Italian mercenaries in the island he fore- 
shadows and prepares the way for the subjugation of 
Sicily^ first of all lands out of Italy, to an Italian power. ) 
Yet, on the whole, his reign is, in a certain sense, a time \ 
of Greek advance^ in the same sense, that is, in which 
the reigns of the Macedonian conquerors is a time of Greek 
advance. No earlier Greek had such widely spread dealings Becomes 
with many lands, Greek and barbarian. Besides his domi- old Greece 
nion in Sicily and Southern Italy, he is the first Sikeliot ^^^^^y'"**- 
ruler who becomes a power in Old Greece and in the lands 
to the north of Greece ; he plants Greek colonies on both 
sides of the Hadriatic ; he extends his power, and thereby 
the name and influence of Greece, by hiring mercenaries 
to the west and to the north, in Spain and in Gaul, and 
employing them in the wars not only of Sicily, but of 
Greece itself. Forerunner of Agathokles, in some sort fore- 
runner of Pyrrhos, his dominion has far more in common 
with that of the Macedonian princes than with that of 

\} For Geldn's deetnictioxi of Kamifcriiiylfe Sicily, toL ii. 130, 497, 498 ; 
of Megara Hyblaia, ii. 13I1 133, 498, 499. In both cases the inhabitauts 
were transferred to Syracuse.] 

B a 


CHAP. X. any Greek roler of earlier times. He has enslaved his 
native city; he has made his fellow-citizens his subjects; 
bnt he has made Syracuse the greatest city of the European 
world, and he%as made her {he head of a dominion such 
as the European world had never before seen. 
Dominion With Dionysios then we may fairly place the Heginning 
nysiM of ^^^^ extended Greek life of Macedonian times, in which 
^fM°^" Greek freedom of the old type, the freedom of the several 
donian. city-commonwealths, gives way to the wider field of action, 
the more varied political relations, which give us a fore- 
shadowing of modem times such bs is not to be found 
in the elder political system of Greece. The world of 
Philistos, as compared with that of his elder contemporary 
Thucydides, has made a larger advance towards the world 
of Polybios. But that wider world is only foreshadowed ; 
it does not actually come intjp being. It was in the East, 
not in the West, that the main field for Greek dominion 
and influence was to be opened. It was perhaps not without 
a contrast in his own mind between Sicilian and Mace- 
donian dominion that Aristotle contrasted the nations of 
Europe and Asia, the latter so easy to conquer, the former 
so hard to subdue ^. Later conquerors or deliverers, such 
as the Molottian Alexander, threw the same truth into a 
more epigrammatic f orYn \ It was not so easy to establish 
a dominion at the cost of Latins and Samnites as at the 
cost of Syrians and Egjrptians. The wars of Dionysius 
therefore led to no such direct result as the wars of the 
Macedonians. But they mark a distinct epoch in the 
military art. They show us war on a far wider scale 
and carried on with &r more of scientific appliance than 
in the earlier wars of Greece. Under the rule of Dio- 

[^ Aristotloi Pol. yii. 6, and compare iii. 9.] 

[^ Aul. GeU. xvii. 21 ; '^ £um Molossum, cum in Italiam iransiret, 
dizlsBe accepimnB se quidem ad Romanos ire, quasi in dyBpcavtrtPi Ma- 
cedonem isse ad PersaB, qnasi in Twac/rafvmK/'] 


nysios improvements are made in every branch of the art ohaf. z. 
of warfare by sea and land; he first begins that systematic 
use of troops of various arms and nations^ acting in com- 
bination towards a single end, which the Macedonian 
Alexander afterwards carried to perfection. 

One notable feature in the reign of Dionysios is its Long 
remarkable lengthy a contrast to the short reigns of the^^y^ioe. 
earlier tyrants of Syracuse. A Greek tyrant seldom kept 
his power for life; Dionysios not only kept his for life^ 
but a life which lasted thirty-eight years after his seizure 
of the tyranny. Many causes combined to enable him to 
do this. One of them is undoubtedly to be found in the 
nature of the tyranny as it was wielded by his hands. 
Dionysios stuck at no crime, at no deed either of blood 
or treachery, which he thought likely to advance his 
purposes; he destroyed the political freedom of his own 
city and the very being of some other cities ; the amount of 
human wretchedness which he caused was beyond reckoning; 
but of the mere personal insolence of tyranny he shows 
very little. There is nothing small about him, except 
when he sinks into that strange literary vanity which he 
shares with some other rulers of men. His crimes are 
mainly political ; he is the enemy of the commonwealth ; 
he is not, in the same way as many other tyrants, the 
personal enemy of each of its citizens ^. In one important 
respect the subjects of Dionysius were better off than the 
subjects of most tyrannies and of some oligarchies ; better 
off than the citizens of Corinth in the days of Archias. 
He was a sober and temperate tyrant, altogether free from 
that special form of wrong which guided the dagger to 
the heart of so many of his fellows. No man in Syracuse 

P Of. Corn. Nepos, De Begiboi, a ; '* Dionysiai prior et nuAu fortis et 
belli peritus fait et, id qnod in tynnno non fikoile reperitur, minime libi- 
dinosos non luKorioeuB non avftrui, nnllins rei denique cnpidni nisi ringa- 
Urie perpetuiqne imperii, ob eamqae rem cmdelis. Nam dum id stadnit 
mnnire^ nulliuB peperoit vitn quern ejus inridiatorem pataret."] 



CHAP. X. feared outrage for his wife, his daughter, or his son at the 
hands of his master. An illustiative anecdote told how, 
when he found his son in an intrigue with another man^s 
wife, he told him that, if he did that kind of thing, he 
would not be tyrant long ; it was by keeping himself from 
such deeds that he had been able to hold power for so 
many years ^. We are told of particular occasions on which 
he cast aside the outward signs of tyranny, and bore him- 
self again as the equal of his fellow-citizens '. We may 
suspect that such was not only his occasional, but his usual 
demeanour, so far as his safety allowed. But we may be 
sure that, whether Dionysios was stem in mien or genial, 
his trusty spearmen were never far ofE. 
Bionyrioa* It was the presence of those spearmen, the body-g^rd 
gawd : the whom the deluded assembly at Leontinoi had first voted 
badge ofhiB^ him, which made the difference between his position 

tyrannj. ' ^ * 

and that of the lawful magistrate of any Greek common- 
wealth. They were the outward badge of a power which 
rested, not on law but on force, a power which was em- 
phatically the rule of unlaw. Dionysios was none the less 
a tyrant because he kept himself from some particular 
forms of oppression, because he in no case took a direct 
delight in oppression for its own sake. That his govern- 
ment was a tyranny was a simple matter of fact; he is 
spoken of as a tyrant by his friends as well as by his 

{} Plat. Reg. et Imp. Apophtheg. ; rdy 82 vlbv alcr$6fjityost f rifif ipx^ 
dwokiirfiy l/icAAcr, dy8/>df ik€v$ipov ^uupOtifiavTa yvvaiw, ^p^mfatfur ipy^, 
Tl TOKWTOV airr^ ffwwlkv, ElmJrrot 8i roO vtayiffKov, Xb yip obn clxct 
maripa Tofovww^ Ohtk ^, ^ircy, vlhv t^tis, leU^ /a) wavffjf raOra woiwvJ] 

[' Thas on the oocasion of bis bailding the wall on EpipoUe, Dionjiios 
took his place among the common workmen and imposed on himself the 
hardest tasks (Diod. xiy. i8); iea$6\ov d* dwo$4fJL€yos rb r^ &PX7P fidpos 
Ukimp^ airrdv dvcSc/iryvc, itai rcls fiapvrdrois rSw tpywv wpcXffrdficvos, tvi/itv€ 
r^y cebrifi^ to*s &Xkois tccueowdBttay. So too after the stormy meeting of the 
EkkUsia described by Dioddroe (xiv. 64-70), we read, /utSl Hk rtuhu 
fptXay$p&voi9 \6yoit xptfcrdfuvos ica0caf»i\ti rf vXtfiu . . . riwds h\ M rd 
awTtrlrta 9ap9\dfifiav(»] 


enemies ^. If we are asked what was his formal position chap. x. 
in Syracuse^ we can only say that^ in his character of 
tyrant^ he had no formal position. We should be glad 
indeed if we had any formal documents of his reign^ to 
see under what names and forms his rule was actually 
carried on. But we may be certain of one thing, that Dionysioa 
the words "Dionysios the Tyranf would not be found in f^\o™ 
them as a formal description. It is equally certain that, *" ***^®' 
whatever we say as to the possible kingship of his Deino- 
menid predecessors, not a shadow of kingship ever rested on 
Dionysios or his son. The tyranny of Dionysios was a 
fact without a legal name. There is no outward mark, 
no name or badge of any kind, to distinguish a coin struck 
under the tyranny of Dionysios from one struck under the 
lawful magistracy of Hermokratte or of Timole6n. We 
may believe that the name of the Senate and People was 
still used in all public formulas; we may believe that the 
Senate and the Assembly still met to pass such decrees 
as the tyrant thought good ; we may believe that courts 
of justice still sat to condemn those whom the tyrant 
wished to have condemned, perhaps to do fair justice be- 
tween man and man in all causes in which the tyrant's 
interest was not concerned. Whenever the name of Dio- 
nysios appeared at all, we may suspect that it was accom- 
panied with the name of the office to which he had once 
been chosen, that of general with extraordinary powers ^ 
The commission which that office conveyed would naturally 
last only a single year ; he may have kept it on as a decent 

P Didn oonld retort to DionyiioB who was jestmg at the expense of his 
predeoesBor Geldn, «a2 /li^r <rh rvpawtis ^d Vikcma wiartvStit (Pint. 
Didn, ▼). The yonnger Dionysios is made by implication to address his 
father as a tyrant (Plut. Beg. et Imp. Apophth. ; cb y^ oiie tJxfs warifa 
Tupeanfov), and DiouydoB (loe. cit.) speaks of himself as r^paofvm to the 
Corinthian enyoys. Yet he had the audacity to write the line, ii y^ rvpayrlt 
dStidas ftfyrffp 1^ (Stob. Flor. xliz ; toI. ii. p. 285, Mein.)] 

[" OTparrfybs airraiep&ntp. See Supplement I. pp. 3ii seqq.] 


CHAP. z. name to use whenever a name was wanted ; at the same 
time we may easily belieye that an assembly which was 
not likely to be attended by any but his own creatures 
re-elected him to the post in thirtynseven successive years. 
On these points we have no certain evidence; but men 
love legal forms^ and Dionysios was wise enough to see 
that it was his interest to indulge that love whenever 
it did not stand in the way o£ his designs. One thing 
is certain ; Dionysios was not^ either in name or in fact, 
a lawful king; he may have been in name, he was not 
in fact, a republican magistrate. During all the years of 
his dominion at Syracuse he held a power over Syracuse 
which the law of Syracuse had not given him. For a man 
in such a position the Oreek tongue had a name, and that 
name was Tyrant. 

Periods of The tyranny of Dionysios falls naturally into several 
reign. divisions, which are best marked by his wars with Car- 
B. 0. 405- thage. For the first eight years of his reign he was at 
397 L39 J- peace with the Phoenician enemy ; but he was all the 
while making ready for the struggle which we may be 
sure that he was already designing when he swore to the 
peace which made Leontinoi independent and Kamarina 
tributary to Carthage. During this time he is strengthen- 
ing his power over Syracuse ; he is extending his dominion 
in Sicily ; he is b^^ning to meddle in the affairs of Italy. 
B.C. 397- Then comes his first Punic War, a war waged on both 
[398-397.] sides of the island, a war which beheld the memorable 
sieges of Phoenician Motya by the Greek and of Greek 
Syracuse by the Phoenician. The war is ended without 
any formal treaty, but Hellas practically receives again all 
that she has lost, with the drawback that Hellas is just now 
B.C. 396 represented by a tyrant. The third period of his reign is 
L39/J"39»'^^ time between his first Punic war and his second, a 
time of busy action on his part in the north of Sicily. It 


is a time of advance on his part till his failure before ohat. x. 

Taoromenion. After this his power goes back somewhat, 

and his second war with Carthage follows, a war chiefly b. a 393. 

memorable for the part played by Sikel allies on both sides^ 

but a war in which Dionysios again has the advantage^ and 

which he ends by a highly favourable treaty. In the fifth 

period^ the interval between his second Punic war and his b.o. 39a- 

thirds Dionysios enlarges his power in Italy^ plants colonies ^ ^' 

in the Hadriatic^ and appears as a threatening power to the 

north of Old Greece. It is now that the general hatred 

towards him felt in Greece shows itself in the famous 

attack on his legation at Olympia. Of the latter years of 

his dominion our knowledge is less detailed ; but a third b. 0. 383. 

Funic war follows. It is ended by a treaty in which the 

Carthaginian frontier again advances^ at thetK>st of Hellas, 

and the Halykos becomes the boundary. A time of fifteen 

years follows^ in which we hear of him again in Italy and b. 0. 383- 

as a supporter of Sparta in Pdopomi&os. Lastly, a fourth f^' ^gg 

Punic war was going on at the time of his death ; it was 

ended by a treaty by which the Halykos was again fixed 

as the boundary of Greek and Phoenician^ which it long 


The primary aspect of Dionysios in general history is Bion j- 
thus that which is most creditable to him. Whatever his obftmpion 
motives, he does, as a matter of fact, play a part in the <>^^®^^' 
great strife of all, which is in the main successful. After 
having for a moment betrayed Hellas and Europe to the 
Semitic invader, he turns about and gives his best energies 
to win back all, and more than all, that he has betrayed. 
And, if in his later warfare he again loses part of what he has 
recovered, the state of things at his death is at least more 
favourable to Greece than that which was in existence when 
his career began. But this and his Hadriatic colonization 
are the only parts of his life on which we can look with any 
satisfaction. While driving back the Carthaginians from 


CHAP. X. some parts of the island^ he did much in others to weaken 
the strength of Greek life in Sicily; and his destruction 
and foundation of his cities, his wholesale removals of in- 
habitants from one spot to another^ did much to increase 
that general instability and uncertainty of things in the 
island which men had noticed long before. 

§ 1. The Establishment of the Power of Dionysios 
in Sicily. B.C. 405-39? [39^]. 

We have in the last chapter traced the course of the 
second great invasion of Greek Sicily by the Carthaginians^ 
their destructive advance from Selinous to Kamarina. Along- 
side of the later stages of this war we have marked the 
rise of Dionysios to power in Syracuse, down to the treaty 
by which, as the price of his acknowledgement by Carthage, 
he surrendered the whole of the Greek cities of the south 
coast of Sicily to Phoenician dominion or supremacy. Such 
a submission as this was meant to last only till he felt 
himself strong enough to win back what had been lost. To 
that end he had first to strengthen his power in Syracuse 
itself, and to extend it as &r as he could over other parts 
of Sicily. 

It must be remembered that the power of Dionysios was 
something that was still quite new, and that, setting aside 
the strong suspicion of direct treason under which Dionysios 
lay, his reputation had been in every way damaged by the 
war and the treaty which ended it. The war was over, a 
war in which Syracuse had gained no honour, and in which 
her master had won neither dominion nor distinction. The 
thoughts of men, enslaved at home and disgraced abroad, 
were likely to turn to designs for the recovery of their free- 
dom. For the defence of his power and person, the tyrant 
needed a stronghold. In most cities that stronghold would 
naturally have been found in the oldest and strongest and 


also the loftiest quarter^ in the akropolis strictly so called, chap. x. 
At Syracuse things were otherwise. The oldest and strongest 
quarter was not the loftiest ; the physical akropolis of the Ortvgia 
city within its present boundaries would have been found tyrant's* 
on the top of Achradina. But such a site would not have *^^^®* 
suited the purposes of Dionysios. It was the Island^ it was 
Ortygia itself, which, of all the quarters of S}rracuse, could 
be best defended as a separate fortress ^. It had the docks, 
older and newer, on each side of it, and the artificial isthmus 
could easily be fortified against the mainland. Dionysios 
saw the advantages of the site, and he determined to make 
the Island the stronghold of his power. He parted it ofE 
from the rest of the city by a lofty wall, thickset with 
towers^. This must have been built on the mainland, 
a little in advance of the isthmus, as it was carried on so 
as to take the Lesser Harbour within its line of defence '. 
Just within the new wall, seemingly on the isthmus itself, 
Dionysios reared his castle, the chosen home of tyranny ^. 
By the strange but easy misapplication of a word, he is said 
to have built an akropolis. That is to say, he built a fortress 
which, though planted on the lowest g^und, was meant to 
fulfil the same purpose which in other cities was fulfilled 
by the fortress on the highest g^und. Indeed he did more. 
By a still stranger use of language, we hear of two akropoleU 
in the Island; so thoroughly had the word put on this 
secondary meaning. The second akropolis was also the 
work of Dionysios ^, and there can be little doubt that we 

[* Diod. xiT. 7. See Sicily, vol. i. pp. 35a, 353.] 

[* Diod. ziv. 7 ; ti^t "S^ffw . • . lk^Ko96fiitf<r(y dvd rQf dXXi/r ftSktvs 
rtixu iroAtrrcXcr, koI ir&pyous iftfnjkobf kclL wicvo^r Ir^iro&^fn^o'c.] 

[' lb. ; «a2 <rv/jartpi4ka0t r^ roi^n^f ^'^X*' '"'^ ^P^ """^ l^'^PV ^l^^^h "^V 

[* lb.; ^itM/iffirt 8* kv auii voXvrcXws itxypcaikhfiv ijcp&nkiv wp6s 
rcb al^Hiovs Karaupvydt.'] 

[^ lb. ztI. 70 ; Ttfiokimy 8i vapakafiofv i^p yfjffw mi ^ppoipuL ret Atcwal^ 
wpArtpov {nrcueovowTa reb fi^v Kordi ri^v yijffov ditpow6\€t5 . . . tcaritrKta/ftf and 
cf. xvi. 9 and 13.] 



oHAP. z. must look for its site at the other end of the Island^ a point 

also of no small importance to defend. 
Fortifica- The choice which Dionysios made of sites for his military 
Diony- works has been abiding. The castle at the furthest point 
CUri^v. ^^ **^® Island is represented to this day in the castle of 
ft* Syra- George Maniakfis and King Frederick. Nor does the great 
fortress on the isthmus lack its modem representative^ 
though the brutal destruction in which modem improvers 
rejoice in Sicily no less than in England will soon make 
the likeness much less striking. The g^igantic works of 
the Emperor Charles the Fifth call up at every moment the 
thought of the works of the native tyrant. And this, 
though the plans of defence go on exactly opposite principles. 
Dionysios^ finding the artificial isthmus^ welded Island and 
mainland together^ even while parting them asunder by his 
new wall Charles^ on the other hand, cut through the 
restored isthmus which he found, and parted mainland and 
Island by more than one channel and bridge. But both 
masters of Syracuse alike piled up a vast mass of defensive 
works on the same spot ; and there was one special point 
of likeness between the two. He who now passes from 
Achradina to Ortygia passes under the endless gateways of 
the Emperor, and he who made the same journey in the 
days of Dionysios passed through the PefUapj/la, the Five 
Gates^ of the tjrrant. Those too were doubtless gates one 
behind the other^ though they must have been much nearer 
to one another than the gates of the later work. For 
Charles was simply strengthening one of the endless cities 
of his dominions; Dionysios was strengthening himself 
and making himself a house which should be the strongest 
of human dwellings. In that house the lord of Syracuse 
livedj master of land and sea on both sides of him^ master 
above all of those docks in the Lesser Harbour which imder 
him grew to an importance which quite outstripped the elder 
docks in the Great Harbour. In these newer docks he 


regularly kept sixty triremes^ defended against attack from chap, x, 
without by a new mole across the mouth of the haven. 
That mole was pierced by what is called a gate, which 
opened and shut to let one trireme at a time in and out ^. 
Within the fortified space he built treasure-houses; and, 
besides these works of defence and government, he did not 
neglect the ornament of the favoured quarter by the build- 
ing of stately colonnades^. For the Island became the 
exclusive abode of himself and of those on whose support 
his power rested. It was a fortress and a capital within a 

Great changes in the civil condition of Sjrracuse followed 
on this full establishment and strengthening of the power 
of the tyrant. The slaughter and driving out of the richest 
men in Syracuse, carrying with it of course the confiscation 
of their lands and goods, which had followed the attempt 
of the horsemen^, made Dionysios master of a well-filled 
hoard. He had ample means of rewarding all those who Enfi-an- 
had done him service and of winning over all whom he of bIatob 
wished to attach to his person and power. He gave citizen- J^^^f^^^ 
ship to many slaves, most likely those of the slain and Citiaena. 
banished men, thus forming a class of citizens who were 
sure to be wholly creatures of his own *. These Keto Citizen9y 
as well as others, both Syracusans and strangers, were 
further bound to him by the grant of lands and houses out 
of the forfeited estates. But the richest part of those estates, 

\} DiocL xiv. 7 ; vtitpia . . .- i^^itorra rpi'fiptK x^P^^^^t vvXiyy (tx* 
H\ttOfihnp^y Ik* fs «arct f/Uca^ rStv vtwv (l<yvk€iv erwificuvt,'] 

[' Diod. loc. cit. ; ivq>Koli6faja€ /eal vp6 ovr^r xpijiAarnrHipia m^ {rroas 
ivya/Uvca Sx^^i^ ImHix^ffBai wk^Bos, These buildings are placed bj 
Schubring (Achradina, 37) and Holm (see Lupus, Stadt Syrakas, 167) on 
the Agora. Dioddros (xiv. 41) speaks of rah Kard. ri^v dyopSiw orocuV.] 

[• Diod. xiv. 7 ; t^s 8i x^P^^ '")'' M^^ dplcrrpf i^tKdfxtvos kSopi^ffaro toTs 
re <pi\iH5 Mol Tois i<p* ^ifjiwias rtray/Ui^oiSf ri^ 9* SXXrjv Ifxipitrtv ^v* fen;; 
£^y re tcai iroXcT];.] 

[* lb. ; <rvfar€fuXa$iiV rf rwv woKirwv MfULti robs ^KtyBtpUfxivovs M\ovs 
otf kM6X(i FcovoAirof.] 


CHAP. X. as well as all the houses within the Island^ were reserved 
for his immediate friends and for the mercenary soldiers 
who were the real support of his powex' ^. He now held 
himself to be fully master of Syracuse ^. He had punished 
his enemies ; he had enriched his friends ; he had gained 
a new class of supporters to his side^ and he had fixed his 
dwelling-place in a fortress of prodigious strength^ inhabited 
only by men whom he believed that he could trust. To 
the old citizens of Syracuse the Island^ the oldest and holiest 
part of their city^ had become something like a foreign settle- 
ment at their gates. The temples of Athene and Artemis^ 
the sacred fountain of Arethousa^ might seem to have passed 
away from the true citizens of Syracuse, to become posses- 
sions of the strangers and barbarians by whom they were 
held down in bondage. 

As Dionysios had sacrificed so much to obtain a guaranty 

of his power at the hands of Carthage, it is to be supposed 

that fear of Carthaginian intervention was one of the 

means on which he relied for establishing his power at 

DionyflioB Syracuse. But as soon as his power was fully established, 

treaty with ^s soon as he felt himself safe in his island fortress,, he 

Carthage, began to trample the treaty with Carthage under foot. By 

one of its clauses, the Sikels were to be independent ; yet 

Attacks the first recorded act of Dionysios, after his works in the 

Island were completed, was a campaign whose object was 

to enlarge his dominions at the cost of the Sikels ^. He 

began, whether on any provocation we are not told, by a 

march to besiege the Sikel town of Herbessus *. This, his 

{} Diod. xiy. 7 ; dci8w«c S^ rds otxias rots 5xA.ocs, vX^r twf kv ry Jf^ff^' 
ratrrar 8c rois <pi\ois koI rocs /uff$o<p6(>ois ISvpf^ffaro,"] 

[' lb. ; rd. xard r^y rvpaofviZa xaXm Mxti Ik^xrjKlvatJ] 

[' lb. ; rifip Swafuv 4^^yeytc(v M ro^ StiiccXo^s, miirras fi^v atrMoiv to^s 
airroySfiovs h^p' iavrhv vot^aaaBai, fi&Kiara 9^ ro^cvi &cl rh crvfiftax^ffoi 
rtp6r€pw Hapxffioviou^ 

[* Diod. 1. c. For HerbeBsns see Sicily, i. 149. It lay on the bordera of 
the territory of Syracuse and Leontinoi. Its site is still uncertain. The 
identification by Fazello and the older Sicilian antiquaries of Herbessus 

B. 0. 404. 


first military enterprise since the full establishment of his chap. x. 
power, led at once to a revolt a£!:ainst him. This was the §i®g® ^^ 
first and one of the most dangerous revolts of several ; but 
as all of them were in the end unsuccessful^ the result in 
each case was simply to strengthen the power of the tyrant. 
The attack on the Sikel town was disturbed by a threaten- 
ing military revolt. That part of the army who were 
native Syracusans^ once more finding arms in their hands^ Mutiny in 
felt more disposed to use them against their master than army^"^* 
against enemies who at least did not threaten their liberties. 
Men came together in groups ; they talked over the state of 
affairs ; each man began to blame the other for not having 
helped the horsemen in their attempt against the tyrant on 
the march from Gela. An officer of Dionysios, in com- 
mand of a Syracusan division, Dorikos by name^ made use 
of threats to a soldier who made himself conspicuous by the 
boldness of his language. The story almost reads as if 
Ddrikos was not a Syracusan^ in regular command^ say^ of 

¥nih Pantalica has however found support from Dr. P. Orsi, the most recent 
explorer of that old Sikel settlement. Besides the prehistoric tombs, the 
contents of which show Mykdnsean influences, he notes the occuirence of 
Greek vases and a system of fortification — the peninsular hill-top cut off 
by a rock-hewn trench, here in form of a trapeze, the inner side of which is 
crowned by a waU — which, like the similar works at Leontinoi, seems to 
draw its inspiration from Dionydos* fortress at Eury&los. (Contribnti aU' 
Archeologia preellenica Sicula, Parma, 1891, 166.) The construction of the 
waU itself above the trench reminds us of the waU of HermokratSs at 

)Selinous. The most convincing proof that Herbessus was thoroughly 
Hellenized is to be found in its fine fourth-century bronze coins (Imhoof- 
Blumer, Monnaies Grecques, pp. 19, a o), the obverse of which represents the 
myrtle-crowned head of Sikelia, the reverse at times the forepart of a man- 
headed bull, at times an eagle and serpent. These coins are always over- 
struck on Syracusan pieces with the head of Zeus Eleutherios, and belong 
to Timoledn^s time. The bull signifies a River-God, and if the site of 
Herbessus is to be identified with Pantalica this must be the Anapos. 
£. Pais on the other hand (Osservazioni sulla Storia, &c. della Sioilia 
durante il dominio romano, p. 48, note), following €. MilUer (note to Ptol., 
Par. ed. p. 405), cites a corrupt passage of Vibius Sequester connecting 
Herbessus with the Heldroe, on the strength of which he seeks the site at 
Busoemi, where an andent necropolis also exists.] 


CHAP. X. his own tribe, but one of the mercenary dependents of 
Dionysios^. When the soldier answered with yet more 
daring words, D6rikos lifted up his hand to strike him ^. 
DionyBioB This insult to their comrade at once kindled the spirit of 
reyolted the whole band ; Ddrikos was slain ; a cry for freedom rose 
troops. from all the native Syracusans in the army. They were at 
once in open mutiny ; they remembered that those whom 
they blamed themselves for not having helped were still 
able to help them. They sent to the horsemen who had 
fled to ^tna, and who still held that post as its garrison ^. 
Dionysios meanwhile broke up the siege of Herbessus, and 
this time reached Syracuse before his enemies ^. The re- 
volters put themselves into a more reg^ular order by the 
choice of generals. These officers were doubtless meant to 
be, not only leaders of the Syracusan army, but also magis- 
trates of the restored Syracusan commonwealth. The men 
chosen for the post were those who had made themselves 
the most marked opponents of the tyrant by taking the 
lead in the slaughter of Ddrikos \ The force under their 
command, strengthened by the horsemen from Aitna, 
marched against Syracuse, where Dionysios was ready for 
Dionysios them. Again, as in the days of Thrasyboulos and the 

nfifitlAC^fid. 1X1. 

Syr^use. mercenaries *, Syracuse was besieged by its own citizens. 

B. 0. 403. The revolted Syracusans now occupied the old battle- 
ground of the Athenian besiegers ; they encamped on Epi- 
polai, and hemmed in the city. They must have trusted 
to their own powers of blockade ; at least we hear nothing 
of the building of any walls; but it is clear that none 

p Ddrikos is described as 6 «a$«<rra/i4vos inrd rod Aiovvtriov rSfv crpa^ 
riwrSw 47cyi^.] 

[' Died. xiv. 7 ; iit^XBtv &s irar^an^.] 

[' lb. ; /uTtwifiiroin'o rohs 4« t^j AJnnjs Ivnetr 0^01 y^p iv ^pl^ Tijf 
Tvpayvidos kicvtirrcoK&rts, tficow tovto rb ^po^iov. See Sicily, iii. 578.] 

[* Diod. f\v. 8.] 

[' lb. ; ol Hip dnSffraaiv noiijadfifyoi ffrpartfychs clXovro rohs Avo- 
KTtivcarras rhy tvapx^^-] 

[• See Sicily, ii. 305-308.] 


could go in or out of the gate of Achradina ^. Again as in ohap. x. 
the days of Thrasyboulos, days which a few aged men 
conld remember, they sent for help to other Greek cities 
both in Sicily and Italy. It will be remembered that no 
men had better gromid for a grudge against Dionysios than 
the Italiot allies who had fought and suffered before Oela. 
They had marched away in bitter wrath against the tyrant 
whom they believed to have betrayed them ^. It was in 
that quarter therefore that the insurgents at Syracuse sent 
for help. The two cities of Messana and Bhegion, who in 
this matter at least seem to have acted together, could 
between them muster eighty triremes, and this whole force 
was willingly sent to help the cause of Sjrracusan freedom \ 
Later events might make us think that some of the nearer 
Sikeliot cities did something towards the same work ^ ; but 
only Messana and Bhegion are named. The new Syracusan 
government, from ite quarters on Epipolai, put forth a pro- 
clamation, the exact words of which would be precious, 
offering a large reward to any who should slay the tyrant ^, 

[^ Diod. xiy. 8; Iv roTr KoXov/Aivais *Ewiwo\€uk ian^crfaTortiJkvcay r^ 
rvpiatvfp ni JkiicKueaM alr^v rijf kvl Ti)y X^P^'"' k^69ov. But DioddroB says 
nothing about Achradina, and from his following statement, KaTttrie€vaaa» 9k 
Mai i/Jixoarfiimra ZC S/v rd f^^X"! <^a^c^i^cs k^kXwai kouL wpoffi$aXXo¥ Ma$^ 
ijft4po» rf V-fja^f it certainly looks as if Dionyiios had retired into the 
" Island,** and that the waU attacked by the engines was the new waU 
across the isthmus. That in a moment of emergency he should have pre- 
ferred to oppose to the enemy the extended line made up of the walls of 
Achradina, Tycha and Temenitte, rather than the wall across the isthmus 
which he had himself constructed, in yiew of emergencies such as the 
present (see aboye, p. ii, note 4; Diod. ziv. 7), it is hard to understand. 
So too Holm (Gleech. Siciliens, ii. loa) understands Diod6ros to mean 
that DionydoB was besieged in his peninsular castle, and Grote (c. Izxxii) 
remarks, " Dionysios maintained himself in his impregnable position in 
Ortygia ... if he eyen continued master of Achradina he must haye been 
preyented from easy communioation with it.**] 

[» SicUy, iii. 574.] [» Diod. xiy. 8.] 

I* Dionysios* hard treatment of Naxos and Katand might in this way 
be partly accounted for.] 

[' Diod. L o. ; kvtic^pv^ay di mt xpinji&TW irXrfioi rciis drcAov^c rbv 



CHAP. X. and also promising citizenship to any of his mercenaries 
DionydoB who would come over and join them^. The siege was 
Syracuse, pressed vigorously ; the besiegers made themselves batter- 
».c. 403. ing-engines with which we are told they shook the walls. 
The walls against which the engines would be brought 
must have been the wall of Greldn, carrying down the 
old west wall of upper Achradina to the Great Harbour, 
and the newer walls of Tycha and Temenitte K Geldn's 
wall was likely to be a serious obstacle ; but the other walls^ 
thrown up hastily for special purposes, were likely to be 
below the average streng^ of Oreek defences. But behind 
them stood the old wall of Achradina^ and, strongest of all, 
the new defences of the Island. While the outer walls were 
thus assaulted by land, daily attacks were made on the 
Island itself, which could have been made only by the 
ships that had come from Messana and Bhegion^ The 
hopes of the besiegers seemed so good that not a few of his 
mercenaries forsook him. They accepted the offers which 
were made to them by the revolters, and were welcomed by 
them as comrades ^. 

It seems to have been the desertion of his mercenaries 
which drove Dionysios for a moment to despair^. He held 
a council of his most trusted friends, the debates at which, 
recorded in the first instance by one who had a chief place 
at the board, have come down to us in a variety of shapes. 
Strange to say, it is the tyrant himself who is set before us 
as the most faint-hearted in the assembly. He gave over 

\} Diod. ziz 8 ; icai roTs fitrafiaXXo/Uvoit rSt¥ £^Mtfr kmjYttikavro fura' 
Uffftiy r^s woXiTtiasJ] [' See above, p. 17, note I.] 

[* See aboTe, p. 1 7, note I. In the margin of the MS. there is a pencilled 
" f *' which Beems to ahow that Mr. Freeman himeelf doubted whether the 
attack on the island oonld only have been made by the shipi.] 

* Diod. xiy. 8 ; ro^ /i^ToflaXXo/Uyovt rw ^h«¥ ^iKafBpinnat dewMxon^o, 
We seem both here and jost before to catch the words of a formal decree. 
The civil term ^hoi should be marked. 

' lb.; itrh rSnf /ua$o^ponf kyicaraktivSfuyos. Here Diod^ros, or his 
authority, speaking for himself, no longer speaks of ^^yot. 


all hope of oyercoming the revolted Syracusans ; he thought chip. x. 

only of finding some end to his power which should not 

be utterly inglorious. Then Heldris^ called by some his Counsek of 

adopted father, uttered the famous words, to be spoken Poiyxenos. 

ages after in the ears of one of the most &mous of Rome's 

Caesars, " The robe of the ruler is a goodly winding-sheet ^/' 

His kinsman Poiyxenos bade him mount his swiftest horse, 

and ride with all speed to the Campanians in the service of 

Carthage. Another counsellor, of whom all we can say 

with certainty is that he was not Philistos ', retorted with 

another epigram ; let not the ruler, he said, ride away from 

his dominion on a swift horse ; let him rather cleave to it 

till he is dragged out by the leg. To him Dionysios Dionydoa 

hearkened ; he would endure all things rather than give up ^^^ 

his power of his own free will ^. To gain time, he opened 

a pretended negotiation with his enemies; he asked for 

leave to go away from Syracuse with his own property ^. 

The lawful goods of Dionysios, as distinguished from the 

confiscated property of the men who were waiting outside 

to recover them, would perhaps have been no very heavy 

burthen. And the saying of Poiyxenos grew in the tyrant's 

mind into a very practical piece of advice. He would 

not ride to the Campanians in person ; but he contrived 

to send messengers to them, praying them to come to 

his help, and offering them any rewards that they might 

demand ^. 

The besiegers were thoroughly fooled by the tyrant. An 
agreement was made by which Dionysios agreed to leave 
Syracuse with five ships ^. His enemies deserved their 

^ See Appendix U. 

[* Flnt. DiOn, 35 ; tee Appendix II.] 

' Diod. xiy. 8 ; f wpocx^ ^ J^w^am l«firc var irwoiULvai ntp&r*po¥ 4 

^ lb. ; ficrd rfir I0(«r dvcXtfco' Ik t^ «idXc«M. 

' lb. ; Utawf xf'il*'*''^ ^* ^ aMfomoip €h ri^ wiXwpitUaf» 

* lb. 9 ; l^owrUxv Stfrrcs t^ rvpAanf^ /ttrdL w4rrt i^cAr dvovXcrF. 

C 3 


OHAP. X. £ate, when, on the strength of this agreement, they sent 
The be- heu(*)s. the horsemen from Aitna, whose help they had so 

negen out- 
witted, eagerly sought for. Horsemen were of no ose in the siege ^. 

And they thought that there was to be no more siege for 
any one. They deemed that the tyranny was already over- 
thrown; they simply waited for the tyrant to go. The 
horsemen were gone ; the more part of the footmen gave 
up all military duty, and scattered themselves about the 
country. Syracusan citizens doubtless had houses and 
lands which they might wish to visit ^; but one would 
like to know what became of those of the tyrant's mer- 
cenaries who had gone over to the popular side. Their loss 
Arrival of was soon well supplied. While the blinded besiegers were 
ni^. ^*' every hour expecting the tyrant to set sail with the five 
ships allowed him, twelve hundred Campanian horsemen 
came to his help. We have heard of them already in the 
service of Carthage ; they had been left by Himilk6n in 
garrison in some part of Sicily ^. The geography of the 
story seems to show that they were quartered at some point on 
the northern coast, where the Punic dominions now reached 
as far eastward as the territory of Himera had reached. 
That they should be sent to help Dionysios against the 
people was strictly according to his treaty with Carthage, 
far more strictly according to it than his warfare with 
Herbessus could have been. Carthage had given a guaranty 
for the dominion of Dionysios over Syracuse ; she now ful- 
filled that guaranty. The Campanians set forth ; on their 
way they passed by Agyrium, and the local piety of our chief 
guide has preserved the fact that they left their baggage 

^ Diod. xiv.9 ; rois fiiv Iwwtts dWXvcrav wp6f r^ woXiopiuap oMv xP7<''Wv* 

* lb. ; rwy di irc{wy ol vXcurroi Kord ri^ Y^pno^ i^^taca^. So GroteyCh.lxzxii. 

[> In Diod. xiy. 8 they are spoken of aa in the ** Carthaginian Dominion." 
O. Meltzer (N. Jahrb. f. Phil., 1873, 333) snggests that they had been 
settled by HiroilkOn at Halssa, and this view is supported by Holm 
(G. S. 433). It would explain the march by Agyrion.] 

\ th 


with Agyris^ lord of Agyrium^ an important personage of chap. x. 
whom we shall presently hear more^. They then made 
their way with aU speed to Syracuse. They must have 
me from the north; a decent watch could easily have 
kept horsemen f r<mi scaling the sides of Epipolai. But no 
watch seems to have been set^ though some besiegers were 
stQl on the height ; all had not gone off on their urgent 
private afhirs. The Campanians at once set upon those 
whom they still found there, slew not a few, and forced 
their way into the city to Dionysios ^. Just at the same 
time another reinforcement of three hundred joined him by 
sea from some quarter not mentioned \ His hopes began 
to revive, and they were further strengthened by dissen- 
sions among his enemies. Some wished to stay and go on 
with the siege ; others thought that it was wiser to break 
up the camp and leave the city altogether^. While the 
besiegers were in this disunited and disorderly case, he him- 
self being strengthened by this new accession of force, the 
tyrant thought that the time was come to attack instead of 
simply resisting attacks. It must have been by the gate Viotorious 
of Achradina that Dionysios led out his troops, and set ^* 
upon the imprepared and scattered masses who were sup- 
posed to be besi^^g him. He easily routed them, we are 
told, at the New City, Neapolis^. This name, the fellow 
of Carthage and Naples, as of Newton and Newbury, is 

^ Diod. ziv. 9 ; t6 fikv vpSrrov iw* 'Ay^piov mp€y€>^0rjffav' kK€t 52 ri^ 
dvo^Kcv^ 'Af&pti wapafii/t€PiH r^ Bwa<rr€^m r^f w6\€«n. Witli Holm (ii. 
430) I do not share the difficulty of Grote (eh. Ixxzii) about the geography. 
He Beems to have thought that the Campaniaxu must have come firom the 
extreme west of Sicily. At this moment, though the town itself is some 
miles off, Agyrium has a station on the railway between Palermo and 
Syracuse. [See pp. 40, 41, note 3.] 

' lb.; raxi^ 8i itay^aatrrtt rij/v Mwy dMpociotHfrvt kw€ip6nfC€» rctt 

* lb. 

* lb. ; Twr 8i Xi^iy r6 or/wr^f 8oy leat r^ ir6kLV kMkiw«¥, 

* lb. ; i^^iyaytif 4v' abroht ri^ H^ra/uv, not rerapayfAiyius l«ivf<rc^, fi^SUn 



of Die* 

CHAP. X. now heard for the first time in Syracusan history. At a 
later time it becomes much better known, and it may be 
that it is found here only by carrying back to this time the 
language of the historian's own day. But the district 
meant is perfectly plain. It is what we may call the region 
of the theatre; the r^on west of lower Achradina, and 
reaching from the south wall of Temenit^ to the Great 
Harbour ^. The slaughter was not great ; it was just now 
the policy of Dionysios to be merciful ; he rode along his 
lines and bade his soldiers to spare the fugitives ^. Taken 
as they were on the level ground, their flight was easy ; 
they were scattered hither and thither through the country. 
Presently they recovered themselves, and a body of seven 
thousand were glad to join the horsemen at Aitna whom 
they had so lately sent away ^. 

The siege was now over, and Dionysios was relieved 
from all immediate danger. He carried on the conciliatory 
policy which he had begim to show on the day of battle. 
In the utter rout of that day the burial-truce had not been 
thought of; the dead lay unburied; Dionysios had the 
opportunity of doing a popular act by giving them the usual 
funeral rites^. Of this he took care to boast when, as his 
next step, he sent a message to the seceders at ^tna, inviting 
them to come back to Syracuse, and pledging his word that 
all grudges should be forgotten'^. Some, who had left wives 
and children in the city, were won over. But the more part 
refused to hearken to the tyrant. To his boast of having 
buried the dead they answered that they would be glad 

B.C. 402. 

[^ See Lopiui, Stadt SynkuSi 36 8eqq. and 168, 169. The dearest 
datum for the rite of the Neapoli* is eapplied by Cicero, Verr. iv. 53, 
"ad sainmam (Neapolim) theatram maximam.''] 

[* Diod. idv. 9; wapiww€<&M^ i/Ap 6 Aao^ios Ix^Xiwc ^orc^ir roht 

[• lb] [♦ ft.] 

[* lb. ; dfifir robs fvyadus dioK^Hf^ ml t^ warpltia. itarouc^w Ziho^ 


to do the same service for him^ and that they hoped the chap, x 
gods would soon give them the chance \ Notwithstand- 
ing this mockery of their comrades^ Dionysius welcomed 
and well treated those who did come back, in the hope 
that the rest might be won over to follow them \ 

An event now followed, &r away from Syracuse, which Camp*iiian 
was in some sort an incidental result of the civil struggles ^ i^^ut. 
of Syracuse, but which in truth marks a new stage of 
Sicilian history. A new element was to be added to the 
mingled population of the island, not wholly foreign to 
one of its chief existing elements, and pointing to much 
that was to come in the nearer as well as the more distant 
future. We have now come to the first instalment of 
settlement in Sicily on the part of the native nations of 
Italy, the forgotten kinsfolk of the Sikel. The cities of 
Sicily, Hellenic and Hellenized, were now to feel here and 
there what the Greek cities of Italy had long been enduring. 
It was the Campanian mercenaries who had won the victory 
for Dionysios; but he put no faith in them; he had 
no wish to keep them in his service now his power was 
set up again* He sent them away loaded with gifts ^. 
This time they marched straight away to the far West. 
They reached the Sikan town of Entella, which would 
seem to have been at this time an ally or dependency 
of Carthaga The soldiers of Carthage were welcomed 
friendly; the people of Entella were even persuaded — we 
should gladly know more of the process — ^to receive the 
new-comers as fellow-dwellers in their town^. Presently 

[} Diod. xiv. 9 ; t^aaoM airr^ ^loi' c&ai rvxciW 7^ 6/ioiiu x^P^^f ^ 
rois Bicis ffix"'^^ ^^ rax^OT^r a&r^ knlw raOrrp nrjfx*^^'''^^] 


* lb.; ro^f 8< Ka|i«nro^ ToTf mBiiKo6cmt iotptaa ntt/jcas i^aWorci^cv 
i« riff «dXc«f , £^^/«cros drnDr ri^ dfitfitu&rtfm, 

* lb. ; ir€i€rarr€t ro^t ky rj «idX<t Kafi^Tv karrc^ ^vrodrovr. A joint 
commnnity of SikanB and CunpaniAni leema strange, even anu>ng the 
confaaed nationalitiea of Sicily. 



CHAP. X. in the night season the Campanians rose^ slaughtered the 
men of Entella, and took the women to themselves. They 
are spoken of as the lawful wives of their captors ^^ which 
may suggest a wish to connect themselves with the former 
owners of Entella and to keep alive the traditions of the 
place. Yet the new Campanian community of Entella 
in no way shrunk from proclaiming its nationality, but 
announced itself as Campanian on its coins ^. This was 
the first settlement of the kind in Sicily; but not the 
last. Italy had no lack of armed sons to whom Sicilian 
lands and dwellings were tempting. The Mamertines 
were still to come, and the Romans were to come to their 
help \ 

Afiiun in Our field widens in every direction. The connexion be- 
"**** tween Sicily and Old Oreece begins in the days of Dionysios 

Sparta and to grow closer and to put on new shapes. In the days of 
^^ ' the Athenian invasion Sparta had fought alongside of 
Syracuse on behalf of Syracuse. Political combinations 
in Old Greece were now beginning to take new shapes; 
the Peloponnesian confederacy which had waged the Pelo-* 
ponnesian war was breaking up, and before long Athens 
and Corinth were to be fighting side by side against 
Sparta. It is not unlikely that a direct opposition between 
Sparta and Corinth in their dealings towards Syracuse 
may have helped to lead to this turning about of parties. 

^ !Diod« ziv. 9 ; rds ywaikas ram wipamnvZirfiivrw yfnaaarr^i, 
[* On the Campanian coins of Entella see Holm, G. S. ii. 430, 431 ; 
Salinas, Le Monete della AnHehe CUtd di SieUia, Tar. iii ; Head, Coinage 
of Syracoae, p. 36, note 47; Hist. Num. 119. Thsj were not stnick till 
Ilmoledn's time according to Head. See below, p. 35a.] 

* Holm (ii. 103) compares Kymd. Bnt the Samnite occupation of Kymd 
was the advance of a people in its own land, while the Campanian settle- 
ment at Entella was made in a new land. On the other hand, the fall of 
the illustrious Greek city of Kymd was more striking than that of Sikan 
Entella. What the new folk of Entella found it oonyenient to become 
I haye mentioned already. See yoI. i. p. 314. 


Sparta^ the city which had never seen a tyrant^ was held ohap. x. 
to have a traditional hatred of the class ; bat that hatred 
was felt &r more strongly at Corinth^ where the memory 
of the Kypselid dynasty was not forgotten. A hundred 
years before our time, when Sparta had thought of Athens 
again under the yoke of the tyrants whom she had cast 
forth^ it was by the vigorous opposition of Corinth that 
she was saved from such a base forsaking of her habitual 
policy^. The same parts are now again played by the 
two cities with regard to Syracuse. The tale is told very 
meagrely and with much confusion ; but we can at least 
see that^ as sixty years later^ the heart of Corinth was 
stirred at the enslavement of her great colony. The aristo- 
cratic parent could sympathize with the domestic tyrant no 
less than against the foreign invader. A Corinthian agent, 
Nikoteles by name, was now at Syracuse, in what avowed 
character we are not told ; but his business was clearly to 
act as a helper of Syracusan freedom ^. Presently a Lace- 
dsemonian agent also appeared on the field, chained with 
quite another errand. 

Sparta, under the influence of Lysandros, had now quite Inimical 
cast aside her old traditions; she had cast aside the pro- of Sparta, 
fessions with which she had entered on the Peloponnesian 
war. The watchword of that war on the Peloponnesian 
side had been the independence of every Oreek city', and 
no one had as yet dared, as Epamein6ndas did at a later 
day, to argue that that principle involved the existence 
of Amyklai and Helos as cities independent of Sparta ^ 
It was as the tyrant city that held other Greek cities 
in submission that Athens had been warred against and 
overthrown by Sparta and her allies. The practical result 
had been the setting up of a dominion on the part of 

* Herod, v. 93. * Diod. xiv. 10. 

' Thuo. i. 139, and other paasages to the same effect. 

* X01L HeU. vi. 5. 



and Dio- 

CHAP. X. Sparta immeasureably more oppressive than the dominion 
of Athens had ever been. Some cities were directly ruled 
by Spartan harmosts^ others were imder the dominion of 
oppressive oligarchies of their own citizens, maintained by 
Spartan influence. The famous Thirty at Athens were 
essentially of the same class as the dekarchieSy the gpovem- 
ments of ten men^ which were set up in other allied 
cities^. Sparta could even stoop^ when it suited her 
purpose, to give her support to a tyrant. So it was at 
Syracuse, now, since the Athenian siege and the war in 
Asia that followed it, fully looked on as a member of 
tiie LacedsBmonian alliance. Here the policy of Sparta 
was likely to be best supported by an alliance with Dio- 
liysios. In any possible dispute between Sparta and 
Corinth, a popular government at Syracuse was sure to 
take the Corinthian side; it was wise then to bind the 
tyrant firmly to Sparta by steady Spartan support. The 
i alliance between Sparta and Dionysios was long and firm, 
and its importance in Spartan eyes is shown by the fact 
that, at some stage or other, no less a person than Lysandros 
himself appeared at Syracuse as a Lacedsemonian envoy ^. 
At the time which we have now reached, a less famous repre* 
sentative of Sparta, Aristos or Aretas, was at Syracuse '. 
The story is most confusedly told ; we cannot see when he 
reached Syracuse, whether while the siege was going on 
or not till later, in what exact official character he came, 
whether he brought any force with him or whether he 
simply came in the strength of the Spartan name. We 
are only told that the Spartans, wishing to win over Dio- 
nysios by benefits, sent Aristos, one of their chief men, 
under a pretence of putting down the tyranny, but with the 

^ Grote, c. Izv. * Plat. Lyiand. a. 

' Diod. xiv. lo ; dWorciAor *Apiarw Mpa rSav Ivc^owr cir Sv/Nuro^otts. 
In c. 7<> ^0 read, 'ApSnft 6 Aoun9ai/»6yios, iarnXaiifiaofoiUvrnv ainw riyf 
IXcv^c^f , kykvero wpMrtp. The Bame man mast be meant 


real purpose of Btrengthening it ^. He sailed to Syracuse ; chap. z. 
he had a private interview with Dionysios ; he called upon Interven- 
the Syracusans to rise and promised them help in establish- s^^n 
ing" their freedom'* He found means to put to death the ^^^Z^Jf 
Corinthian Nikoteles, who had taken the part of a Syra- 
cusan leader'; and by some means or other^ betraying 
those who had put trust in him, made the tyrant &8t in 
his power \ How and when all this was done is by no 
means clear; but it is clear that Spartan help conveyed 
in some shape by Aristos was held to have been of essential 
service to Dionysios in the firmer establishment of his 

As &r as we can make out the story, it was somehow Dionysiofl 
the result of the treacherous intervention of Aristos that power. 
Dionysios was able to take further measures to secure his 
power over a people who had made up their minds to 
endure anything rather than submit quietly to his rule ^. 
One measure that we hear of sounds a little too much as 
if it came out of the general stock of tales about tyrants. 
The time of harvest had come ; the Syracusans, as in time 
of full peace, had gone forth each man to the reaping of 
his fields. The tyrant took that opportunity to search 
their houses and carry away their arms ®. He then hired 
more mercenaries and built more ships, and took every 
means further to strengthen his power. Whatever we think 
of the story of the seizing of the arms, we may be sure 

^ Diod. idv. lo ; r^pkv \A^ vptHrmHO^fuyoi mraXA^a^ ri^ 8vra<rrffoy, rj 

* lb. ; KorairXvCea's cir ^vpaicovaat, icai rf rvp6in^ X60pa w€pt to^tw 
8ia\cx0c2f, Tc4i re Xvpa/coualoos ioKUf^iotif icaL rifif JAcv^c^W dMotearoffr^irttv 

* lb. ; VucoriKtp^ t^f KofMiw drccXcy, d^fjyoi6fAty0v rwv ^vpaicwiriMf, 

* lb. ; robs wtirrtuffayras wpodohs, rdr rvpaanntv lirxyp^ Kariarrf^t, 

' lb. ; wHptar dKfj^iifs tn «ay hm/iivmHnw oi "XvpaxoC^toi x^ptv rov /til 

* lb. ; Aioy^ios revs 'Xvpaicovalcvs M rhv $€pt0/ii^ AwtMrrtikas, kwrjKO* 


CHAP, X. that the failure of the revolt was followed by redoubled 
energy in all these ways on the part of Dionysios. The 
most outwardly striking was a second wall with which 
he now fenced in his castle, his akropolis, on the Island^. 
Men might now begin to say with truth that he had bound 
Syracuse imder his tyranny with chains of adamant ^. 
Dionyiios The next step that the tyrant took was of another kind, 
covery of He took up a character which was by no means unknown 
Leontinoi. ^ Syracuse in her days of freedom, but which free Syia- 
cuse had never carried out with the same unrelenting 
energy. His first captain and father-in-law had preached 
the doctrine of friendship and union among all Sikeliots, 
not only as against barbarians, but as against Oreeks from 
other parts of the world. Hermokratte, a republican, if an 
oligarchic statesman, could put forth such a teaching. Even 
in his view, Syracuse was doubtless to be the head of Sike- 
liot cities ; but it was to be no more than the head. The 
tyrant had other objects. He either shared, or found it 
convenient to profess to share, the old jealousy between 
Syracuse and the ChaUddian cities. To either a man or 
a community swayed by that feeling, there was something 
specially annoying in that clause of the Carthaginian treaty 
which secured the independence of Leontinoi. Carthage 
had done what Athens had failed to do; she had torn away 
a Syracusan possession from the dominion of Syracuse and 
her master. Dionysios had been largely kept in power by 
the help of soldiers of Carthage ; but, having gained his 
objects, his engagements to Carthage did not trouble him. 
He recked little of the clause which bound him to respect 
the independence of Leontinoi or that which in the like sort 
secured the independence of the Sikels. He began to plan 

*■ Diod. Jjv, lo ; /icrd Sk ravO* tr^pw rcrxot ^KM/itt wtpi ri^ djepSmokiw 
Koi rovr Tf jrorc^Kcvd^fro, cw^§ di mi /uo$o^6p«gy irXSj$<ts, nd rd Koiwd 
wapfffKtv&(ero wp^ H^ dff^&kuay rijs rvpayvifiot. 

[* Pint. Didn, Yii ; m^t 6Zaimmli^ovs Zwiu^t kx^bfovs, o& d wp€fffi^€pos 


the recovery of Leontinoi, and much more. He liad designs chaf. x. 
against varions points, Sikel and Greek. Specially he had 
an object of which the recovery of Leontinoi formed a 
necessary part. He sought the absorption into his Syra- 
cusan dominion of all the Ionic cities of the eastern coast^ 
of KatanS, the late ally of Athens, and of Naxos^ eldest 
of Sikeliot settlements^. And, before he attacked any 
of these, he had more immediate enemies of his own to 
chastise. , 

These were the Syracusan seceders and others who had Aitn* 
established themselves at Aitna. If the town of Aitna be 
Inessa^ and if Inlssa be any of the points on the ridge of 
Hadranon below the slope of the great momitain^ he must 
at least have shown himself on his march thither to the 
Leontines and Eatanaians. This may even have been part 
of his object. His warfare against Aitna is told us in a 
very few words. He took the fortress^ because the exiles 
who were there were not able to withstand so great a force 
as he brought against them ^. This leaves it uncertain 
whether they simply withdrew before his coming, or whether 
he overthrew them in any battle or siege. Those who 
escaped, whether the whole or a part, were most likely 
scattered abroad to add to the crowds of disinherited men 
who were beginning to wander about Sicily, seeking homes 
where they might find them. 

From ^tna Pionysios marched southward to his attack 
on LeontinoL He crossed the Symaithos and the Erykas, 

^ Dioddros (ziv. 14) brings these events in with some chronological 
solemnity ; Aioyvtrios 6 rav Xvpnucwaton^ r^papvos, l««<8j^ ti^f vp6s "Kapxt 
doidovs €tp^yify Iwov^aarOf rSav Z\ xar^ r^ v<$X(v ordo'cwF d.wfi\XtueTO, rcU 
6p6povs rSrv XaX«(8ca>y v^Xct; lovcvSc vpoaayayiff$ai' avrai 8* ^aav, N^ot, 
KarAyfj, Atoyru^ot, He adds the notice ; rodrw l-wMtui. itvpi€v<rai, 8id rd 
mpopi(€ty oirrctY t$ 'Svp€uto6<rQ [^vpoKovcitf] icat roXXdr AipopfjbSts ix*^ *7^' 
ri^ av^Tfatv r^ 9vyaaT€tas. He does not mention the wholly different 
position in which Leontinoi stood to the other two, with regard both to its 
past history and to the treaty with Carthage. 

* lb. ; rw ^vydiwf oix 6vtww d^toft&x"''' *P^ rffKiKcavrriv B^yafuv. 


CHAP. z. and encamped by a third stream^ the Terias^ that which 
rons through the Leontine lake and empties itself into the 
sea by an independent month south of the common mouth 
Attack on of Symaithos and his tributaries. He came prepared for an 
postponed. G&sy conquest, and he did not find it. He sent a herald to 
the Leontines, calling on them to surrender the town ^. In- 
stead of the easy submission which he had looked for, they 
began to make every preparation for standing a siege. The 
hills and ravines of Leontinoi, with their twin akropoleis^ 
stood up in their strength before the eyes of Dionysios. 
Such a place could not be taken without his full stock of 
military eng^nes^ and he had brought none such with him. 
He therefore put off any attack on Leontinoi for the present, 
and did nothing beyond a thorough harrying of the famous 
fields and the other territory of Leontinoi'. 
Campaign This was not a very promising beginning of the great 
Henna. Campaign which was to bring the Chalkidians into bondage 
to their Doric neighbours. And what immediately follows 
is startling. Dionysios now went on to set at nought 
another clause of the Carthaginian treaty, that which de» 
clared all the Sikel towns independent. If he had turned 
away from Leontinoi as from a city which it was rash to 
attack without military engines, his next steps were taken 
against a city before which it might almost have seemed 
that engines would be useless. In turning from Greeks to 
Sikels, he turned first against that Sikel town whose 
modem surname proclaims it as beyond the power of be- 
siegers. His mind was still set on Naxos and Katane; 
and it is said that it was mainly to lull the natural suspicions 
of the men of those cities, to make them less careful in their 
preparations against him, that he professed to wage his 

* IMod. ziv. 14 ; ^aW^rciXt fffpuum «pdf rcht AMwrtwoyt «<X<tf«r wapa- 
' lb. ; Aior^cot, ctx txm^ fOfxt'^IULTa^ ri)y /c)y woKtopicltv kot^ r6 wopdr 


Sikel war^ and set forth against Henna the Inexpugnable ^ ohap. x. 
It is emphatically said that he spent time before it ^ He 
made no attempt to storm the mountain-city with or with- 
out engines. He knew^ we may fancy, that^ steep and 
rough as were the paths up the hill-side^ an ass laden with 
gold could make its way up the steepest of them ^ In this 
case indeed we do not directly hear of bribery; but an elabo- 
rate tale of intrigue, of double treason, seems to imply it. 
The value of the story lies in this, that it gives us one of our 
few glimpses of the inner politics of a Sikel commonwealth. 

What most strikes us in our view is how fully Hellenized Politics in 
some Sikel cities already seem to have been. Henna, we 
may well believe, more thoroughly so than any other. 
There are in Henna the same political elements^ the same 
causes of discord^ which there might be in any purely 
Greek town. The city is clearly a commonwealth after 
the Greek fashion. There is no king like Ducetius or 
Archdnides ; but there is an ambitious citizen^ bearing the 
Greek name of Aeimnestos, who is perfectly ready to tread 
the path of Dionysios. That it was the lord of Syracuse 
who suggested to him to seize the tyranny, promising him 
every help in such an undertaking ^, implies that the wish 
had been already formed in the mind of Aeimnestos himself. 
The stroke succeeded. We are not told by which of the 
received means of rising to power Aeimnestos set to work ; 
but^ by some means or other^ he seized the tyranny. What 
follows seems to show either that he was supported by a party 
in the city or else that he had contrived to strengthen him- 
self by a force of mercenaries. But^ once tyrant of Henna, 
Aeimnestos had no mind to act as a dependent of the tyrant 

[^ Diod. xiv. 14.] 

[* lb. 14 ; 9tarplfivif 9k v<^ rifit^Eyvay.'] 

[* For the ms laden with gold see Plntarch, Beg. Apopth. s. ▼. Philippns ; 

cf. Diod. XTi. 54. The eMrliest ooenrrenoe ftpperently is in Cic. Att. i. 16. 8.] 

[* Diod. ziT. 14; 'A^lfanfffTW rdir 'EtvoTor iw§iff€p kwi$4ff$ai rvpianti9i, 


OHAP. z. of Syracuse. He refused to admit Dionysios into the city. 
On this Dionysios changed sides, and stirred up the people 
of Henna to get rid of the master whom he himself had 
helped to give them ^. AeimnSstos had not yet disarmed 
his subjects; for the citizens presently rushed into the 
agora with their weapons^ shouting for freedom. All Henna 
was in confusion ^; the tyrant must have had some force at 
his command which hindered the citizens from seizing his 
Dionysios person. Dionysios watched his moment. Not seemingly 
Henna as a ^^ ^^J large force, but with a party of his friends ^ — 
deliverer, phfligtos was surely among them to write the story — he 
climbed up by some unfrequented and unexpected path ^ — 
such paths may still be found on the steep sides of the hill 
of the Goddesses — and suddenly showed himself in the city. 
What followed is told in a few words which crave a com- 
ment. The lord of Syracuse appears in Henna as a kind 
of deity who could not be withstood, even if he came alone 
without helpers. ** He seized Aeimnestos, and gave him 
up to the men of Henna for- punishment ; and he himself 
went out of the city without doing any harm *.'* This is 
all that we know of his acts; but we have a further account 
of his motives. He did not do what he did out of any zeal 
for right, but in order to lead the other cities to put trust 
in him •. 

It does not seem that Dionysios really did any hostile 
act towards Henna. That cifcy had the privilege of seeing 
a tyrant within its walls, and becoming free through his 
presence. What Dionysios did was to intrigue successfully 
with two opposite parties, to set up a tyrant and then to 

\} Diod. xiy. 14 ; tovs *E3nfcdovs vap^KoKti miraXi;ctv rbv riupavvcv.'] 
[■ lb. ; vAi}p7r f^v 1) v6fus Tapaxns.'] [' lb.] 

[* lb.; KoX raxion 8i<& rivoi iprffiov rowov Molar waptiaiwtfftv th ri)y 

[' lb. ; itat rbv iikv * h€l{uni(TTOv avXXafiiiy vapiUnKt rois *Earvcuoi5 wpbs 

[• lb.] 



put him down again* It is quite possible that at Henna ohap. x. 
he was looked on as a deliverer. At any rate he had shown 
that he conld influence the &te of tyrants and common- 
wealths without himself drawing the sword. The next UnsuooesB- 
reoorded &ct shows us another glimpse of Sikel politics ^^^^ 
in a town whose appearance in ovi present story shows 
how &r from Syracuse the power and the plans of Dio- 
nysios were spreading. This town was Herbita^ among 
the Nebrodian hills^ where another Archdnid^ was now in 
power. He is described by a title which would hardly be 
used of an acknowledged prince, but which leaves it open 
whether we are to count him as a tyrant^. He seems 
at least something more than a republican magistrate. 
Why Dionysios, who at Henna had simply intrigued for 
and against Aeimnestos^ marched with hostile purpose 
against Archdnides and his city we are not told. We 
are told that Archdnides^ with a view to the war with Dio- 
nysios, had taken into pay a body of mercenaries, and that 
a mixed multitude had come together in the city^ seemingly 
seeking for shelter^. We are told further that Dionysios 
attacked Herbita^ but &iled in his attempt ^. We are told 
further again that he then made a peace with the men 
of Herbita. And the words used might almost imply that 
the peace was specially the act of the people, as distin- 
guished from their ruler Arch6nides ^. 

This story of Herbita is dark^ but there seems to be 
no further light to be thrown upon it. In any case the 
dealings of Dionysios with the Sikel prince or tyrant were 
hardly of good omen for an attadc on a &r more powerful 

[} Diod. xiv. i6 ; d rfjs 'Ep0hrp kviarAnjsJ] 

[* lb. ; ETxc f^p /uoBo^povs re vXtiovf leat (r^fifuirrow 6x^ov hs Ir t{) 
vpdf AioK^aiov woXiiup <rwiipafjt€y tit rj)y v^Aiv.] 

[■ lb. xiv. 15.] 

[* lb. ziv. 16 ; kwtiHf^ wp6s Aiov^toy tlpffpnfv 6 8$/iot 6 rvv *EpfiiTaiMr 
awi0€ro, and compare xiv. 15; vpdt ftiv roirmn {'Epfiiraiovs) tlpfpnpf 



cBAP. z. Greek city. Yet the next thing that we hear is that he 

Katand i^ow at least turned his face towards Eatanfi. Perhaps the 

Ste^3 to ^®y ^ ^^ difficulty is that both at KatanS and at Naxos 

DionjBiofl. he kept up a warfare of another kind from that of arms, 

one which would perhaps have been useless if attempted 

towards Arch6nides. On the low sites of Naxos and 

KatanS the ass laden with gold could find nothing to 

hinder his entrance. In both cities Dionysios tried the 

full strength of gifts and promises, and among the chief 

men of both he found traitors ready to hearken to him. 

The betrayer of Katane was her general Arkesilaos. By 

his help Dionysios entered the city in the dead of the 

nighty and became its master^. His first dealings were 

comparatively merciful ; he did but take away the arms of 

the citizens, and leave a strong garrison in possession*. 

Proklteof He was next called to Naxos, where another traitor, 

Proklte, a chief man whose office is less distinctly marked 

than that of his Katanaian fellow ^, had been won over by 

P Diod. riv. 16.] 

[* lb. ; d^X^/Mvof 9) Tvr voAirwr ret 5«Aa, ^povfA^ h a^if miriffTtiff€¥ 

[* lb. ; npoKk^ 6 rw No^W iupfjyoiiuvot. It is an intorestiog coin* 
cidence that tbe name of Proklds oocnn in minnte leHen, Ladicating the 
agnature of an engraTori on the latect coinB of Naxos. A signature of snch 
a kind mnat be taken as an indication of artistic eminence, and tbe die-sinkers 
seem to have been also the responsible mint-officials in some Greek cities 
(see A. J. Evans, '' Horsemen "* of Tarentum, i3o seqq.). Proklte, with 
the exception of a single work (Weil, Kiinstlerinschriften, ftc. 16) for the 
allied city of Katand, is exoliisiTely connected with the Naxian mint, and 
there is therefore a reasonable probability that he may have been an 
official of some importance in this city, and even one and the same person 
with the contomporary Proklds vaguely described by Dioddros as A^nfyotj- 
fiCFot or leader. But we cannot say more than this. Two principal views 
have hitherto been put forward on this subject. CSarelli saw in the in- 
scription the official stamp of the chief magistrate of Naxos, and necessarily 
the same person as the d^yodfia^ot. Yon Sallet (Die Kttnstlerinschriften 
auf griediischen Mttnien, 34), who rightly recognized that it was an 
engraver's signature, considered that this necessarily excluded any identifi- 
cation with the historic Proklds. But, as has been pointed out above, this 
condnsion is by do means obligatory. There is moreover, as we shall see. 


the promises of the tyrant to do him the same shameful chap. z. 
service. Naxos, by his agency, passed into the hands of 
Dionysios ^ ; the traitor received whatever the tyrant had 
promised, and his kinsfolk were set free from the common 
fate of their fellow-citizens '. 

What that fate should be, the purchaser , we can hardly Fate of 
call him the conqueror, now sat in judgement to decide. andNaxoe. 
The lord of Syracuse had to pronounce the doom of the 
two Hellenic commonwealths which had passed under his 
power. The &te of the two was not exactly the same; 
but the word went forth against both that they were to 
cease to be Hellenic dwelling-places. The lord of Syra- 
cuse, presently to show himself as the champion of Hellas, 
was minded — one hardly sees why — to deal with his 
new possessions as Hannibal had dealt with Selinous and 
Himera. He would cut Hellas short by two of her cities. 
In both alike the inhabitants were doomed to slavery. 
The men, women, and children of Naxos and Katand were 
carried off and sold in the market at Syracuse as they 
might have been sold at Carthage or Ekbatana '. Those 
who escaped, a feeble renmant, wandered about till, years 
after, they found new homes, till, after the tyrant's death, 
one body of them or their children found a home indeed 

a piece of internal evidence supplied by the ooins themeelyet which tends 
to show that the mint-official and civic leader were one and the lame 
person. (See p. 37, note i.)] 

\} Diod. xiT. 16. Compare the fQlleraooonnt in Pol7ainofl(y. 3,5). Diony- 
sios approaches the walls with 7,000 troops at a late hoar, the traitors being 
in possession of some of the towers. At the same time he sends a fifty- 
oared vessel into the harbour of Nkxos, having on board such a number of 
flute-players and coxswains (icAtwrras) shouting, as it seemed, to the crews 
of so many triremes, that in the darkness it might be thought that a whole 
fleet was approaching on this side. This diversion, coupled with the dis- 
covery that the towers were occupied by traitors, struck the Nazians with 
panic, and they surrendered the city unconditionally.] 

[' IHod. ziv. 15 ; rdt hoif^t (l«o8i8o^ r^ itpoM6my lul ro^ avYftvut 
odrf} x<*P'^^M<''<^ "^^ v^Xiy k^rfptpaMoSiaaTo, (Cf. Died. ziv. 68.)] 

[' lb. 15 ; Ika/^vpomitKfict ro^s alx;<a^^ovf Ir 3Sv^airoi/<ra(s.] 

D % 


CHAP. z. hard by the forsaken dwelling-place of their forefathers ^. 
The spoil of both cities was given up to the tyrant's soldiers. 
Thus far^ as far as their human inhabitants were concerned^ 
Katand the fate of Naxos and of KatanS was the same. As regards 
Cunpa- the buildings^ the walls and houses^ the fate of Katane was 
^*°'* lighter. It was allowed to keep its being as a city of men, 
but not of Hellenic men. Dionysios gave it over as a 
dwelling-place for his Campanian mercenaries'. Greeks 
in Sicily, as elsewhere, had before now done harsh and 
cruel things to other Oreeks ; but Dionysios was the first 
to sweep away the Greek population of a Greek town and 
to hand over their homes to barbarians. Italian settle- 
ment on Sicilian ground is now advancing. At Entella it 
had been made at the cost of barbarians, and by the act of 
. t^e barbarians themselves ; it was now made at the cost of 
\ "Greeks, and by the act of a Greek. This settlement marks 
\ii stage in the history of Katane, of Sicily, and of Europe. 
I'he Campanian mercenaries were but the foreranners of 
Italian conquerors and settlers of quite another kind. Where 
the Campanian first fixed himself the Roman was to follow, 
and Greek Katane was to pass into Roman Catina. Yet 
the soil, if lost to Hellas, was not lost to Europe. The 
Campanian was a kinsman of the Sikel ; he was one of the 
same wider brotherhood as the Greek. Like the Sikel, he 
could, as we shall presently see, be brought within the pale 
of Hellenic culture. 

While the change which Dionysios wrought at Katane 
looks forwards, the change which he wrought at Naxos 
looks in a strange way backwards. The people of Naxos 

\} The Rhd^anB held out a helping hand to the remains of the kindred 
Nazians and Katanaianii (Diod. xiv. 40). For a moment, but a mom^t 
only, in 394 B.o. (Diod. ziv. 87), they settled them at Mylai. Finally, in 
358 B.O. the remnant of the Naziaas were planted by Andromaohos at 
Tauromenion (Diod. xvi. 7). See below, p. 287. For the Naxian Neopolis, 
see below, p. 37, note i.] 

[■ Diod. xlv. 15.] 


&red as ba4lly as the people of Eatane, but no worse; ghap. z. 
against the walls and houses of Naxos a sterner doom was Destrao- 
decreed. The oldest home of the Oreek in Sicily was to Kazos. 
be swept with the besom of destmction ; the Nazian penin- 
sula was to be brought back to the same case in which it had 
stood before Theokl^ had crossed the Ionian sea. The city 
was rased to the ground ^ ; the black walls of lava which 
fenced it in became^ what they have been to this day^ the 
quarry for meaner buildings. The soil where Naxos had 
stood, fertile with the same pr»-historic overflow^ was 
handed oyer, a specially welcome gift^ to the remote de- 
' soendants of its former owners ^ By a strange irony of 

[} Di0d.ziv.i5; rcb/iir irn^cif l^icc rots arpartirrakt 8ia/nrd<rai,Td tk r^xt 
Mat rcb olUdas nariffitta/f^. A remarkable pieoe of numismatic evidence how- 
ever Bhowa that in spite of this destrtiotion a Nazian Neopolis stiU oontinned 
to exist awhile. There has been foond a small coin — a diobol — now in the 
Berlin cabinet (Sambon, Beoherohes snr les monnaies de la preaqn*ile 
italique, p. 14a ; Von Salleti Ktbutlerinschriften kc., 35 ; B. Weil, Ktlnst- 
iMrinschrifien, ko., 15, 16), presenting, in a similar style to the last 
Naxian corns signed by Proklte, the same dvio types — ^the head of Apollo 
and the squatting Seildnos — but with the legend KEOFOAI instead of 
NABinN. Holm (6. S. ii. 432) has suggested that this coin was struck by 
the Naxiaas who were settled in Mylai (Milasao) by the Bhdgians in 394 
B. 0. But this settlement (Diod. xiv. 87) was seemingly of the most 
m<mientary kind. Moreover, the continuanoe of the purely local types, the 
head of the Arbh^getds, the reference in the reverse-type to the wine-pro- 
dudng nature of the volcanic soil, and the name Neopolis itself which 
suggests juxtaposition to the Palaiopolis, lead us to look nearer the ancient 
site. The absolute identity of style too indicates that this coinage was as 
neariy as possible contemporary with the fiiU of Naxos in 403. (Cf., too, 
Weil, op. cit. 16.) But, if a Naxian Neopolis was allowed to exist awhile 
in the neighbourhood of the destroyed city, it could only have been by 
the permission of Dionysios. We must therefore suppose that this new 
settlement had been allotted to Proklds and his supporters. The cdn 
itself, though unsigned, seems to be from the same hand as those with the 
name of the engraver Proklds (" Offenbar von gleicher Hand," Weil, L c.) $ 
MBid if, as suggested above, the mint official and the Naxian leader were 
one and the same person, this &ot shows clearly of what element the new 
etty was composed. From the mention of Naxos by Pliny and Antonine's 
Itinerary, Pais considers that a smaU town of that name continued to exist 
in Boman times (Oss. sulla Storia, &c. della Sicilia, p. 135)*] 

[' Died. L 0. ; rifr tSjv Nafl«r x^^cv XmccAms roTs dftopov^tw k9afpifjffaro.'\ 


CHAP. X. £ate^ the altar of Apolldn ArchegetSs^ the special and sacred 
badge of Greek settlement at the cost of the Sikel, now 
stood on soil which was again a Sikel possession. The 
whole Naxian territory^ rent hj TheoklSs from the Sikel^ 
became, hj the gift of Dionysios, once more Sikel soil. 
The old folk of the land tilled the ground where the streets 
and towers of the Hellenic city had once stood, and to this 
day no man has bidden them rise again. 

Syracuse Of the three Ionic cities of the eastern coast Dionysios 
^^1 ^' had thus wrought his will upon two. He had also shown 
by his conduct at Henna that he could, if his policy so 
bade him, keep himself from any monstrous act of oppres- 
sion. His object there, we are told, had been to induce 
other cities to trust him, and this object was gained at 
Leontinoi. The relations of that city to Syracuse and its 
master were wholly unlike those of Naxos and Eatane. 
The men of neither of those cities could, on any showing, 
be called rebels and traitors; the men of Leontinoi in some 
sort might. Naxos and Eatane had never been under 
Syracusan rule since the days of the Deinomenid dynasty ; 
the present independence of Leontinoi had been won at no 
less a cost than the dismemberment or disintegration of the 
Syracusan dominion. Its independence was moreover the 
most galling provision in the treaty with Carthage ^. The 
Leontines might therefore with good grounds look for a 
worse fate for themselves than that which had &llen on 
Naxos and EatanS. On the other hand, it was quite certain 
that Leontinoi would not be, like Naxos and Eatane, handed 
over to barbarian possessors. It was sure, if it came into 
the hands of Dionysios, to be, in some shape or other, again 
incorporated with Syracuse. Submission might perhaps 
make this incorporation take a milder shape than was likely 
to follow in case of resistance. 

\} Sidly, ill. 582.] 


As it turned out, it was incorporation in the mildest chap. z. 
shape which the tyrant of Syracuse offered to the men of Leontines 
Leontinoi. Dionysios drew near to the town with all his planted to 

force, doubtless this time with the needful engines of war. Syracuae. 
He called on the inhabitants to leave Leontinoi and accept 
the citizenship of Syracuse \ The change was distasteful ; 
but things might have been much worse. With no hope 
of help and with the examples of Naxos and Katane before 
their eyes^ the men of Leontinoi yielded to their fate. 
They accepted the tyrant's offer; they moved from Leon- 
tinoi to Syracuse, and were there received as citizens ^ 
Leontinoi again sank from the rank of an independent 
city to that of a Syracusan outpost ; its citizens were again 
merged in the greater mass of the citizens of Syracuse. 
But when the like had happened to them at an earlier time ^, 
they had been admitted as citizens of a free Syracusan 
commonwealth; now to be a citizen of Syracuse meant 
only to be a subject of Dionysios^. Still, when they looked 
on their neighbour cities, one lying desolate^ the other 
changed into a home of barbarians^ they might well think 
themselves lucby. It was a fall to become subjects of 
Dionysios instead of citizens of free Leontinoi ; but it would 
have been a much lower fall to be sold in the slave- 
market. ' 

The next recorded event is the foundation of a new 
Sicilian city under circumstances which call up thoughts 
of many kinds. We are carried back to the days of Duce- 
tiusj when we hear of a Sikel ruler^ whether we are to look 
on him as prince or tyrant or popular leader, calling into 
being a new commonwealth^ and that on the north coast of 

{} Diod. xiv. 15 ; MXcvacr cMto^ wapa^id^^tu H^w w6ku^ Kat/i^rix^iy r^t 
Ir Xvp(ueo6aatt voAirckf.] 

[' lb. ; rijiy w6\ip {«X««^<f cb Xvpcuto^ffat /ccr^ki^fray.] 
[» Surily, iii. 70.] 
[♦ See p. 6.] 


CHAP. X. the island where Greek settlements at least were so scarce. 
AxohOnidte Arch6nidte of Herbita, after he or his people had made peace 
fonndi ^' ^^^ Dionysios^^ seems to have found himself straitened 
AlMsa. within his own city. He l^ad, as we have seen, a large 
body of mercenaries whom he had brought together for 
defence, and a mixed multitude who had seemingly come 
to Herbita for shelter ^ To get rid of them he proposed 
to found a new city. In this we cannot say that the Sikel 
was following the example of the Greek; he was rather 
setting before him a path which he followed. Dionysios 
wafl hereafter to be a founder of cities both in and out of 
Sicily. But he had not shown himself as such as yet. 
When he had provided any people, his mercenaries or any 
other, with new homes, it had been by driving out the 
earlier possessors of those homes. So the Campanians had 
been planted at Eatand; so the site of Naxos had been 
granted to the neighbouring Sikels. It was a more generous 
policy which led Arch6nid&3 to provide for troublesome or 
dangerous inhabitants of his own city by the foundation of 
a new ciiy elsewhere. Still, if in this work Archdnides 
had the precedence over Dionysios, we feel that the Sikel 
leader is acting as a Greek. His foundation, like the earlier 
one of Ducetius, marks one of the stages of the Hellenizing 
process among the earlier inhabitants of Sicily. 

The new colonists however did not consist wholly of 
mercenaries and refugees. Many citizens of Herbita joined 
in the settlement, and the city now founded was reckoned 
as a colony of Herbita ^ Men of enterprise in an inland 

P See p. 33.] 

[' Diod. xiv. 16 ; c7x< 7*^ fU0$otp6pous rf wktiovs Kot crC/i/mcrw Sx^^ 
Zt h Tf) wp6s Aicvvaiw wo\ifi^ mvUptifiO^ cit ri^ «^<y.] 

C Later on Halttsa, which had developed a Urge maritime conmieroe 
and had been granted immuniiiet (dWXcior) by the BomanB, loughi to 
duown its kinsmen of Herbita who were then in a condition of oomparative 
poverty. But Dioddros (ziv. 16) observes that many &mily oonnezionB 
■till existed between the two cities, and that the sacrifices in the temple of 


Sikd town might well be tempted to try their luck in a chap. z. 
new home nearer to the sea^ and which had a &ir chance of 
winning for itself a higher place than Herbita among the 
cities of the earth. So it turned out. Yet the new plan- 
tation by no means wholly forsook the old Sikan and 
Sikel notion of building on the hill-tops. It was not a 
rival to Ortygia or to Panormos that Arch6nides called 
into being. The eastern half of the great sweep of the 
northern coast of which Cephalcedium is the centre had as 
yet but few settled points, Greek or Sikel. The Eald Aktd 
of Ducetius was indeed the only settlement of any moment 
between Cephaloedium and the headland of Agathymon or 

ApoUdn (at Halesay ^Apxpy^''^ were made according to the Bame rites 
(«o/>* dfbporiptus cvyyivtiai re vAc/okcs ^lafUyown, isai tcU tcard rb 'AvoX- 
X^ftor &vfffas roia abrois I0c<ri itouccvet). He adds that "some say it 
was founded by the Carthaginians at the time that HimilkOn made his 
peaoe with Dionysios." On this Meltzer (N. Jahrb. t Phil., 1873, 233) 
suggests that the Campanians left behind by Himilkdn in 405 (Died. ziv. 
8) had been settled by him here, which wonld explain their subsequent 
ride to Syracuse by way of Agyrion (see p. ai). CMm^^ S. ii. 433, points 
out in sapport of this earlier settlement that in l&e^reat inscription (G. 
L G. 5594) describing the boundaries of many of the Halsesan fisnns there 
ooours a stream caUed 'Ovucoi^f distinctly pointing to an Osoan element. 
He might have added from the same inscription (which is of pras-Boman 
date) the name Tv/)p(&or, which seems to represent a diminntiYe of tmrru. 
This boundaiy record is, Itself, of great topographical interest. The itXapoi 
(fck^poi) delimited are partly public fiums let to individuals, partly private 
piroperty. Among the landmarks are boundaiy stones or ripfiaiftSt walls, 
ditches (ffmi^at), mounds or banks (Tocfircff), posts, marked olives, and 
various buildings, from huts (<r«aroU) to towers and temples. Besides the 
temple of Apollo mentioned above, those of Hadranus and the Meili o hiaa 
Zeus are named; and we read of the x"^^ or smithies, the public 
oooking^place {imrftipiwh) so eharaofeeristio still of Greek sad Oriental 
towns, and a bath (^oXarcTor), the remains of which Easello reoogniaed 
in some imposing ruins on the shore. Th% names of the trees given throw 
an interesting light on the ancient vegetation of this part of Sidly ; they 
are olives, wild-olives, fig, pomegrsaate, wild-pear (fixp^)i thorns (^i/mu), 
and an oak-wood {pfWfiM), Among the boundaries, streams, wateroourses, 
and ^* the river " (Halnsus) naturally play a principal part, and a fountain 
Iw^pa is mentioned* perhaps that celebrated by Solinus, v. ao. A large 
spring with aqueducts leading from it to various quarters of the city is 
described by FaseUns, I>e reb. So. Dea i. 1. ix.] 


CHAP. X. Orlando^. It was perhaps the only one actually on the 
shore. Wherever we place Apollonia and Aluntium, they were 
not immediately on the sea. Nor was the new foundation 
Site of ^^ Archdnides. He chose a site tp the west of the stiU 
'^^**"*- youthful city of Ducetius. At a point somewhat east of 
the small headland which keeps the Arabic name of Resi- 
gelbi^ a small promontory, such as one could fancy the 
place for a Phoenician factory ^^ is crowned by the modem 
castle of Tusa. Some way inland, on a lofty hill approached 
by a winding road, the town of Tusa sits on high. It is 
easy to mistake either for the creation of Archonides^. 
But we must go a little further to the east, near the mouth 
of the river HalsBsus, now Pettineo, where the wide valley 
of that narrow stream opens to the low ground which here 
lies between the hills and the sea. On the hills immediately 
above the left bank of the stream, at a height a good deal 
higher than Himera and a good deal lower than Henna, the 
ruler of Herbita planted the town which took its name from 
^ the river*. We are told that, as there were other places 

[* See Sicfly, i. 140, 143-145 ; 11. 378-381.] 

[' For a similftr uie nearer Cefalii — ^now crowned by the Torre delta 
CtUdura^-ct Sicily, L 14a.] 

* I ipeek feelingly, having gone up a long way towards Toia in the 
belief that I was going towards Alesa, The walk is interesting, it is ribh 
in fine yiews, it afibirds many stadies of Sicilian cultivation, and Tusa occupies 
a noble site. But it hindered me from doing more than look at the real 
Alesa from below. I was specially disappointed at this. For there are 
said to be large remains of the walls, and I wished to compare the military 
architecture of Alesa with that both of Syracuse and of Tauromenion a little 
later. There is a wide difference between the work of the Greek 
tyrant on Epipolai and the irregular work of the Sikels on Tauros (see 
below, p. 109). One would expect the work of Archdnidte to come nearer 
to the work of Dionysios. The Sikel ruler could easily find Greek 
engineers to his hand. So in Gaul in the fifth century A.D., it made no 
difference whether a waU was built by order of a Roman emperor or of a 
Gothic king. Euric would get the best skill of his day at Carcassonne ; so 
doubtless could ArchOnidte at Alesa. 

[* The ruins of Halma lie about the church of Sta. Maria le Palate 
on a hill above the Pettineo, and extend to the sea-shore. They are 
described by Fasellus (De rebus Sioulis, Deo. i. 1. ix).] 


called Halsesa in Sicily, this particular one was distin- ohap. x. 
guished hj the name of its foonder Archdnides^. Even 
without climbing to the top, it is easy to see the akropolis 
rising above the rest and to mark part of the wall which 
surrounded it. 

One is rather surprised at the choice of a site. The Choice of 
tradition of the city set on a hill must have been still p,!^^ 
strong with ArchdnidSs and his people. The sea must have *?fA^^^ 
been an object ; but the sea is not close at the foot of the 
hill, and at the nearest point of the waters there is nothing 
very tempting in the way of a haven. We at once feel, 
as we look up at Halsesa on its hill top, that things have in 
some sort gone back since the days of Ducetius. Halaesa, 
sixty years later in point of date, belongs to a distinctly 
earUer stage than KalS AktS. Nor is this wonderful. 
Ducetius was evidently an enterprising genius, a man who 
made experiments and learned by his experiments. He 
may be called a scientific founder of cities and founder of 
colonies. Of his three creations each is an advance on the 
earlier one. He leads his people in a single lifetime, in 
truth in a very few years, through the experience of ages. 
He first founds the city on the hill, after the manner of his 
forefathers. He then comes down from the hill of MensB- 
num and founds Palica on the inland plain. Last of all, 
after dwelling among Greeks, after using his powers of 
observation at Syracuse and at Corinth, he ventures on the 
final step of a settlement immediately on the shore. There 
is nothing like this, as far as we can see, impHed in the 
foundation of Archdnidte. The lord of Herbita does not 
stand out as the scientific colonizer, but simply as the 
man who has to meet an immediate need how he can. He 
has a nimiber of people in his own city whom it will be a 
gain both to himself and to them to transplant to somei 

[} Dioddrot (ziv. i6) oallB it *ApxoMriii<n, On late coins of the city oooun 
the inioription halabsa ABOOHOiODyL] 


CHAP. z. place other than Herbita. He gives them a new home ; he 
founds for them a new city; but he founds a city after the 
use of his people, a city on the hill-top. Halsesa is im« 
doubtedly an advance on the first foundation of Ducetius, 
the inland hill-town of Mensenum. It overlooks the sea; 
it stands in some relation to the sea. Mosaic pavements 
and other remains on the flat g^und between the hill and 
the sea show that, if the city itself stood on the height^ it 
had its Marina, its haven on the low ground. Still Halsesa 
was essentially a hill-city^ and not a foundation alone upon 
the shore like KalS AktI. Halssa after Kal6 Akt&, if not 
like Leontinoi after Syracuse, is at least like Akragas after 
Gela and Selinous. 

The new city however took root and flourished. It so &r 
outstripped its metropolis Herbita that it undutif uUy with- 
drew the reverence due to its parent. It declined to be any 
longer reckoned as a colony of a town so inferior to itself \ 

Forttfica- The next undertaking of Dionysios was a local one, 
Syraoaee. affecting his own city. But it had very wide aims. "We 
are given to understand, and there is every likelihood in 
the statement, that all this while, perhaps from the very 
moment of the Carthaginian treaty, he had been looking 
forward to the day when he could afford to attack the 
Carthaginian power. He had already shown how little he 
cared for the treaty in his conduct towards the Sikels and 
towards Leontinoi. His power had now greatly grown at 
home and abroad. His authority in Syracuse itself seemed 
firmly established, and he had largely increased the Sjrra* 
cusan dominion. He had indeed won no marked victory in 
the field over any enemy except his own citizens ; but his 
power had advanced without victories, and there is some- 
thing specially terror-striking in the course of the man 
who achieves great results without proportionate visible 

P See p. 40, note 3.] 


means. He had sacoeeded so far as to make a war with c'b^* ^• 
Carthage an object of serious thought, but he still did 
not feel himself ready to &ce so great a risk at once^ 
He had first to strengthen his capital — ^under him we may 
apply that name to the Syracusan city — and the experience 
of the Athenian war had taught him the way in which 
S jrracuse needed to be strengthened. To that end he formed 
a design which was nothing short of the greatest work of 
military engineering that the Greek world had yet seen, 
and what he undertook he carried out with a speed which 
almost passes belief. At a single stroke he made Syracuse 
the vastest fortified city in Europe ^. At the time of the 
Athenian siege it was spoken of as a city in no wise smaller 
than Athens ^ It was now to be made much g^reater, at 
aU events in extent, than Athens or any other. The com- 
parison with Athens was made when Syracuse consisted of 
Oriygia, Achradina, and Tycha, and it doubtless applied 
to Athens as contained within the wall of Themistoklte, 
without taking in Peiraieus and the Long Walls which 
joined the haven in the inland city. Those Long Walls 
are said to have been in the mind of Dionysios when he 
undertook his g^reat work of wall-building at Syracuse, 
and there is every likelikood that so it was \ But, if so, 

[* Diod. jdv. 1 8.] 

p lb. zv. 1^; leal rtixos wtpiifiaX* rg voXh n^Aiicourtf rd fUy^os &mt 
rp w6\fi y&icr$ai rdy wtpifioXov /UyKrrw rSty *E\Xfjyidcor w6X,teor,'] 

[' Thuc. yii. 28 ; ir6XiP ovSh kxAtrtru aMpf re icalf aMjpf r^f *Mrpfalu¥, 
Cf* ▼!!• 55* a- Lupus (Siadt Synkus, 48, note) reckons that Athens then, 
including Peiraieus, coyered a space of 8| sq. kilometers ; Syracuse, reckon- 
ing Ortygia and Achradina alone, contained 6} sq. kilometers, but to this 
l>^cha and Temenites have to be added. By taking in Epipolai Dionysios 
now raised the droumferenoe of the dty walls to 2*j\ kilometers — ^including 
a spaoe of about 18.59 kilometers — thus leaving Athens far behind. The 
walls of Aurelian at Rome were 19 kilometers in droumferenoe and con- 
tained a space of about 14 sq. kilometers.] 

p I am unable to find any authority for this itatement. Dioddroe (nv. 
18) says that Dionysios wished to prevent any future enemy fropn hemming ' 
in Syracuse by building a wall from sea to sea, as the Athenians had tried 
to do.] 


CHAP. z. it was the mere general idea that was suggested ; the cir- 
cumstances of the two cases were in many respects different^ 
and Dionysios knew perfectly well how to adapt himself to 
Walls of all circumstances. As at Athens^ so at Syracuse^ the object 
Syracufle ^^^^ ^^^ ^^ extension of the city in the same sense as the 
compared, extension under Geldn. At Athens we cannot strictly speak 
of an extension of the city at all. Both at Athens and at 
> Syracnse, the primary object was military; a point was to 
be joined to the city which for the safety of the city it was 
expedient to have joined to it. But at Athens the point to 
be joined on was the haven itself, a separate town from the 
city. The Long Walls secured the communication between 
Athens and Peindeus ; but they did not fuse the two into 
one general mass of buildings. At Syracuse there was 
nothing to be joined to the city which at all answered to 
Peiraieus. Syracuse was its own haven, and the point to 
be joined on answered in some sort physically to the Athe- 
nian akropolis. The object was to fence in the whole of 
the hill of Syracuse, to bring within the city the whole 
region which adjoined its higher quarters, and above all to 
bring one point of special military importance into the one 
general line of defence. That is to say, Dionysios pror 
posed to fence in the whole of Epipolai, as Tycha and 
Temenit^ had been already fenced in. So to do was a 
physical extension of the city in a way that the union of 
Athens and Peiraieus was not. Whether the new part of 
the city was likely ever to be as thickly peopled as the old 
was another matter. But from the time that the work of 
/ Dionysios was done, we must reckon the city of Syracuse, 
as a fortified enclosure, as stretching from the furthest 
point of Ortygia to the neck of land which bears the name 
of Euryalos. 

Dionysios, we must never forget, had seen the Athenian 
siege. He had doubtless taken his part as a young soldier 
in the Syracusan defence. He had marked how near 


Syracuse had come to being hemmed in from sea to sea by chap. z. 
the Athenian wall on the hill \ He had doubtless marked 
with his own eyes the importance of the comer by which 
Lamachos and Demosthen^ had come up to attack and 
Gylippos had come up to deliver. He had heard too how 
earlier attacks on the existing Syracuse had been made 
from the top of the hill^ when the city was besieged by its 
own people against Thrasyboulos and his mercenaries^. 
More than all^ he had seen and felt the same thing in his 
own person ; he, as well as Thrasyboulos, had been besieged 
by revolted Syracusans encamped on Epipolai \ He made ^ 
up his mind that nothing of the kind should ever happen 
again. Epipolai should be part of Syracuse, fenced in by WaU of 
the wall of Syracuse. That is, the existing walls should ^^y»^«»- 
be carried on to the west^ to meet at the western point of 
the triangle in a single strong fortress to guard that most 
important point. Of the building of the wall on the north 
side we have considerable details. The wall^ by the advice 
of the engineers whom Dionysios consulted, was beg^un at 
the east end, near the point known, at least in after times, 
as Hexapyla or the Six Grates ^. But we have no further 
description of the Hexapyla or Hexapylon, though it plays 
an important part in the very last stage of the history of 
independent Syracuse; we have no exact definition of its 
site, and it would rather seem that the name was later than 
the days of Dionysios *. We may be pretty sure that it 
stood at or near the western end of the north wall of 

P Diod. ziy. i8; cI8ctv«ard rbv 'Am/rdv v^tfioy rifif v^Axy U Bak&mjs 
elf Bikarray dvorcrcixt^M^'^-] 

P Sicily, ii. 305-308.] [' See pp. 16 seqq.] 

[* See Appendix IIL] 

[' The words of Dioddros, xiv. 18, Are ; J vw rb wp^ roU *fifair^A.ocs Mipxti 
ruxos. As the Hezapylon did not exist in Diod6roB* time, Schubring 
(BewMserung von SyrakuB, 631) obeerves that he most have taken this 
passage yerbatim from his souro^— probably Philistos. He adds, '*pw 
heisst somit seit dieser ZeU^ nach der Analogie yon Diod. xiy. 43." In 
this case both the name and bailding go back to Dionysios' time.] 


CHAP. z. Tycha ; but we have no definite statement as to tlie extent 
Wall of of Tyeha towards the west. It is commonly placed at the 
point now known as Scala Oreea^ where the high road 
from Catania to Syracuse climbs the hiU. This is a very 
important point of defence^ being the point where the hill, 
making a slight angle to the sonth, no longer rises im- 
mediately from the sea. More truly we might say that at 
this point the sea forsakes the hill, and leaves a gradually 
increasing space of low land between the high ground and 
the water. The slope of the hill, for just here it is little 
more^ is specially rough and rocky, deeply burrowed into 
both by nature and by prse-historic man. Both on the fiat 
ground below, on the top of the hill itself^ and even on its 
slope, are many cuttings, large and small, for the foimda« 
tion of buildings. But what is specially distinctive of this 
comer of the hill is the great number of well-marked roads 
up ttie hill, some of them made with great military pre- 
caution. There is one such group at the point — ^the point 
of Scala Greca, where the modem road begins to go down 
the hill; there is also another somewhat further to the 
west. It is tempting to place the Hexapylon at either of 
these points. The more eastern one better agrees with the 
measurement of thirty stadia given as the length of Diony- 
sios' building on this side of the hiU ^ ; but the measure- 
ments of the ancient writers are seldom scrupulously exact. 
We may say with safety that the wall of Dionysios b^^ 

/ swherever the elder north wall of Tycha ended. The exact 
point is of less importance for anything that directly 

 touches the wall than as fixing the western limit of Tycha. 

> The wall was built by Dionysios mainly to secure his 
own power ; still it was not, like the castle on the isthmus, 
a simple instrument of tyranny. It was a work wrought 
for the safety and greatness of Syracuse imder whatever 

{} Diod. ziy. i8. Cf. Holm (Topografi* Aicheologiea di Sirftcusa, 252), 
and see Appendix III.] 


form of government. This seemingly was understood at ohap. x. 
the time. The building of the wall was clearly a popular The build- 
act. The lord of Syracuse set to work with all his might; ^^*^ 
and the people of Syracuse seconded his purposes. He 
brought together a crowd of men from all parts of the 
Syracusan territory. Of these sixty thousand freemen were 
chosen for the work ; the defences of Syracuse were not 
to be wrought by the hands of slaves ^. Dionysios made his 
arrangements systematically; chief engineers were placed 
at the distance of a stadium apart ; master-builders were " 
planted at each pUthron with two hundred workmen under 
each. Another multitude cut the stones, hewing them 
out of the rock^ chiefly at the great quarry now known 
as Zatamia del Filagofo ^, just to the south of the mound 
of Buffalaro. The stones had further to be cut to the 
shape in which they were needed, finely wrought rectangular 
blocks of the best type of Greek military masonry ^. Six 

[} Diod. xiy. i8 ; Tdy Auh r^ yfapas Sx^oy fOpoiffG^ i^ ol Tob$ tMrcm SvZfos 

[* ^e older name for this quarry is Latomia di Buffalaro. Ab it is 
utnated in Epipolai, and uElian (V. H. 12. 44) etates that the poet Phi- 
lozenoB was imprisoned in a qnany of Epipolai, Bonanno and the earlier 
Syracufian antiquaries assumed that this was the scene of his imprison- 
ment (see p. 195, note 3). The dimensions given by .^lian^-three times as 
great as the quarry on Epipolai — and his further statement that Philoxenos 
was shut up in the finest of the quarries (rd tcAXkurrw rSw kxti an^AaW) 
point rather to Latomia di Paradiso or that of the Capttceini ; but mean- 
\ while, as Holm has no doubt rightly conjectured (Top. Arch, di Sir. 265, 266), 
\the ** Latomia di FUosseno" of the old Syracusan antiquaries has been 
transformed by the vulgar into the meaningless " Latomia del Filotofo.**] 
\ [' Diod. ziy. 18 describes the wall as i/r KlBeay rtrpavidwy tptXcrlfun 
aififfipfyafffihwy. The blocks are 1.40 meters long, 0.6 m. high, and 0.70 
wide. Their exterior surface is of rustic work with a smooth border five 
oentimeters wide. (See Gavallari, Top. Arch, di Sir. 70.) They fit 
exactly together. The average thickness of the walls is about 5.10 m., 
in places it sinks to m. ; near Euiy&los, on the other hand, it attains 
a width of 4.45 m. CaTsllari considers that they originally attained 
a height of 6 meters. There were lofty towers at intervals along the 



CHAP. X. thousand yoke of oxen were employed to draw tlie stones 
to the places where they were needed. The work was 
pressed on with all speedy every man zealoasly doing his 
Particip*- At such a moment the tyrant threw off his tyranny, 
ny^M in ^ ^^^ made himself again a private man^. He made promises 
the work, ^f ]arge gifts to the engineers, the master-builders, the 
common workmen. He was everywhere, accompanied by 
his friends, looking into the work at every point, work- 
ing himself, it was said, as hard as any man that was 
employed. We need not infer that he actually laid stones 
with his own hands, like Saint Hugh of Lincoln; it 
was enough if he went to and fro, ready for any call at 
any moment, like the engineers and master-builders. This 
politic affectation — perhaps more than affectation — of 
popular conduct distinctly marks the class of tyrants to 
whom Dionysios belongs from a meaner class. He was 
jealous and suspicious; when either policy or passion dic- 
tated such a course, he could be remorselessly cruel. But, 
except perhaps in matters of literary vanity, his head was 
never turned by senseless pride like that of so many 
meaner oppressors. When it suited his purpose to do a 
popular act, he could do it simply and g^racef ully. 
Completion Pressed on in this sort, the work of building the wall 
' was done with a speed as well as an excellence which 
amazed all who beheld ^. In the space of twenty days the 
whole northern brow of Epipolai, from the wall of Tycha 
^to the point by Euryalos where the Athenians had first 
climbed up twelve years before, a space of not less than 
thirty stadia along the ins and outs of the line of the cliff 
was fenced in by the new wall of Dionysios. On that 

\} Diod. 11 V. i8; Ka$6kov 8* iatoBifuvoi rd r^s <ipx9' 3<i/)os» Ihtimjv abrbv 
dvc8«l«yi/c «U roTt fiapvr&rois r&y ipyonf vpoaurrdfi/tyos, M/itv€ t^k avrifr 
Tois dXkots icaMow6$fuaf.'] 

[« lb. xiv. i8.] 




side at least it was hoped that Syracuse had become a city ohap. x. 
which could not be taken ^. The work of those twenty 
days of eager toil is still to be traced in a long series of 
well-preserved fragments along the whole line which it 
once defended. In many places we see the squared stones 
still abiding in the place where they were first laid under 
the eyes of the tyrant. Here they barely rise above the 
surface of the ground ; there they stand up, course upon 
course, to tell us what the wall of a first-rate Greek fortress <' 
could be ; here the stones, torn from their places, lie heaped 
in wild disorder on the edge of the cliff. In no place has 
the wall been left at its full height; we see the bases 
of n^iany of the towers standing thick together as the 
historian^s picture tells us ; but nowhere does any tower 
stand up even to the same measure of height as many 
parts of the wall itself. At several points, specially at the The gate- 
notable one already mentioned, we see the places where ^^^' 
once were gateways ; we see the roads by which they were 
reached from below, carefully guarded from the attacks of 
an enemy and almost hidden from his eyes. But it is 
at one point only, near the western end, the part where the ^ - 
finest pieces of wall are preserved, that the gate itselE still , 
survives. It is a small, low, and rather long passage, with 
its jambs and lintel; the apparent arch of Hermokrates 
at Selinous has no place in the work of Dionysios. The 
masonry proclaims the date and object; as far as the 
construction goes, it might be a cromlech of unrecorded 
times. It is something to step out the remnants of this 
great work, with the sky of Sicily above, with the blue 
Mediterranean below, and the life-giving breezes sweeping 
over the historic height. The bay of Megara with its 
peninsulas is at our feet; there is Thapsos, station of the 
ships of Athens ; there is Leon, landing-place of her sol- 
diers ; there is the plain over which Nikias and Lamachos 

f Diod. xiv. i8.] 
E 2 


CHAP. z. led them to their first climb^ and where Marcellns held his 
camp when Syracuse made her last stand for independent 
being, ^tna of course soars over all with his tore of snow 
narrower or wider according as it is the time when kingfs and 
commonwealths go forth to battle or the time when they rest 
View from at home ; . and now and then from the wall of Dionysios the 
Dionyfdofl. ^7^ lights on that Italy to which his long arm reached^ and 
a slight exercise of fancy will carry us round both its southern 
peninsulas into the Hadrian sea which he studded with out- 
posts of Syracusan power. Hardly equal in general charm 
to the view over the Great Harbour^ the view from the wall 
of the tyrant shows us^ as is fittings more of the later days 
of the city to which he gave dominion in exchange for free- 
dom. And there are favoured points from which both views 
may be looked down upon at once. On one of these Dionysios 
has left his mark in a form almost more impressive than 
that of the wall itself. 

We have thus an unusually minute account of the build- 
ing of the northern wall of Epipolai, and large pieces of 
Castle of the Wall are there to speak for themselves. But our in- 
formant is strangely silent on two points, the building of 
the southern wall and the connexion of both with the 
castle on Eury&los. Of these last two the remains are 
there to bear their own witness^ and we can hardly conceive 
the three as other than several parts of one great scheme 
of fortification. Dionysios, in planning the defences of 
his city^ took care to do the work which Athenians and 
Syracusans alike had so strangely &iled to do sixteen 
years before. The experience of that time led him to see 
that Euiy&los^ the key of Epipolai and of all Syracuse^ 
must be made into a strong fortress. And large remains 
of a strong fortress are there. At the narrow neck which 
joins the triangle of Epipolai to the hill to the west^ the 
height^ as in many other parts^ rises in two stages with 



a terrace between. The upper ridge is narrow indeed ; it ohap. z. 
is on the lidge itself^ just to the east of its narrowest 
point, where the isthmus first begins to lose itself in the 
general mass of the hill, that the fortress of Dionysios 
arose, with the ditch that forms its first defence across 
the very narrowest part of the ridge. The visitor from 
modem Syracuse, unless he has made a toilsome march 
over the whole length of the hill, will approach the castle 
of Eury&los from the west, as if he were an enemy ad- 
vancing to test the strength of the engineering works 
of the tyrant. The modem road at the foot of the hill 
climbs it at this point, and brings him in front of the 
best preserved part of the castle, five towers of fine 
masonry, placed closely side by side and with two deep 
ditches in front of them. The rest of the fortress is less 
perfect. Taking the group of towers as the centre, it 
sends forth two branches to the north and the south- 
east, to the points where the wall of Epipolai, north and 
south, parts from the castle to run its own course along 
the brow to the lull. An outpost of very irregular shape 
stands out to the north-west, near the point where the 
Athenians had climbed up. The works on the south side, 
where at this point the ascent is easier than on the north, 
are also of a remarkable shape. Taken as a whole, thej* 
form a long and very irregular triangle; but this is made 
up of a nearly rectangular court adjoining the towers, con« 
nected by a small gate with its lintel with an irregular 
polygon to the east. The extreme eastern point of this 
building is one of the most striking that Syracuse can 
supply. It is the centre of the Syracusan territory, com- 
manding the full view of the city and her belongings in 
the widest sense. The windings and different heights of 
the hill itself bring into view the greater part of the south 
side and some points on the north ; the Island is full in 
sight, with the Oreat Harbour and all that surrounds it. 


oHAP. z. the plain^ the isthmus^ and the hills with their steep blaffs 
which seem to goard them. Between those hills and the more 
ragged bluff of Hybla^ we get a glimpse of the ways that 
open to the inland regions of Sicily^ to the outpost of Akrai 
and to the inner depths of the Sikel land. But the wonders of 
Under- the castle of Dionysius are not all above ground. Beneath 
SSm of the towers and in front of them are underground chambers 
Eury&los, gj^^ passages which at first sight it is tempting to look upon 
as primseval works turned to account by Greek engineers^ 
but which have so clear a reference to the buildings above 
^ that one is driven to conclude that they are all parts 
, of the same work. Of several such passages the longest 
and most remarkable is that which leads from the great 
I ditch in front of the towers to the northern f orb A shorter 
one also leads to the outer court on the south side. Special 
care is taken not to carry any of these underground works 
under the group of towers^ so as not to endanger the 
strength of their foundations. By works like these^ if an 
enemy had taken an outpost^ he might still be attacked^ 
like Yeii in the story of Camillus, by a party making its 
way through the bowels of the earth. Some of the chambers 
i were seemingly used as store-houses, and mysterious char- 
acters are carved by the entrance of one of them which are 
held 1^ be figures in some imknown system of notation ^ 
Elsewhere rings seem to show places for tying up horses ; 
such a retreat might wdl be needful when the garrison 
, was hard pressed. The whole fortress is the most unique 
J and the most striking of all the monuments of Syracuse, as 
the place where it stands is the most striking of all the 
points of view. The history of the city was wrought on 
both sides alike; and the mightiest ruler that she had yet 
seen, the man who spread her fame and power wider than 
Geldn or Hierdn or Hermokrates, took care that this central 

p Published by Schnbring, Jahn's Jfthrb., Sapplementbftnd iv. 672; 
Lupui, Stadt Syrakofi aSo.] 


spot should be Held £ast indeed by the adamantine chains chap. x. 
of his dominion. 

It is strange that the making of such a work as this 
should nowhere be set down in history. But there can be 
no reasonable doubt that it is the work of Dionysios. It 
is so completely of a piece with his work of walling in the 
hiU that the two must be part of the same design. It is Southern 
almost as strange that^ with so minute an account of the Epipoiai. 
building of the wall on the north brow of the hill^ we 
should hear not a word of the wall which answered to it 
on the southern side. We need not answer that such a 
wall was needful to carry out the purposes of Dionysios^ 
for the wall is there to speak for itself ^. It may be fol- 
lowed, sometimes in very large and striking pieces^ though 
none perhaps quite equalling the grandeur of some on the 
north side^ from the castle on Eurydlos to the Portella del 
Fusco eastwards. In some places we can see the thickness 
of the wall inwards ; towers may be traced and the sites of 
gates ; there is one clearly marked a little west of Tre* 
miglia, and a specially striking approach between Tremiglia 
and Portella del Fusco. There is no room for doubting 
that this wall, too, is the work of Dionysios; we have only 
to account for the odd fact that the building of the southern 
wall is not recorded ^ We may further ask whether the 

[^ The line of wall on the south tide from Euiy&los to the Portella del 
Fusco does not show that unity of construction that marks the northern 
part. There is often a difference of material between the upper and lower 
layers, and Cavallari (op. dt. 5 a) concludes that it belongs to yarious periods 
and has been more than once restored or altered. The best executed parts 
are near the castle of Eury&loe. The rough-hewn blocks used in some 
parts betray hasty work and seem to show that this part of the fortification ' 
was hurriedly completed in view of the Carthaginian invasion of 397 B.O.] 

[" Yet Dioddros (xt. 13) writing of the event of 385 B.o. says that , 
Dionysios walled round the whole of Syracuse {koL rtixot w€piifiak€ t$ ir^ci 
TifXucovTO rd fUytOui &<rr€ rg ir^Xci ywicrOcu rhw wtpifioKov iikyiarw r&v 
'EXkipfSdwy wSktcov). He thus implicitly records the building of the southern , 
wall, and the €sct that only the northern part is included in his previouv ' 
account relating to 401 B.a may have been due to some temporary in- 
terruption of the works.] 


CHAP. X. wall wluch may be traced, thoiigli not in sncli striking 
pieces, along the sea-cli£Es of eastern Acfaiadina^ the wall 
that was attacked by Marcellus and defended by Archi* 
mM^^ is also part of the work of Dionysios, that is whether 
his scheme of defence took in only the newer parts of the 
city and not the older as well. This question is not so 
easy to answer; the fortification of Achradina to the east 
is not so necessarily a part of Dionysios' present ^iterprise, 
and it is likely enough to have been undertaken by Geldn 
or any Syracusan ruler or leader, earlier or later. But in 
the fortification of Epipolai^ the southern side is quite as 
. important as the northern; if the wall was undertaken 
with a special view to danger from Carthage, a Carthagi. 
\ nian attack was, as the event proved, more likely to come 
from the southern side than from the northern. We must 
therefore believe that the southern wall followed very soon 
after the northern ; some slight break in the works, and 
therefore in the narratives, may quite accoimt for the acci- 
dent of our guide from Agyrion copying the account of the 
building of the northern wall, and forgetting to copy the 
account either of the southern wall or of the castle. 
Was the We have still further to account for the fact that, on the 
tinned to fiouth side, when we have traced the wall from the castle 
Harbour^? ^ Portella del Fusco eastward, all signs of it stop ^. Yet 

[} A remarkable disoovery made in 1886 haB now thrown a wholly new 
light on this qnestion. On the level spaoe below the Portella del Fnsoo 
and between it and the lower terrace excavationfl oondaoted by Signor 
Cayallari at the expenie of the Italian GoTemment have brought to light 
a ooloBMd wall trayerring diagonally from N.W. to K. E. the modem 
Cemetery and the Contrada del Faaoo. Its K. W. end points towards the 
Portella ; in the central part of its coarse it makes an angular bend, and 
it nms as if it would reach the edge of the lower terrace a little to the 
east of the oil-miU of San Nicola. 135.40 meters of this work haye been 
nncoTered, andCavallari (Appendice alia Topografia Arch, di Sir. 35 seqq.) 
has put forth the view that it is part of the Temenos wall of the double 
sanctuaiy of Ddmdtdr and Kord, and that it served as a kind of << Ambula^ 
erum " or Sacred Way for their votaries. But it is impossible to believe that 
this massive work (which attains a thickness of 5'(^ meters) standing where 

Sicily. Vol. Rf, p. 5«. 










; St MM /br4/9 glyT* JjftaJ» 


on no part of the hill was a wall more needed than between chajp. z. 
this point and the gronnd above the theatre, or^ as a Sjra- 
cusan of the age of Dionysios would have put it, between 
the temple of Herakles and the temple of Apollon. For 
in this part the ascent is singularly easy; the terraces of 
the hill-side here die away into something little more than 
a somewhat steep and rough slope. It has therefore been 
suggested with all likelihood that^ as it was from this point 
that the besieging wall of the Athenians was carried down 
to the Great Harbour^ their work suggested to Dionysios 
the thought of a more permanent wall of defence along 
the same lines. That is to say^ at Portella del Fusco^ 
near the Herakleion^ the wall of Dionysios forsook the 
height, and was carried over the low ground down to the 
water. His old battle-field of Neapolis^ would then be 
taken within the city and would become Neapolis in a 
stricter sense. This seems the most likely explanation; 
but we may take for granted that the wall did not end at 
Portella del Fusco^ but was carried eastward in some shape 
or other. Dionysios was not one of those princes who begin 
to build and are not able to finish. 

it does can be other than the continuation of the •outhem wall of Dionysios. 
It is beantifullj compacted and worthy of the best skill of the tyrant's 
architects. The sise of the blocks used answers roughly to those of the 
walls of Epipolad, and if on the crest of the hill the wall of Dionysios 
attains at times a width of 4.45 meters it is reasonable to expect an even 
greater thickness on the lower ground. The view here expressed that 
this work in fact represents a continuation of the Dionysian waU was 
formed by the present writer on the spot, and has been now independently 
corroborated by Dr. B. Lupus in his review of Cayallari's Appendice. 

The further course of the wall will, it is to be hoped, be revealed by 
future excavations. Should the foundation of the sanctuary of D^mdtte 
and Kord be eventually found within its limits, a proof wiU be afiEbrded 
that this part of DionysiOs' ciroumvallation was not finished at the time of 
the Carthaginian siege of 397. For we know firom Diod6ros (xiv. 63) that 
Himilkto took — apparently without having to storm any wall — the wpo- 
&ffT€iw of Achradina (included in the later Neapolis) in which the 
Sanctuary lay.] 

[* Seep, a I.] 


CHAP. X. The tyrant had thus done somethings by a wise and 
Predom- popular measure of local defence^ to make his tyranny 

inant pom- ,,,« . 

tion of somewhat less hateful to the people of his own city. He 
^'*^""'*' had also taken a step which brought him not a little nearer 


to preparation for the great undertaking which he had most 
at heart. But the very advance that he thus made threw 
some hindrances in his way. The strengthening of Syra- 
cuse^ which pleased the Syracusans, would have an opposite 
efiEect on the rest of the Greeks of Sicily. To them the 
new walls of Syracuse were simply a means for making 
Syracuse and her master yet stronger and more threatening. 
But it is well to stop and think how few the independent 
Greeks of Sicily at this moment were. The Carthaginians 
and Dionysios between them had left only one free Greek 
commonwealth in the island. Besides Syracuse^ there was 
now only one independent Sikeliot city^ Messana on the 
strait \ Of the three Greek cities which had lately stood 
between Syracuse and Messana^ one had been incorporated 
with Syracuse^ another had been swept from the earth and 
its site handed over to the barbarians of the island ; the 
third had become the dwelling-place of barbarians from the 
neighbouring mainland. The east coast of Sicily, once 
thick with Greek cities till an earlier lord of Syracuse had 
cut short their number ^, had now only Syracuse near one 
comer and Messana at the other^ with an interval of bar- 
barian coast between them. On the north and south coasts 
Himera had vanished in the great sacrifice of Hannibal ; 
its successor Thermal, together with Selinous, Akragas^ 
Gela^ and Kamarina^ frightfully weakened and cut shorty 
all stood to Carthage in various degrees of subjection or 
dependence. And within the Sicilian lands which were still 
left to Hellas men were beginning to think that the bar- 
barian was less hateful than the tyrant. The Phcenician 

^ See Holm, G. S., ii. 108. 
* See YoL L pp. 131, 13a, 498. 


slaaglitered or enslaved in the hour of storm j he solemnly chap. z. 
destroyed where he had a slain grandfather to avenge ; but 
he did not sweep away Greek cities for no visible reason^ 
as Dionysios had done at Naxos. Many Greeks in the 
dominions of Dionysios^ chiefly^ it would seem, those who 
had fled from the cities now under Carthaginian rule, took 
themselves back again to what was now Carthaginian ter* 
ritory^ as to the less grievous bondage of the two. They 
were &vourably received ; they were allowed to go back to 
their own cities, and to recover their properties ^. In such 
a state of things the remnant of independent Hellas in 
Sicily began to tremble^ and the same feeling spread itself 
beyond the strait. 

Messana and Bh^ion constantly come together at various MesMuia 
stages of our history, and so it was now. Indeed it was ^^j^ g;^^ 
Bhefifion that was touched sooner than Messana by the!^^^ 

*=* "^ Dionynoa. 

feeling of hatred and fear for the tyrant. Messana was 
indeed nearer ; but her mixed population was not so strongly 
stirred by the wrongs of the men of Naxos and Katane as 
their Chalkidian kinsfolk at Bhegion were ^ These last 
not unnaturally feared that he who had overthrown 
KatanS and Naxos on no ground but that they were Chal- 
kidian might soon go on to attack them also \ They de- 
termined to forestall his attack by making war on him first. 
They were further stirred up by Syracusan exiles for whom 
BhSgion was a specially chosen shelter^ who^ after the 
manner of exiles, told their hosts that they had only to 
march against Dionysios and the Syracusans would join 

^ Diod. sir. 41 ; ipSay [6 Aun^tos] rSrw 'EAXi^i^wy rivas cIs r^ kwitcpdrttav 
rw Kapx*fi<^^^ dworpixoyras, rds 7€ ir^cis icat rds iirrfcrcir ico/u(ofUyovs, 
Thete last words show whence ihey had oome, as the words that follow 
show that they were at the time subjects of Dionysios ; iroXAo2 tQw ^^' 
airr^ rarro/jUywy. [But cf. p. 65, n. a.] 

* lb. ziy. 40; 'Frjyiyot 91 XoAjrtS^air 6yrts Awoiicoi, ri^y ai^i7^iy rod 
Atoyvciov xaA.<irws iitpoty. Various fiky ydtp Kal KoLTCOfedovs avYf^yus Arot 

» lb. 


CHAP. X. them in a body ^. The RhSgines therefore made prepaia- 
^'>^fl^ctiw^ turns for a campaign; they appointed generals^ aA4 gathered 
Bb^^iM a force^ laige for a single city^ six thousand foot, six hmi- 
mdImu. ^^^ horse, and fifty triremes \ It seems strange if they 
entered into no negotiations with their neighbonrs of Mes- 
Sana before they crossed the strait ; but it seems to have 
been so as the story is told us. The Bhigine army lands^ 
and not till then do the Bhdgine orators set forth to the 
Messanian generals the wretchedness of seeing Greek cities 
utterly destroyed before their eyes, and pray them to join 
with them in their march against the doer of such deeds \ 
Without waiting for a vote of the Messanian people \ the 
Messanian generals join the BhSgine force with a smaller 
force of their own^ three thousand f oot^ three hundsed hors^ 
and thirty triremes. The united army marched as far as 
the Messanian frontier. Their next neighbours, one would 
think^ must have been the new masters of the site of Naxos, 
the Sikels of Tauros^ but they, as well as the Campanians 
beyond them, were doubtless reckoned as dependents of 
Dionysios. At the frontier a mutiny broke out. A cer- 
tain Iiaomeddn called on the soldiers not to follow the 
generak in marching, without any vote of the people, 
against one who had not done them any harm^ Both 
grounds of refusal, as far as they went, were certainly un- 
answerabla Dionysios had as yet done no wrong either to 
Messana or to Rh^on, and the peculiar feelings which 
stirred the Rhegines were naturally felt much less keenly 
at Messana. The Messanian soldiers accordingly forsook 
their generals and marched back home. 

P Diod, ziy. 40; M6cKorrts tin cvrfmB^coitm r% Ktupf virrtt ol 


[' lb.; ^<rMorr§s ScirdF cfyeu 9tpuMf dffrvytlrovas 'JSXkijriSat v^Xcit 
dpitfw 6yffp>p/iihat ^6 rov rvpiwrcv.'] 

[* lb. ; ol iihf oJk mparrffoX •uwrBbrru roTt 'Ftiyiwcis £fcv T§f T<ni Miiuv 
yi^/t^ ii'/iyay€¥ T<At crparUrras.'] [» lb.] 


Meanwhile Dibnysios had marched as far as the S jra- chap, x. 
cosan border, awaiting the enemy^s attack ^. By this^ it 
would seem/we most understand the enlarged border of the 
immediate Syn«msan territory, taking in Leontinoi, but not 
taking in Katane. He there waited for the attack of the 
enemy. It was not his policy at the time to plunge into 
new warfare with Greeks in Sicily or Italy. He needed all 
his own strength^ and all the strength that he could gather 
by hire or persuasion for the great work on which his mind 
was now bent. He was doubtless well pleased when he 
heard of the mutiny and retreat of the Messanian army^ 
and when he further heard that the Bh^gine army, not 
deeming itself strong enough to act without the Messanians, 
had marched back also '. He felt no call to wage an offen- 
sive war against either^ and he marched back to Syracuse. 
Presently embassies came from both the cities which had 
taken up arms, asking for peace. Peace suited his purpose 
at the time, and peace was agreed to ; we are not told on 
what terms ^. 

§ 2. The First Punic War of Dionjfiios. 
B.C. 397 [398*]. 

At this point we may place the beginning of the wars of 
Dionysios with Carthage. The actual outbreak of hostilities 
does not come just yet ; but the lord of Syracuse is now 
something more than planning warfare, he is directly 
making ready for it^ 

[* DkxL xiv. 40 ; Iwi to^ tpovf t§s ISv/xucoa/as.] [* lb.] 

[' lb. ; Kpiyogy evfu^pw tlveu StoXt/co^cu ri^y tyBpOLW wp^ r^i w6\ut, 
<rvri$€To t^ tlpifpnfv.'] * See p. 127, note a. 

[* The account of DionysioB* preparationB b given in Dioddros, ziv. 41- 
43, probably from Phili«to§ (of. Holm, G. S. ii. 107, 108, 433 ; Grote, ch. 
Ijcxzii). Unfartunately, with ihe exception of the short paragraph inierted 
in the text from his little work on Sicily, p. 165, there is nothing on the 
subject from Mr. Freeman's hand. Dionynos tempted engineers and 
artisans with offers of high pay not only from Italy and Greece, bat from 


CHAP. z. ''He hired mercenaries; he built ships of greater size 

ftnd z^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ before^ quinqueremeSj with five banks of 

S^ToT ^*™ ^' *® ^^ ^ triremes with three. He invented the 

Dionydiu. catapult^ a machine for hurling g^reat stones and darts^ and 

made various military improvements » 

the Carthagixiian Dominion in the Island (r^r Ka^x?^^ im/tpartias). He 
distributed for reprodaotion specimens of every kind of weapon and annour 
in nse among the various peoples from which his mercenaries were drawn, 
thinking that they would best know how to use their national arms, and 
that the general e£fect of his armament would be more terrifying to his 
enemies. This manufacture of Gaulish, Iberian, and other barbarous 
weapons by Greek and perhaps Punic artisans has a singularly modem 
sound. Equally modem is the specialization of arms and equipment for 
various regiments ; like dispositions gave rise to the Hussars and Uhlans 
of our own time. Such was the concourse and rivalry of the armourers 
that every comer of the city was fuU of them; the principal private 
houses, the market halls and Gymnasia, and even the Pronaoi and Opisiho- 
domoi of the temples, being occupied by workmen. (Diod. ziv. 41.) 
Laige prises were offered for new miUtazy engines, and one of the results 
of the oompetition thus promoted was the invention of the catapult. (See 
p. 64, note I.) Dionysios himself went daily round the workshops, en* 
couraged the most zealous among the engineers with friendly words and 
I gifts, and invited them to his table. Besides military engines and artillery, 
I 140,000 shields, the same number of swords and helmets, and over 14,000 
/ breastplates of every variety of form and surpassing excellence of fabric, 

were thus tamed out.] 
I P Diod. ziv. 4a ; "Ep^aro tk yavmjytiffOcu rerp/jptis teal w€yrrjpue^ aK&^, 

wpSgTot TVB&Ttpf Ti)v KOTaaictvipf rStv ytav Imro^cm. Compare Pliny, vii 207, 
aoS ; "quadriremem Aristoteles Carthaginienses quinqueremem Mnesigiton 
Salaminios sex ordinum Xenagoras Syracusios (sc. primes fecisse).** Dio- 
ddros says (1. c.) that Dionysios, hearing that the Corinthians had first built 
triremes, was anxious that the colony of Corinth should have the credit of 
increasing the size of ships. Already at the time of the Athenian siege it 
had been the naval policy of Syracuse to build laige vessels. The timber 
was obtained by Dionysios from Etna and the opposite Italian coast by means 
of rafts. 300 new ships were built, no old vessels refitted, and 160 new 
ship-houses, each of which was mostly able to contain two ships, were 
added to the 150 already existing round the circular basin of the Lakkian 
port. (Diod. 1. c. ; ^tcMfiti ical vtcacoucotn wbKuT€\€is ic^kK^ rod yvv teaXov" 
Ikbfov . . . Ai/i(yo9, «. r. X., where Schubring (Achradina, 27) no doubt rightly 
supplies AaicKi6v,) The foundations of some of these y^tnToucoi, rectangular 
and of a size to contain a trireme, are still to be seen rising just above the 
sur&oe of the water near the shore of the small harbour (see Schubring, 
op. dt. a6).] 



The enterprise with which Dionysios opened his first chap. x. 
Punic war brings impressively before us the change which 
had taken place in the affairs of Syracuse and all Sicily 
since the establishment of his dominion. We have passed 
out of the familiar Greek world of single cities^ actiag 
alone or with allies brought together for some inmiediate 
purpose. Syracuse had long been the chief city of Sicily Syracuse 
and one of the chief cities of Hellas. But republican est d^ 
Syracuse cannot be said to have been a great power, even ©^Greece 
according to the Greek standard of great powers. It was Europe, 
only under the rule of Geldn and Hierdn that she could 
at all pass as the peer of Sparta and Athens. But now 
she had again purchased greatness without at the cost of 
y freedom within. Dionysios had made Syracuse, in physical 
extent the greatest city of Hellas, the greatest city of 
Europe. And under his rule she was fast advancing to 
the position of the greatest power of the Greek world. 
The mere numbers of the men who march at his bidding 
and of the ships that cover the sea in his service startle us 
after the modest figures to which we have been used in the 
war&re of the Sikeliot cities. The tale of the armies of 
Dionysios is on a scale Carthaginian rather than Sikeliot. 
But it is not a matter of mere numbers. Dionysios was ' 
a Greek; in resource and adaptation of means to ends 
he stands among the first of Greeks. It is not in mere 
numbers that he trusts, but in numbers parted out and 
arranged according to an intelligent will. The reign of 
Dionysios was one of the most memorable epochs in the 
history of the art of warfare. He was the first to do 
many things which the Macedonian princes after him did 
on a yet greater scala He was the first to employ large 
bodies of men of various kinds of arms in skilfully planned 
relations to each other. Under him army and fleet, horse- 
men, heavy-armed, light-armed, artillery, all became parts ^ 
of a whole, members of one living body, acting, each in its / 


oHAP. X. place, at the bidding of one who knew how to guide them. 
Inyention In artillery above all^ in the construction of the warlike 
catapult, engines which now played so great a part in sieges, he 
ranks high as an inventor^. 

The increased scale on which military operations are now 
beginning to be carried on stands out strikingly in the 
opening campaign of the war. Dionysios began with an 
enterprise such as no Sikeliot commander before him had 
ever planned. And yet it may well have been suggested 
by warfare in which he had borne a part when he was not 
yet master of his own city. Dionysios^ comrade of Her- 
mokrates in his attempted return to Syracuse', can hardly 
fail to have been with him at Himera. He may well have 
been within the restored walls of Selinous and in the fights 
before Motya and Panormos. His present purpose was to 

P The principal military invention of Dionysioe' engineers (see pp. 6i, 6a. 
note 4) was the catapult. Diodoros expressly says (xiv. 4a), KnL yd^ rb 
icarcar€kTue6r €lpi$7j tear^ rovrw rdv leatpbw Ir 'XvpaKoi6<raiSf its Av rw 
KparloTwif TtxyiTW manax^tv clf %va r6'iicv cvyrjyfUrcjv, Diodoros 
(zx. 48, &c.) speaks of two olasses of catapults ; wfTpo06\<H which threw 
stones up to three hundredweight (rpiTdkawToi), and the 6^v0€kus which 
threw darts. In Koman times the name oaiapuUa clave to the latter 
class. The werpofiSkoi were icnown as haUita. According to Rttstow 
{GrUekueha Kriegswesen, ao8) the catapult began to be first used 
in Greece proper about thirty years after its introduction at Syracuse. 
From a passage in Flutaroh (Reg. et Imp. Apophth.) it looks as if 
they were first used in the Feloponneee by the mercenaries of Dionysios, 
who helped Archid&mos III of Sparta to grain his ' tearless * victory over 
the Arcadians and Argives in 367 B.O. The Spartan King, on seeing 
the new artillery, exclaimed : *A *lELpAjckttt, dir^\ dy^pds dfitrd. The 
effect resembled that of the invention of gunpowder on chivalry, and 
the revolution in military art may be judged by the fact recorded by 
Josephus (B. J. iii. 7. $ 19, 33) that catapults were made that could 
throw stones a quarter of a mile. Dionysios (v. infra, p. 74) was 
shortly to use his new engines with great effect, not only against the 
ramparts of Motya, but from the shore of the Motyan lagoon against 
the Carthaginian ships. (Diod. xiv. 50 ; drd tk r^s yijs rois ^v0€\iffi 
: Karaw4\Tcui ol 1vpojto6aioi ^^fttyoi, <rvxy<^ rStnf wokt/dogy dy^pow. koH 
ydp Kardwkrf^uf cfxc fuydkiiv rovro t6 04kos 8id rd vp&rcas fbpfO^yat tear* 
kietiyoy rbv Kaip6v,y\ 
17 Sicily, iii. 505, 506.] 


renew the enterprise of his former leader on a greater scale ohap. x. 
and with more abiding effect. He would use the whole 
force of his dominions towards striking a heavy blow 
at Carthage within her Sicilian possessions. He would 
conquer^ he would at least destroy^ where Hermokrates had 
simply plundered and won battles. The work was to be 
done both by land and sea. A fleet numbering nearly two Expedition 
hundred ships of war, with five hundred ships of burthen 5S^^ 
loaded with stores and engines, was sent forth under the 
command of Leptines. They were to sail along the 
southern coast of Sicily to the western stronghold of 
Phcenician power, the island city of Motya ^. With the 
land force of Syracuse and her alUes, and with the mercen- 
aries in his service, Dionysios himself began his march in 
concert with the fleet. His immediate object was Eryx. 
His line of march lay along the south coast ; as he passed, 
the Greek cities which had become subject or tributary to 
Carthage gladly welcomed him. '' They hated the heavy 
yoke of the Phoenicians, and longed to win back their 
freedom ^.'^ By the treaty, Kamarina and Gela, though TTam^-nft 
unwalled towns, were still separate communities, paying jSn Dio- 
tribute to Carthage. At that moment they stood free ; ^7^^ 
they had slain or driven out any Carthaginians who were 
among them^. Their inhabitants joined Dionysios with 
their forces ; the tyrant was at least less hateful than the 
barbarian. The next point on his march was Akragas, Akragas 
which the treaty had left, not even a tributary community, Themuti. 
but an immediate part of the Carthaginian dominion. Here 
too the inhabitants who had overcome their Carthaginian 
masters hastened to join the Hellenic champion. In the 
like sort, the forces of the northern Thermai, the new 


{} Diod. xiv. 47.] 

[' lb. ; /ufftnhrrts /Up rd fidpos t^ $ r&v ^oivlKwr k-MucftarfiaSf iwiOvfiovvr^s 
8i rvx^y Torc rfjs iXtvStplas,'] 




OHAF. z. Himera^ came across from their own coast to join the 
muster^. The last point on his own march was the 
remnant of Selinous^ whether within or without the walls 
with which Hermokrates had girded its akropolis. Here 
too Dionysios enlisted all whom the restored and now 
delivered town could furnish. What amount of increased 
force any of these places could give to the army we are 
not told ; we suspect that they formed but a small propor- 
tion of the eighty thousand foot and feu* more than three 
. thousand horse ^ at whose head the lord of Syracuse entered 
I the land of the barbarians. And among those thousands 
every Sikeliot at least was fully minded to repay in kind 
on the barbarian enemy all that the men and the cities of 
Hellas had suffered at his hands. 
Force of No Greek leader^ we may safely say, had ever before 
stood at the head of such a force. Dionysios saw before 
him in actual being a force &r greater than that which 
Gel6n had merely talked of. He commanded a fleet that 
fell little short of the greatest navies of Athens, and at the 
same time led forth a land-force such as no Spartan king 
had ever had at his bidding. And no Sikeliot leader had 
ever before gone forth on an errand such as his. Pent- 
athlos and Ddrieus had come to seek their fortunes in the 
same regions, and they had had little joy of their enter* 
prise. But since the power of Carthage had been fully 
established in western Sicily, no Greek leader had gone 
forth with a serious purpose of defying the Phoenician 
power in its own strongholds. Gelon had thought it 
enough to beat back the Phoenician from Greek soil ; he 
had not gone on himself to attack Phoenician cities. In 

[} Diod. xiv. 47 ; /ic0' ots 'Ifxtpaiovs iitr^wifBparo Karoiitcvvras Iwi B&rtpa 
fiipij TTfs ^KtXlas, It is to be obseryed that Dioddros speaks of them bj 
their older name. Their coins however struck about this time and later 
bear the inscription eEPBOTAN; Head, Hist. Num. 128.] 

[• Diod. xiv. 47.] 


the days of independence Akragas^ perhaps Selinous, had ohap. x. 
waged BUCceBBfol wars with Motja ; but there is no sign 
that they implied any attack on Motya itself ^. Hermo- 
krates himself^ in some sort the forerunner of Dionysios^ 
could hardly have hoped that his raids would seriously 
weaken the Carthaginian power. But now a host such as 
Greek Sicily had never seen before set forth to do^ at least 
for a moment^ the work in which D6rieus had failed and 
which Hermokrat^ had not ventured to attempt. 

Selinous was the last point of muster. Such recruits as 
it could supply formed the last addition to the Greek army. 
At the boundary-stream of Mazaros Dionysios crossed from 
the Greek land held in bondage by the Phoenician to the 
land whose Phoenician possession no Greek since D6rieus 
had disputed. But it was not against any Phoenician city 
that the Greek leader first marched. He did not come^ 
like Ddrieus^ as the bearer of a divine commission to do 
the work of a son of Herakl^. But it was in the path of 
D6rieus that he marched. His first display of military 
power was made in the ancestral lands of HenJdes^ beneath 
the mount of Aphroditfi K 

At this point we get one of our few notices of Elymian Segesta 
politics^ almost our only notice of the special politics of carthage. 
Eiyx. The two Elymian towns were just now not of one 
mind. Segesta^ the new dependency of Carthag^^ clave^ 
as we shall presently see^ steadfastly to her allegiance. As 
for Eryx^ we do not know what were its exact relations to 
Carthage at this time ; but we are distinctly told that its 
people hated the Carthaginians^. Such hatred is in no 
way inconsistent with the old friendship between the 
Elymians and the older Phoenician settlements. Indeed 

[» SicUy, ii. 339.] 
P See Sicily, i. a 10 seqq.] 

C Diod. ziy. 48; ^Epviuvoi fi^v KOTawkayiyris rb n4y€$os rijs 9wdfifoas 
icat /uffoSrrts Kapxfj^wiovs vpoa^yftpaiaay r{r ^wvaU^."] 

F % 


CHAP. X. we wish throughont to know what was the feeling towards 
Carthage on the part of the old Phoenician settJements 
themselves^ now that they were brought down to the level 
of Carthaginian dependencies. We can understand that 
the Carthaginian supremacy may have been not a little 
irksome^ and yet that a wider Phcenician patriotism might 
lead the men of Motya^ Panormos^ and Solous to fight 
manfully for Carthage against a Oreek invader. In the 
JBlymian towns feelings of this kind would be less strong. 
Segesta had no ill will to Greeks as such. She had^ just 
as a Oredi: city might have^ grounds of enmity towards 
some Greeks and ties of friendship towards others. She 
had strong g^rounds for attachment to Carthage^ and she 
had her own grievances against the present enemies of 
/arthage. Carthage had overthrown Selinous in her cause, 
lyracuse had been the ally of Selinous^ and the remnant of 
^the Selinuntines were in the Syracusan army. But the 
ie motives might not tell at Eryx. We do not know 
the exact relations between that city and Segesta just at 
this time. At the time of the negotiations between Athens 
and Segesta^ the connexion between the two Elymian towns 
clearly was of the closest kind. But in the later quarrels 
between Segesta and Selinous we have not heard a word 
Eryx joins of Eryx, At any ratc^ in whatever relations the two towns 
o ygioa. g^j^^ ^ ^^^ another, they took directly opposite courses 

in the present war. Segesta remained loyal to Carthage. 
The men of Eryx looked out at the host of Dionysios 
marching towards the foot of their hill, and they felt that 
even on their height they could not withstand it. More- 
over they hated the Carthaginians and had no wish to 
withstand it. They accordingly joined the side of Dionysios, 
on what terms we are not told. 

Motya meanwhile remained firm, whether we are to say 
in its Carthaginian allegiance or in its wider Phoenician 
patriotism. Tpeople were nerved for the defence with 


all that stem and deadly resolution which is chaiaeteristio of chap. x. 
the Semitic races. With them real resistance sometimes 
seems to begin at the point where the resistance of other 
nations seems to leave off. They looked for help from Car- 
thage^ they trembled not at the nmnbers of the enemy; 
they made all things ready for the siege. They believed 
that it was their special loyalty to Carthage which had 
marked them ont for the first attack ^ ; and it was a point 
of honour with them to do deeds worthy of their reputation. 
The siege b^^^ a siege which it would be hopeless to try siege of 
to understand by a glance at the existing map only. But b^i^ 
it becomes clear when we remember the relations of land 
and water as they must have stood at the time^ The 
island of Motya still lay in the midst of its own haveUj 
low and sheltered from the outer sea by a yet lower 
peninsula. The town, girded by walls^ of which large 
traces still remain, covered the whole island, which was, at 
the north-eastern comer — if the word comer can be used at 
Motya — joined to the mainland by a mole. When the lord 
of Syracuse advances to the attack of Motya, the analogy 
between Motya and his own Ortygia comes still more 
strongly on our minds. The island city of the Fhcenician 
on the western side of Sicily is attacked by the forces of 
the island city of the Greek on the eastern sida But in 
the hands of Dionysios Ortygia had become a mere strong- 
hold of tyranny; the tme Syracuse was now on the main- 
land. No such change had taken place at Motya. The 
city was still on the island, and on the island only. And it 
was a city which had indeed come to acknowledge the 
supremacy of another city of its own race, but which had 
not passed under the dominion of a domestic tyrant. 

Of the forces by which Motya was at this time defended 
we are told nothing distinctly. The citizais of Motya 

{} Diod. Tvr. 48 ; 8id ri^ inffT€r6rriw cfrcu (ti^k Mor^v) rots Kapxn^^^^^^.] 
[' See Mftp.] 


CHAP. z. were^ as the story shows^ thorough men of war after the 
Phoenician type. But we shonld expect to find also some- 
thing of a Carthaginian garrison ; and that such there was 
we learn from a single casual notice. Some of the defenders 
of Motya were mercenary Greeks — we have already heard 
of such in the great Carthaginian invasion^ — and the name 
of their captain, Daunen&s^ has been preserved^. What 
share they took in the struggle against their countrymen 
we are not told. 
Motyans The first act of the men of Motya when threatened with 
nexion & siege was to break down the mole which joined their 
wi^ mam- ^j^y ^ ^^^ mainland. The island should be again an island ; 
no means of approach by land should be left open to the 
enemy ^. But in the face of the engineers of Dionysios 
their toil was labour in vain. It was easier for him to 
New mole build up than for them to pull down. The old mole had 
Dionys^. hccn a mere road; the mole of Dionysios was to be a piece 
of artificial land on which he could plant his engines and 
let them play on the wall of the city*. He now brought up 
his ships ; but he designed no attacks on the wall by sea. 
The vessels of burthen he placed at anchor along the neigh- 
bouring shore of the mainland. The ships of war were 
taken into the inner haven to the north of the island^ and 
there drawn up on the shore of the isthmus '. The crews 
of the ships were left to go on with the mole. Dionysios 
himself; to fill up the time till he could attack Motya by 

P SicUy, iii 454, 470.] 

p Diod. xiv. 53.] 

[* lb. ziv. 48; c7xc 8^ koI 69^ trrtvi^ x^^P^^^^V^^f <t^povcav M rdr 
T^s St/vcX/cv alyiakbv, i)r o2 Morvrirot r6rt 8i^<r«a)^.] 

[* lb. ; Aiai^iot 82 ficrd rcDr dpxn^m-iiwt^ jcarcur/vc^/iCKOf robs t6vovs, 
^fiioTO "xwitara MarcuTKtvdCur M rijiy Mot^k.] 

[^ lb. ; Koi rdis /iir luucpds ravs wofA rhv daitXow rov XifUvot ht&X/crjat, 
rd 82 ^prtfyd r&y wkoiwv &p/uiT€ vapi^ rhif oItioX^. In making Dionyrioa 
draw np his wanhipi on ihe isthmuB to ihe north of the island Mr. IVee- 
mafiJoUowB Hokn (G. S. ii. 43^. Schubring (Motye-Iilybseom, 54) places 
them south of the Mole on the S. E. side of the Motyan lagoon.] 


land^ made several expeditions at once to win allies to his chap. z. 
side and to take^ or at least to blockade, the towns wliich 
held out against him. 

At this end of Sicily whatever had not been occupied by 
Elymians^ Phoenicians^ or Greeks^ still belonged to the 
oldest people of the land. The neighbouring Sikans^ fearing Sikans 
the power of Dionysios and assuredly having no attach- carthage™ 
ment to Carthage^ threw off all Phoenician dominion or 
supremacy, and joined themselves to the Greek invader. 
We must seemingly except the town of Ankyra^ of which 
so little is known \ if indeed it was Sikan at this time. It 
is spoken of as one of five towns which held out for Car- 
thage. Of the other four two were naturally Phoenician, 
Panormos and Solous. The others were Segesta^ as has been 
already mentioned, and Entella on its rock, now the strong- 
hold of those Campanian mercenaries who had done good 
service to the tyrant against revolted Syracuse K Dionysios 
laid waste the lands of the two Phoenician towns and also 
of Ankyra ; but he seems to have done nothing more than 
lay waste their lands. With Segesta and Entella he went Segesta 
further; he besieged them and made several assaults. The j^tella 
geographical position of these towns seems to explain this '^P^^ 
difference of treatment. Segesta and Entella might bar his Dionynos. 
march in many directions, so that it was a great object to 
take them, if possible, to hold them in check, while the 
siege of Panormos and Solous might be left till their 
turn came to be attacked, like Motya, for their own sake. 
But a siege of either Segesta or Entella was not an easy 
matter ; and it appears that the assaults of Dionysios did 
little towards bringing either town under his power. Mean- 
while the mole grew; Dionysios, like an eastern despot, 
had men enough for his work \ The new artificial isthmus 

\} Diod, 1. c, where the true reading is "Aympai, uot 'AAiiKtku* CI 
Sicily»i. lai.] 

[' Diod. ziy. 9. See p. ao.] 

[' lb. ziy. 5 1 ; T$ wo\vx**pii^ rw kp^(Qfiircty cwrtJUirat r6 x^/mi*] 


CHAP. z. oould now bear the Syiacusan artilleiy, and all things were 

ready for making an attack on the walls of Motya. 
Renewed Dionysios now went back to his main object. He left 
Motya.^'^ troops enough to keep up the blockade of S^festa and 
Entella^ perhaps of the other towns in the Carthaginian 
obedience. He deemed that^ as soon as Motya fell, they 
would presently surrender^. But Motya was not to iall 
without a yigorous effort on the part of Carthage to relieve 
her. A diversion was first tried. While the force of Syra- 
cuse was before Motya, a sudden blow might perhaps give 
Carthage possession of Syracuse herself. At any rate an 
attack on Syracuse might be likely to draw away the lord 
Carthagi- of Syracuse from Motya. Himilk6n was now busy in 
ing^force ' making ready for a great attempt to relieve the besieged 
H^'^^ikA *own. He was seemingly still at Carthage when he bade 
his admiral take ten triremes, and sail with all speed and 
all stealth ^^ so as to enter the 6 reat Harbour by nighty and 
Descent on to destroy all the ships that were left there. The immediate 
Harbour*of P'*^ was successfully carried out. The Punic triremes did 
SyraouFe. enter the Great Harbour by night; they drove their beaks 
into such ships as they found there ; they sent nearly all of 
them to the bottom, and sailed away to Carthage. But watch 
must surely have been kept at Syracuse in the absence of 
her master. Was there no chain, no defence of any kind, 
to guard the wide mouth between Ortygia and Plemmyrion ? 
As a certain amount of damage done to the Syracusan 
power^ this daring attack thoroughly succeeded. But it 
teiled altogether in its main object of drawing away Dio- 
nysios from the siege of Motya. That work he had taken 
in hand^ and from that work he did not stir. 

The Carthaginian admiral had now no choice except to 
attack the Syracusan force^ within the most strictly guarded 

[} Diod. xiv. 49; 4j\wi(9 y^ ra^t imroXiopgrfO^ifffp rdis 6XXas t^iws 
[* lb. ; ic€\t6<ras /rard rdxof Ki0fi^ vXf tV.] 


home of Phoenician power, in the haven of Motya itself, chap. x. 
The mode of attack which Himilk6n chose was the repeti- Himilkdn 
tion on a greater scale of the exploit of his officer in the destro^ 
Syracusan harhour. As the wardships of Dionysios were ^^^^^^ 
not afloat^ but were drawn up on land in the inner haven^ Motyan 
the Carthaginian commander hoped by another sudden blow 
to destroy or get possession of them. The loss of his fleet 
wonld surely cause Dionysios to raise the siege of Motya, 
and would enable Himilk6n to transfer the war to Syra- 
cuse^. With a hundred picked triremes^ he sailed from 
Carthage; he reached the shore of Selinous in the night; 
he then followed the coast; he passed the point of Lily« 
baion^ and appeared at day-break within the inland sea of 
Motya. Dionysios had no means of resisting him by sea. ' 
The war-ships were on shore at the other side of the haven 
to the north of the island. Himilkdn found no difficulty 
in burning or disabling the ships of burthen that were 
lying at anchor at its mouth'. He then sailed into the 
haven, and put his ships in order to attack the Oreek ships 
that were drawn up on its inner shore. His intended course 
must have been by the western side of the island, as the 
eastern channel was barred by the mole. Dionysios feared 
to put his ships to sea in the haven. The space was small ; 
the Punic fleet kept the mouth to the south of the island. 
If he met the enemy in battle on those terms, far greater 
as was the number of his fleets he would lose his advantage^ 
as each ship would have to engage several of the enemy ^. 
A sea-fight in the narrow waters between the isle of Motya 

{} Diod. xiv. 50. How it came about that Dionysioa, who moat have 
expected the appearance of * luge Carthaginian fleet for the relief of 
Motya^ left his own galleyi drawn up high and dry and his transports at 
the mouth of the harbour at the mercy of the first hostile squadron, is not 
explained. Dionysios* arrangements, as set forth by Dioddros, argue sheer 


[' Hx Cl Schubring, Motye-Lilybeum, 55 seqq.] 


oHAP. X. and the peninsula to the west of it would have jeoparded 
all his plans. 
Himilkdn*8 Bat the master of engineering craft was not without his 
puUed by resources. If he could not trust his ships to the waters^ he 
catapults, could find a way out for them by land. The famous device 
of Mahomet the Conqueror was forestalled by the tyrant of 
Syracuse^. The land-force of Dionysios was brought to 
the mouth of the haven. That is, it occupied the shore of 
the peninsula — now an island — ^west of Motya. There he 
placed his engines of war^ above all, his own special creation^ 
the catapults. On the ships themselves^ on those at least 
that were nearest to the shore^ were placed a crowd of 
archers and slingers. As Himilkdn sailed in to seize the 
foremost ships, he was met by a shower of arrows and 
bullets from the ships themselves. And more than these, 
the catapults, the new and fearful arm of war brought that 
day for the first time into action, hurled their mighty stones 
against the Punic navy. The newness of this form of 
destruction cowed most hearts ^. Many men were crushed, 
and one would think that some of the ships must have been 
crushed also. The navy of Himilkdn was beaten back 
without a single Greek vessel being put to sea to meet it. 

Even while this work was going on, Dionysios was able 
to beg^n the carrying out of his scheme. The crews of his 
ships were available for his purpose, while the men of the 

\} The Ottoman shipB were traniported a distance of six miles from the 
Bosphoms to the further part of the harboar of GonBtantinople. See 
Gibbon, ch. Izviii ; and cf. Yon Hammer (French ed., ii. 406 seqq.), who 
cites other parallels. Leonard of EJiioe says that Mahomet borrowed his 
idea from the Venetians, who twelve years before had transported their 
ships from the Adige to the Lake of Garda. The Lacedaemonians in the 
Peloponnesian war carried their fleet across the Isthmus of Leukadia 
(Thnc. iv. 8). So too Hannibal dragged the Tarantine ships across the 
Agora of Taras from the Mar Piccolo to the outer sea (Polyb. viii. 36). 
Augustas according to Dion Gassius (L and li.) twice dragged his ships 
overland — across the isthmus of Nikopolis and that of Gorinth. This 
latter feat was repeated by the Patrician Niketas in the tenth century.] 

[' See p. 64, note i.] 

himii46n sails away from MOTTA. 75 

land-force were hurling death at the Carthaginian seamen, ohap. x. 
Roads of wood were laid across the low and muddy neck of Syraonsan 
land which then parted the haven from the outer waters, dragged 
Along them^ a distance of two miles and a half ^ the ships f^" 
were dragged into the open sea^. A short sail round the 
peninsula would have brought them again to the mouth of 
the haven^ ready to meet Himilkdn's fleet on their natural 
element. But^ beaten back in his first attempt, seeing the 
success of the device of Dionysios^ the Carthaginian com- 
mander feared to risk a naval battle with the far greater 
force of the enemy. When he saw that his attempt had 
failed^ he at once sailed away to Africa, >nd left Motya to 
its fate. 

It was now that the siege really began. On the Oreek Asaaalton 
side as yet nothing had been done beyond making ready for ^otiyik 
the attack. * On the Punic side nothing had been done 
beyond fruitless attempts to hinder the work of the Greeks. 
But now the way was open for the Oreek land-force to 
make its direct assault on the walls of Motya. The mole 
was already finished. The vast number of workmen em- 
ployed on it had enabled Dionysios to bring it to perfection 
with tmexpected speed ^. We are tempted to ask whether 
Dionysios received any willing help, or pressed in any that 
was unwilling, from the friends and enemies of Carthage in 

P Polysen. v. 2 ; Aior^criof . . . 9ap€tc6\€aM robs veaSrat ital ffrforUnos 
Bappuv KoX wapatnc*vd(€a$ai t^ 9tayarfi^ tw^ rpttipeav [8«cl] t^ vc/k- 
cxov<n^ ijcpas rdv Xi/Ura, r&wos j}f dftaXAs xat wij\6»9rjt, tZpos ttcwn ar&bia, 
rwrw cl arparwrm (^Xou ^aXKayy^Hmyrts i^tpfy^tyicay irfiaffKoyra rpvfip€is 
i^/Uptf /uf. Diod. xiv. 50 ; Ai6w€p rf wXiffiti rw or/tanamiw ^Vicn 
SccXicv^af rd ff/ediprf dcd r^ 7^ elf rifiy Ut^ tov XifUvos BiXarroM, Ikiffwrt 
rAs yavs. As Hdm (G. S. ii. 435) remarks, the twenty stadia can only be ., ^ 
obtained by supposing that what was then the tongne of land formed by 
the present islands of Isola Longa and Bonone was considerably broader 
than either of the existing islands.] 

' Died. ziy. 51 ; Aior^iof 8i ry «o\vx<«^ rtjr ipya(o fUrM^ irwrtKiaas 
rd x^M'* 


CHAP. X. the immediate neighboarhood. The men of Eryx^ who 
hated Carthage ^, might be ready to do something in the 
cause of her enemy. On the other hand, we are struck by 
the &ct that there is nothing in the story to imply the 
presence of even the smallest Punic force on Lilybaion. 
The city of that name was not yet^ but one would have 
expected to find the point occupied as a Punic outpost to 
guard the Peraia of Motya. But we are now expressly 
told that Motya was left altogether without allies ^. The 
island city, cut ott from all help, had to bear alone the full 
brunt of the whole power of the lord of Syracuse bringing 
into play the new. engines of war whose earliest trial was 
to be made against the walls of Motya. It was a strange 
assault. The Macedonian Alexander was in some things the 
pupil of Dionysios, and it was from the siege of Phoenician 
Motya that Alexander learned the device which he brought 
to bear upon Phoenician Tyre ^. Water had been turned 
into land to serve the purposes of the besiegers. It was 
on groimd of his own making, by the new mole which 
had made Motya no longer an island^ that the Syracusan 
battering-train was brought up to the attack. The main 
point of assault would therefore be on the north-east, 
where the great gate of the city led down to the elder 
mole ^. The man who had fenced in the hill of Syracuse 
with the most finished work of the Oreek military archi- 
tects must have looked with some scorn on the ruder work^ 
the rough stones^ the unfinished angles, of the wall of free 
Phoenician days. But, in &ce of those ancient bulwarks^ 
he must almost have felt himself, as we now see him, as 
the beginner of a new state of things for Sicily, Oreece^ 

^ See above, p. 67. 

[* Diod. ziv. 51 ; Srm fytnun ffvfAftdxuy*] 

[* Aniftn, An»b. ii 17. 96; Diod. xvii. 40-45; Q. Guiiius, iv. 4-27. 
AlexaDder*8 mole at Tjre was soo ft. wide and about a mile In length ] 

I* Remains of the great gate of Motya are stili visible ; see Sicily, i. 273, 
274. It is there described as the Northern Gbtte.] 


and the world. Amid the inland waters of Motya, within osap. x. 
the innermost home of Phoenician sea-faring strength^ but 
from which all Phoenician sea-faring strengfth had with- 
drawn before his coming, he had entered a new worlds a 
watery world never before ploughed by the keel of an Hel- 
lenic warship. 

He was the fint that ever buret 
Into that silent 

He stood there as the pioneer of many a day to come. 
Eiyx looked down on him, now in some sort his own^ if but 
for a moment. What Ddrieus had &iled to do, Pyrrhos 
was to do for another moment and Junius for a thousand 
years. But Dionysios showed them the way. Pioneer of 
a new age, he fitly came by a new path, and brought with 
him new devices. 

The work began with his weapons of assault, new and Moving 

towers 01 

old. The ram to batter the walls was nothing fresh. The Dionysios. 
wooden tower, the beffroi or belfry of later days^, had 
been brought up with no small effect against the walls of 
Selinous^. But the moving towers of Dionysios were of 
unusual height They needed to be so. At Motya engines 
of war had to fight, not only against the walls of the city 
but against the houses of the citizens. Those citizens were 
many and wealthy, rejoicing in the splendour of their 
dwelling^. But in the small compass of the island space 
wafi precious ; the houses of the rich men of Motya took 
the shape of lofty towers, soaring above the walls of the 

\} See Dacange, 8.v. Belflredut; "Machina bellioa lignea in modum 
excelsioris turris exstraota, variis tabulatis coenaonlis sea 8tat%an%6u» 
constans, rotasqae quataor vecta.'* Cf. Roman de Garin ; 

" Un engin fet, de tel parler n'oi 
Qui ot de haat cent piez tos enterins. 
Pres de la porte fist venir tel engin, 
A sept estages tot droit de fust chesnin 
Arbalestriers i a mis jusqu*k vint, 
Bien fat does, convert de ooir boli.*'] 
[» Sicily, iU. 463.] 


OHAP. z. ciiy ^. Against both them and the walls the moving engines 
were brought up on wheels. They were towers of six stages, 
rising to a height at which the soldiers who fought from 
them oould fight on a level with the defenders of the loftiest 
dwellings in Motya. But above all there was the new and 
special device of Dionysios himself. While the ram beat on 
the wall itself, the catapults hurled massive stones to crush 
and sweep away its defenders'. Of the whole force of 
Dionysios, a reserve was left on the landward side of the 
mole. But those to whom the actual work of assault was 
assigned greatly outnumbered the defenders of the town \ 

Defence of But even in such straits as these, the hearts of the men 
of Motya did not give way. They had their devices for 
the defence, as Dionysios had his for the attack. Tall 
masts were set on the highest points of the walls, with 
projecting spars on which daring men, the most skilful 
seamen one would think, trusted themselves. Themselves 
well sheltered by breast-plates, they hurled lighted torches 
and masses of tow covered with pitch and set on fire, in 
the hope of burning the wooden towers and other engines ^. 
Some of them were presently in flames ; but the fire was 
soon quenched, and before long a breach was made in the 
wall by the strokes of the ram ^. For the first time since 
Oreeks and Phoenicians had held their several portions of 
the soil of Sicily, a Phoenician city seemed to stand open 
for the victorious Oreek to enter and take possession. 
But with such foes as the besiegers of Motya had to deal 

\} Diod. xiv. 51 ; wpo<Hiyayt 82 mt ra^ {nrorpSxovs v^pyovs rots T€ix*<fti^ 
i^Mp6^cvt Smu ots tcartffictvaffe vpbt rh r&y cIkiw tfffos,'] 

[' lb. ; TOis 82 Morairikrais dy^^rcAAc rohs M rw kit&K^tMf ftaxofjiit'ovs,'] 

[* So much may be gathered from the aooount of the final asiaidt. 
Diod. ziv. 5 a ; fi&yit ol XtircXiofrcu rf vAli^ci icar€w6yrja€a^ robs i»$€arriic&ras. 
This wai before the entry of DionyBios* full force.] 

[* lb. ziy. 51; SfSat ^jfA/Uras 1j<^waw xai arwrtM Mtt^fwra ficrd wimp 
€h rds rShf woXtfdwy fii7X<u^0 

[' lb. ; Tou 82 Kpiois wxvcU Tcb kfA0oK^s Iii96rr€s mrifidKov ftipos rov 



with it was only now that the battle really began. The chap. x. 
,^6tem Semitic spirit of resistance to the last breath was 
wound up to its highest pitch in the hearts of the defenders. 
They saw their solitary city left without hope of any kins- 
man or ally to come to its help. The work to be done was 
now their own work only. We cannot say that in these 
wars the Greek and the Phoenician change places ; for the 
Phoenician ever remains himself, while the Greek in a great 
measure puts on the Phoenician. At Selinous fear and 
hatred of the Semitic enemy had stirred up the Greek to 
defend every inch of his city with all but Semitic despera- 
tion. Stilly at Selinous some could and did escape. In 
island Motya there was no means of escaping^ and surrender 
was not in the mind of any man. Let the enemy once 
make his way into the city, and death or slavery were the 
only alternatives. But on the other hand experience of 
barbarian warfare had well nigh turned the Greek into a 
barbarian. When the brei^h was first made, the first 
thought in the minds of the soldiers of Dionysios was that 
the hour of vengeance was at last come. They could now 
pay back on the Phoenician all that any Greek had any- 
where suffered at Phoenician hands ^. To that end they 
thronged to the breach. But in the breach they were met ijeeperate 
by men who thronged thither with a resolve as stem as g^f^ of 
their own. With no hope of succour, with no hope of flight ^^^y""- 
by sea, with the remembrance — so Greek fancy at least 
loved to believe — of their own deeds before them^ looking 
to be dealt with by others as they had dealt with others^ 
knowing in sober earnest that the doom of bondage with 
its horrors was the lightest prospect before them — ^in such 
a case as this^ the one purpose of the men of Motya was to 
die valiantly^ and to defend every inch of their city hand 

p I>iod. xiy. 51 ; 02 /cir XiMkuhm K€KpcmjMivai rijf v6\€ws Ijirj vo/jd(o¥Tts 
vav M^cyor tyticw roO rc^ Anitas dfa&ywr$ai w^pl &y wp&rtpov cfy ahr<Ais 


CHAP. X. to hand against the inyader^. And something of this 
y stem Semitic spirit maj^ by the mere power of military 
discipline and fellowship^ have found its way into the 
hearts of the motley force of which a Funic garrison was 
likely to be made up. But the mercenary Greeks — how 
did they fare ? Of them we hear not a word till the last 
stage of all And what we hear then might make us think 
that a fear hung before their eyes which would nerve them 
for as fierce a resistance as any that the men of Canaan 
themselves could offer. 
The The walls of Motya had failed its citizens; but they 

within the ^^^ sought to shelter themselves by ramparts and bulwarks, 
walla. They barricaded the narrow streets ; they defended the tall 
and stately houses, the houses which were themselves a wall, 
a wall of richer and more costly workmanship than the 
common defences of a fortress'. The Greeks who had 
pressed within the walls, and who deemed that Motya was 
already in their hands^ found that there was still hard work 
before them. From the tops of the lofty houses showers of 
darts and missiles of all kinds rained down upon them. 
The siege had to begin again within the walls. The 
moving towers were now wheeled through the breach ; from 
them alone could men fight on equal terms with the de- 
fenders of the towering houses. Bridges were thrown 
across from the towers^ and by their means the Greeks 
strove to fight their way into the upper stories of the 
dwellings of Motya ^. High in air they had to struggle 
hand to hand against desperate men. Some were struck 
down by the wounds which were given and taken in equal 

\} DiocL xiv. 51 ; v^k AyeyvQs inrf/uyov rbv 0&varov.'\ 
[' lb. ; kyiipparrov rcl^ ar€vwvohs, koL raXs kuxdrais oltcicus kxpSwro 
KoBdwip rcix^V vokvT€\Sas ifitoiofjajfiiv^. With regard to its domestic 
architecture Dioddros (xiv. 48) remarks of Motya that it was r{; irX^^ci 
Ktd rf MiXXct T&v olKivy ds {nr€pfio\ifi^ v^piKoT^xyiV^^* '<^ ^'^ txrwopixm 
rwv KaroiKo^yroiy^ 

[• lb. xiv. 51 ; To^s (vXivovs vupyovs irpoira'Yay6yT€s reus wpwrats oUciais 


fight ^ ; 8ome^ thrust back from the houses, fell headlong ohap. x. 
from the bridges to the g^und^. This kind of fighting 
lasted all day. At last Dionysios^ like Hannibal at Seli- Dionyrioe 
nous and Himera^ called ofE his men from the bloody and meo.^ 
as yet unavailing work. The walls of Motya had been 
breached ; Oreek and Phoenician had fought hand to hand 
within the wall. But that first day's struggle had not made 
Motya a possession of the Oreek, 

As in the case of Hannibal at Selinous, we are told that Benewedv 
this f earfal hand-to-hand fighting within the town went on ^'the 
for several days. Besieged and besiegers fought all day, ^*^' 
and in the evening Dionysios called ofE his men by sound 
of trumpet ^. In such a warfare he could not fail to win 
at last by sheer dint of numbers. But even a Greek tyrant 
could not venture to throw away the lives of men whom he 
called citizens and allies quite so recklessly as a Carthagi-* 
nian Shophet could throw away the lives of African subjects 
and Spanish mercenaries. Motya must be taken; but some 
other way must be found for taking it. The work was at Night sor- 
last done by a surprise by night. The Motyans had got ^'^'^' 
used to the sound of the Syracusan trumpet every evening. 
They had come to look on it as a sign that the day's 
work was over, and that they might give themselves some 
measure of the rest that they so sorely needed ^. By night 
then a valiant captain, Archylos of Thourioi, was sent in 
with a chosen party. One would like to know a little more 
clearly what it was that they did. They set ladders against 
the fallen houses. By these they climbed up^ and so were 
able to let in Dionysios and his army at a favourable point, 
perhaps by the great gate near the mole of which the traces 
still remain ^. The men of Motya were taken by surprise ; 

[> IHod. xiv. 5a.] [• lb.] 

p lb. 5a ; ry (r6XwtYti rohs iiaxofiivovs dyeuRiXoi;fi«yor t\vt r^ 
ttoKtopdaof,'] [* lb.] 

[' lb. For the gate eee Sicily, i. 273, 274.] 







Fall of 
[B.C. 398.] 

of the in- 
by the 

bat even at this last moment their hearts did not fail them. 
As soon as they conid come together against their enemies, 
the last fight began. Eveiything was against the Phoeni- 
cians ; bnt they were PhoBnicians^ and they f ooght on. The 
last armed man defended the last inch of his native soiL 
The Greeks overcame them by sheer dint of numbers only. 
Bnt the work was done, and Motya was in the hands of 
the lord of Syracuse. 

The news that Motya had fallen presently reached the 
men whom Dionysios had left on the Tna.inla.Tid- They now 
rushed along the mole into the captured city. The burning 
thought in their minds was not the mere greed of plunder, 
but the longing to have their share in the great vengeance 
which had been so long delayed. The wergild of Selinous 
and Himera was to be paid in full in the blood of the people 
of Motya. Now came one of those fearful scenes of mas- 
sacre which the Roman war-law made the natural conse- 
quence of the entrances of the besiegers into a stormed 
town^ but which in Greek warfare are spoken of only in 
moments which called for special vengeance. And, in 
making their way into the first Phoenician town which had 
ever yielded to Sikeliot arms, the soldiers of Dionysios held 
that they were called to a mission of vengeance indeed. To 
them the people of Motya were what the people of Himera 
had been to Hannibal. They were victims whom the gods 
had given over to their hands. Plunder was not thought 
of; slaughter was the one impulse; old and young, men, 
women, and children, every living soul of the hated race 
and his allies, were hewn down without mercy \ Whether, 
as in a Roman storm, brute animals that came in their way 
shared the same fate, we are not told. Such slaughter was 
in the eyes of Dionysios useless and mischievous; every 
human being that was slain lessened the value of the prize 

\} Diod. xiy. 53 ; jAvtos I^^^s dirjpow dir\ws, oi vaiMt, ob ywcuKt^s, oA 


by the price which he would have fetched in the slave- ohap. x. 
market ^. He first put forth an order bidding the slaughter 
to cease. But the rage of the Sikeliots could not be con- 
trolled ; they went on slaying in spite of all orders '. He Motyan 
then sent forth heralds to announce to the remnant of the f ncedl^ 
people of Motya that all would be spared who took sanctuary ^"^^ 
in the temples of those gods whom Oreeks and Phoenicians • 
agreed in honouring ^. This order did its work. The sup- 
pliants in the privileged temples were spared; and the 
soldiers, when they had begun to spare, turned altogether 
from slaughter to plunder. 

The question at once arises^ What were the deities whose 
holy places were in this way common ground for such em- 
bittered enemies ? The definition given might open some 
curious questions as to the mutual influence of Greek and 
Phoenician religion. There may have been in Motya tem- 
ples of strictly Hellenic deities. Such there had been already 
at Carthage ; such there were to be again. Or it may be 
implied that while, among the native Phoenician deities^ 
there were some to whom the Oreeks paid no respect^ there 
were others whom the Oreeks reverenced^ as deeming them 
the same with the powers of their own religion. The Mount 
of Eryx, the Mount of Corinth*, could witness that the 
Greek had accepted a Phoenician worship^ possibly under a 
name which had been always Greek. And the coins of 

[^ Diod. xiv. 53; Aiov^atos 82 0ovX6fifvos i^aydpawoilaaaOai t^k v6\iy 

P lb. ; vaptarfftraro ic^fnmas rohs /urd 0o7js JhrjX^otrras rcits Moruoiois 
ipvytty €ls Tcl wapd, rots 'ISkkrjffiv Upa rifi^ftcva.] 

[* See Sicily, i. 227, and Errata, p. zxzi ; Sayoe, Hibbert Lectures, p. 
266. A curious bit of numiBmatio evidence bearing on the Semitic and 
Asiatic side of Aphroditd is supplied by an obol of Eryx (Salinas, Sul 
tipo de* tetradrammi di Segesta, 38, 39). The obverse of this ooin has the 
legend EPTKINA beside the head of Aphrodite ; the reverse nOPNA, above 
her dog. At Abydos there was a temple of Jphroditi Porni, Athen. 
xiii. 573*] 

G 2 



CHAP. z. Motya show that the nymphs and the Oorgons of Greek 
^^^^. mythology had made their way into Phoenician belief^, 
on Motyftn But we may doubt whether an altar dedicated to the rites 
which Gelon was believed to have forbidden would have 
drawn to itself much reverence from the warriors of G^ldn's 
city. We know only that there were within the walls 
of Motya spots which were holy in the eyes alike of the 
captive and of the conqueror; in them therefore the 
conqueror first kept back his hand from the work of 
Spoili of And now the work of plunder began. The spoil of the 
hard-won city was given up by Dionysios as the reward of 
the men whose toils had won it. Gold and silver in abtm- 
dance, goodly garments, rich stufE of every kind, the whole 
wealth of the busy traffickers of a Phoenician city^ was 
dragged forth as the booty of the hung^ Greeks ^. Such 
was the tyrant's policy. Let the soldiers^ citizen and mer- 
cenary^ be allowed to glut themselves well with the riches 
of this first conquest, and they would be more ready to 
follow their lord to future toils *. Of those who escaped 

[} A youthful head of a river-god also occurs — ^probably the local Btream 
AkithioB, now known as the Birgi. On other Motyan coins, however, as 
on those of Eryz, Segesta and Panormos, the river takes the form of a dog, 
in which we may perhaps see the influence of an Elymian cult. It is note- 
worthy that the types of the latest coins of Motya seem all to be copied from 
the works of the great Syracusan engravers Kimdn and Euidnetos. The 
head of the river-god is taken from that of Anapos (or perhaps Assinaros) 
on the gold fifty litras of Euainetos (Syracusan " Medallions/' &c., pp. 68, 
69). The head of the island-nymph of Motya» sometimes facing, some- 
times in profile, is taken with great appropriateness from those of Arethoosa 
on the dekadrachms and tetradrachms of Kimdn (op. cit. 67 seqq.)* Tet 
these coins belong to the period after the Carthaginian invasion of 410 B.O., 
from which date the Semitic inscription finally supersedes the Greek on the 
Motyan dies (op. cit. 64 seqq.)- Nothing can be more remarkable than 
this numismatic tribute to the abiding force of Hellenism at Motya in 
days when, as the legends themselves attest, the official ties with Carthage 
had been drawn tighter.] 

[' Died. xiv. 53 ; tad ditipopuro voXhs fiiv Sipyvpos, olf« 6\lyot dk xpvo'd' 
Kal I<r09rat iroAvrcX«tf, Koi rifs dWrji dBeufiOfyias irX^^os.] 

[' lb.] 


the sword we hear nothing save only of a few who deserved chap. x. 
special mention ; for the rest the ordinary doom of slavery 
is to be taken for granted. But there were some among 
them who were traitors of Hellas. Their treason was per- 
haps no blacker than that of Dionysios himself when he 
planted the Campanians at KatanS ; but the destroyer of 
Naxos had now passed into the Hellenic champion. The Greeks in 
Greek mercenaries in the Punic service had not, at least not gmian 


all of them, taken a share in the last desperate resistance of '^'^^j^ 
the native Phoenicians. Daimenes and several of his com* 
pany came alive into the hands of Dionysios. The Greek 
had been corrupted by barbarian warfare, and neither slavery 
nor simple death was deemed punishment enough for the 
men who had forsaken Hellas for Carthage. They were to 
die, and to die by the death which Carthage meted out to 
her defeated generals. Daimenes and his fellows ended their 
days on the cross ^. But if Dionysios could specially punish, 
he could also specially reward. The booty of Motya was 
the common prize of the army; Archylos of Thourioi, to 
whom the last success was immediately owing, received the 
marked reward of a crown of a hundred minie^ 

The work was over. For the first time in recorded 
Sicilian history, the Greek stood as victorious master within 
I the walls of a PhoDnician city. The lord of Ortygia was 
lord also of Motya. Dionysios, as a champion of Hellas, 
had outdone the fame of Geldn. The elder tyrant had 
saved Greek cities from fear of the barbarian yoke ; the 
younger had wrested from the barbarian one of his choicest 
jewels^ one of his most precious fortresses. Such an exploit 
was enough for one campaign. The season of warfare was Dionysiot 
nearly over, and Dionysios put ofE fresh enterprises till the syzaoiue. 
next year. With the mass of his army he marched back 

{} Diod. ziv. 53 ; AaZ/Umpf 8i mi nvas rw 'EAAi^roir cvmiaxovyms 
£' lb. ; 'A^x^AoF . . . iMarir fofms lart^wrt,'] 


CHAP. z. to Syracuse ; but he left those behind him who were to go 
on with the less active daties of the campaign. Leptines 
was left with a hundred and twenty ships to keep watch 
against any naval enterprises that might be undertaken at 
Carthage. Divisions of the Oreek force, under leaders whose 
names are lost^ were left to go on with the blockades of 
Moiyagar- Segesta and Entella^. In Motya itself he left a garrison 
^3^^ under a Syraeusan officer named Bit5n. His force con- 
sisted mainly of Sikels^. Sikels ootdd fight; and there 
might be policy in thus employing and trusting them. 
They had no reason to love Sjrracuse or her lord, and nearer 
the seat of his dominion they might have been dangerous. 
But any of the native races of Sicily^ Sikans^ Sikels, some 
even of the very Elymians, might — so Dionysios at least 
thought — ^be trusted to defend a Sicilian post against the 

FresH The faithfulness of the allies of Dionysios, and the 

SSimil." strength of his power in every way, were put to a hard 

^^^ ^ test in the course of the next year. It was seen at Car- 
B.c. 396 . , , •' 

[397]. thage that the Sicilian war called for greater efforts than 
had yet been made. Dionysios had altogether changed the 
state of things. Carthage had no longer to attack, but 
to defend. It was not as in the days of Hannibal, when 
her armies could take one Greek city after another, almost 
at pleasure. She had been robbed of a chief jewel of 
her island dominion. Of her allies some had gone over 
to the Oreek side, others were blockaded by Oreek armies. 
Such a time was a time for action under a vigorous chief. 
Himilkdn was chosen Shophet; armed with the authority of 
the chief magistrate of the commonwealth, he set to work 
again to gather a great force. By conscription and by 
hiring, in Africa, in Spain, among all the subjects and 

[> Diod. xiv. 53.] 

[' lb. ; rd 8i w\uw fiipof ^m tw ^MtkStw ^v$/%€.] 


allies of Carihage, he got his force together. A moderate ohap. z. 
reckoning puts its numbers at a hundred thousand. An- 
other account swells it to thrice that number of footmen 
only, with more than four thousand horse, four himdred 
ships of war, and four himdred ships of burthen. Four 
hundred war-chariots are also spoken of, that old Canaanite 
arm of war which we heard of in the days of Oel6n and 
Hamilkar, but of which we have no mention since ^. 

Leptin^ meanwhile was watching ofE western Sicily, 
and Bitdn with his Sikel garrison was keeping Motya for 
their master. Dionysios himself, when the new season [b.o. 397.] 
for warfare came, set forth from Syracuse with his whole l>»ony«»<» 

" , returns to 

force, and again marched into the barbarian comer. Where- Western 

ever he marched, he harried. The Sikans of Halikyai, ^^^' 

due east from Lilybaion, of late allies of Carthage, moved 

by the ravage of their lands, sent an embassy, and entered 

the alliance of Dionysios'. The blockade of Segesta was Blockade of 

still going on, and to this object Dionysios now gave ^^ 

his special attention. His coming against them in 

person seems to have stirred up the defenders of the city 

to a daring sally. Suddenly in the dead of the night, a 

party from Segesta came down to the Greek camp, and 

set fire to the tents. The flames spread widely; but of 

human lives only a few were lost. The men could escape; 

but the horses, tethered or haltered, were for the more 

part burned with the tents \ The loss on the Oreek side 

was serious ; but nothing was done to relieve the blockade, 

and Dionysios went on harrying the lands of Segesta as 


Meanwhile the Carthaginian fleet was at sea. That it 
was so was not known in Sicily till the ships were actually 

17 Diod. ziT. 54 ; *Iwc» Sk rrr/Miet<rxi^KUnn x^P^ ^^ dp/t&rwr rovra 8' 
^<rav TcrfMU(6<ria. Cf. Sicily, iL 185.] 


[' lb. ; T&v 8* fnrar ol wX^ffrot nus ffKtpms ovyicartimCOfffftat,'] 


oHAP. X. in sight. Himilk6n had given the masters of the ships 
^*™^JJ^'" sealed orders which they were not to open till they were at 
with sealed sea^. This was for fear of their course becoming known 
through the spies of Dionysios at Carthage^. Among 
these^ it would seem from a somewhat confused story, were 
men of high position at Carthage, who were not ashamed 
to damage political opponents by betraying the secrets of 
the commonwealth^. It is most likely an exaggeration, 
but it is an instructive one, when it is said that, to avoid 
such dangers, the Carthaginian Senate made a' law that no 
man in Carthage for the future should learn Greek ^. 
This points to the shape which such communications took. 
It was all one-sided. That the Greek tongue and Greek 
arts were spreading in Carthage and other Phoenician cities 
we have seen from abimdant signs ^. But the Greeks who 
could imdenstand Phoenician must have been few indeed. 
We may believe that Himilk6n was quite ready to speak 
Greek on occasion, while we may be sure that Dionysios 
did not know a word of the language of Canaan. 
HIb deeti- This time the device of the Punic Shophet succeeded as 
PaaormoB. far as it could succeed. He and his fleet sailed forth from 
the haven of Carthage. The sealed letters were opened, 

\} Diod. xiy. 55 ; 'IfdXjwif 8^ toTs tevfifpnr^ais dwuri Jlo^r fiifiXiop lire- 
a^>paytffiUyoy, MXtwrtp 6yoiy€iy Srcw ittrnkt^oMn Hat woiuv rd yeypafifUifa. 
(Cf. PolysxL y. 10. 2 ; Front. Stmt. i. i. a.)] 

[^ lb.; vp6s rd fufiiva rS/y MaraatcSmwy dinyyHXai rhv lear&uKow rf 

[' JuBtis, zx. 5; ** Dux belli Humo CarthaginiensiB erat; cnjas inimiottB 
SuzuAtus potentiBBiinuB ea tempestate PoBnorum, qauin odio ejus Groda 
litterifl Dionyaio adventum exercituB et Begnitiem duds fiuuiliariter 
ptonuntiaBBet, oomprehenBiB epistolis proditionifl danmatur."] 

[* JuBtin, loc. dt. ; ** facto aenatuB oooaulto ne quia poetea Carthagini- 
enalB ant litteris Gneda aut aermoni atnderet ; ne ant loqui oum hoBte ant 
Boribere sine interprete poaset.*' The andden diange firom Greek to 
Semitic epigxaphy on the ooina Btruck during this period in the Carthaginian 
Epikrateia (aee above, p. 84, note i) ia a dgnificant commentarj on this 

[' See Sicily, i. 30a, and above, p. 83.] 


and the orders were found to be to sail to Panormos. ohap. x. 
What follows is not perfectly clear. The ships of burthen 
were to keep out in the open sea, while the ships of war 
were to sail to some point on the western coast of Sicily, 
and then to keep along the shore K The reason doubtless 
was that, by this means, Leptines would be more likely to 
foil in with the ships of war which could resist him, not 
with the transports with their precious burthens, which 
would be an easy prey. As it was^ things turned out the 
other way. It is not clear where the Carthaginian war- 
ships could have been when the watchers of Dionysios first 
saw the transports from some unknown point of the 
Sicilian coast'. As soon as they were seen, Dionysios Fifty 
sent orders to Leptin^ to sail against them with thirty ^^^nk 
triremes^ to charge them with the beaks of his ships^ and ^^^ 
to sink as many as he could. This work of destruc- 
tion was successfully carried out on fifty of the transport 
ships. The Greek ships sent them to the bottom, with 
five thousand soldiers and two hundred of the war-chariots. 
But the transports of Carthage had both sails and oars^; 
the wind was favourable to their course ; the oars were 
plied, the sails were filled, and the rest of the transport 
fleet came safely to Panormos ^. Himilkdn also reached the mmUkdn's 
same haven with his ships of war ; how he had escaped an embark at 
encounter with Leptines does not appear. At Panormos P»»o"'^<»« 
he disembarked all his forces; according to the report 
which gives those forces the smaller number, he was able 
to strengthen them by thirty thousand men brought to- 
gether on Sicilian soil ^. 

[t The meaainglesi " cb ri^ Ai^r ** of Dioddroi (ziy. 55) hae been 
connected '< <2f r^ Mor^.*' Holin (6. S. ii 435) aiisgeets kwi r^ Aik6fiatov 

[• Diod. jdv. 55.] [• lb.] 

[* lb. ; al dl XonrcU, mnrfipus oSdOi ttaX rdv dy€/»cv rcis larUks 8cx^fMMu« 

[' Diodftroe, ziy. 54, gives the more moderate reckoning on the authority 


oHAP. X. A campaign followed in which Dionjsios showed less 
Inconae- than his nsual energy, and allowed the fruits of his last 
action of year's victories to slip out of his hands in a way which it 
^°*' is hard to understand. There was always a suspicion that 
the tyrant was not thoroughly in earnest in his Punic 
warfare. It was whispered that he did not wish to press 
the enemy too far, deeming that, in some turn of fortune, 
Carthage might again be the support of his tyranny 
against SikeUot enemies^. And there were stories of an 
oracle, which he understood as a warning that too signal a 
victory of his Funic enemies would be followed by his own 
death'. On the other hand, it is quite possible that 
Dionysios had begun to doubt whether he could keep his 
distant conquests, so utterly cut ofE from the regions where 
his strength lay. And, so thinking, he may have deemed 
it the wisest policy to let them go by the chances of war. 
As far as our meagre narrative allows us to see anything 
at all, his outward course was that of a man who had set 
his heart 'on one object, to the neglect of objects of greater 
moment. Dionysios so busied himself with the si^e of 
Segesta as to let Eryx and Motya fall away from his 
grasp, almost without an effort to keep them. 
Snooeofbl Our narrative is indeed of provoking meagreness, a 
of HimiU strange contrast indeed to the full and vivid account of the 
^^^' taking of Motya. But we can see that Himilk6n set forth 

with the full purpose of winning back for Carthage all 
that she had lost, and that, as far as the barbarian comer 
of Sicily was concerned, he did so most thoroughly. He 
set forth from Panormos with his land-force, bidding the 
war-ships follow along the coast. But it is disappointing 
to find his acts set down only in such a style as this; 

of TImaioB. The eaLonlation which brought up ihe infaniiy of Himilkdn 
to 300,000 (see above, p. 87) was taken by him from Ephoroe.] 

[} Diod. ziy. 75. See pp. 14a and 149. Compare too the speech of 
nieoddros in the Syracusan Assembly ; Diod. ziv. 65-69, esp. 0. 68.] 

[• Diod. TV. 74.] 



He took Eryx by treason. He encamped before Motya, ohap. x. 
and, as Dionysios and his force were at that time before Motyaand 
Segesta^ he besieged and took it^.'^ That is all; we are taken by 
left to guess at every detail. We note indeed that Eryx 
was not surrendered, but betrayed. The betrayal was 
doubtless the work of some of the people of Eryx ; but did 
it express the feeling of all of them ? Had the men of 
Eryx, as a body, become weary of the alliance of Dionysios, 
perhaps of the presence of a garrison, or had there all 
along been a party by which the general hatred of Car- 
thage had not been shared ? It is yet more disappointing 
to come to another siege of Motya in the very year after 
the former, and not to be able to compare the two in a 
single point. The city was seemingly not surrendered, 
but taken by storm. The Sikel garrison of Dionysios 
might be true to their trust, and yet might not feel called 
on to make such a resistance unto death as had been made 
by Phoenicians warring against hope. We get no answer 
to the question where Leptin^ was at this time; nor is 
any explanation given of the seemingly strange obstinacy 
with which Dionysios clave to the attack on Segesta 
instead of marching with all his force to the relief of 
Motya. As has been hinted, his course in that matter 
may have been a blind. It would seem that, when Motya Dionysios 
was well lost, he was less eager to carry on the siege of j^^^f ^ 
S^;esta. The Sikeliots in his army were eager to carry on S^e"*»- 
the war to the uttermost ; seemingly by a march to give 
battle to Himilkdn K But Dionysios, &r away, it is said, 
from the cities in his alliance and finding provisions fail, 
thought it expedient to change the seat of war to other 
quarters ^. The words have a suspicious likeness to words 
uttered both by himself and by others at an earlier stage of 

[» Diod. iiY. 55.] [• lb.] 

[' lb. ; AiOM$ffior d/ta fikv fMicpiiw rS^ avfifMxi9wy wiknaw dwtwCfUvof, 



oBAP. X. Ills career ^. Then their meaning was sorely treasonable ; 
now we have no ground for suspecting anything more 
treasonable than the conviction that his successes of the 
last year in the extreme west had been a mistake. That 
we know so much of the siege by which Motya was won 
and so little of that by which it was lost may be because 
Philistos was at both times at the side of his master. But 
he might have given us — ^most likely he did give us — a 
clearer account of a siege of the heights of Segesta carried 
on^ as we may conceive it to have been, from the flat and 
muddy ground beside the Sicilian Skamandros. 
5f*"** ^ Dionysios, in short, now brought his second year's cam- 


to Syr»- paign to an end, and went back with his force to Syracuse, 
harrying as he went. He must have raised the si^;e of 
S^^esta; all else that he did in western Sicily was to 
enter into a negotiation with the Sikans or some of them^ 
proposing that they should leave their towns and enter his 
service. He woidd give them lands of equal value else- 
where ; and, when the war was over, he would lead back to 
their own homes any whose wishes were that way '. A 
few only agreed to these terms ; and those, it is said, only 
for fear lest they should be plundered by his soldiers^. 
At the same time one of the chief of the Sikan towns, 
Halikyai which had so lately joined his alliance, now sent 
an embassy to the camp of Himilkdn^ and went back to 
the alliance of Carthage ^. 

Dionysios then went back to Syracuse, leaving western 
Sicily much as it had been before he set out on the ex- 

[} After the fiulure of the alliei at 6eU, the << Council of Friends " 
Bummoned by Dionyiioe were nnanimoiiB in the opinion drcviri^dcior ttvoi 
rbp t6ww (Diod. ziU. 1 1 1). Cf. SicUy, iH. 571 .] 

P IMod. xiv. 55.] 

[• lb.] 

[* lb. ; &wi<miawf tk vapawKifaSen xal *AXucvaioi, ical wiftfMims wpiafitis 

himilk6n founds LILTBAION. 93 

pedition of the year before. He bad raised a great many chap. x. 
hopes, and be had shed a great deal of blood; but he had 
made neither lasting conquests nor lasting alliances. The 
Greek cities of the south coast had freed themselves before 
he set out, and the barbarian comer was a barbarian comer 
again. For twenty years he made no second attempt to 
make it otherwise ; it was only towards the very end of his 
days that he again adventured himself in those regions. 
Motya, for less than a year an outpost of Hellas, passed 
back into the hands of its old masters and inhabitants. 
But it was not any longer to remain a stronghold of any Motya for- 
power. Himilkfin decreed that Motya, as a city andjji^^^^ 
fortress, should exist no longer. Its position, as one of the ?°^J?**m 
seats of Phoenician power in Sicily, as its main seat on the kdn. 
western side of Sicily, was to be translated to a spot on 
the neighbouring mainland, a spot of which we have often 
heard, and where we have been tempted to wonder that no 
city of men had already arisen. On the most western 
point of Sicily, by the sacred spring, a new city was 
foimded, bearing the name of the spring^. Motya was 
forsaken ; we are told that such of the old inhabitants as 
could be found were invited to become citizens of the town 
which took its place*. Like Naxos, the city never rose 
again. The wall that gave way to the arts of Dionysios Site of 
is largely there, nearly everywhere in its line, in many 
places in its very stones. The great gateway still stands, 
at least in its lower courses. The line of the mole to 
which it opened is still plainly stamped on the waters. 
But all else is gone. The towering houses of Motya no 

{} Diod. ziii. 54 ; dvd rov ^piaros h 6vof»d(tro AiXv/3aiov. See Sicily, 
i. 371, and iii. 455. This spring from its supposed gift of soothsaying was 
afterwards connected with the Sibyl ; and its grotto was in Christian days 
hewn into the Baptistery of St. JoHn. Faxellas, De rebus Siculis, yii. i. 
The actual foundation of Lilybaion is recorded by Dioddros, zxii. 10.] 

[* Diod. zxii. 10 ; rohs ydp i« ravrtfs (sc. Morinji) {rro\fi<pBitrras d0poi' 
coasts Kor^KKrav cir rd Ai Av/Soiok.] 


CHAP. z. longer rise against the sky. Within and without the wall, 
wheat and vines and the other fruits of Sicily grow in 
abundance over the sites of streets and temples. The green 
island makes a cheerful contrast to the dreary saltworks 
that stretch along the coast both of the mainland and of 
the surrounding islands. And from forsaken Motya we 
look out on half -forsaken Lilybaion. Modem Marsala 
covers not much more than half the site of the city of 
Himilkon. And the point itself^ most western spot of 
Sicilian ground^ looks as we see it from the shore of 
Motya^ more like a fellow of lowly Aigithallos ^ than the 
famous headland which was held to part the seas of Africa 
and Europe. 

Site and From this time Lilybaion becomes the centre of Cartha- 
of LUy- ginian power in the extreme west of Sicily. It certainly 
^^^^' plays a more conspicuous part in the history of Carthage 
in Sicily than Panormos itself. In a military sense it 
certainly plays a more honourable part. Panormos was 
taken^ first by the Epeirot and then by the Romans; Lily- 
baion was never taken at all. Its harbour^ its general 
position^ could never have been compared to those of Panor- 
mos ; but^ as the point of direct communication with Africa^ 
it had an importance in Carthaginian warfare which even 
Panormos did not share. The point of Lilybaion had often 
been a camping-place for Carthaginian armies ^; one thinks 
that there must have been at least a permanent fort ; but 
there was as yet no city. But now a great city arose which 
took within its walls the most western point of the Sicilian 

\} The ancient name (of. Biod. zxiv. I ; Zonaras, viii 15) of the former 
peninsula, now the Isola Lunga and Borrome. Ptolemy also mentions 
Aigithanoe, which if probably the same aa a cape (&cpa) between lily- 
baion and Drepana. (See Schubring, Motye-Lilybemn, 57).] 

[' The only recorded instance is in Dioddros, xiii. 54, on the occasion of 
Hannibal's landing at this point in 409 B.a (Sicily, iii. 455). Whether 
he landed or encamped here in 406 does not appear.] 


mainland and the holy spring beside it. The new town chap. z. 
took the shape of an irregular four-sided figure^ two of 
whose sides^ the south-west and north-west, were formed 
by the coast on each side of the point itself. The inland 
sides, south-eastern and north-eastern, were formed by two 
gigantic ditches cut in the solid rock, a work as great as 
the ditches of Arques or of the elder Salisbury, but cut 
with far greater toil through a harder material. Of those 
ditches Polybios speaks with wonder ^, and a large part of 
them still remains to speak for itself. Of the walls of 
Himilkdn we have small fragments indeed; but there are 
some fragments still. 

The modem town of Marsala, in its Arabic name, given liiybaion 
it by the devotion of its Saracen conquerors^, not unfittingly J)|^ "' 
carries on the Semitic tradition of the Phoenician city 
which it represents. But it represents it only as the part 
represents the whole. The south-eastern and north-eastern 
sides of Marsala coincide with part of those of the old 
Liiybaion, and the ancient ditch is preserved along the 
whole of the north-eastern side and along a great part of 
the south-eastern. But Marsala nowhere touches the sea ; 
and it is plain that the ditches were carried down to the 
sea on both sides. The line of the north-eastern ditch can 
easily be traced. At the north- eastern comer of the present 
town, its direction has been changed to allow the building 
of a large bastion of the time of Charles the Fifth. Beyond 
that towards the sea the sinking of the ditch is clearly seen 
in the green fields. The walls on these two sides within the 
ditch naturally follow the Phoenician lines, and their lower 

\} Polyb. i. 43; rtixffft iut/^pSrrcas iitr^aXiciUvypf itak v4pt^ riupp^ 
fia0t(q. Dioddros (zxii. 10), speaking of Liiybaion on the occasion of its 
siege by Pyrrboi, says ; o{f<nfs 8i rtjs wSX^ats rd vKtttrrw ftipos kv $dK&ffay 
ras dvd rijs yrjs wpoaodovs irtix^ircv tctd w^fryovs wvKifO^ ^wolrfffay Mut r&^pow 
tfi^arrts fiiyay, ir.rA. In xxiv, 1 he speaks of khe fosse as extending from 
sea to sea and aa being 60 cubits in width and 40 in depth.] 

[* Mar$d Alt'^Hie haven of Ali ; not of Allah, as implied in the text] 


oBAP. X. course may keep traces of Phoeniciaii masonry, but they 
M°bii^ ®^ hsLve been patched up in every age, and they contain at the 
south-eastern comer the shattered medisBval castle which^ 
though planted on no great height^ is the nearest approach 
to an akropolis that Marsala or Lilybaion has to show. 
The other two sides of the wall of Lilybaion ran- along the 
edge of the sea. Their remains are slight^ and they are 
constantly perishing, but something still is left. To the 
men of modem Lilybaion the work of their PhoBuician 
founder seems to count for nothing. Much has clearly 
perished since the chief monograph of Lilybaion was 
written ^. Still, lying among the stones of the sea-shore, 
dashed by the waves or covered thick with the seaweed, we 
can . even now see some poor fragments of the wall of 
Himilk6n. It was a wall of squared stones, a vast advance 
indeed over the rugged masonry of forsaken Motya. Now 
and then we can see one or two still in their places ; many 
more lie as chance has thrown them, suggesting in the 
thick plaster which still covers not a few, that Phoenician 
Lilybaion may have shone as white in the evening sunlight 
as Saracen Tunis' or Kairouan. Here we light on a 
motdded stone ; here a luckier moment than all reveals to us 
the capital of a half -column graven by the hands of the 
men of Canaan ^. Here, by way of contrast, a fragment of 
a Doric column is built into a modem wall ; here is the 

[} Schabring^B Motye-LUyhmuin was published in the Fhilologns (Ko. 
xxiv. p. 46 Beqq.) of 1866. It ooold be no longer written as he does, " Die 
Matter am Meer ist noch ilberall in ihren Fnndamenten erhalten."] 

' Tania is distinctiyely iohite in Diod. xx. 8 {rbv Xwiehv T^rjra MtAoO- 
ftMvow). At present it does not seem whiter than the other Saracen towns. 
But we must remember that the Greeks themselves loved plaster as well as 
any Phoenician or Arab. 

' Guided by the sharper eyes of Mr. Macdonald of Corpus Christi 
College, I saw such a capital in 1889. I did not see it in 1S90. Whether 
in the meanwhile it has been destroyed or preserved I know not. It had 
the same approach to classioal form which we see in many medisBval 
capitals, but no mediaeval capital was likely to have strayed to such a 


stamp of an eight-Bided pillar Buch as may still be seen in ch^> ^ 
fallen Megara \ Beneath the waters we see the stones cut 
deep by man's hand ; near the point itself we can see the 
lower stages of two towers — ^they have perhaps a place in 
the story of Folybios ' — hewn out of the rock ; and hard by 
are the traces of the western gate, the gate that led from 
the main street of the western sea. It is something to 
follow the comparatively perfect wall of still inhabited 
Eryx. It is more to track out the primseval defences of 
forsaken Motya. But to pick one's way among the rocks 
and waves, stumbling here and there on a stone of forgotten 
Lilybaion, within a stone's throw of living Marsala, hard 
by the castle of the kings and the bastions of the Emperor, 
brings yet more home to us how the works of kings and 
Csasars and SAophetim rise and pass away. 

Modem Marsala contains within its walls but little that Marsala 
throws light on our story. Save here and there a Roman ekegUr, 
column built in at a comer — the acanthus leaves perhaps 
turned downwards towards their native earth — save one 
name of the days of the Arab which has lived throughout 
the base servility of modem nomenclature — all is of days 
that concern us not. But those parts of the walls of 
Marsala which do not coincide with any part of the wall of 
Lilybaion are of no small moment. They clearly represent 
an inner line of defence ; they form, not indeed an akro- 
polis, but a citadel within the city. Marsala takes the exact 
shape of the Roman cAesier^ and doubtless, from the same 
cause. When a city was founded on the spot where the 
armies of Carthage had so often encamped, its inner circuit, 
like so many towns in Gaul and Britain, took the shape of 
the camp. The north-western wall has a ditch, narrow and 
shallow compared with the great ones, and which the taste 
of modem Marsala deems it a good work to fill up, as it 

> See yd. L p. 388. 

' See Polyb. i. 47. We shall oome to it in tiine. 

VOL. rv. H 




The Ca%' 
earo of 


in land 
and sea. 

does also to pull down the wall at points seemingly chosen 
at random. The most marked single feature in the wall 
must be^ not of Punic but of Roman date. The line of the 
Casifaro — the name still lives-— of Marsala ^ must have been 
partly changed, like that of the High Street of Exeter. 
The gateway^ bearing the significant name of Porta Nuova, 
by which the Cassaro opens to the void space that was the 
open city, stands a little to the right of the spot where 
lately was a double gate of ancient masonry, clearly marked 
within and without. And not only was there the double 
arch in the wall itself; its fellow, the inner arch of the 
gate-houfle, was there also. Such a relic as this would make 
the fortune of a city of Britain or Northern Gaul. In Phoe- 
nician Lilybaion it is uncared for, and is left to be de- 
stroyed piecemeal, year by year, at the caprice of any to 
whom destruction is a sport ^. 

At Lilybaion, as well as at the neighbouring Motya, the 
relations of land and water have changed a good deal. The 
modem haven of Marsala, with its rich merchandize of 
Sicilian wine, the haven by which the last deliverer of 
Sicily made his way into the island, lies on the other side 
of the western port from the old haven of Lilybaion. In 
the geography of Polybios, the old one lies on the sea of 
Sardinia and the new one on the sea of Libya '. The de- 
scription implies that abiding error as to the shape of Sicily 
which has been mentioned more than once ; but it marks 
that the two havens lie on different sides of the most 
western point of the Sicilian mainland. The old one is in 
truth the southern end of the haven of Motya. It looks 
out on that low island, and on the yet lower islands — 

^ Cctstrum, xdffrpov, ceaster^ kcur, eassaro. One is delighted to find a 
place where the name is allowed to live on. In this matter Marsala has 
not sunk so low as Palermo and Taormina. 

' The double arches were perfect in 1887. In 1889 thej had sunk to an 
impost in one place and the beginning of an arch in another. 

[» SeeSicUy. i. 271.] 


a peninsula in Himilkdn's day — ^which shelter it. It looks ohap. z. 
out also to the north-east on the mighty mass of Eryx. To 
the north-west it looks out on the clearly cat oatlines of 
Aigousa and the neighbouring islands, which Folybios, 
under the influence of the same error, so strangely places 
between Lilybaion and Carthage. At the point where the Moles and 
great ditch reached the sea on this side, amidst masses of ^l^aion. 
ruined buildings, early and late, we trace large remains of 
the north-western wall of Lilybaion. We make out the signs 
of a sea-gate and of a mole stretching into the sea. And 
not far ofE we see the substructure of a small temple rising 
close above the waters, the house doubtless of one of the 
sea-faring gods of Canaan. Beyond to the north-east, the Ancient 
larger remains of another mole are clearly seen here and LUybaion. 
there above the waters ; beyond that now is a long spit of 
land trending northwards, whose end worthily bears the 
name of Punta cPalga. But it is doubtful whether this 
last is not of later formation. It may be that it was 
the artificial mole rather than any natural feature, 
which went far to meet the peninsula stretching towards 
it from the north. Between them they left but a 
narrow passage into the joint haven of Motya and Lily- 
baion ^. 

The ancient haven of Lilybaion, it will be thus seen, lay 
outside the town on one side, as the present haven of 
Marsala lies outside the town on the other side. It must 
therefore have needed protection to the north-east. It 
has been suggested that it was defended and joined to 
the town, after the manner of the Long Walls of Athens, 
by a wall drawn to the sea at the point called Portazza, 
This is a point which seems to have parted the haven itself 
from a small bay which then occupied the site of the present 

\} The fMnrXovf ctf rhv kt/Uva mentioned above. The sea at the actual 
entrance to the lagoon of Motya was onoe deep and the waves beat here 
with great force. See Polybioe, L 47.] 

H 2 -. ' - 


OHAP. X. fialtrmarshes ^ Within the ancient haven^ the water is 
^«. now of the very shallowest. The keel of the boat is apt to 

ancient , 

haven of touch the bottom, and progress is ever and anon checked 
^ ^"' by masses of sea-weed. This doubtless represents a state 
of things which has been coming on for ages, and which 
has cansed the removal of the haven to the other side. For 
a long way round the point of Lilybaion the sea is com- 
paratively shallow, and made dangerous by hidden rocks ^. 
But the haven of Lilybaion, when Lilybaion was chosen to 
be one of the chief seats of the maritime power of Carthage^ 
must have been deeper than it is now. In any case he 
who ventures his craft between PutUa Saiga and the main- 
land will have a lively impression of the shallows on whose 
hard navigation Folybios enlarges '. He may &ncy that 
he has in this small Mediterranean inlet learned somewhat 
of the experiences of Hanndn on the Ocean. He will be 
better able to appreciate the gallant deeds of Hannibal the 

P Sdhubring, op. cit. p. 73 ; " Meina Termuthung, es mdohtedaher durch 
eSne ui langer nunem das beicpiel der verbindnng Athens mit dem 
PeirMUB naohgeahmt worden sein, hat an ort nnd Btelle eine fiberrasohende 
beetatigung gefanden. Die atadtmaaer an der see setzt lich namlich in 
norddetUcher richtang jenieits der foma deile uaffi fort, l&oft wie vorher 
aaf dem felaigen ktistenrand bis an die Balina dea Giuieppe Polleri, wo einrt 
der alte hafendamm nch absweigte, jetzt aber die meergraizunge {Punta 
d'alffo). Die anlage des lalzwerkes hat jegliche ipor yerwischt ; doch 
begfaint die befestignng aaf deren ostlicher leite wieder nnd debt lioh am 
nferrande det hafens wohl erhalten bis snm thoim PorUiaa bin, dem 
* thor,* deisen name bedeatsam ist, und wo auch naoh der Btadttradition 
alte anlagen sich befunden haben."] 

[' Cf. Polyb. i. 4a ; 4<r^aXi(r/i^n;r . . , md rw6f^tv ht teX^m^r hi &v 
ioTiv tls TiAs Xi/Uiwt tUrwkcvs «oXX$f Ztofiimit ifi9€iplat Kai avnfOtfas, So 
too Veig. JEn, iii. 705 ; 

'* Et Tada dura lego Baxis Lilybseia csBda." 
The low promontory on whieh Lilybaion itood — now Cape Boeo — \b in 
fact continued out to aea as a broad reef of rocks and shoals.] 

[' In 1887 Mr. Freeman, in company with the writer, after circum- 
navigating the promontory of Lilybaion in a small yacht, tried to enter the 
lagoon of Motya, but was thwarted by a contrary wind. When near the 
old mole we put off in a boat in order to land in what was once the har- 
bour of Lilybaion, but the shoab and sea-tang made the task one of great 

HIMILk6n's expedition to N0ETH-BA8T SICILY. 101 

Rhodian^ who knew how to steer his way among shallowB, chap. x. 
seek- weed, and hostile ships K 

Lilybaion in short was Motya translated from its island Lilybaion 
to a point on the mainland at no great distance. The city ^ ^ 
and fortress were simply moved from one end of the inlet 
to the other. Lilyhaion took npon itself the duties of 
Motya. The history of the one city beg^s where that 
of the other ends. At Motya we have to look for nothing 
later, at Lilybaion we have to look for nothing earlier^ than 
the day when Himilkon decreed that Moiya should pass 
away and that Lilybaion should come in its place. Even 
during the lifetime of Dionysios, the new city was called 
^on to discharge the calling which it had inherited from the 
elder one, to act as the Semitic bulwark against Hellas. 
But this was not yet. For many years the great war 
between Syracuse and Carthage was carried on in quite 
other parts of Sicily. 

The war had thus far gone distinctly in favour of Himilkdn's 
Carthage. It was a war of Dionysios^ own beg^inning; toxO;!° 
and, as far as things had gone yet, he had lost all^^^^' 
that he had won, and Himilk6n had won back all that 
he had lost. Dionysios had withdrawn from the region 
he had himself chosen as the seat of war ; and Himilkon 
had made that region safer against any future attacks by 
the foundation of a city and fortress whose value was 
proved in many later wars. But the Punic commander was 
by no means disposed to a defensive course only. He would 
carry the arms, and, if he could, the dominion of Carthage 
into a part of Sicily which had hitherto seen nothing of 
either. He had secured the barbarian comer in the north- 
west; he would go on and win a new barbarian comer in 
the north-east. His object in the end was of course an STFMrase 
attack on Syracuse ; but he would make his way to Syra- mj^te 
cuse by a new road. He saw that no point in Sicily ®^i®^ 

[^ See PolybioB, i. 46.] 


CHAP. X. conld be of greater value than Messana. The deep haven 
Himilkftn's sheltered by the Banklon conld hold all his ships^ more than 

dengns on 

Messana. six hundred as they were ^. From that point he could hold 
the strait; he could hinder any help going to Sicily from 
the Greeks of Italy; he even hoped to hinder the allies 
of Dionysios in Old Greece from coming to his aid ^. The 
last time Messana had had any dealings with Carthage 
they had been of a friendly kind. Messana^ under the 
\ tyranny of Anaxilas^ had been at least a nominal ally 
of the Hamilkar who died at Himera^ By the treaty 
between Carthage and Dionysios the independence of 
Messana had been secured^. Since then, only yester- 
day, Messana, or at least her generals, had, out of mere 
jealousy of the power of Sjrracuse, without aiiy special 
grievance to allege against the lord of Syracuse, gone forth 
with at least the will to war against him ^. No war had 
really been waged; peace had been made, and since then 
Dionysios had put on a new character. He had become 
the champion of Hellenic Sicily. In that character he 
had Messana to his ally. We have not distinctly heard 
of any share taken by Messana in the two western cam- 
paigns ; but, as the horsemen of the city were at this time 
at Syracuse ^ we may infer that they had played their part 
in some of the warfare of the two years. We have no 
reason to think that the Messanians would in any case 
be other than zealous in the common cause, but just then 
Dionysios had in his hands most precious hostages for their 
faithfulness to it. Himilk6n doubtless knew all this, and 
he expected a stout resistance at Messana. Moreover it 
was the possession of Messana that he wished for and not 

P Diod. xiv. 56.] 

[' lb. ; fjkgi^t rds rwif IroAiArrfiy fiaqB^ias l/i^^cir gal rodt ix IIcAoiroy- 

[» Sicily, ii. 184.] [♦ acily, iii. 583.] [» Sec p. 59.] 

[• Diod. xiv. 56.] 


its alliance or its tribute. We hear nothing of any n^o- chap. x. 
tiations^ of any offer of terms. Himilkdn simply saw what 
a prize Messana would be in his hands^ and he set forth 
to take possession. 

His starting-point would naturally be Panormos. From Himilkdn 
thence the fleet and army of Carthage advanced in concert pi^ormo^ 
along the north coast of Sicily. If Himilkdn had no 
thought of offering terms to Messana, it did not suit his 
policy to deal in the like sort with all the places on the 
road. He had no mind to tarry, and it suited him better 
to win the towns over than to take them by force. Two 
places only are mentioned ; towards one of which nothing 
but the calmest policy could have kept back any Funic 
commander from dealing out the sternest vengeance. The The Hi- 
men of the Himeraian Thermai. now spoken of as men of Thermu 
Himem, were Greeks who had supplanted a Punic settle- rl-^P"- 
ment designed both as a trophy of Funic victory and as treated 
a defence of Funic territory^. They had by the treaty 
been recognized as immediate Carthaginian subjects^; and 
— as no exception is made-^it is to be presumed that they^ 
like the other Greek subjects of Carthage^ had taken a bloody 
vengeance on their masters at the moment of Dionysios' 
declaration of war^ Yet Himilkdn^ in his eagerness to 
strike at Messana^ and through Messana at Syracuse, could 
pass by all this^ and could receive the men of Himera to 
a relation which is spoken of as friendship ^. That word 
is vague ; but it at least implies a state above that of mere 
subjection ; it would mark the relation of Oela to Carthage 
rather than that of Selinous ^. That the men of Cephaloe- 
dium were also admitted to friendship is nothing wonderful. 
Himilkdn was just now acting on a veiy distinct policy 

P See p. 65.] [* See Sioay, iii. 580.] [' Died. xiv. 47.] 

[^ Diod. xiT. 56 ; iipds itih 'Ifupaiovf md robt rb Kt^aXol^w fpo^picr 

[• See Sicily, ilL 580, 581.] 


CHAP. X. of stirring ttp the Sikels against the Oreeks. We should 

Advance of be glad to hear what action he took towards any of the 

onMes- other Sikel places on the road, and especially how the 

'^'^ new foundation of Archdnides fared at his hands. But we 

hear nothing of Halsesa or any other point on the north 

coast eastward of Cephalcedium. The Punic fleet however 

did something in the way of warfare against a Greek city 

for which there must have been some special and unrecorded 

motive. Himilkdn sailed to Lipara ; he laid a contribution 

of thirty talents on the inhabitants^; whether he did 

them any further damage or received them to any kind 

of terms we are not told. 

With this addition to his military chesty Himilkdn again 
took to the land, and marched on towards Messana^ the 
ships sailing in concert al<mg the coast. It is strange that 
we hear nothing of the Messanian border-fortress of Mylai ; 
it may be that its peninsular position allowed him to pass 
Encamps by without either attacking or being attacked. After the 
voyage to Lipara we next hear of him as encamping at the 
north-east comer of Sicily, on the low gp:t>und of Peldris, 
by the salt-lakes and the temple of Poseiddn '. Messana 
was now very directly threatened. The blow was doubtless 
as sudden as a blow could be which needed so long a voyage 
and march. But the Messanians must have known that 
the Punic force was comings at any rate affcer it had 
reached Lipara. But though every man in Messana was 
hostile to Carthage^ though no man thought of surrender 
or submission, yet no fit preparation had been made against 
the coming of such an enemy, and men^s minds were sore 
perplexed as to the fittest course of action now he had 
come. It is now that we hear that the Messanian horse- 

{} Biod. ziv. 56 ; AtvApat 8^ rijs v^cav iytepari^s y€r6fttwos, rpt&Mwra 
^iXmrra vapdt tw KaroutoCvrotv r^ vrjcw iv/>df aro.] 

[* lb. ; KaTf<rTpaT<m49€WT€v M rijt n<X»^9or. The distaaoe given from 
Messana — 100 stadia— is over the mark.] 


men were at Syracuse, and we hear nothing of any message ohap. x. 
being sent to call them back to the defence of their own Perplexity 
city. The walls of Messana too were out of repair \ This niana. 
&ct carries us back to the vain attempt of the Messanian 
generals to wage war with Dionysios^. The walls can 
hardly have fallen to decay since the peace which followed 
that attempt ; the mutineers may have had specially good 
reasons for distrusting the wisdom of the enterprise. At 
any rate the weak state of the defences and the lack of 
time to repair them was the thing which most weighed 
down the hearts of the men of Messana. Some proposed 
to send the women and children and the most precious 
things among their moveable goods to the neighbouring 
cities^; that is^ we may suppose^ across the strait to 
Rh^on. The men, it would seem, were to stay and brave 
the worst, as Greek had now learned to do towards FhoB- 
nician and Phoenician towards Greek. Others, on the 
strength of an ancient oracle, looked for the best and 
not for the worst. It had been said in old time that 
the Carthaginians should carry water in Messana^. The 
interpretation put on this saying was of course that the 
Carthaginians were to become hewers of wood and drawers 
of water to Messanian masters. But both parties were 
united in a strong mind to do valiantly in their city's 

The first step taken for the defence of Messana was to Defence of 
send a chosen band of the younger men, the flower of the 
warlike force of the commonwealth, if not to assault, at 
least to watch, the Punic camp at Pel6ris, and to hinder 
the enemy from advancing further towards the city '. In 

{} Diod. xiy. 56 ; ftaXtara 8^ a^roifs tls i$v[iiar fyc r^ tc/x*? Karair€tr»- 
K^raJ] P See pp. 59, 60.] 

[' Diod. 1. c. . . . f If T^f dLonrfwrwas v^eif.] 

[* lb.; d/toOarrit ri woXoidr adroTf cZwu \6nftw 5rc Sci Kapyri^wiow 
t9potpopij<nu jford rj)y v^Air.] [' lb.] 

[* lb. ; mfKiffomus robt woKtfdovt Imfiatvur rrjt x^pasJ] 


CHAP. X. this Himilkftn saw his opportunity; he oould dash down 
upon Messana with his naval f orce^ while her best defenders 
Himilkftn were outside the walls. A north wind was blowing, and 
Sana by presently two hundred Punic ships, all in full sail with the 
^c^^o7 1 ^vouring breeze, were seen bearing down the strait ^. At 
earlier stages of our story we have heard of Messanian 
ships doing good service for the freedom of Syracuse^. 
Now we hear nothing of any attempt at defence by sea ; 
the Carthaginian fleet seems to sail in imhindered by the 
narrow mouth of the Zanklaian haven. As soon as the 
Messanian force at or near Peloris saw what was happening, 
they hastened back towards the city with all speed ; but 
before they could get there, the work was done*. We 
must suppose that the ships had taken a land-force on 
board ; for the Carthaginians seem to have invested the city 
by land as soon as they had command of the harbour. The 
words literally imply that they surrounded the town ^ ; but 
that is a hard thing to do to Messana on the inland side, 
and it may be enough to suppose that an assault was made 
at both ends. But there was nothing that could be called 
a siege; the ruinous walls were no defence; the enemy 
made their way through the breaches and got possession of 
the city ^. So we are told with a grievous lack of detail 
and local colouring ; when we are told of the various fates 
of the defenders, we can see that it is Messana that is spoken 
of. When the barbarians burst in, some were slain valiantly 
fighting ; a vast number made their way through the hills 
that overhang the city to the various fortresses of the 
Messanian territory *. Some became the prisoners of the 

[} Diod. xiv. 57.] 
[' See Sicily, iii. 40 seqq.] 
[» Diod. xiv. 67.] 

[^ lb. ; ol Kapxfi^ytoi vcpcorparovcSf^avrcf ti)k M€ffiHjvrj¥ . , .] 
[* lb. ; &d Tw ir*wTMc6rafif rc<x^ €l€r^<iffdfityoi rQ; w6\€cas licvpitwray.'] 
[* lb. i 6 Hk wokhs ix^^^t ^ ^^ napcucttfiiyvy dpwv Spft^cras, cts rd xard 
r^y X^pay fpo6pia 8ic<nr^.] 


enemy ; some who were cut off on or near the Danklon^ to chap. x. 
the number of more than two hundred^ threw themselves 
into the sea, hoping, we are told^ to save themselves by 
swimming to the opposite coa^t. The more part were carried 
away by the current ; but fifty are said to have made their 
way in safety to the Italian shore ^. Himilk6n led his 
whole force into the city, which must have afforded less 
human spoil than he may have reckoned on. The oracle 
was fulfilled. The Carthaginians, or those whom they Sncoeaafdl 
brought with them for such purposes, carried water in Mes- ^Mewa! 
sana^ but not as captives of the Messanians. Himilkdn's first Jj^ ^^^^ 
object was to get possession of the fortresses of the country^ ^ 
beg^ning doubtless with the predecessors of those which 
crown the hills above the city^. But the places were 
strong and held by men who made a stout defence ^. He Hlmilkdn'a 
turned therefore away from this smaller prey^ and gathered ap^^ g^^. 
his host together for the great object of all^ the march ^^^"^ 
upin Sy^cuse. 

He had a work to do on the road which led to the f ounda- His 
tion of a new Sicilian town, one which has become a^^j^^^^^^^ 
favourite resort of travellers in our own day. We have J*^^ 
marked his dealings with the Sikels of Cephaloedium on the 
north coast. In the east also the older people of the land were 
now again to show themselves. The Sikels of that r^on 
had long hated Dionysios^ and they had long wished for an 
occasion of declaring themselves against him^. His affected 
moderation at Henna had clearly been seen through ; even the 
grant of the site of Nazos to its Sikel neighbours had failed 
to win their hearts. All the neighbouring Sikel communities^ 
with the exception of the single town of Assorus^ turned 

[» Diod. xiT. 57.] 

P lb. ; t6 fi)r wpStrw iw€x*if»f<r§ voptfciV tA /mret rifi^ X^/nr <ppoCpuu] 

[' lb. ; To&rvy 8' hx»pSn^ &rrMt koI rvr elf aMi ffvjjort^vy&rvtf ytrifaiwt 

[♦ lb. xiv. 58.] 


CHAP. z. against him. As usual, the newer and less known danger 
seemed the less dangerous ; against Dionjsios the Sikels did 
not shrink from entering into the alliance of Carthage. They 
had had one day of hope under a leader of their own people ; 
they now looked for another at the hands of the enemy of 
their enemy. Himilkdn was not a man to let slip so great 
an opportunity. He saw a means of helping his allies and 
annoying his enemy^ of annoying his enemy the more 
keenly because he was able to torn his own a*t against him. 
By the gift of Dionysios the site of Naxos had again become 
Sikel ground ; but no Sikel city had sprung up either on 
the flat peninsula where Theoklds had settled or on the 
Himilkdn heights to which Naxos had looked up. On those heights 
Sikels at it suited the purpose of Himilkdn to outdo the gift of 
meDion. Dionysios. The lord of Syracuse had given them lands ; 
the Shophet of Carthage would raise them to the level of 
the Greek or the Phoenician ; he would give them a city to 
dwell in. It would seem that the Sikels of the immediate 
neighbourhood were already beginning to occupy the hill of 
Tauros ; but as yet they had no acknowledged leader^ and 
their dwellings were not fenced in with walls ^. Such a 
beginning Himilkdn was well pleased to encourage. The 
fortification of the Sikel post^ the foundation of the new 
city of Tauromenion, was his work^ the fruit of the Sikel 
alliance with Carthage. From that day to this the hill- 
side of Tauros has been occupied by a city of men^ girded 
in by walls which have withstood and yielded to many in- 
vaders, and which were to be put to a hard trial while they 
were yet in the days of infancy. Now or within the space 
of a few years the hill put on essentially the same &ce 
which the most picturesque of the towns of the Sicilian 
coast keeps to this day. Tauromenion — ^the new settlers 
gave that Greek name to their new home because they had 
made up their minds to abide on Tauros ^ — the Tabermin of 

^ Diod. xiY. 59. See Appendix IV. ' lb. See Appendix IV. 


the Arab, the Taonnina of modem times, arose on the hQl- ohap. z. 
Bide. The new dwelling-place of the Sikel looked down 
on the forsaken home of the first Greeks to whom Sikels 
had had to yield np the soil of their &thers. 

And truly no city upon earth sits on a stronger or more site of 
goodly site, or looks forth over a nobler prospect of land ^eoi^. 
and sea. Not sheer above the waves, but with a sandy 
beach between the wide sea and the mountain's foot, Tauros 
rises above its bay, its lower mass cloven by steep gullies 
and projecting points of rock, the heights above broken into 
a crowd of peaks varying in outline and in loftiness, shift- 
ing into endless groups as the eye follows them from 
various points of land or sea. The town itself must at 
all times have kept the same feature of a long main street 
running along a ledge on the mountain side, from which 
smaller side streets branch off upwards and downwards. 
Its extent has varied at different times. Its exact bounds 
in its brief Sikel day it would be hard to trace ; in later 
times, as a flourishing Roman city, it spread far wider 
than the modem Taormina. The present wall on the side Modern 
towards the bay is of far later date than the times with 
which we are concemed, and it has been commonly thought 
to be of Saracenic work. But on the north side, at a 
much lower level, may be traced a. far more ancient wall. 
Where that wall is best preserved, we may see two strongly 
contrasted forms of constmction side by side. There is 
a long piece of many perfect courses of whose workman- 
ship the engineers of Dionysios need hardly have been 
ashamed. Close by, continuing it in an unbroken line, is a 
walling of stones of various shapes and sizes thrown roughly 
together. Our thoughts fly down to the ancient wbU at 
Naxos ; but this on the hill-side is a less massive work of 
smaller stones ^. Lastly, there is the base of an angle-tower, 

\} Since Mr. Freeman's last Tisit to Taormina the present writer fonnd, 
beneath a covering of ivy and brushwood, a remarkable fragment of wall 




V¥all8 of 



of a piece with the rough wall, but built with somewhat 
greater care and of rectangular stones. In this ruder work 
we are tempted to see the witness of the first, the necessarily 
hasty^ fortification of Tauromenion^ which the Sikel wrought 
at the bidding of the Phoenician. The more finished piece 
is doubtless a rebuilding of the days when Tauromenioa 
had become a Greek city. The wall of which they are both 
parts marks a far greater extent for the town than that of 
the present Taormina. Such an extent Tauromenion un-> 
doubtedly had in later times^ and it may well have been 
so planned out from the first. Later walls^ of East-Roman 
or Saracen work, when for two hundred years and more the 
town was so often lost and won by Christendom and by Islam, 
would be far more likely to narrow than to enlarge the 
circuit of the ramparts. But further^ the town must have 
its akropolis, and for Tauromenion, as for Leontinoi^ though 
in so different a way^ nature has provided^ not one akropolis 
only^ but at least two. The ancient wall must have taken 
in that eastern hill of many points and siunmits, in a sink- 
ing of which a site was found for the &mous theatre^ where 
the Roman overlaid the work of the Greek. This is the 
height which men climb to see the sunrise of the Sicilian 
spring ^^ or to look on ^tna either sleeping peacefully imder 

which seemB to belong to a much more remote period. It lies just below 
the Capuchin Monastery, immediately to the right of the path that leads to 
the castle and the village of Mola. It is of huge, more or less polygonal 
blocks, — not here of lava as the walls of Kaxos below, — ^but of the native 
limestone of the hill on which Taormina stands. It is however of the 
same style and there can be little doubt that it belongs to the same period 
as the early work of Nazos, and one may infer that long before the founda- 
tion of Tauromenion the Nazians had established a castle on the hill of 
Tauros. It is likely that the earlier foundation became the nucleus of the 
new, and that this older piece of wall was included in the defences of one 
of its Akropoleis, This tells in favour of the suggestion (see Appendix 
IV.) that the hill of the theatre was one of the AkropoleU.'] 

\} These words are unfortunately no longer true. This, with others of 
the most interesting and beautiful sites of Taormina, has passed into the 
possession of an English proprietress, who has barred the access and warned 
off the civilized portion of mankind in four languages.] 


his mantle of snow^ or threatening again to pour down the chap. x. 
streams which hide the soil of Naxos. At the moment Two dkro- 
when Tauromenion was f oimded, he must have been already xauro-^ 
sending up his pillar of cloud to give warning that the™®"®^' 
powers of fire were about to take their share in the strife of 
men^. This height then, the height of the theatre, stand- 
ing out from many points in front of the town on the 
ledge, was one akropolis of Tauromenion ^. But there was 
another, steeper and loftier. Not in front of the town, 
but rather behind it, rising right above its long street, 
soars a rocky height, hard indeed to scale. Of its two 
summits the loftier is still crowned by a shattered fortress, 
which bears the name of the Castle of the Rock. Its lower 
point, a place of devotion and pilgrimage, is hallowed to 
Our Lady by the style of Our Lady of the Rock. Here is 
the second akropolis of Tauromenion. Of one at least of 
them we shall presently hear in our story. 

But the walled town and its two citadels were not all. 
Further from the dwelHng-places of its citizens, far higher MoU. 
again than the Castle of the Rock, with its upper part 
rising as a sheer precipice, soars a loftier height, too dis- 
tinct from the town to have been reckoned as an akropolis, 
but which was doubtless garrisoned as an outpost in time 
of need. Unlike the Castle of the Rock, this highest point 
of all is still a dwelling-place of man. A small colony 
still keeps its home in the hill town of Mola, a home to be 
reached only by the most sure-footed among men and 
beasts. Above the town the Castle of Mola again crowns 
the highest point of all. Even the Castle of the Rock, 
much more the Castle of Mola, might seem fit rather to be 
the eyrie of birds of prey than to be a human dwelling- 
place even of warriors. For a besieger of Tauromenion it 
was a work to climb to the town itself and to its lower 

^ Diod. ziy. 59. See below, p. 116. 

' Diod. ziv. 88 ; ida cUp^voXis. See Appendix IV. 


CHAP. X. akropolis; bat he who reached its rampaits might deem 
that the sky itself was peopled with his enemies. With 
defences such as these to watch over the infant settlement, 
the Sikels of Tauros might well flatter themselves that 
they should abide on Tauros as long as the mountain 
itself and the sea beneath it should abide. A new life 
might seem to be beginning for the long trodden-down 
Sikel folk. 

Defenuve The lord" of Syracuse had his eyes fully open to this 
tions of important accession to the strength of his enemies, Punic 
DionyuoB. ^^j Sikel. It was a time which called for vigorous action. 
The fleet of Dionysios was to be strengthened, but, to 
supply the new ships with crews, he was driven to the 
extreme measure of giving freedom to many slaves in 
Syracuse, by which means he manned sixty triremes, in 
addition to the fleet which he already had of a hundred 
and twenty \ He sent to his LacedsBmonian allies for more 
than a thousand mercenaries, and he went round to see 
personally to the strengthening and provisioning of all 
the fortresses of the Syracusan dominions. Among these 
his foremost care was given to the lately recovered strong- 
LeoQtinoi hold of LeontinoL The fortifications of each akropolis 
were strengthened, and abundance of com was brought in 
from the neighbouring plain ^. Among Syracusan fortresses 
was now reckoned that Aitna which had once been Sikel 
InSssa, prize of the warfare of Ducetius in the earlier 
day of Sikel hope ^ In a new Sikel uprising, that post 
was likely to be striven for again. Dionysios therefore 
sought to place so important a stronghold in hands which 
he could fully trust. Such he thought that he had found 

P Diod. xiv. 58.] 

[' lb. ; imfitKi<rrara 82 rcb h hucurrlvois dxpowoKfu Irccxio'c, icat rbv !« 

P Sicily, ii. 322.] 


in the Campanians whom he had settled at Katana. He chap. x. 
persuaded them to leave their new home by the sea, and to p^n^P^i^* 
occupy the inland Aitna ^. The men whom Dionysios had at Aitna. 
planted at Katana were of their own free will to make the 
same move which the men whom Hieron had planted there 
had been driven to make against their will. The change 
could hardly be thought a change for the better; the 
Campanians were called on to give hostages and to send 
some of the best soldiers of their body to come and join 
the tyrant's army at Syracuse ^. According to a later story 
which has somewhat of legendary sounds this special care 
for the outlying fortresses of Syracuse was partly to dis- 
tract the attention of the enemy in case of invasion^ and toi 
lessen the strength of his attack on the city itself \ But 
it was an obvious precaution to strengthen Leontinoi and 
In^sa and every other post on that side of Syracuse. A 
Punic host had now to be met which was not coming by 
the way of the African sea or of its coast^ but which was 
marching straight from the north, through the lands 
which had been Greek, but which Himilkon and Dionysios 
between them had so largely made barbarian. 

Having made all these preparations, Dionysios set forth Dionysios 
at the head of thirty thousand foot and more than three Katand. 
thousand horse, while the fleet of one hundred and eighty 
ships sailed in concert with them along the shore. The 
shore was his own at least as far as Katan& In whose 
hands that city was now the Campanians were moved to 
Aitna we are not told. KatanS, as a spot, fills the fore- 
most place in the events which follow; but of any in- 
habitants of KatanS, citizens, garrison, or any other, we 
hear nothing. Further north the Sikels were in possession 

[» Diod. xiv. 58.] 

[« lb. 61.] 

[' Polyainos, ▼. 3. 9. According to this storj it was part of the plan 
that the outlying fortresses should snxrender easily and thus draw off to 
themselves Carthaginian garrisons.] 




CBAP. X. of forsaken Naxos below and of new-bom Tauromenion 
above. It is clear that both sides had marked the northern 
Tanros as the spot near which their armies were likely to 
meet. It was a point which the one side had a special 
object in attacking and the other a special object in de- 
fending. As things turned out, the event of the march 
was determined at a point south of the northern Tauros ; 
but the narrative is made a little puzzling by the fact that 
the first halting-place of the Syracusan army was made at 
that other Tauros which overlooks the sea just to the north of 
Bionynoe the peninsula of Xiphonia ^. From thence Dionysios went on, 
' fleet and army moving together^ with all speed to KatanS ^ 

Are we^ in such a warfare as this^ to look on Dionysios, 
the destroyer of Greek cities, the planter of barbarian 
settlements on their soil, as worthy to be called a champion 
of Hellas, even though it is a Punic host that is marching 
against him? At Motya, with the remnant of Selinous 
and Himera, of Gela and Akragas, in his train, we can 
look on him as at least the Hellenic avenger, sent to do 
to the barbarian as the barbarian had done to the Greek. 
On his own side of the island, by desolate Naxos, by 
barbarian Katane, it is hard to look on him in that light. 
And yet we are again disposed to do so when we see the 
next act of his Punic enemy. Dionysios, in the working 
of a crooked policy, a policy whose shiftings it is not 
always easy to foUow, did not scruple on occasion to 
sacrifice Greeks to barbarians. But further than this he 
does not go. Himilkdn, on the other hand, begins his 
march against the Greeks with the utter destruction of a 
Greek city, as a solemn symbolic act, to make his hatred 
towards the Greek name known to all men ^. The taking 

[1 Diod. xiT. 58. See Appendix lY.] 

[' lb. xiv. 59.] 

[' lb. ; hawo9tt(dfi€yos oSv rd vpds Tots "EXkip^as fuaos ly rg ra)y Mc(r« 


of Messana had not been accompanied by any great chap. x. 
slaughter of its people. Himilkon had not had the MeBsana 
opportunity of rivalling the mighty sacrifice to the gods deateoyed 
of Canaan which his kinsman Hannibal had done at}^?^""^" 


Himera. Sut the walls and houses of the city stood ready 
for him to deal with as he would. Messana might be 
wiped out from the roll of cities of men^ though the mass 
of the Messanian people had escaped destruction. And 
so it was. The walls were first broken down and more 
than broken down, not merely slighted^ but rased to the 
earth ^. The soldiers were then bidden utterly to destroy 
the houses^ to leave neither wood nor tile, but to bum the 
one with fire, and to grind the other to powder*. Of 
temples and other public buildings we hear nothing, but 
they were not likely to be spared when so much care was 
taken to sweep away the private houses. Through the 
vast numbers of hands that could be set to work, the com- 
mands of Himilkdn were obeyed thoroughly and speedily; 
it could be said, clearly without much exaggeration, that no 
sign was left where Messana had once stood \ Himilkdn 
deemed that he had indeed struck a blow at Hellas. He 
had swept away the one among the Greek cities of Sicily 
whose position was the choicest of all. And it was a 
position so far away from any of her allies that he might 
have a good hope that it might never be restored. In any 
case it would be a long and toilsome work to call it again 
into being *. 

After this solemn .rite of havoc, Himilkdn set forth from 
ruined Messana with the Punic land-force, while Magon 
sailed along the shore with the fleet. The place of meeting 

\} Diod. ziT. 58 ; 'IfdXxwif 82 t^ Mtaaip^ r^ 7<^X>7 ««Ta<r«^ar, w^oa- 

fiXiTT, fr^r' dXXo fofih^ tuoKiwuv, dXkd. Tct fUr icaTOiKaO0^w, ret 5i uvyrphfxu.^ 


[' lb. ; 4 *^' Sji^worot ^p Svov wpdrtpw aMji^ 6Ucuff$at cvyifimwtv,'] 



CHAP. X. ordered for landmen and shipmen was under the hill of the 
Advance of northern Tauros, now all alive with the new city which was 
growing up at the bidding of the Punic general. The object 
clearly was to reach that special point before Dionysios could 
get thither. So far they succeeded ; but when the fleet and 
the army met before Tauromenion, they had at once to part 
company again. Nothing hindered the fleet from sailing 
on any whither ; but the land-force could no longer continue 
its march, as had been intended, along the coast. The 
powers of nature, the gods of the nether worlds sometimes 
; the devastators^ sometimes the defenders of Sicily, had 
Eruption, stepped in. iEtna was at work. We hear nothing this 
"*■ time of any destruction of cities — men perhaps on both 
sides had done enough in that way. But Himilkon setting 
forth from Tauros, presently found his further direct path 
southwards barred by fields and hills of lava not yet cooled, 
which had just poured forth from the crater of the moun- 
tain, and now covered the whole of the coast of Tauros ^. 
As Dionysios had not shown himself below the eagle's nest 
of his Sikel enemies, it was Himilkdn's object to gro forward 
and meet him nearer Syracuse. But with the still living 
fire-flood between him and his enemy, his only way of so 
doing was to make a long and toilsome march all round 
the huge base of the burning mountain. It was his busi- 
ness to make this march with all the speed that might be, 
lest a sea-fight with the Syracusan ships should come on 
while his own fleet and army were parted^. His course 
would lead him by the new seat of the Campanians at Aitna, 
and we most likely have the key to a negotiation which is 
recorded a little later. It was equally the object of Diony- 

{} Diofl. xiv. 59 ; npocrtpdron 5i mpds iitpayivrot Ite r^ Alrvrfs lUxP^ ^f 
BdKAmis, oifKirt Swardr ^v r^ ^^{^ arparidof ffv/Ampiytty wupaw\€orkrais 
rms pavtrir" lip$apfiiyc» ydip r&y wap^ Hfif 96kaTTa¥ r^vour inri r<w «aXou- 
fUvov fivoKOSf dyaytccSov ijy rb ir§(^ aTfiarSirt^oy ttpvwopt^taOai rhv r^; AXrvrp 


sios to bring on a eea-figlit^ while the land-force of Himil- chap. z. 
kdn was making its way through the inland regions. He 
wished to be able to occupy the shore with his troops^ as at 
once an encouragement to the sea-force in a naval action 
and a means of giving them help and shelter in case of 
defeat^. He so far succeeded as to occupy the shore by 
KatanS and to bring on the sea-fight before Himilkdn had 
finished his journey round ^tna. He sent LeptinSs on 
with the fleets charging him to keep his ships together, and 
not to break his line in the face of the greater numbers of 
the enemy ^. For the whole fleet of Magdn numbered no 
fewer than five hundred ships. Many of them indeed were 
only transport and merchant-vessels ; but they had all been 
furnished with brazen beaks^ so as to be able to take their 
part in a battle by sea^ 

The two fleets then met in the waters of Katane^ while Sea-fight 
the land-force of Dionysios kept the shore. A sea-fight by rg ^ 397.]' 
Katane is less easy to call up in imagination than a sea* 
fight by Panormos or Syracuse. For nowhere does the 
present line of coast so little represent the state of things 
that was even two hundred and twenty years back. Much 
that was then water available for naval warfare is now 
land, land formed by the vast masses of lava which 
have driven back the sea. Wherever the exact line lay, 
it was occupied by the Greek land-force, ready at once 
to encourage the shipmen by their presence and to 
give such help as they could to such vessels as might 
need it*. 

Dionysios himself kept on shore. His brother was the 

P Diod. XIV. 59 ; rd 8) fUyt<rrcVf tt r< 4rv/i$aifi ywiuBai mjtffiia, raU 

' lb. ; Acvr/yip^ fiiv dWorciAc /icrd woffwy rwy vtSav, ftapoYt^tkas 
&Bp6oi's roTr vkA/^oi povfiaxtii^, leat f/^l k6ttv H^ TiS^ir, Bws /til Kivhwtiffwriv 

' lb. ; <r^ Tuts iXjcAci /ttd tols 6\kaus rats ktrut^mnHSf oI^oas x<>^<f^oA<Mr. 


CHAF. X. recognized admiral of Syracuse ; yet the fight off KatanS 
was lost for Greece simply by the admiral n^lecting the 
wise orders of the tyrant ^. Leptines failed to do as his 
brother bade him and to keep his ships together. With 
thirty of the best he sailed far in advance of the main body 
Naval of his fleet. The first appearance of the Greek ships and 
Magftn oif ^^ ^^® shorc lined with the Greek fighting-men struck fear 
Katan^. f^j. ^ moment into the hearts of the Phoenicians. Some were 
only kept back from flight to the shore by the thought that 
by such a course they would only bring on themselves a two- 
fold attack. By the time Leptines drew near, such cowardly 
thoughts had passed away; all the ships of Carthage were 
in good order and awaiting the enemy with a stout heart ^. 
Mag6n was thus able to lead his whole force against the 
thirty ships of Leptines. Never did valour strive more 
stoutly against the odds of numbers. The fight at sea 
took the likeness of a fight by land« There was no place 
for subtle manoeuvres, hardly for the direct charge of beak 
against beak. Men fought hand to hand ; some fell into 
the sea as they strove to board an enemy's ship, some carried 
on the fight on the hostile decks ^. At last the division of 
LeptinSs^ the chosen thirty ships^ had to yield to the force 
of numbers, and escaped into the open sea. The failure of 
the admiral daunted the hearts of the Greeks and stirred 
up the spirit of the Phoenicians. The rest of the Gveek 
ships still kept on the fight^ but without order*. Presently 
they fled hither and thither^ the Carthaginians pursuing 
and destroying till they had sunk or disabled more than a 
hundred ships. Then the lighter and smaller vessels were 

^ Diod. ziv. 60; Atmrbnif . . . o^tc iv6»lipwsiikv dficvkcM 82 Htfj^en^iauro. 

* lb. ; tepiyayT€f oty vavfuix€iy, Stirarrov rets vavs ital rdv rSnr voktfuuv 
Mv\ow kieafiaS6Kcvy, 

' lb. ; TtF^s filv M rdf r&v kvayrivy vavs Ivtvi/dvrrcs Iviirroy tls rilp 
$&KaTTay, rtvU 82 icparijaairrts rrp iwifioXSji, Iv rats rS/v voXc/iW vcofaiw 

* lb. ; ai 82 Xoi«a2 ran^ v€w Muctok r^y MirX,ov¥ vcMO^/icyai. 


sent to take their place near the shore^ and to hinder the ohap. x. 
crews of the disabled ships from swimming to land. Not 
a few thus perished near to the shore^ under the eyes of 
their comrades who were unable to give them any help. 
Two thousand men of the Syracusan fleet thus perished. 
The navy of Carthage anchored off Katani. Those Greek 
ships which had neither escaped nor been sunk were, not- 
withstanding the neighbourhood of the Greek land-force^ 
drawn on shore^ as trophies^ we are told, to show the men 
of E^tane^ whoever the men of KatanS were just then^ the 
greatness of the Carthaginian victory \ 

Dionysios had thus seen the naval power of Syracuse, Dionynos 
under the command of his own brother, utterly defeated ^^ gy„^ 
before his own eyes. The land-force had been ranged on ®***®- 
the shore specially to help their comrades who were afloat^ 
and they had been able to do nothing. But the hearts of 
the men who had been thus constrained to stand idly by in 
the hour of battle did not fail them. The Sikeliot troops, 
those seemingly who were not Syracusans^ called on the 
tyrant to stop and meet Himilkon in battle. After the 
late victory by sea, the barbarians would in no way look for 
a Greek attack. They might therefore engage the startled 
enemy at an advantaged Dionysios at first consented. 
But some of his friends warned him of the danger if Magdn 
should at once sail against Syracuse ; from the waters of 
EatanS, the long line of the Syracusan hill seen &r away 
on the horizon might seem to beckon to him. An attack 
on the city by sea in the absence of its land-army might 
put Syracuse itself into Carthaginian hands. It was in the 
like sort that Messana had become a prey to the barbarians. 
Dionysios therefore withdrew his orders for waiting to 

* IMod. ziv. 60 ; Aorc rocf Karoni/ocr f/^ ft&rw ^wffrbr dAAci mt Btotptf' 
[» lb. xiv. 61.] 


CHAP. X. engage Himilkon and began a march straight for Syracuse. 
Defection To the men who had called for the bolder course the defence 
^ ^ of Syracuse was a matter of less moment than it was to her 
own master. Yet it was hardly a sound Sikeliot patriotism 
which led most of those soldiers of Dionysios who were 
Sikeliots but not Syracusans to forsake his army on the 
march. For^ whatever might be said of the tyranny of 
Dionysios and of the frequent ambition of Syracuse even 
when not under a tyranny^ stilly at that moment^ Dionysios 
was the champion of Greek Sicily and of all Hellas^ and no 
blow to either could be so heavy as for Syracuse to fall into 
barbarians hands. Sut to the Greeks who came from other 
cities than Syracuse the tyrant's change of purpose seemed 
either simple cowardice or else betrayal of the general cause 
of Greek Sicily to the special needs of his own city. They 
largely betook themselves^ some to their own cities^ others^ 
it is said^ to the neighbouring fortresses ^. Dionysios there- 
fore had to march on to Syracuse with a force sensibly 
Land- Two days after he set out^ Himilk6n came by his round- 

^^Vdn A^ut 3>^oad to the shore of KatanS. He was in full 
]^"^ possession both by land and sea. He had marched round 
the lava and the source of the lava, and nothing now stood 
in his way to keep him from pressing on against Syracuse 
both by sea and land. But he did not hurry; he gave 
some rest to both branches of his force. The ships were 
all drawn up on shore^ and he gave his land-army a few 
days' rest after their toilsome march. Those days he em- 
ployed in sending an embassy to the Campanians at iEtna, 
calling on them to forsake the aUiance of Dionysios and to 
accept that of Carthage. He bade them remember that 
their countrymen at Entella were zealous on the Cartha« 
g^ian side^ and he painted the Greeks as the common 

P Died. xiv. 6i ; 61 i^kv tU t6s lUas narpUhSt ol 8' cb rd lYfvs rSnf ^pov* 
fHw drcx^^crai'.] 


enemies of all other nations ^. The Campanians hearkened^ ohap. z. 
and were strongly inclined to come over to the Cartha- 
ginian side. Sut they remembered their hostages in the 
hands of Dionysios and their comrades in his service, and 
they abode in the Syracusan aUiance '• 

The darkest of all times for Hellenic Sicily seemed now Synciue in 
to have come. Till the present war, till the present cam- ST^^^"^ 
paign, the eastern side of the island, the side which looked 
towards Oreece, the side on which Greeks had first fonnd 
themselves a home, had been free from Phoenician attack. 
On that side at least no barbarian enemy was ever dreaded 
save the old inhabitants of the land who were fast ceasing 
to be barbarians, and their kinsfolk from Italy whom the 
Syracusan tyrant had brought into Sicily as defenders of 
his power. The old Hamilkar, the more recent Hannibal, 
had wrought their will on more distant parts of the island, 
on Himera on the north, on Selinous, Akragas, and Oela 
on the side looking towards their own continent. But 
now the men of the East, settled in the West, challenged 
and overcome in their western strongholds by European 
invasion, were advancing against the eastern cities with 
terrible force. Phcenician loss at Eryx and Motya had 
been more than revenged by Hellenic loss at Messana and 
at KatanS, by the defeat of the navy of Syracuse in the 
Katanaian waters. The enemy was on his steady march 
towards Syracuse herself. One small gleam of hope alone 
there was ; in the fidelity of the barbarians settled at the foot 
of ^tna. Dionysios, feeling the danger, but not cast down 
by it, sought for help in every quarter. A chosen envoy, 
the tyrant's own kinsman Polyxenos, was sent to the Greek 
cities of Italy, to the old ally at Sparta, to the ever-ready 

P Diod. xiv. 6li leal koMKov tk rh tw 'EXXijiwr yipos dvcSc&cyvc iro\^- 


CHAP. z. metropolis at Corinth, praying, in the name of common 
Appeal of Hellenic brotherhood, that they would not suffer Hellenic 


to Corinth, cities to be overthrown by the barbarian, or stand by 
and see Hellenic life utterly swept away from the soil 
of Sicily^. And with these powerful appeals to loftier 
motives, Dionysios knew well how to mingle those meaner 
inducements of which he had a wide experience. The 
Hellenic champion was also the bountiful paymaster of all 
-stout soldiers, Greek or barbarian, who would draw sword 
in his service; the wealth of Syracuse was not yet ex- 
hausted ; the tyrant sent his officers into Peloponnesos with 
orders to gather all the mercenaries that they could, and to 
spare no cost in so doing ^. But before an ally or a 
hireling could come from Greece or from Italy, Syracuse 
looked out on a sight such as she had not seen since 
Demosthenes and Eurymeddn came in all the pride of war 
to cheer up for a moment the filing hopes of the host of 
Cartha- Kikias. The Great Harbour again saw the entrance of an 
eiS^ the CJiemy's fleet, and this time an enemy flushed with victory 
Great Har- ^y^j. ^j^g naval power of Syracuse. Two thousand Punic 
Syracuse, vessels sailed without let or hindrance between PMmmyrion 
and the southern point of Ortyg^. First came Himilkdn 
with his two hundred and eight war-ships, all in goodly 
array, their oars beating the water in perfect measure, each 
ship adorned with the rich spoils of so many Hellenic cities 
and of the fleet of Syracuse herself. The transports fol- 
lowed ; ranged close together, the Great Harbour, great as 
it was, was filled with them; all things were hidden by 
the dense mass of sails that the navy of Carthage opened 
to the breeze^. The vast fleet presently lay at anchor, 

P Diod. xiv. 6a ; /o^ vc^idciV rdtt Ir SiircMf wSkus rwv 'EXXifvem^ ApStiw 

C lb.; (vtfjapt 82 teat ^twokSyovs tls ncXov^yyi/aor ficret voXX&r XAvM^^^^t 
iFrctXdficvor (&$ vXciorovr d0poi(€iv arpartinas, fifl ^iZoiUvow rw /ii<j'0a)v.] 

[' lb. ; <nfy40aiy€ rhv Xi/Uva rStw XupaMovffUav, niittp Surra ftijav, l^vc- 
^p&xOai fihf ToTs oic6^§<ri avyMakiwT€a$€u 82 ffx*^ Sanarra rots 2<rrlocf.] 


HIMIIiK6n encamped in OLYMPIBION, 123 

carrying dismay by its presence to every heart in Syracuse ^. chap. x. 
Almost at the same moment, so well had the Punic general 
laid his plans, the land-force come in sight from the other 
side. That must mean from the side of Katane ; the army 
must have marched beneath the new-made wall of Dio- 
nysios and have compassed the western end of the long hill 
of Epipolaij while the fleet was sailing along the shore of 
Achradina and Ortygia. Again^ within less than twenty C«rtha- 
years^ the banks of Anapos saw the encampment of a be- ^'^ped 
sieging enemy, and this time not a Greek but a barbarian oj^^>«" 
enemy^ the bitterest foe of Syracuse and of all Hellas. 
The old camping-ground of the Athenians again became 
the camping-ground of the Carthag^ian ^, but with one 
memorable difference. The devout Nikias had feared to 
draw on himself the wrath of Zeus and had forborne the 
great military advantage of taking the Oljrmpieion within 
his line of defence. To Himilk&n Zeus and all the gods of 
Hellas were as nothing; the profanation and overthrow of 
their sanctuaries was an acceptable offering to Baalim and 
Ashtaroth ; and^ when we look on the venerable columns 
which still mark the spot, we may be thankful that he 
was satisfied with profanation and did not level the ancient 
temple with the ground. Sut he pitched his tent within Himilkdn's 
the sacred precinct, if not within the very temple itself*, oira^ * ^ 
Here on the higher ground of Polichna, on its northern V^^on, 
side^ were the head-quarters of the general ; to fix the exact 
extent of the encampment of the vast and motley host^ 
three hundred thousand foot — so our numbers stand — and 
three thousand horse, was less easy. Our data are some-* 

[» Diod. xiv. 6a.] 

[* From the distance from Synoase given — twelve stadia (Diod. 1. c.) — 
it appears that the main body of the Carthaginians enoamped beyond the 
Anapos^ whieh, aooording to Plntardh (Didn, 2J), was ten stadia distant 
from the waUs of Syraonse (of. Holm, G. S. ii. 436, and see Appendix V .] 

[* Diod. ziv. 6a; *lt»i\Mam Marwu^vwrw iw r^ rmi Ai^t rcfr; and of. 
xiy. 76, voci}0'a/Myof iritrivi^v h rf rov At6s ^(P9^0 


cHAF. X. what vague ^. The camp seems to be spoken of as some- 
Potiiion of thing distinct from the head-quarters of the general ; but 
camp. the two were of course in close connexion. The Cartha- 
ginians, we are told, encamped on the same ground as the 
Athenians; but such a description would be satisfied if 
any part of one camp coincided with any part of the other. 
And it must not be forgotten that the Athenians occupied 
two sites at different stages of their warfare. Part at 
least of the camp was on a low and marshy ground ; but 
there is low and marshy ground on more than one side of 
Polichna. The camp again was twelve stadia from the 
city; but all such measurements are somewhat uncertain, 
and we are not told from what point of the city to what 
point of the camp the measuremenf is made, or whether it 
is made in a right line or along any road. But the chief 
requirements seem to be met by giving the camp an extent 
which leaves the north-west comer of Polichna, including 
the temple, as outside the actual camp, while it stretehes te 
the north a little beyond the Anapos, and reaches the sea 
te the south at about the middle of the bay of Daskon. 
Such a position takes in both higher and lower ground, 
and some of it marshy enough. It would thus roughly 
coincide with the first camp of the. Athenians, but would 
streteh further te the north. That the general should find 
comfortable quarters for himself, perhaps for all the native 
Carthaginians in the army, while the mass of the host 
were left te fare as they might in the swamp, was charac- 
teristic of Punic warfare. The myriads of Himilk6n were 
mainly mercenaries gathered from every quarter; of the 
lives of such troops the generals of Carthage were ever 
reckless, and never thought of the tender care which Nikias 
showed towards the free citizens and allies of Athens. 
Still Syracuse was now threatened by land and sea, by such 
a host as had never before come beneath her walls. She 

[■ See Appendix V.] 


might well look for worse than the &te of Selinous, of chap. x. 
Himera^ and of Akragas; it was not now an army and 
a general of a past generation that had to be avenged ; it 
was the fresh blood of the slain of Motya that cried for 
vengeance against the men and the gods of Hellas. 

Himilkdn began his work with a solemn display of his Military 
force on both elements. All the myriads of his land-army demon- 
were drawn out in battle array before the walls of Syra- "*'*\**on 
case, the new southern wall of Epipolai, the hardly finished Synctue. 
works of the reigning ruler. A hundred of his best ships 
sailed forth and beset the island on both sides, making their 
way into the Lesser Harbour as well as the Greater \ Syra- 
cuse was to be made to confess that Carthage was the 
mightier power, alike by sea and by land '. The land-force 
called on the men of the besieged city to come forth and 
fight. None answered, and the host marched back to the 
camp. No assault was attempted ; Himilkon sought an- Syraousan 
other means of enriching his own men and striking fear into „^^JJ 
the men of Syracuse. For thirty days a pitiless ravaging 
of the whole land went on. He then advanced further j 
he occupied the region which our historian calls the j)ro^ 
asteimi of Achradina — ^Qforhuryy to transfer a local word 
from some English town ^. This must be much the same 
region as that which sometime back was spoken of by its 
later name of Neapolis ^, the district, still unwalled, which 
lay west of Gelon's wall of Achradina and south of the wall 
of Temenit^ and the new wall of Epipolai ^. Here Himil- 
kon did one deed which, in the belief of every devout Greek, 
destroyed all his hopes, up to that moment so brilliant, of 
success against Syracuse. Somewhere in this unprotected 

\} Diod. xiv. 62.] 

[■ lb.; twws KorawXii^rfrm, ro^ icoTd rifi^ fr6\t» koL tnnravorfK&ajf ffvyx»p*if^ 
IJTTOvs cTvoi Ktu /rarct MLXarroK.} 

[* lb. 63 ; tcaT§?Ji0€ro 8) icai t6 t^s 'Ax/w&i^ wpodtrrtioy.] 

[* See p. ai.] 

[' See p. 56, and note i.] 


oHAF. z. region^ somewhere on the lower terrace of Fusco and Galera, 
Temple of stood the temple— perhaps the twin-temples — which Gelon 
m,a the had built to the patron- goddesses of Hellenic Sicily, Demeter 
^^ ^^^' and the Kore. The Punic general had wrought one act of 
Himilkdn. sacrilege by encamping in the sacred precinct of Zeus ; he 
went on to one yet darker by plundering the temples of The 
Ooddesses. In counting up his misdeeds, the irreverence 
towards Zeus is not left out, but it is the robbery of The 
The Ooddesses which is specially dwelled on ^. The vengeance 

avenwedT ^^^ ^^^^ Crime, the special curse of sacrilege, now began to 
fall upon Himilkon and his host. The great manifestation 
of divine wrath came a little later ; but there were signs 
already. From that moment the hitherto unbroken success 
of Himilkon began to fail him. Dionysios took heart ; he 
led out his men to sallies and skirmishes, in which the 
Syracusans often had the better. But the wicked flee when 
no man pursueth; ofttimes in the night-season was the 
Punic camp disturbed by sounds and rumours of visionary 
enemies ; men ran to their arms and formed for battle, as 
if besiegers had been breaking down the defences of the 
camp, and lo there were none ^. Hitherto those defences 
had been only a trench and palisade ; but now, to secure 
himself at least against bodily enemies, Himilkdn sur- 
rounded his camp with a regular wall ^. But in so doing 
he found an occasion of sinning yet more. The circuit of 
his fortified camp took in many tombs of the Syracusan 
dead, and among them the most venerated tomb of all, and 
the one on which a patriotic Carthaginian would look with 
the bitterest feelings. Hannibal had avenged the wrongs 
of his own house on the men of Himera, the death of 
Hamilkar had been atoned for in a mighty offering to 
the gods of Carthage. But Himilkdn could do yet more. 
Before him, within the line traced out for his camp, rose in 

[» Cf. Diod. xiv. 63 and 77.] [» Died. xiv. 63.] 

[» lb.] 


all its pride the tomb of the victor of Himera^ the stately chap. x. 
pile which Syracuse had reared to the honour of her second 
founder Gelon. The tomb of Gelon, along with the tomb Destruo- 
of his wife Damareta, was now swept away by the bar- oeldn b 
barians. The towers which surrounded it were left to be the ^^^' 
prey of a later tyrant. For better defence of his position^ portB bailt 
and specially of his fleet, Himilkon now built three forts, ^^ ^}^^' 
one on Plemmyrion, one, the fort of Daskon, in the middle 
of the harbour, the point surely which divides the two bays, 
the point which parts the flat shore to the north from the 
cliffs to the south. It must have stood on the narrow ridge 
of higher ground between the salt-works and the sea. The 
third, that of Polichna, was to guard his own immediate 
head-quarters ; it rose hard by the holy place of Zeus, per- 
haps within the very precinct, at any rate on one or other 
of the brows above the hollow road that crosses the hill ^. 
By this time Himilkdn had found out that the siege was 
likely to be a long one ; he stored up com and wine and 
all needful things in his three forts, and he sent forth 
merchant ships to Africa and to Sardinia to bring in yet 
further supplies of com and provisions of all kinds for the 
host before Syracuse. 

Meanwhile Polyxenos had not been idle on his mission to Arrival of 
Italy and Peloponnesos. From the allies of Syracuse in^l^gi^^" 
those lands, he had gathered together thirty ships of war, co^^^ent. 
under the command of the Laeedsemonian Pharakidas^ 

{} Dioddroe (1. c.) simply says of this fort that it was teard. rhv vt&v rod 
Ai6s. For the poBition of the forts see Appendix V.] 

' Diod. xiy. 63. [From Polyainos ^ii. 1 1) we learn that Pharakidas on 
his way to Syracuse took nine Carthaginian triremes. He manned them 
with his own men, and the Carthaginian vessels on the watoh off Syracuse, 
seeing as they thought their own squadron retiurning, let Pharakidas enter 
the harbour with his ships unopposed. Cp. Frontin, i. 4. i a, where the 
number of the captured vessels is given as ten. Pharakidas, as Beloch 
has shown (Rhein. Mus. zzziv. 124)1 i> in aU probability the Pharax of 
Xenophon (HelLiii. a. la) and Theopompos (a 18 Mttller) who was Spartan 
Nauaroh in 597. From this he inrers that this was the real date of th« 


cHj^p. X. His coming was presently followed by a remarkable episode 
in the war. Dionysios and his brother Leptines sailed forth 
with some ships of war^ to act as a convoy to vessels bring- 
ing provisions to the besi^^ city. The Syracusans are 
described as being thereby left to themselves ^ ; but some 
one must have been left in military command^ whether 
Pharakidas or any other. Whoever he was^ he was vigorous 
Naval enough in action by sea. A Punic corn-ship was seen 
SyraOTswis. entering the harbour. Five Syracusan ships were at once 
manned and put to sea^ and the prize was brought in to 
the city. Forty Punic ships then sailed forth, to be met by 
the whole number of Syracusan ships that were still in the 
docks and to suffer defeat at their hands. Twenty ships were 
^taken by the Greeks and four sunk. Among the former, 
we are told, was the admiral^s ship ; but if Magdn, who 
afterwards plays a great part in the story, had become the 
prisoner of Syracuse, we should surely have heard of it more 
distinctly*. The victorious Syracusans — we are not told 
their numbers — sailed straight to the Punic naval station, 
by Daskon we may conceive, and challenged the whole 
armada of Carthage to come forth and strive with them on 
the waters. The Carthaginians kept still, and the Syra- 
cusans sailed to the city with their prizes. 

This picture of naval warfare in the Great Harbour, clear 
enough as to the main facts, but lacking the living power 
to call up the scene before us, makes us feel the loss of the 
great master who was our guide only twenty years before to 
war&re on the same waters. We long yet more for his 

mege of Syracuse, and by the same reasoning the capture of Motya falls 
in the year 398.] 

^ Diod. xiy. 64 ; /icrot tk rcurra 6 Aimr&irios n\v mt Ajtwrivrff ftcrd /uuepuiw 
vtw dyopdy fiov\,6/A€yot vapaMOfdffOi ... ol 9^ Zvpcurovaioi imtf* airrais re 7cyd- 
/icroi mUxoTctTi/x^yJd^rrcfinnTTdKvXoroF wpoa<^p6fttvo¥. Something haa 
dearly dropped out after mpa»o/d<riU, but most likely only a word or two, 
the verb to Atw^ciot nai Atwrlvtp, 

' lb. ; T^ f re OTfxiniyibos rc«^ iitvpl€wrt» Mat rSav d\>My tUoffi lad Wrra- 


guidance when we come to what we should have hardly ohap. x. 
looked f or^ the report of the debates in a Syracusan assembly 
summoned by Dionysios. It was preceded by less regular 
gatherings. The people of Syracuse, hating the tyrant, 
began to compare his many defects, above all his late 
defeat before Katan^, with the victory which they had 
themselves won in his absence ^. Men came together and 
stirred one another up. They would no longer be the 
slaves of Dionysios. The time for deliverance was come. 
Hitherto they had been without arms ; now they had arms 
in their hands and might defy him '. While men's minds Debates in 
were in this state, Dionysios came back, and, as the story f,^^^ 
runs, he gathered a regular assembly of the Syracusan 
people ; he made a speech to them, praising their late ex- 
ploits, and bidding them be of good cheer, for he pledged 
himself to put a speedy end to the war ^. He was about 
to declare the assembly dissolved, when an unexpected turn 
was given to the proceedings by the rising of an opposition- . 
speaker. Theoddros, one of the equestrian order of Syracus^ Speech of 
a man of renown and energy, dared to address the assembly 
in a long harangue against Dionysios and his tyranny K 

A speech like this is not like a speech in Thucydid'ies. 
When he is our reporter, if we do not hear the actual words 
of Hermokrates or Athenagoras, we may well hear some 
echo of them ; at the very worst we hear such arguments 
as the most observant of contemporaries looked on as likely 
for them to have used. Here we are listening to a mere 
rhetorical exercise, possibly the invention of Diodoros him- 

^ Died. xiy. 64; 5iaAo7<fo/i«yoc rbv /aIv Atopiiaioy nXtopAxis ^rTijfi4yoy, 
ahrobs 8^ X^P^^ kxttvov vtwuajM6Tas Eapxt^ylovSt ^ppovrifMros Irnktipowro. 

* lb. ; rbv ftiv 7^ tiapoaB^v "xpovw {aay ApcavXtafUyoi, r6r€ Z\ did rhy 
ir6\tfwy T&y 6vkvy i(<rar Kvpioi, 

* lb. ; <nfyayay&v IteKkijffiay iwgvti to^s Sv/xurovo'iovr mi ira^cir(iXci 9appuy 
iwayy€XX6fA€yot rax^ftw tcaraXiucrtiy r^ v6k€ftoy, 

* lb. ; ^9fi 8* ttOrov lUXXayrvs 8iaXi;cii' 7^ lirirXi/a/aif, ilrcurrdf Oc^Soi^r 
6 IvpmcQ^iot, iy to» Iwcvair MomiiSiy aal homfy ttyai wpaucrucbs, drc roAfUf^c 
vtpl 7179 iktv$9plaM nHwhois xfh^*'^^ XAyois, 



CHAP. X. self, far more likely to be the work of Timaios or some one 
Speech of else nearer to the time. Of a real speech delivered by 

TheoddnM. . 

Theoddros or any one else we are not likely to have the 
faintest echo. We are not so near to listening to a real 
orator^ as when Tacitus, professing to report the famous 
speech of Claudius^ really does report its general argument^ 
though not only the words, but the particular illustrations 
chosen, are the historian^s own ^. Our only chance is thsA, 
^ among the ordinary common-places of a speech on so well- 
|wom a subject as freedom against tyranny, we may light 
ion a few scraps implying local knowledge or handing on 
local traditions. And one or two such perhaps there are in 
the alleged speech of Theod6ros. All the evil deeds that 
Dionysios had done, all the good deeds that he had failed to 
do, all the mischief that he had allowed the Carthaginians 
to do^ all this is of course put forth in the strongest light. 
He had driven out the people of Naxos and Katane, and had 
handed over Katane to the Campanians ; the orator fails to 
tell us in whose hands KatanS was at the exact moment of 
the battle. He had slain and banished citizens of Syracuse 
itself, he had filled the city with strangers and emancipated 
slaves and mingled folk, and had given to them the wives 
of the banished citizens. All this is obvious; in any 
harangue against Dionysios these counts must find their 
place. But in the account which the accuser gives of the 
war which was still waging^ there are one or two points 
which are worth some notice, and which may perhaps point 
to a narrative of some of its events different from that 
which the historian himself has given us. 

The war itself is attributed, most likely with reason^ to 
Dionysios^ fear of revolts against his tyranny. Any scruples 
that he had^ says the orator, about breaking his oath to the 

[} The speiH^h itself is preaerved on a brazen tablet at Lyons and Is 
printed in Bran's Fontes laris Komani, p. 156. Taoitos* report comes 
Ann. xl. c. 24.] 


Carthaginians were less strong than his fears of the few chap. x. 
elements of freedom that were left in the SikeUot commu- ^^^ o^ 
nities ^. Yet we may be sure that the most popular king 
or magistrate would not have lost credit among his people 
by breaking such a treaty as that by which Dionysios had 
bound himself. The account of the western campaign is 
clearly unjust. We may wonder that Dionysios made less 
advantage than we should have looked for out of his great 
victory^; but there can be no ground of any showing for 
charging him with fleeing from Motya without seeing the 
face of an enemy ^. Tyrant as he was who wrought it, 
the taking of Motya must ever count as one of the great 
exploits of war between Greek and barbarian. But when 
we come to the battle of KatanS, we find some touches 
which really soimd as if Dioddros, in reporting or improving 
the speech, followed a different version from Dioddros 
telling the story in his own person. In the tale as told by 
the. latter, we heard nothing about the weather; it was 
perhaps not wholly clear why the Punic ships betook them- 
selves to the shore when it was in possession of the Greeks^. 
Here we are told that they were driven to the shore by a 
violent storm. Dionysios is blamed, first, for allowing the 
sea-fight to take place when it did^, and secondly, after 

^ Such» I snppoBe, is the meaning of the words in Diod. ziy. 68 ; 06 ydp 
cXrrws tiXafitiro Xvffm rcb <rvifO^JKas wa/A robs Sptcow &t k^Bttro rel irapa- 
XiktiiiiUva ffvarfj/taTa rwr SorcAittrrwi^. Strictly speaking, Messana was the 
only independent Sikeliot oommnnity left, and trCarqua should mean a 
federation. Bnt the words are doubtless meant to take in those every- 
where who wished for the overthrow of the tyranny. 

' See above, p. 85. 

' Diod. ziv. 66 ; 6tk 6m6 Mon^rfs M vAfftp rrjs vifffov ^vpi/v, ffvyie4M\€iic€v 
iavrbv ivrds rw rtiyw, ir/>dr /«iv rodf woKlras $/>a(rw6fJitvo5, r<^ 8i woXtfdovt 
ov52 jMir* Sipiv tZtty {twofi^ywy. He is contrasted with Geldn. 

* See above, p. 118. 

' Diod. ziv. 68 ; rd 8) rcXfvrcuoy h r^ Karayaiuy alytaiXf Ikriywylfraro, 
waptU wp6s Ty v6\€i ri^ t'^X'T^ owrrifaaurBai vp6s rd robs ikarTovfUvovs Kara' 
^ifyu¥ tls robs olisticvs XifUvas. We must remember that the Karoofolvy 
tdytaX6s is wholly different from what it was then. 

K 2 


CHAP. X. the battle^ for not attacking them with his whole force by 

land ^. Had he so done^ it is said^ they would either have 

been utterly destroyed by the Greeks or else have been 

driven to put to sea to be destroyed by the tempest *. 

The debate But the real interest of the scene does not lie in anything 

in the . 

assembly, that was said, or supposed to be said, by Theodoros or 
any other speaker. What is instructive is the picture of 
a Syracusan assembly held at the summons, seemingly 
under the presidency ^, of Dionysios. The mere gathering 
of such a body, much more the freedom of speech allowed 
to its members^ are so unlike the received pictures of a city 
under a tyranny that we can hardly fancy that they are 
sheer invention ; they must surely come from some genuine 
tradition. Dionysios acts and speaks as a magistrate of the 
commonwealth ; but he has his spearmen within call, ready 
to do the tyrant^s bidding as soon as he shall find it needful 
to act as a tyrant. He allows the debate to go on as long 
as it is merely debate. And the debate soon takes a re- 
markable turn. The people^ stirred up by the harangue of 
Theodoros, turn to the allies^. They hope that the men 

* Diod. xiv. 68 ; fAtrSi Si r^v vaviiaxiov iity&Kwv irvtvyiATW kmywoftivajv 
Koi rw Kapxfl^ayiejy AvayKOffOivrcay vtdfXje^ffM tow ar6KoVf icauphv c7xc ^ov 
viK^ K&KKiijrw. One does not know how much of all this may lurk in the 
words of c. 60 ; rd 8* {nrrjptrucd^ vapSt rhv alyioKbv tearaar^ffavrts : but in 
that account they are in no way hindered by any storm. 

' lb. 68 ; rd filv ydp w«(dy ffrpAriVfjUL rSav wo\§fuvy oHirw MaTtjvnjKbs fy, 
TO 8i fiiy€^oi rov xc<M^<>' ^^^ '''^^ alyiaXdv tUrrdis rds yavs k^ifiparrt, T6t€ 
evy§viO€itiywy i^ftSiy v€(^ vdyrcav IjvayKdaOrjffay ity dwofiaiyoyrts iXlaKiaOoi 
fiqSUaSf 4 «y>^ rd KAitara fiia(6fuyM Toy alyicJ^tiy vXtip&ffou yavaylary. These 
last words are oddly like those in c. 60; was 6 rortos iy€ft* ytKpSav kquL 
yavayUjv, But the process is different in the two accounts. 

' According to the analogy of most Greek assemblies, DionysioSy if <rrpa- 
Ttiy6s, whether oirroicpdTwp or not, would not be the formal chairman of the 
assembly. (See Hist. Fed. Got. i. 296, 338 ; new Ed. 331, 264.) But he 
might practically summon {avyayay^) and adjourn (8i4Avc). One might 
use nearly the same words of our Leader of the House, and something like 
it is said of Periklds ; Thuc. ii. 65. 

* Diod. ziv. 70 ; ol iiky ^vpoKovinot /uriwpoi rtus ifwxoXs iyiyovro Kal vpbs 
Tohs ffvfifidx^^ dw4fiK€voy. 


from Old Greece will be on their side. They hope above all chap. z. 
that the Spartan admiral in command of them will be a 
captain over them in winning their freedom ^. Pharakidas Pharakidas 
went to the hema. To the utter disappointment of his Syra- Sonyrioe. 
cusan hearers^ he told them that he had no orders from 
Sparta to overthrow the dominion of Dionysios. His com- 
mission bade him help the Syracusans and Dionysios against 
the Carthaginians ^. It was somewhat strange to expect 
an officer sent in answer to a demand of Dionysios to turn 
and act against him, and Pharakidas might have forestalled 
the pithy saying about swopping horses while crossing a 
stream. But the Syracusans doubtless hoped, however vainly, 
to find in the Spartan that genuine hatred of tyranny 
in any case which had led the Megarians to sentence 
Thrasydaios to death ^ When Pharakidas ended his speech, 
the Syracusans stirred not; but they loudly cursed the 
Spartan traitor and his countrymen ^. Dionysios feared Dionyaios 
an outbreak. He felt that the time was come to appeal ^^^^. 
openly to the last argument of tyrants. He gathered his ^^y- 
mercenaries round him. No force was needed ; he was able 
to dismiss the assembly quietly ^ Was it dissolved by the 
presiding magistrates or an expression of the will of Diony- 
sios ? Or did the assembly dissolve of itself when it was 
seen that the tyrant was ready to use force^ if need called 
for it ? These are questions to which we should gladly have 
answers; but we have none. 

^ Diod. xiv. 70 ; iniyrcr •upocMtcmv Apxrjyby IctaOm r^ iKtvOtpias. 

' lb. ; ^ 82 rel vpds rhv n&pawav tx*^ oiKtiojt, iiprjaty alrr6v iv6 Acuvc- 
IkufuiyUay dwfordXBcu IvptueoualoK kojL Aiowcli^ avfi/Mxttv vp^ Kapxt^iovlovi, 
dXX' 06 Aiwvciov T^ dpx^^ MtLToXj&tty. This was doubtless strictly tme. 
On the formula, compare the dedication of Hierdn in toI. ii. p. 251, and the 
words of the treaty, Sicily, iii. 579. 

' See vol. ii. p. 298. 

* Diod. xiv. 70 ; ol9^ Xvpaico6<noi Karankayivr^s ri^v ^avxtoF tlxon^t voAAik 
TOis ^irapTidrais Karti^dffuvot, 

* lb. ; ol fiikp fuffOotpSpoi ffwiUpafMov wpis rhv Aioin^tw ,,.6 91 luwicim 
t6t€ fA^y iyiytro vtpi^fios /ra2 St^Xvcrc ri^ itcKXtfaiay, 




adopted by 

of pesti- 
lence in 

The power of Dionysios^ so near for a moment to utter 
overthrow, had been saved a second time by the interposition 
of a Spartan ally ^. But he had learned a lesson. He saw 
that he was hated of all men in Syracuse^ save his own 
strange mercenaries^ and that, if he was endured, it was 
simply because the barbarian was hated with a still deeper 
hatred. He saw too that the hatred of the citizens was a 
feeling which even the tyrant in his castle^ with his foreign 
guards around him, could not afford wholly to despise. He 
fell back again therefore on the same popular mood which 
he had showed when building the wall of Epipolai. He 
showed himself familiarly among the people ; to some he 
gave gifts ; others he bade to his own table. Meanwhile 
the wrath of the gods was falling heavily on the sacrilegious 
besiegers. The heavenly powers thought it no scorn to 
work through natural causes. A large part of the army was 
encamped in the low marshy ground. That ground is ever 
unhealthy in the heat of summer, and that summer was one 
of special heat. Encamped^ it would seem^ without any 
proper shelter^ they felt every extreme. Before daybreak 
their bodies were chilled by the morning's cold ; at noon the 
crowds packed closely together were stifled by the mid-day 
heat^. Pestilence broke out and swept away the besiegers 
faster than the arms of Syracuse could do. First it smote 
the African troops ; we should be glad to know the exact 
spot of their encampment. But they^ the native subjects of 
Carthage^ would claim yet less heed than the strangers hired 
from Gaul and Spain. For a while the dead were buried ^ ; 
but presently men died so fast — ^those who looked after the 

^ Dioddroe bimself makes the remark (u. b,\ tcctt yct^ rd vp6rtpw 'Apinjs 
6 AaK(9ai/i6yiof, AyriXafAfiayofUvwy ahrSfv rip k\€vOtpias, l7^ycro wp(MTfis, seal 
rirt ^paiUSas Mffrtf reui 6pfuus rw Hvpatwwriuw, 

P Died. ny. 70; vpSnop fikv, wfiy Ijkiw drarciXcu, 8id rijir ^fuxp^rtfra 
rijiy l/r rijs aHpas r&y itidrvy, ^pimj icarux^ rel aiffiara' tcarA 8i ti^ fitfftf/iBpieaf 
4 9tpi»Arrp iwytyty As iky roffo&rov wK^Buvs kv artyf nrSv^y <rvyt$ponr/Uyov.'] 

[' lb. 71 ; t6 fiky wpSaroy iBawroy robs rcrcXcvrTiM^rar.] 


fiick dying among the rest — ^that funeral rites were no chap. x. 
longer to be had, and the stench of the dead bodies was 
added to the malaria of the marsh. A minute description 
of the symptoms is given^ surely from the contemporary 
\ history of Philistos^ which may be well compared with the 
more famous description of the plague of Athens ^. 

And now comes one of those moments in the tyrant's Dionysios 
long career in which we almost forget that he was a offe^ye. 
tjrrant. We cannot keep back some sympathy for the 
Hellenic champion when waging his war with the bar- 
barian in Western Sicily; we can give it more unreservedly 
to the daring and skilful captain fighting for the Hellenic 
city against barbarian besiegers. And yet^ even in this his 
highest character^ Dionysios is a tyrant still; he cannot 
work even the deliverance of Syracuse without doing a 
tyrant's crimes in the very thick of what in another man 
we should call a patriotic struggle. Yet how Dionysios 
and his people — for once we can speak of him as we might 
of a lawful king— smote the huge host of Himilkdn on 
their own soil is a stirring tale of gallant enterprise. The 

[^ Diod. L c. The symptomB were, first catarrh {jtarippovi), then sweU- 
ingi about the throat (trtpl r^ rp&x'l^o'^ oIH/mto), To these in a short 
time laooeeded fey ear, paini of the spinal nerves (v«p) ti^f fi^X"^ i^cv/mut w^roi), 
heaviness of the legs, dysentery, and pustules (^<{«rcuKai) over the whole 
body. Some were seized with paroxysms of insanity and wandered about 
the camp. Death occurred on the fifth or sixth day. Yet, though some 
of the symptoms as recorded by Dioddros present a certain likeness to 
those of the Athenian plague— as for instance the ^^teratvai — the course 
and character of the disease were different. The Athenian plague was 
part of a great wave of epidemic disease that had swept down on Europe 
from JSthiopia, by way of Egypt and Persia (Thua iL 48). The outbreak 
in the Carthaginian camp was, as far as we can see, of local origin, and 
the symptoms as described show that it was simply a bad fonn of malarial 
fever. The celebrated passage of Thuoydldes seems none the less however 
to have been in the mind of the original writer of the account preserved 
by Dioddroe— in all probability Philistos, who as we know from Dion. 
Halic. (v), set before him Thucydides as his model (ctVolquardsen^ Quellen 
ftc. bei Diodor. xi-xvi. 107).] 




oBiault on 
camp by 
tea and 


first blow had been dealt by the gods ; man had only to 
follow; and man, in the person of the lord of Syracuse, 
followed well and wisely. Now that the enemy was 
visibly weakened by the divine stroke, Dionysioe planned a 
joint attack by sea and land on the Carthaginian camp. 
Eighty ships were manned under two commanders, his 
brother LeptinSs, not less trosted because of his defeat, 
and the Spartan Fharakidas, whom he had to thank that 
he still held his power. They were to sail and attack the 
Punic ships in the bay of Daskon. For himself he chose 
the work of an attack on the camp from the land side. 
That his attack might be sudden, he had chosen a moonless 
night and a roundabout path by which none could look for 
him. He marched across the low ground, but not by the 
nearer and more usual path of the Helorine road leading 
straight to Polichna from the north. He made his way 
round by the temple of Kyana, which stood on the high 
ground not far from his famous fountain, and so drew near 
to the quarters of Himilkdn from the west. He marched 
by night, but it was not a night attack that he designed. 
It was daybreak when he drew near to the camp of the 
astonished besiegers. His plan was a subtle one. on 
one side a bloody and a treacherous one, a plan which 
could never have come into the head of a general whose 
army consisted wholly of his own citizens. For the direct 
attack from the west he told off the horsemen and a 
thousand of his mercenaries^. But this attack was, as 
regarded the enemy, a mere feint; its object was at once 
to draw off their attention from more serious operations, 
and to relieve himself of soldiers whom he could not trust. 
The thousand who were to climb the small ascent of the 
hill that looks out on the windings of Kyana were a body 
of mutinous and disorderly men, who were destined for the 
fate of Uriah. The orders of the horsemen were, as soon 

[» Died. xiv. 7a.] 


as the thousand were well engaged with the defenders of chap. x. 
the camp, to withdraw in seeming flight ; the mercenaries 
were to be smitten and die ; the real services of the horse- 
men themselves were to be done elsewhere. The horsemen, 
one may suppose^ were still men of good Syracusan famiUes^ 
and we have heard of them hitherto as the strongest 
enemies of the tyranny. Yet they did not scrapie to carry 
out the treacherous command of the tyrant. We may well 
believe that^ while they hated Dionysios^ they hated his 
mercenaries yet more, and in marching against the bar- 
barians even the tyrant's orders were to be obeyed. The DeoeptiTo 
assault on the west side began ; the Carthaginians came to on the 
the rescue ; the horsemen turned away; the thousand were ^^^ 
left and presently cut to pieces. This side of the camp, it 
will be remembered, where no attack had been looked for, 
was not defended by a fort. The scheme of Dionysios, 
besides getting rid of his mutineers, was to draw the 
attention of the Carthaginians away from the real attacks maskB real 
which were to be made on the two forts of Polichna and eMt 
Daskdn. For the last work the horsemen sped swiftly 
eastward; they were to act in concert with a chosen de- 
tachment of triremes who were to sail at break of day ^. 
Dionysios himself led the attack on the fort on Polichna 
hard by the temple; that is, he was to mount the hiU by 
the usual road, the hollow way that led over Polichna to 
Heldros. Meanwhile the defenders of the camp were 
thrown into confusion by the very suddenness of their 
victory over an enemy whom they had not looked for; 
they came as &8t as they could from the slaughter of the 
thousand, but in too disorderly a guise to give any efEectual 
help to the points that were really threatened ^. The whole 
scheme succeeded. Dionysios carried the fort on Polichna 

P Diod. xiv. 72.] 

[' lb. ; rwv fiapfidpofp M t6 wap6Zo^w learoMtwkiiyiUvw ital wapafiofi' 
$avirnm rrrapayiUtrntJ] 


CHAP. z. by stonn ; he was now on the hill, and he began to besiege 
?t^"" ^^ ^^^ V^^ ^^ *^® camp which lay on the high ground. The 
horsemen and triremes too luckily met at the appointed 
moment, and their joint efforts carried the fort on Daskdn. 
A mighty shout from the Syracusan camp announced the 
capture of the forts to friend and f oe^ and struck fear into 
the hearts of the barbarians. These fears were soon made 
yet keener as the whole fleet of Syracuse sailed forth to 
support the few triremes which had led the way^. The 
two greatest navies of the world — for Syracuse under 
Dionysios must come before Athens — ^were to struggle for 
life and death in the space^ narrow for such a strif e^ of the 
Great Harbour of Syracuse. 
Seft-victory A struggle it hardly was. The Carthaginian army, 
casans in frightened and bewildered at so many attacks on so many 
Di^kln. sides, had first rushed confosedly to wtth8l»Dd the assault 
of Dionysios and his in&ntry on the camp. But when 
they saw the Syracusan fleet come forth^ they turned towards 
the new danger. In the bay of DaskAn were Punic ships 
of all kinds and in all cases. Triremes and transports 
lay at anchor ; forty ships of five banks of oars — ^Nikias 
and Demosthenes had commanded none such — ^were drawn 
up on the shore '. The first thought was to put out to sea 
with the triremes and meet the enemy. Men rushed to the 
shore and crowded into the ships ; but they were too late. 
Before the Carthaginian ship was even manned^ much more 
before its rowers could take their places and trim their oars 
in order^ the Syracusans were upon them. There was no 
chance of meeting prow to prow in equal fight; the Greek 
ship, coming on with its full power of oars, easily drove 
its beak into the side of the Carthaginian trireme not yet 

[* Diod. xiv. 72.] 

[" lb. ziy. 73. If we are to belieTe (see p. 62) that Dionysios was the 
first to build pentekonters, the Carthaginiani had been quick to follow 
his example.] 


ready for defence. Some sank to the bottom at a single oraf. x. 
well-directed blow; others were in the confusion pierced 
by several beaks at once^ and became mere wrecks with 
their timbers shivered into atoms ^ The noise of the 
cracking planks sounded loud^ as the best triremes of Car- 
thage were broken asunder K On such ships as still sup- 
plied a foothold the Syracusans^ stirred up by success to 
greater success, leaped with eager speed, each man striving 
to board before his fellows. The amazed barbarians, not 
yet formed in any order, were slaughtered without mercy. 
Next came the share of the Syracusan land-force ; the Deetrac- 
horsemen had come already; the foot followed — ^they could tvi^ yman 
leave their siege when there was no one to defend — Diony- *®®*' 
sios himself rode round to Daskdn to join them ^. They 
found a ready prey in the pentekonters drawn up on shore. 
Hard by them were transports at anchor, and still a few 
triremes which perhaps no one had tried to put to sea. 
Fire was the weapon; it was first applied to the pente- 
konters ; they were presently all ablaze, the flames rising 
high, and spreading far and wide. A strong wind was 
blowing, and the fire next reached the transports. The 
men who were on board them swam to shore ; the cables 
that held the anchors were burned; the burning ships, 
left to themselves, were carried wildly to and fro by the 
wind, with the flames curling on high around their masts. 
From the walls of Syracuse men looked on as on a living 
tragedy acted before their eyes^. Vengeance had indeed 
lighted on the ungodly. In the excitement of the moment, 
it seemed no earthly fire that did the deed ; the thunder- 
bolts of Zeus had fallen to destroy the sacrilegious barbarians 

[^ Diod. ziy. 72 ; at 9^ ftX^iociv i/iBokats Aimpp^TTovffai rcb avyytyo/A" 
^miUwat <nufl9as, Sciin^ ^inrXTf ir roTr dmrarrofUrois waptixovro.'] 

[' lb. ; v^jrnf 82 r&y i^ox»fTdT9m r^&v BpavofUvw ai /aikv i/r rvr ififi6XMf 
itmppffTr6/*iiy€u X(uei!5€$ i(aia$o¥ Ivocovrro ^fi^wj] 

[• lb. 73]^ 

[* lb. ; roTf 9k kie r^s w6Kfcn Bwrpuei^ ffwifiaivt ybf€a$at r^ Biay,"] 


CHAP. X. who had recked not of his holy places nor of those of the 
Destrno- . Guardian Goddesses of the land \ 


thagfinian This vivid picture^ it must be remembered^ comes^ beyond 
all doubt, from a contemporary^ an eye-witness, and more 
than an eye-witness. We read the tale as it seemed to one 
of the foremost actors in the work. If Fhilistos was not 
himself entrusted with any special command^ we may be 
sure that on that day he was not far from the side of 
Dionysios. And on that day he may have thought with 
pride of that other day when he held out his purse to help 
the young and daring demagogue in his defiance of all rules 
of procedure. For on that day the people of Sjrracuse 
gathered round their tyrant, as they might have gathered 
round Gel6n or Hermokrates, or round Athenagoras or 
Diokles had they been men of war like Dionysios. Men 
fought at his bidding and without his bidding. The men 
of military age, shipmen and landsmen, horse and foot, 
were smiting down the enemy at his side or giving the navy 
of the enemy to the flames. But when those who were left in 
the city heard the shouts of victory from Syracusan tongues 
and saw the fires of Syracuse burning up the ships of Car- 
thage, they too longed to have a share in the work. Lads 
who felt already the strength of years to come, old men 
from whom the strength of years past had not wholly died 
away ^, rushed to the harbour. The Syracusan ships of war 
were busy by the shore of Daskon ; but there were mer- 
chant-ships and other vessels at anchor. The zealous youths 
and elders manned them with all speed, and hastened across 
the friendly waters to the spot where their countrymen 
were still doing the work on which the gods of Greece had 
sent them. They had no fighting to do ; they had only to 
come upon the spoil. Some of the Punic ships, forsaken 

\} Diod. xiv. 73 ; xol roTs 8c* dffifi€ia» ictpavvv0uci ^alv€a$ai mpairkijolar 
[> lb. xiv. 74.] 


by their shipmen^ were still unhurt ; others, though damaged chap. x. 
by the fire^ still contained something to reward a search 
among their wrecks ^. The spoil was carried off ; the still 
serviceable vessels were towed in triumph into the docks of 
Syracuse. The city was still not empty; there were still Exultation 
those left who could look on and could rejoice^. Houses ^uaaniL" 
were left to slaves alone ; women and children^ and doubt- 
less old men too feeble to take share in the toils of their 
fellows^ crowded the walls, and gazed on what v^as doing. 
Some raised their hands to heaven in thanksgiving to the 
gods; some pointed the moral of the scene before them^ 
and told how the gods had visibly avenged themselves on 
the robbers of their temples. For the sight seemed as if 
the gods themselves had gone forth to battle^, as Punic 
hulls still were blazing, as the flames were still curling 
round Funic masts^ as the shores of the Oreat Harbour still 
echoed to the victorious shout of Greece, to the confused 
and motley cries of barbarians dying or flying or crowded 
together without order or hope of help. Syracuse was 
saved ; but there was still work to do ; the camp was still 
not taken; the day of toil and triumph had still to be 
followed by a watchful night. That night was not spent 
by Dionysios in his castle in the island; he had pitched 
him a camp hard by the ancient temple in Folichna, and from 
thence he designed to carry out whatever had still to be 
done to sweep away the camp of the barbarian and the 
barbarians themselves from the soil of Syracuse \ 

Setting aside his treacherous dealing with the thousand 
mercenaries^ the chosen general of a free democracy could 
not have done more on that day than Dionysios the tyrant 
had done. If he had fought for himself^ he had fought 

\} Diod. xiv. 74.] 

[' lb. ; i<l>cdv€TO ydp iicL fuucpov $(OfjLaxl<f vapavK^ffios 4 ^^a.] 

[* lb. ; Aiom&aios Iirc<rrpa70ir48cv<rc roTs fiapfidpois vp^i t^ tov Ai^ Up^ 


CHAP. X. , also for his city and his people^ and his people^ if they 

fought for themselves^ had fought well for him also. 

Treason- B^t the tyrant was a tyrant still : the greatest victory 

ablo oom- , . 

pact be- of Hellas over barbarians since the day of Salamis and 
IMo^rius Himera fourscore and four years back was stained by 
^d Hinul-j treachery at its ending as it had been at its beginning. 
' Himilkdn knew that his only hope lay in Dionysios himself. 
I The tyrant, we are told^ and Himilkdn may have made the 
same surmise^ did not wish the victory to be too thorough ; 
he did not wish the power of Carthage to be altogether 
crippled ; if the people of Syracuse were released from all 
fear from without — he might have added^ if they had no 
longer need of him as their defender — ^they might again 
take to plans for the recovery of their freedom ^. But the 
Syracusans and their allies from Old Greece and Italy were 
in no such frame of mind ; their one wish was to go on 
with the work which they had beguu^ to smite the barbarian 
once and for ever^. A secret interchange of ideas followed 
between Himilkdn and Dionysios^ of which the mass of the 
two armies knew nothing. The Punic general asked the 
tyrant's leave to take away to Africa all that was left of 
his army on giving up to Dionysios three hundred talents 
which he had in the camp. Dionysios modified the terms. 
On the payment of the three hundred talents Himilkdn 
might sail away secretly by night — he could not promise 
a safe voyage by day— taking with him such part of his 
army as were citizens of Carthage. The allies and mer- 
cenaries must be left behind to their fate. The policy of 
this proposal is obvious ; something like it had been done 
by Demosthenes thirty years before when the Peloponnesians 
forsook their allies at Olpai^. Dionysios would clearly 

{} Diod. ziv. 75 ; ov fiov\6fitvoi rtKtlwi dwoXiffOai lify r&y KapxtJ^yiw^ 
Si/va/ifi', Jhrcas ol ^vfHUCOVfftot Sect rby dird ra&rojv <p6fiov, fiijBivoT€ axoXifi^ 
Xafiojffiv ivrix*^^ ^9^ kKtvOtpias. Cf. p. 90.] 


[' Thuo. iU. 109.] 

HIMILk6n allowed to escape. 143 

gain less by the slaughter or bondage of Himilk6n and his chap. x. 
feUow-citizens^ than he would by letting it be known ^ 
through all Sicily that the Carthaginians were capable of 
looking after themselves only and leaving, not only their 
mercenaries^ but their allies to any chance that might befall 
them. It was agreed that the Carthaginians should de- Himilkdii 
part on the fourth night, and Dionysios^ instead of further thf^gjil^T^ 
attacks on the camp, led back his forces into the city, *^]?*^ ^ 
Everything was veiled in secrecy; it was by night that escape. 
Himilkdn brought or sent the money in full tale to the 
hoard of Dionysios in the island^ and on the appointed 
night, having manned forty triremes, set f orfch accompanied 
by all the Carthaginians in the army. Carthage was so 
sparing of the blood of her own citizens, who, save on a few 
special occasions, seemed to have served only as officers, that 
one almost wonders that so many ships were needed. The 
fleet sailed forth and passed the mouth of the Great Harbour. 
But even at night forty triremes could not set sail quite 
unnoticed ; the plash of their oars alone would reveal them 
to some wakeful ears. None were more watchful than 
those who had come from the metropolis of Syracuse to 
save the noblest colony of their own city. The Corinthians, 
knowing nothing of the secret treaty, came to tell Dionysios 
that the enemy was escaping. He could not openly refuse 
to act upon their information ; but he took care not to act 
vigorously. He gave orders that the army should be called 
out ; but he purposely lost time in summoning his officers ^ 
The gallant men of Corinth, eager in the cause on which 
they had come, could not brook the delays of the tyrant. 
They set sail without orders, striving among themselves 
which should be foremost; they overtook some of the 
Carthaginian ships that lagged behind, and with an im- 
looked-for charge of their beaks sent them to the bottom. 
The rest doubtless escaped ; Himilkdn at all events found 


CHAP. X. his waj to Carthage. To keep up perhaps a show of 
energy^ as well as to carry out his own special purposes^ 
Dionysios again led out his army against the Cartha- 
ginian camp^ where now only mercenaries were left. The 
Sikels who had taken the Carthaginian side had already 
decamped; they knew the roads to the inland parts of 
the island, and got them away each man to his own 
home ^. Warned by their escape, or possibly conniving at 
it^ Dionysios ordered the roads to be watched, lest any of 
the mercenaries should attempt to follow their example. 
Rout and He then attacked the camp by night. Forsaken by their 
of i^e commander and his officers, forsaken by their allies in the 
wnwiee ^ country, disheartened by defeat^ and startled again by the 
tyrant's sudden move in the dark^ the motley crowd of 
barbarians who were left lost all heart and tried to flee. 
If it be true that 150,000 dead bodies — one half of the 
whole army — ^were left unburied, one wonders that they 
had not gone away long before. They tried to escape by 
this road and that ; but they were everywhere met by the 
Syracusan guards and many were taken prisoners. The 
rest threw down their arms and prayed only that their 
Iberians lives might be spared. One detachment only showed a 
Dionysios' bigher spirit. The bom soldiers of Spain kept to their 
^y* arms in good order, and sent a herald to Dionysios pro- 

posing peace and alliance. The tyrant knew the value of 
such men as they; a truce was made and an agreement 
come to, and the warriors of the western peninsula were en- 
rolled among the mercenaries of the lord of Syracuse. 
They served him in later wars, and were sent by him 
into Peloponn^s to support the cause of Sparta against 
her Greek enemies^. It was not the last time that 

{} Diod. xiv. 75 ; o2 Si (rvfifULXowrts rois Kapxrj^hvloii %ic€\ci, ^^dacatrts 
robs ^vpajcovalovs, i<pvyw 9idL rov fitaoydov, xai ox^i^ vdrrcs 9i€frij0ri<Tay 

[' Xenopbdn, Hellen. vii. i. ao-a8 ; Diod. xv. 70.] 


Spaniards have passed from Sicily to work deeds of arms chap. x. 
on the soil and on the waters of Greece ^. The rest of the 
mercenaries, who did not know so well as the Iberians the 
advantage of keeping np a strong hearty were made 
prisoners and seemingly sold as slaves. The camp and all 
that was left in it he gave over to his own soldiers to 
plunder. The siege and the war was ovei^ a;i;i^ Syracuse 
was saved. 

The most speakixig^ monument of* this . great iHeDenic Rising 
victory was set up, not in Syracuse or in any otK|^j^Greek ^^,Le 
city, but in Carthage itself. On the Carthaginianodefeat o^ AfriiMn 
there followed a struggle in Africa which may pass as a and Alliei. 
foreshadowing of the great war with the mercenari^ which 
followed the first Punic war with Rome. This time the 
revolters seem to have been, not the mere mercenaries hired 
from all parts, but the allies and subjects of Carthage in 
Africa. Both they and the mercenaries were, as Dionysios 
had meant them to be, stirred to g^eat wrath by the way in 
which Himilkon had betrayed his whole army, save the 
native Carthaginians only. They rose against the ruling 
city, a mingled body of PhGenicians and Africans, their 
numbers being further swelled by not a few slaves, whether 
their own or runaways from Carthage itself. A host of 
two hundred thousand held the open country; they occupied 
the threatening post of Tun£s, and made Carthage a besi^ed 
city K In this strait the conscience of the commonwealth 
was smitten. The votaries of the gods of Cauaan were 
brought to confess that the gods of Hellas could do some- 
thing. Their late discomfiture in Sicily, their present 

[* In 1571 MeMinft wm the starting-point of the Spanish and allied 
fleet under Don John of Austria for the expedition against the Tarks 
which ended in the great victory of Lepanto.] 

[* Died. xiv. 77 ; ra^ V 06 fi^or tktvOipom dXAcl muL M\tty avrrp*^ 

[' lb. ; MaTaXa06/uPOi 8i T^tnfTa . . . rtixtp^* '''^^ Wr.«af wrMixov.'] 


OHAF. X. distress in Africa, were clearly the divine judgement for 

Expiatory the sacril^pe which they had wrought against the protecting 

Bdmdtdr deities of Syracnse. Zeus, as before, is not spokoi of. It 

Kardlosti- ^'^^^ ^® specially Sicilian powers, Dem^ter and the Kore^ 

tated at ^^q had undergone the wrong and who now dealt out the 

vengeance. Hitherto those Aryan goddesses had received 

no worship in Semitic Carthage ^. A stately temple was now 

built to them. Some of the most honourable citizens of 

[} Diod. ziy. 77. This view is not in agreeoment with Mr. Freeman's re- 
mark in Sicily, yoL ii. a 10, referring to the treaty oondnded in 480 B.O. be- 
tween Geldn and Carthage after the war of Himera ; ''Oneof thedanses of 
the treaty bound the Carthaginians to bnild two temples in which the stonee 
on which the treaty was graven should be laid np (Diod. zi. 36). These 
oonld not Ml to be temples to Greek deities ; we may say almost with 
certainty that they were temples to the Goddesses of Sidly, the special 
patronesses of G«ldn and his house, Ddmdtdr and the Kord." Among the 
errata however to the same volume, p. zviii, Mr. Freeman notices the 
discrepancy between this and the later notice of Dioddros according to 
which the worship of "the Groddesses '* at Carthage introduced about 396 
is represented as something quito new. He considers therefore that '' the 
foreign rites may have been disused and forgotten between the two times.** 
On this later devotion of the Carthaginians to the cult of Ddmdtdr and 
Persephond the coins of Carthage herself and those struck for her mer- 
cenaries and dependencies in Sicily supply a most striking commentary. 
This solemn propitiation of the Sicilian Goddesses by Carthage and the 
impulse thus given to their cult in the Punic world have been reasonably 
brought into connexion with the appearance at some time after this dato 
of a whole series of Siculo-Puuic totradrachms, in which, with the aid no 
doubt of Greek engravers, there is reproduced the fine head of Persephond 
as she is seen on the Syracusan medallions firom the hands of the artist 
Euunetos. (See Ludwig MUUer, Num. de Tandenne Afrique, ii. no, iii ; 
/ De Saulcy, Acad, des Inscriptions, T. zv. pt. ii. 53i 54 ; A. J. Evans, Syr. 
Medallions, Ac., 106 seqq.) In other cases it Is the Mother-Goddess 
that is represented with a wreath of ripened com in place of the green 
barley spray seen in the Daughter's tresses. Of the two this type was 
preferred by Carthage itself, and became the unvarying obverse type of 
her coinage. It is to be observed however, as illustrating the character 
of this engrafted cult, that both the DSmdtdr and the Kord of Carthaginian 
and Siculo-Punic monetary art are at times associated with the symbols 
of Ashtoreth, with whom their myths had much in common. If I am 
right (op. cit. 1 01, loa) in supposing that some early Carthaginian gold 
coins with the head of Ddm6t6r date from the Sicilian expedition of 
405 B. c, it is evident that the Sicilian Mother-Groddess was known to the 
Carthaginians before the introduction of the special expiatory cult But 


Cariihage were chosen to be their priests ; thej were wor- chap. x. 
shipped in their new house according to the most correct 
Greek ritual ; the best qualified among the Greek sojourners 
in Carthage had been prayed to undertake the missionary 
work of teaching the new servants of the goddesses how 
their favour might best be won^. Hellas and her gods thus\ 
won a religious victory; the Phoenician conscience now \ 
felt itself clear from sins which had been so splendidly 
atoned for ; and the men of Carthage fitted out their ships 
and went forth with higher hopes to subdue their rebels. 
Nor did the Goddesses of Sicily fail their new proselytes. 
The motley host of revolters had no acknowledged generals; 
each chief of a band claimed the first place for himself and 
his own followers '. Some were won over by the gold of 
Carthage ; others held out till provisions &iled them ; the 
Carthaginian ships meanwhile brought in abundant stores 
from Sardinia. Before long the rebels were scattered every 
man to his own home^ and Carthage was for a while de- 
liyered from a danger to which her constitution and policy 
laid her open at any moment. 

It does not appear that this first war between Dionysios Oarthagin- 
and Carthage was ended by any formal treaty. But the gioDBin^ 
defeat of HimUkdn before Syracuse secured a state of things ^^^Jlto^ 
which practically lasted unchanged for four years. The Car- the we«t. 
thaginian power, in its old Phoenician strongholds^ remained 
unbroken. Panormos and Solous had not been touched; 
Lilybaion had taken the place of Motya. But the Cartha- 
ginian power, as a power ruling over Greeks, came for a 

this does not affeot the main fSftct that D6m6tdr and Kord first became 
the prevailing Carthaginian coin-types in the first half of the fourth cen- 
tury B. c, in great measnrey no doubt, as a oonsequence of that expiatory 

[} Diod. ziy. 77 ; Kot furii irAtnjs fftftyirriTof rdis B€ds l^pwrdfuvot, rdt 
Bwrlas rots r&v *E?iKf/yvy iBtffiy kwoiow, itdt r&y wap^ cih'ots Syrwy 'EWffvwif 
rcHfs yapt^in&rcvt kwi\4^€arr€Sf M ri^v iw 0wy 0€paw*im^ jfra^ar.] 


L 2 


CHAP. X. while to an end. The Oreek cities which had come under 
G^*^*d Carthaginian dominion or supremacy had set themselves 
pcsidentooffree as the very first act of the war. And free^ as far 
^ * as Carthage was concerned^ they remained. We have 
already seen that Himilk6n fonnd it expedient to treat one 
of them friendly^, and we shall presently hear another 
spoken of in a way which implies perfect independence of 
Carthage. But the story implies dependence on Dionysios^ 
or perhaps complete submission to his dominion. At a 
somewhat later stage Akragas drove out the partisans of 
Dionysios and asserted its own freedom '. This points to 
the relation which the war established between the lord of 
Syracuse and the Greek cities which had been delivered 
from the barbarian. It looks as if he ruled^ not as an 
avowed master^ but by means of local parties acting in his 
interest. But it shows that Dionysios was none the less 
practically lord of all the Sikeliot cities. He was very far 
from being ruler of all Sicily; but he had come nearer to 
being so than any man had done before him. In the dif- 
ferent shapes of direct dominion^ acknowledged supremacy^ 
and practical influence^ he had all Greek Sicily and a large 
part of barbarian Sicily at his command. Between him 
and the great barbarian power which he had failed to dis- 
lodge from north-western Sicily there was no acknowledged 
relation. There was a tacit understanding that Carthage 
and Syracuse were to leave one another alone for a season. 

§ 8. Fr(m the lirst to tie Second Punic War of Bionysios, 

B.C. 396-392. 

At this stage of the shifting relations between the lord 
of Syracuse and the Phoenician enemy, the question cannot 
fail to present itself why he allowed those relations to stay 
as they were at the moment. When he had just struck 

\} Therma; see p. 103.] [* Diod. ziv. 88.] 


such a blow at Carthage as he had dealt on the soil and on ohap. x. 
the waters of Syracuse^ when Carthage was still barely ^°y?^ 
recovering from plagues both in Africa and before Syra- towards 
cnse, while in Africa she was occupied and weakened by the *^' 
revolt of her allies and mercenaries^ and while in Sicily she 
was discredited by her treacherous dealings with them^ why 
did he not choose what seems so favourable a time for 
another great attack on the Phoenician possessions in the 
west ^ ? The question came up when we saw the com- 
paratively feeble course of Dionysios in the second campaign 
of the war as compared with the mighty energy shown in 
the taking of Motya*. It comes up yet more forcibly now. 
It may simply be that his first campaign had taught him 
that such distant conquests were both hard to win and hard 
to keep ^, and that he did not deem it wise to provoke Car- 
thage to the uttermost, lest she should in the end prove too 
strong for him ^. This line of thought might have come 
into the mind either of a lawful king or of a lawful magis- 
trate ; there is the further question whether Dionysios, in 
his character of tyrant, had not his personal reasons for not 
wishing to press the enemy too hard ^. There is a strange 
story of an oracle which said that he would die whenever 
he overcame those who were stronger than himself \ This, 
it is said, he understood of the Carthaginians, and therefore 
in all his wars he willingly sought defeat, lest he should by 
success bring about the fulfilment of the soothsayer^s words ^. 

^ This is well put by Holm, G. S. li. 133. His use of the word Kreuzzug 
shows a feeUng of the wider OBcomenical bearings of the case. 

* See above, p. 90. ' See above, p. 91. * See Holm, a. ■. 
' See above, pp. 90, 14a. 

• Diod. XV. 74 ; lx«r wapA Bhov k&ytor t6t§ TcXcvTii<rciy traw rw «/mit- 
T^oaw W€piy4yi]rat, 

' lb. ; Tor xpriciti^ Avi^fio^ M robs Kapx/jSovlout, inroKBtfifidwif ro&rovs 
KptlrTous ktvroO <&ai. M Koi wpbis airrfi^ vAcoMLnr «c«oA.c/<i7Mi« dSu$9i kot^ 
Tflb viicas into^^tof ital kMovcitn ^rrao^ai, tva 11^ 96^jf tw Icx'tpofripMf y^- 
yovirai Mptirrmt, We shaU of oonrse come in dae time to the tme expla- 
nation of the parable. 


oHAP. X. This story nusoonoeives and exaggerates matters a good 
deal ; but it points to a belief that Dionysios oould have 
done more against Carthage than he did. Of one thing 
we may be certain. Dionysios was no doubt willing enough 
to be the champion of Hellas; but he had no mind to 
be champion of Hellas in any shape which was likely to 
put the lordship of Syracuse and the neighbour lands in 
Diffionlties We must further remember that Dionysios' own position 
i^ot*^^- was at that moment a somewhat difficult one. The victo- 
«- nous lord of Syracuse was himself in somewhat the same 

case as the enemies over whom he had won his victory. He 
too had to deal with discontented mercenaries, with discon- 
tented allies and injured enemies^ and with the elder folk 
of the land. These last had now no such good national 
hopes as they had had in the days of Ducetius; but each 
Sikel town, as the hellenizing process brought it nearer to 
the level of a Oreek town^ became a greater difficulty in 
the path of the man who was striving to spread his lord- 
ship over Greeks and Sikels alike. Among these various 
elements, the first move came from the mercenaries. We 
have already seen how deeply some of them had been sus* 
pected by the tyrant, and how he had dealt with those 
whom he suspected ^. He now felt that the whole body 
was ill-disposed towards him. His first step was to arrest 
their commander, the Lacedsamonian Aiistoteles ^. The 
whole body, ten thousand in number, now came together in 
arms, fiercely demanding their pay, possibly threatening 
Dionysios himself with death ^. But we shall not lightly 
believe that the tyrant won them over by an appeal to their 
pity, that he came out to them in sordid dress and with dust 
on his head, bidding them deal with him as they thought 
g^ood^. In the more credible version he tells them that Aris- 

> See above, p. 136. [• Diod. xiv. 78.] [» lb.] 

* Thii, with the thrd»t of death (Ajp/oyaay of iu<r$o^6pm Ktwatw), oomet 


toUiis, whose peorticalar offences are not described^ should ohap. x. 
be sent to Sparta to be judged by the tribunals of his own 
city. To the rest he made a splendid offer. He would give Siupected 
them the town of Leontinoi^ with its fruitful plain. The HM^f^Ted 
gift was accepted as full payment for all demands ^. ^ ^1^^* 

Another of the strangely mingled communities charac- 
teristic of this time was thus set up. Greeks and bar- 
barians — ^for there must have been both classes among the 
mercenaries of Dionysios — ^were set down to live side by 
side in a Sikeliot city which had seen ups and downs 
enough already. One specially asks whether the Spaniards 
who showed so stout a heart at the end of the Punic siege ^ 
now settled down as citizens of Leontinoi. How did they 
adapt themselves to a life which must have been at least 
superficially Greek? The new Leontine community was 
of course meant to stand in some relation of dependent 
alliance to Dionysios ; its citizens would be ready to serve 
in his wars; but they would no longer be quartered in 
Syracuse as part of his immediate household troops to act 
at a moment's notice. But a tjrrant must always have 
some force in that character; it was the distinguishing 
badge of tyranny that the ruler could never trust himself 
to his own citizens. Dionysios therefore^ having got rid 
of one body of mercenaries^ presently hired another. And 

from a strange story in Polyainos, ▼. 3. i, evidently patched up from 
•eyeral iources. Tlie meroenaiieB Burround the house of IMonystos, iV 
oUtUttf alrrcvf an odd description of the castle in Ortygia. Then he comes 
out, ka$iJTa IXcciyi^ Xafivy leat r^ it6/up icivw tcaraxf^/uyos, naplx^ijv lavrdv 
hcZoTw &s fiodkoiVTO xfi^^^* ^^^'^ seems to see some dim oonfasion 
iinth the return of Geldn from HimeriL They let him go—60ww A^icay, 
Bat they remain in his service. He takes them to Leontinoi and has them 
surrounded and shot down by the other troops. This suggests aU manner 
of stories. The tale is perhaps hardly worth taking notice of, but it 
seems meant to come at this stage. And Leontinoi comes both in this and 
the more likely versiony though in such different ways. 

^ If any one is anxious to reconcile two opposite stories, he can take 
them to Leontinoi under this promise, and then have them shot. 

' See above, p. 144. 


CHAP. X. to them^ together with the slaves whom he had lately set 

free^ he looked as the mainstay of his power ^. 

MoTeme&to Stirs next began to arise among those large bodies of 

SidUui Sicilian Greeks whom the events of the late war, and 

Greeks. specially the destroying acts of Dionysios himself^ had 

made homeless. The exiles of Naxos and KatanS were 

still without any certain dwelling-place. In whatever hands 

Katan^ may have been just then^ it had certainly not been 

given back to its own former citizens ^ The Messanians 

too who had escaped from Himilkon were in the like case. 

All these were wandering about the land^ loudly setting 

forth their demands to be settled somewhere, best of all to 

Meesana be settled in their old homes. As for ruined Messana, 

DionysiM. Dionysios undertook to build and people it afresh. But it 

was not to be peopled with those who had fled from 

Himilkon, but with men who would be more distinctly 

dependent on himself, men whose settlement on Sicilian 

ground would be wholly his own gift. He gathered 

Peopled colonists from Italy and from Old Greece. He planted at 

Uen horn Messana a thousand settlers from his favourite Lokroi and 

Lokioi and f Qm- thousand from Medma ^. He planted there also a 

Medma, . . 

body of men who might seem to have a special call to 

settle in a city which had exchanged its ancient name for 

and by tiieirs. The Messanians of Feloponnesos, whom Athens 

siansof had planted at Naupaktos and Zakynthos, had again 

^^J^*^*** become homeless after the fall of the city which had given 

them shelter. Six hundred of these wanderers were now 

P Died. ziv. 78 ; ro&rou rt teai rots i\€v$tpu/Uyois oIk4t€us htMwiartvat 

[* That Katand waa rtill inhabited appears from Diod. zi^. 60. See 
p. 119.] 

[' Clavers' oonjecture M*9fiaiovs for the unknown Mcdiftya/ovr of the 
MSS. is obviously correct. (Of. Holm, G. S. ii. 436 ; Bnnbury, in Smith's 
Diet, of GreogT., s. ▼.) Medma or Mesma (both forms appear on its 
coins) was a colony of the Epizephyrian Lokrians ; and its name seems 
to be preserved by the little river Meoma that flows into the sea near 
Niootera in Calabria.] 


given a place by Dionysios in his restored Sicilian Messana. ohaf. x. 
But Dionysios was the friend of Sparta, and Spartan hatred Spartan 
followed the Messanians of Peloponnesos wherever theytion 
went. The tyrant found that he had displeased his most Jf^* 
powerful friends by the favour which he had shown to men ToiasiB of 
whom they had so deeply wrong^ and whom they there- h^mm. 
fore so bitterly hated ^. But^ to his credit be it said, he 
did not forsake those whom he had once taken under his 
protection. He yielded to Spartan jealousy so far as that 
the enemies of Sparta should not be set to dwell in so 
commanding a position as the city on the strait^ whose 
name too was a constant reminder of memories which 
Sparta loved not. Dionysios therefore found for his Mes- They are 
sanian colonists a dwelling in a less prominent part of his Dionyeiw 
own island, and he thereby called a new Oreek city into *^ ^^'^ 
being. On the north coast of Sicily stood the Sikel town of Tynda- 
of Abacsenum K We are not told whether Dionysios had [b*o. 395.] 
any special quarrel with its people, or whether it was 
simply held that any Sikel possession was fair game for 
Greeks. In any case he settled his colonists on a site 
within the Abacsenian territory. That territory was dis- 
membered, according to the pleasure of the lord of Syra- 
cuse, in favour of the Messanian wanderers who found 
themselves settled in yet another home. 

' We have now come to all but the last foundation of a 
Oreek city on Sicilian soil. The destroyer of Naxos showed 
himself as a creator at Tyndaris. Old Peloponnesian 
memories, reverence for the Great Twin Brethren of their 
old land, caused the Peloponnesian wanderers to give that 
name to their new settlement. Near the shore of the bay 
which lies westward of the chersanSsos of Myhd, a lofty 
isolated hill, throwing out more than one bold spur in 
advance, rises proudly, on one side over the sea, on another 
over the lower but still lofty ground which parts it from 

[' Diod. xiv. 78.] [* See Sioilj, i. 145.] 


OBAP. z. the inland moontains. Here Dionysios planted his new 
®*®^^ city, not on the shore like Dncetios, not on an almost 
inaccessible site like Arch6nidte, but still on a site which 
gives Tyndaris a very distinct place among cities set on 
hills. There the fortifier of Epipolai again fenced in a 
height with all the engineering skill of his age. And a 
large part of his work still abides to speak for itself. Two 
steep and lofty spurs jutting out towards the sea were not 
taken within the fortified circuit. On the seaward side, 
where only a broad beach lies between the water and the 
foot of the hill, the wall may be traced, though only in 
slight remains, at a point a considerable way down the 
slope. On the landward side, where the hill is steeper, a 
much larger part of the wall may be followed along the 
edge of the rocky cliffs. The eastern point of the hill is 
crowned by the church of Our Lady of Tindaro, represent- 
ing doubtless some chief temple of the city, perhaps the 
house of the Great Twin Brethren themselves. Just below 
the church, on the landward side, is a projection of the 
hill, which, though by no means its highest point, must 
have practically served as the akropolis of Tyndaris. The 
shape of the height has given the walls that crown it the 
shape of the polygonal shell-keeps of mediseval times; 
we seem at Tyndaris to be looking up to the castle- walls 
of Cardiff or Lincoln or Norwich. But the engineers of 
Dionysios had further devices still. It seems plain that, 
under the shadow of this ;«a«^akropolis, a covered way 
led up to one of the gates of the town. The wall, 
strengthened by square towers at regular intervals, built of 
uncemented rectangular blocks, is fully worthy of the 
great military inventor of his day. The strong city above 
had its haven below, well sheltered by one of the seaward 
spurs of the height on which it stands \ 

{} There is also a sandy tongue ranning eastward from the northern 
promontory whkh probably formed an ann of the original haven, now, 


Events showed that the foundation of Dionysios was cbap. x. 
I wisely planned. The city floorished from the beginning. Flourish- 
The first six hundred settlers welcomed new-comers, and ^r||^^|]^ 
' before long Tyndaris was a city that numbered over five ™* 
I thousand citizens^. The site is now empty^ save for the 
' church and its attached buildings and a few other houses^ 
hardly amounting to a village. But Tyndaris remained, at 
least down to the plunderings of Verres, a city of wealth 
and renown^ which played its part in the wars of Rome 
and Carthage ^. And of the later days of Tyndaris we have Its rains, 
some considerable remains. The Oreek theatre has been 
modified by Roman hands^ and the Roman has nowhere 
left a worthier monument of the building art than the bold 
and massive arches of the building known as the gym- 
nasium ^. It must have altogether changed the character 

except for a few pools and shallows, entirely silted up. The aooess 
to the city above from the harbour must always have been tedious^ as the 
site can only be approached from the seaside by a path which zigzags up 
a steep ascent of 600 feet. On the eastern side, where the wall is now 
very imperfectly pteserred and the difib are steepest, must have taken 
place the catastrophe described by Pliny (ii. 9a), but his statement that 
half l>^daria was swallowed up by the sea is obviously an ezaggeratiott. 
From the line of the existing fragments of wall, it is evident that no very 
considerable part of the ancient site can have been carried away by land- 
slips. It is possible however that part of the sandy flats and shallows 
below were covered at one time by a lower town which was invaded by 
the sea.] 

[» Died. xiv. 78.] 

[' For the history of Tjmdaris see Bunbury (Smith's Diet, of Geogr., 
8. v.). In the first Punic War it was dependent on Carthage, but subse- 
quently, in 354 B. a, expelled the Punic garrison. Cicero, Yerr. iii. 43, 
calls it '' noUlissimam oivitatem." Its great art-treasure, a statue of 
Hermds, formerly carried off by the Carthaginians and restored by Scipio 
Africanus in return for naval assistance rendered to him, was seized by 
Verres (Cicero, Verr. iv. 39-43).] 

[' Earlier Sicilian antiquaries, e.g. Frandsoo Fenara, called this build- 
ing " il Ginnasio." Senadifaloo, Antichitk di Sicilia, v. 55, is more cautioua. 
In exploring the site I was struck by the fact that this fine building with 
its archways and triple gangway lies on a line of cross wall which ap- 
parently represents the barrier between the Agora and Akropolis of 
Tyndaris. It looks as if, in part at least, it had served as a stately portal 
between the two — a Temple Bar of Bomaa l^daris.] 


CHAP. X. of a long line of coast where the Greek had not settled at 

all and where the Sikel had rarely risked himself upon the 

edge of the waters, when Tyndaris arose to supply in some 

sort the blotting-out of Himera from the tale of the cities 

of Hellas^ to atone in some sort for the sweeping away 

of Naxos at the bidding of its founder. He who had 

overthrown the oldest of Sikeliot cities had called the 

youngest into being on a site which waa new ground for 


Hoetilityof The work of Dionysios at Messana and Tyndaris not un- 

^^°* naturally alarmed his enemies at Rhegion. The restoration 

pf Messana^ as a city under the dominion or influence of 

jbhe Syracusan tyrant, they looked on as directly threaten- 

/ing to themselves. They sought therefore to turn his own 

I policy against himself. Dionysios had set up a place of 

' shelter for homeless exiles ; the men of Rhegion would do 

the like for other exiles whom Dionysios himself had made 

homeless and who could be fully trusted to act zealously 

The Rhd- against him. They too chose for their work a site on the 

gaM^oun j^Qj^gj^ coast; but they could hardly be said, like the 

founder of Tyndaris, to enlarge Hellas by a new city. 

Yet they did in some sort design the foundation of a new 

Greek community by cutting ofE a piece of Messanian 

territory and planting it with new inhabitants. The site 

which they chose was evidently suggested by Dionysios^ 

choice of Tyndaris. The two are near neighbours, looking 

forth on each other, neighbours who might be abnost said 

to be natural rivals. In the view from the hill of Tjmdaris, 

along with the inland mountains and the isles of Aiolos, 

a prominent object is the cAerson^sos of Myhd, the western 

outpost of the Messanian territory. Tyndaris is no less a 

prominent object from the cAersonegas of Mylai. Between 

them lies the bold curve of the great bay which seems 

designed as the battle-field of mighty fleets. There 

Gains Duilius first smote the Carthaginian on his own 


element^; there Marcus Ag^ppa wrested the prize from chap. x. 
the younger Pompeius for the younger Csesar *. The two 
points which thus keep watch over one another were both 
at this moment under the dominion or influence of Diony- 
sios. But his enemies of Bhegion determined to wrest one 
of the two posts from his power^ and to people it with the 
men who had most reason to hate him. On the lofty 
height^ the new-built walls, of Tyndaris they did not dare 
to risk an assault. But they marked Mylai as a city of 
refuge for the enemies of Tyndaris and its founder. By 
the side of Tyndaris it seems a lowly spot. From that 
height it looks almost Uke a greater Thapsos seen from 
Epipolai. The flat isthmus is hardly seen ; even the rocky 
peninsula^ with its akropolis and its central hill^ looks low 
indeed beside either the islands or the hills of the mainland. 
But the site of the old Mylai, the rocky hill crowned by 
the castle of Milazzo, the castle which played a memorable 
part in the last deliverance of Sicily, was no contemptible 
post of strength. That post the Rhegine enemies of Exiled dti- 
Dionysios were now able to occupy. They drove out such jJ^M^and 
of his new Messanians as occupied Mylai^ and gave the^^^^^^ 
place fresh inhabitants. They collected all whom theyRhdginee 
could find of the men whom Dionysios had made homeless, ^^ ^ ' 
the wanderers from Naxos and Katane, and planted them 
on the peninsula of Mylai as a new settlement ^. 

Was Mylai, in its new state, designed to form a separate 
community distinct from Messana? That question was 
perhaps left to be settled by the course of events. The 
Rhegines at any rate designed somethiog more than the 
dismemberment of the Messanian territory; they hoped 
for the conquest of Messana itself. They gathered their 
forces, and they found a Syracusan enemy of Dionysios to 

[> Polyb. i. 33.] 

[* Appian, B. G. t. 95-109, 115-iaa; Dion Cms. xUx. a-ii ; Veil. 
Patera, ii. 79 ; Suet. Aug. 16.] [* Diod. zir. 87.] 


CHAP. X. command them. This was Heldris, described as a man of 
high military repute^ who had been driven into exile bj 
the tyrant ^. We are tempted to see in him that Heldris, 
spoken of as the adopted father of Dionysios^ who had 
shown himself a wise and daring comisellor at the moment 
of the tyrants greatest need ^ He who sent Philistos into 

Bhdgmes banishment might do the like by Heldris. Under the com. 

HdSi. n^'^d of their Syracusan general, the Rhegines laid siege 

-^ to the restored Messana of Dionysios. Their approach was 
MesBana. evidently by land — ^perhaps straight from the settlement 
of Mylai. For we read that Heldris attacked the akropolis 
of Messana, where the great modem fort on the hill-side 
rises above the lower town by the sea ". The Messanians 
— the last settlers had already taken the name — ^were ready 
to defend themselves, and they were strengthened by a 
BhdgineB body of mercenaries sent by their founder^. A battle 
andMylai followed, in which the Rhegine besi^^rs were defeated 
^^^'^ with the loss of five hmidred men. The victorious Messanians 
at once marched against the new settlement at Mylai. 
They took the town ; Mylai and Tyndaris were not to look 
out on each other as hostile posts ; both were to be strong- 
holds of the dominion or influence of Dionysios. Mylai must 
have surrendered on terms, for the Naxians, and doubtless 
the Katanaians with them, were allowed to go their ways^. 
Driven from their new home, they were again left to 
wander whither they might, seeking shelter here and there, 
chiefly among the Sikel enemies of Dionysios ^. 

This dismemberment of the territory of Abacsenum, what- 
ever was its immediate occasion, was only part of a general 
plan of warfare designed by Dionysios against the indepen- 

{} Compare Diod. xiv. 87, and 90, 103, 104.] ' 

[» See p. 19.] [» Diod. xiv. 87.] [* lb.] 

P lb. ; roifs olKtaBlvrai ky a^^ Na^/ovs xnroffvSvSovs ixp^ieay.'] 
[* lb. ; tU T€ %KtXobs tfot Tcb dXAos r<i; *E\XfjvlSas w6K*is &if€X$6vTfSf dtXXoi 
Mir* dXKovs T^ovs KaT^ierj(rav.'\ 


dent Sikels. The advance of adopted Greek life in their towns osap. x. 
is here marked in a curious way. Hitherto we have heard Sikel cun- 
of Sikel kings and princes ; Ducetius and Areh6nidSs were Di^ygioa. 
no republican magistrates. But still less were they tyrants. 
But now the Sikel towns^ having been so far Hellenized as 
to develope commonwealths after the Oreek fashion, had in 
some cases gone a step further. They had^ after the Greek 
fashion^ after the speciaUy Sikeliot fashion^ fallen under 
the power of tyrants. Dionysios now set forth on a great 
Sikel campaign, in which he took some towns by arms and 
some by treason^ and made treaties with the rulers of others. 
Smeneos ^ and Morgantina were taken by force. By the He takes 
taking of Morgantina, first conquest of Ducetius, Dionysios ti^lf*^ 
advanced his frontier in the character of lord of KatanS 
rather than in that of lord of Syracuse. But other gains 
followed which might pass for swift steps towards the 
position of a lord of aU Sicily. The founder of Tyndaris 
had already established his power on the north coast, and 
it must have been a gain indeed when the yet stronger hill Cephake- 
of Cephaloedium was put into his hands by some traitor. ^^' 
Under the dominion of Dionysios that whole coast was fast 
passing from the Sikel to the Greek. But what are we to 
make of a perfectly casual notice which implies that the 
extension of his power at this time was not made wholly at 
the cost of Sikels ? We read, without detail and without Scions, 
remark, that among the towns which were now betrayed 
to Dionysios was Phoenician Solous. One whose power now 
reached from Messana to Cephaloedium most likely stood 
in Bome relation to the town which had grown up as a 
representative of fallen Himera^ and from Thermai it would 
be natural to go on to Solous. But at any other moment 
Solous could assuredly not have been won without a Punic 
war. It is just possible that at this particular moment, 

[^ So the MSS. of IModdroe, ziv. 78, bat as no such place is known, 
Dindorf has with some probability suggested Mvcuyov,'] 


OHAP. X. when Carthage was so weakened by her wars in Sicily and 
Africa^ she may have sat calmly by while some faithless 
mercenary allowed the ass laden with gold to toil up to the 
city of the rock. The fact stands recorded^ and we can at 
most suspect some mistake. And the third town taken by 
Henna treason seems strangely joined with the others. The list 
DioraioB. ^^s • " Cephaloedium, Solous^ Henna ^/' Thus the sacred 
city on the height, the home of the Goddesses, where 
the tyrant had once shown himself^ if not as a friend^ 
yet not altogether as an enemy^ passed into his hands by 
the act of some traitor among its own people. Assuredly 
no colony of Syracuse in the begiiming^ it now passed 
for a while under the power of Syracuse or of her 

Henna^ we may believe^ was by this time practically a 

Oreek town. It was doubtless a commonwealth. Dionysios 

himself had first encouraged a tyranny there, and then had 

overthrown it ^. Sut in some other Sikel towns the tyrant 

Treaties of Syracuse had to deal with fellow-tyrants. The name is 

t^,of distinctly given to the ruler of Agyrium, Agyris, who 

^^^y™ seems to bear the name of his city, like Hyblon at Hybla 

of Centn- and Gelon at Gela. An equivalent description is given to 

the ruler of Centuripa, Damon; his name is Greek and 

Doric *. With both these rulers Dionysios made treaties. 

It might often better suit his purpose to support a tyrant 

who would feel himself his dependent and would practically 

act as his lieutenant, rather than to bring the town formally 

under his own dominion. This policy was afterwards largely 

followed by the Macedonian kings, and we may be sure that 

Dionysios thoroughly understood its advantages. In the 

case of Agyrium and its tyrant Agyris they were clear 

indeed. The lord of Agyrium might be a dangerous enemy, 

and he would be a valuable ally. Agyris is spoken of as 

[» Diod. xiv. 78.] [• See pp. 31, 3a.] 

[' Diod. xiv. 78 ; A&fiowa rhv ZwoffTivwra Kiyropiviwy,'] 



the most powerful tyrant in Sicily after Dionysios himself ^. ohap. z. 
We may mark Jiow the two rulers are spoken of together 
as members of the i^ame class^ without any hint at the 
distinction between Greek and Sikel. And we take in the Ftoorish- 
prosperity and power to which some of these inland Sikel ^^yrium. 
towns had grown when we read the description of a place 
which now seems out of all ordinary tracks^ which we 
have seen far away on its peaked hill in the outlook from 
other heights^ but which we have had to give up the hope 
of ever reaching. In the days of Dionysios the holy city 
of Herakl^ and lolaos must have been in the thick of 
the Sicilian world. In Agyrium Agyris ruled over a strong 
and populous city which numbered no less than twenty 
thousand citizens '. The proportion of slaves and strangers 
would doubtless be far less in Agyrium than it was in 
Akragas ; but such a number as this, or a number a good 
deal smaller, would mark Agyrium as a city whose friend- 
ship the master of Syracuse himself could not afford to 
make light of. Agyris was also master of many fortresses 
in the neighbourhood of his city^ and he had a rich hoard 
in the akropolis of Agyrium. He was moreover a tyrant 
in every sense of the word ; his hoard was filled by the 
spoils of the richest men of his city whom he had put 
to death ^. Of the lord of Centuripa we have no such 
details ; our guide is a man of Agyrium and not of Cen- 
turipa. Sut it may be^ to judge from the milder title 
given to him ^^ that his rule was less lawless and bloody 
than that of his fellow at Agyrium. 

Both these Sikel tyrants then Dionysios had every motive 
to win over peacefully to his alliance. It is more remark- 

P Diod. xiv. 95 ; oZros 8i rStv r^rc rvpiyvw tS» ly St/rcXif fitytarriv 
fix* ^op*y /icrd Atovvcicv.'] p lb.] 

[' lb.; iJk 82 Kat tU rovro t6 vK^os ky rp w6\€i evmrfipoiafiivov xp^- 
fiirajy voXXwy xard, r^ AxftdvaXiy vapdBtins, ijjy "Ayvpis ^polxttf vc^Kcvircus 
Tohs tinopturArovs ruy voAiTftn^.] 

[* lb. 78 ; T^y Ztfyaart^oyra.'] 



CHAP. z. able when we hear at the same time of his making treaties 
with the people of three Sikel towns where no lord is 
spoken of. These we may therefore suppose to have been! 
free commonwealths. We may be pretty sure either that> 
Dionysios looked for a stout resistance from them, or else 
that he had some other special motive which led him to 
DionysioB forego any attempt at their complete subjugation. He 
treaty with made a treaty with Herbita^ where the second Archdnides^ 
Herbito ^j^^ founder of Haleesa^ had lately ruled, not as a tyrant 
but as a lawful prince^. In the darkness of internal 
Sikel history, this looks as if he and his dynasty had 
passed away — whether as that of a Tarquin or as that of a 
Kodros — and as if Herbita was now enjoying the early days 
of republican freedom. If so, it must have needed some 
very strong motive to make Dionysios in such a case cease 
and from troubling. He made another treaty with another 

people towards whom he had every motive, if not of grati- 
tude^ at least of policy^ to show every favour. These were 
the citizens of Assdros, the one Sikel town which had not 
joined in the general movement against him some years 
earlier^. A large inland Sikel region was thus allowed to 
keep a certain measure of freedom; its people were the 
allies of Dionysios and not his subjects. Still they were 
watched^ not only from Syracuse and his other possessions 
on the east side of Sicily^ but also from the posts which he 
had gained on the north coast of the island and in its 
innermost centre^ at Cephalcedium namely and at H^ma. 
Makes But when we read, under another formula^ that Dionysios 

peace with .<•-• 

Herbessui. made peace with the people of Herbessus ^, we are tempted 
to think of another meaning. It may be that an attempt 
at the direct annexation of a Sikel town so much nearer to 
Syracuse than any of the others just spoken of had to be 
put off in the face of events^ more distant in place, but 

[» See p. 33.] [* See p. 107.] 

[' Diod. xiv. 78 ; wp^ *Ep0Tfaatrovs ^\pffj[inpf lir<M4<7aT0.] 


which touched the personal feelings of Dionysios far more chap. z. 
keenly. ' 

It would seem that it was while the tyrant was thus DionymoA 
personally warring and negotiating with the various Sikel yengeance 
powers that the events took place in north-eastern Sicily ®? ^^*" 
which were described a little while back. The Bhegines^ 
the people of all others most hateful to the soul of Diony- 
sios^ had been befriending his enemies and attacking his 
friends^ and they had been beaten back without any share 
in the success Mling to the lot of himself personally ^. He 
now wished to show himself face to face to these presump- 
tuous enemies^ and to have his vengeance on them '. Sut 
again Greek and Sikel politics could not be kept asunder. 
In a war with Bhegion a Sikel enemy stood in the way 
whom^ even apart from a war with Rh£gion^ Dionysios had 
every motive to wish to get rid of. The new Sikel com- 
monwealth planted by Himilk&n in its mountain home on 
Tauros was beginning to play its part in the affairs of 
Sicily. From Syracuse to BhSg^on the most obvious course 
by sea and land lay beneath the feet of Sikel Tauromenion. 
Without giving its settlers credit for making war on a 
great scale^ they would have no lack of opportunity for 
annoying armies^ perhaps fleets also^ on their passage^. 
The tyrant made up his mind to deal with the nearer HereaoLyes 
enemy first^^ and an expedition to bring Tauromenion under xauro^ 
his power was decreed in the counsels of Dionysios. menion. 

We have sometimes wondered at the way in which^ in 
Sicilian and in Greek warfare generally, the winter season 
is constantly spoken of as of itself putting a stop to all 

[^ See p. 1 58.] 

[• Diod. xiv. 87.] 

' lb. ; Aioy^toft r&if wtpi rhv wop$/*l^y a^f t69w KancKtvaafAhtaw 

TttvpofUyiay uarukri^Srpfy XiMXair. 

* lb. ; Aiovtp Kflvas otF/i^pcir rofh'oif kfttdiuBai wpdniHt. 

M 2 


CHAP. z. war&re. But with the great improver of the military art 
the time when kings go forth to battle was not boiinded by 
those seasons in which warfare was deemed less plentiful in 
hardship. Dionysios bought his mercenaries dear; they 
had the spoil of cities as the prize of their toil ; he could 
therefore demand services from them which the citizen- 
soldiers both of Athens and Syracuse were beginning to 
shrink from. The day was passed when Sdkrates and his 
fellow-soldiers endured the winter's si^^ at Potidaia ; but 
the Campanians and Iberians by whom the Sicilian warfare 
was now waged were still ready for such toilsome works. 
Dionysios Dionysios did not shrink from devoting the winter to the 
winter to s^ege of Tauromenion, so far as Tauromenion could be said 
Taurc^^ to be besieged. He pitched his camp on the side towards 
menion. the forsaken site of Naxos^ and thence carried on his leaguer 
of the mountain-city. He deemed^ we are told, that the 
siege would not be a long one, that the Sikels^ if pressed by 
warfare or hunger^ would soon forsake their lofty dwelling- 
place^ a dwelling-place where they had been settled but 
yesterday, and for which they could have no traditional 
Calcula- attachment^. Nothings as a rule^ is less valuable than 
DionymoB the surmises of our narrators^ specially when they write 
PUUs^^^ some ages after, as to the thoughts and motives of princes 
and generals. But we may be sure that we are here not 
listening to the compiler of Agyrium in the days of Augus- 
tus, not even to the banished of Tauromenion in the days of 
Agathokles^ but to the statesman and soldier of Syracuse 
who as yet shared the inmost counsels of her master. It 
is Philistos, and none other^ who gives us this vivid picture 
of the workings of the tyrant's mind and of the feelings of 
the people with whom the tyrant had to deal. Dionysios 
had clearly not reckoned on the strength of purpose in 
a long oppressed nationality which has at last again lifted 

^ Diod. xiv. 87 ; ttpoa&caprip^i rg woXiopKiq, rhtr x^^l'^^^ rofu((Uk rovr 


up its head among mankind. The Sikels of Tauromenion ohap. x. 
had indeed no immediate tie to Tanromenion, as to a native 
and ancestral city ; but Tauromenion looked down on the 
ground where Naxos once had stood. They had heard of 
old time and their fathers had told them how that was the 
spot where the Greek had first b^im to encroach upon the 
Sikel. The spot which had been the firstfruits of Greek 
invasion had more lately become the firstfruits of the new* 
bom life of the Sikel ; it was theirs by the gift of the very 
man who now came against them. They had won back the 
soil of their fore&tiierB; they would not move from the 
lofty dweUing-plaoe which commanded it^ If Dionysios 
was to win Tauromenion^ he must win it only by a struggle 
in which every man of Tauromenion would be ready to fight 
to the death. 

If the Sikels of Tauromenion had fully nerved their ABsanU 
hearts for the defence, Dionysios had no less fully made up menion.^ 
his mind to become master of their stubborn stronghold. 
It was now the winter solstice^ and the snow was thick on 
the upper heights of Tauros ^, as it may sometimes^ even in 
more genial seasons of the year^ be seen from Tauros itself 
lying thick on the hills of the oldest Italy. While the 
ground was thus covered, the Sikels^ in one at least of 
the fortresses of Tauromenion^ kept a watch less strict 
than should have been kept when such an enemy was 
threatening them ^. The &ct of their heedlessness reached 

* This moft remarkable setting forth of Sikel fteeliiig itandti thus (o. 88) 
in formal opposition to the mistaken belief of Dionysios ; ol 8) SurcAo2 vofd 
T&y voW^aur l« vaXmov waptiXfj^^ts, Sn ret fUfni Tovra r^ rlj<rov XuctX&v 
Kar*x^wrv¥, "VkXtp^tt vp&rvf learawXtvcarra iienaav fth^ V^fpy, l£^/3aXor V 
lirrdf rov rimv roht r&r^ KaroiKOVirns 2t«cXo^, did d^ ipdffKcrrts varp^fay 
dycu(Ti^<r0(u x^fi^'^t ^ **f^ ^ <'' ^^ lavrw wpoy6y<nn k^^fMprw *E\- 
Kijrts 6piCvaff$at 9iitai»s k^HXaT^ftovlrro icaraax^"^ ^^f A^^ov. We mutt 
imagine Britons of the time of Bogberht living within sight of Ebbsfleet. 

' Diod. ziv. 88 ; Irvxor /tir oScrcu rfwwat x«A(*/Mra2, koI M robs Iwitcko- 
fUvovs xct/M^''*^ ^ ^*P^ ^^ 6Mp69oXw r6wos vkifptit fy x^^^^** 

' lb. ; ikiw^wt rv^ XurcAo^, Ui ri^ bxvp^rfira teal rij/y {nnpfioK^ rev 


OHAF. z. the watchful ear of the tyrant^ and he planned an attack 
^^s^\^ compared to which the famous nkfht attack of the Athenians 
Tauro- on the Epipolai of Syracuse sounds like child^s-play. On 
a moonless and stormy night Dionysios led out his forces 
to the assault of the heights of Tauromenion ^. The 
whiteness of the snow was their only help against utter 
darkness ; but the paths^ rough at best^ were deeply clogged 
with its fall; the intense cold touched the eyesight of 
Dionysios himself and covered his face with wounds ^. Yet 
he and his followers pressed on with a stout heart ; their 
first assault was seemingly directed against the lower 
height^ the hill on which the &mous theatre arose in after- 
One akro- days. " They took one akropolis ^'/' and from that strong- 
' hold Dionysios was enabled to make a successful dash on 
the town itself, and to lead his troops within it^. The 
news that the enemy was actually within their gates 
aroused the men of Tauromenion from their slumbers. 
They gathered fast in the town itself, and helpers doubt- 
less sped down from the Castle, perhaps from the loftier 
Repulse of height of Mola^ The lord of Syracuse and his soldiers 
onjBOB. ^^^Q suiTOunded in the dead of the nighty in a strange 
town, by a force evidently greater than their own. Six 
hundred were killed on the spot; the more part, the tyrant 
himself among them^ were driven over the clifb between 
the town and the sea. They rolled or scrambled down how 
they might, and most of them lost their armour on the 

rdxotfs fitfBv/iovyras vc/>2 71^ mrct ti^v dxpSiroXiV 4>vXaififr €vp&y. See 
Appendix IV. 

^ Diod. xiy. 88 ; &pfiaj<r4 wterh dcrcXi^vov iitia2 xti/itphv vpbs rod; dptrrdiw 
r<$rovf. See Appendix IV. 

' lb. ; voAAd 3^ taucwoBiiffas 8u& re r^ rw Mptffiywy ^hnrx^pttaif itaX r6 
vKijBos r^f x^^^of . . , «a2 rd ttf6cvwov k{^\Mw<rt Mtd rdtt S^tis ifiXaff^ did rd 

* lb. ; luas ii\v dMf>ow6ktats iicvpltvct. See Appendix IV. 

* lb. ; /icrd 9k ravra tls rd tr^potf lUpot wafiHffw(ci», €lc^ayt r^y Mva* 
fuv elf r^y v6Xiy, See Appendix IV. 

' See Appendix IV. 



way. Dionysios was taken up with the breath barely left chap. x« 
in his body. But he had the honour — it is surely his right- 
hand man who tells the tale— -of being the only man in his 
company who came down from scaling the heights of 
Tauromenion still wearing his breast-plate K 

Tauromenion was thus saved from the attack of the 
Syracusan tyrant to be still for a very short time a centre 
of renewed Sikel nationality. The discomfiture of Diony- 
sios not only put off his attack on Rhegion for some while, 
but stirred up all his other enemies to take action against 
him. Sut the two names that are first mentioned raise 
some difiiculty. We are told that the people of Akragas Revolt of 
and of Messana^ after this mishap of Dionysios^ drove out and^ls- 
his partisans and asserted their freedom^. Akragas had 
thrown off the supremacy of Carthage at the beginning of 
the first Punic war of Dionysios '. That must practically 
have meant that it passed from the supremacy of Carthage 
to the supremacy^ if not to the direct dominion, of Diony- 
sios. It was only in human nature that those who had 
won the inch should wish for the ell, that those who had 
exchanged a barbarian for a Greek master should next wish 
to be without any master at all. And it was further in 
Akragantine nature to loathe any superiority on the part of 
Syracuse in any shape. How far any Sikeliot state could, 
as things stood then, expect to keep perfect independence^ 
alike of Dionysios and of Carthage, is another matter The 
statement about Messana is more puzzling. Revolutions 

^ Diod. u. I. ; 4£c^^<ray ol fitr^ rod Aiowaiov' itai airrds Ik r0 ^7§» 
rvwrdfttvos c2f rdy B^fxuea, ittpi€Mv\iff$tf, icai wap^ dXiyor awtkfi^Oij (wv . . . 
dW^oXovdi rcU iraKorX/cv ol vAcroTOc, teat aMs 9i 6 Aiorvo'iof /i6yw rdv B&fOJia 
M^oNTc. In the somewhAt simUar case of the Athenians who feU and 
leaped from Epipolai (Thuc. vii. 44, 45, see Sicily, iii. 516), it ii not the 
loss of the breast-plate that we hear of, bat of the shield, which is more 

[• Diod. xiv. 88.] [» See p. 65.] 



GHAT. z. were so common in Greek cities^ they were so specially 
common in Messana above other Greek cities^ that it may be 
that those whom Dionysios had himself planted in Messana 
thus soon turned against him. Still it is hard to believe in 
such a change at this particular moment ; for directly after- 
wards we hear of Messana again^ and we hear of it in 
a way which implies that it was friendly to Dionysios. 
One is tempted to see some mistake in the text — possibly 
some confusion in the compiler — but it is dangerous to try 
to set it right by guess-work ^. 

§ 4. Tie Second Punic War of Dionysios. 

B.C. 392. 

Expedition We now^ quite suddenly^ without any hint or prepara- 
ags^^^ tion^ find ourselves in the midst of another Punic war. 
MeBuna. [Mag6n, who commanded the] Carthaginian forces in 
Sicily, thought the opportunity a good one to attempt to 
win increased influence for Carthage in the island^ and to 
win it in a manner unusual with Punic commanders. He 
took to showing every sort of consideration to the Sicilian 
cities which were under Carthaginian rule ; he welcomed 
those who were driven into exile by Dionysios ; he made 
alliances with the Sikel enemies of the tyrant^. Thus 
strengthened by the accession of native allies^ he set out on an 
expedition against Messana, and encamped on the road near 
Abacsenum. That Sikel town had been shorn of part of its 
territory for his foundation at Tyndaris ; it had therefore 
gladly entered the Punic alliance ^. There is a certain interest 

\} Grote (c Izxxlii. note) remttka ; " I cannot but think that Diod6niB 
has here inadvertently placed the word VLtufHfvioi instead of a name 
belonging to Bome other community — what community we cannot tell.** 
Holm (G. S. ii. 438) Buggests Ka/ia^cuoc.] 

[' Biod. xir. 90; lvoii}<raro Z\ icaX wp6s ro^s irXtlarovs rSfr 2tKiX&y 

[• lb. Cp. p. 153.] 


in this campaign, waged by a Punic general in quite a new chap. x. 
character. We hear nothing of any reinforcements being 
sent from Africa ; Magdn makes war^ it would seem^ at the 
head of the forces of the Carthaginian possessions in Sicily^ 
and of any natives of the island^ Greek or Sikel^ that would 
join him. But against such a combination as this the lord 
of Syracuse proved the stronger. Dionysios came in person^ MagOn de- 
gave battle to Mag6n, and defeated him with the loss of Dionysioi. 
eight hundred men^. This number shows how different 
a kind of army this must have been from those which 
Carthage was accustomed to gather from every land of the 
barbarians of the West. Carthage^ simply as a Sicilian 
power^ was weaker than Syracuse under such a leader as 

The unsuccessful expedition of Magdn against Messana Fresh Car- 
seems to have called Carthage back to her more usual way ^^l^tion 
of carrying on Sicilian warfare. The depression which had Y?^ 
followed the overthrow before Syracuse had now passed 
away. The defeat at Abacsenum had not seriously weakened 
the Carthaginian power^ while it would be felt as a call 
to greater exertions. An army of the usual kind^ number- 
ing eighty thousand^ was got together from Africa and 
Sardinia. This time there is no mention of Spain; but 
the barbarians of Italy are specially spoken of K Carthage^ 
like her general^ had taken to milder ways. Magdn^ in- 
stead of being crucified for his defeat^ was put in command 
of the greater force which was now sent over to Sicily. 
Thus strengthened, he set forth on a march among the 
Sikel towns in the inland parts of the island. He won 
over^ we are told^ many cities by revolt from Dionysios ^ 
It would have been no great trouble to give their names ; 
but we get no detail till the Punic general reached the 
territory of Agyrium. There the local interest of our guide 

[' Diod. xiT. 90.] 
[* Diod. ziy. 95 ; rwy ^ IraXtat fiapfi^puit,] [* lb.] 


CHAP. z. is kindled^ and he minutely fixes the site of Mag6n's camp 
by the river Chrysas^ near the road that leads to Mor- 
gantina^ Agyris, the powerful tynmt of Agyrium, waa 
a firm ally of Dionysios^ and no persuasion of Magon could 
win him over to the Carthaginian side. Magdn was there- 
fore minded to press on further^ specially as he had heard 
that the lord of Syracuse was himself on his march to meet 
him. So he was, at the head of such a force as he could 
get together at the moment^ a force of twenty thousand) 
Syracusan and mercenary. Marching inland^ he drew near 
to the host of Magdn before it had advanced any great 
Agyrii of distance beyond Agyrium. He then first sent messages to 
^^"^ Agyris, and then entered Agyrium in person with a small 
DionysioB. party. He called on Agyris to abide in his alliance and 
to fight manfully for the common cause ^. It was the 
common cause of tyrants; but it was also the cause of 
Sicilian independence. For the dominion of Carthage, 
however established, over any Sikel or Sikeliot town would 
have been far harder to shake off than the lordship either 
of Agyris or of Dionysios. More immediate ai^^uments 
were not wanting. Dionysios promised Agyris a large 
increase of territory as the reward of vigorous help in the 
present need^. Thus appealed to, the Sikel tyrant first 
furnished his Greek brother with com and all that his 
army needed, and then joined his camp with his whole 
force. Magdn had now to cope with the two greatest 
native powers of Sicily, Greek and barbarian. 

In point of numbers the Punic host no doubt still outdid 
the combined power of Syracuse and Agyrium. Sut it 
was encamped in an enemy's country, and it was hard work 

[' Diod. xiv. 95 ; iear€<rTparovii€va€y Ir rfi rSav 'Ayvpivaiw X^n '^'W 
rbv XpAcay worafibv, I^T^t rfjs 69cv rrjs ^povcfjs ctf Hopytarrmof. This 
passage is valuable for the light it throws on the whereabouts of Morgan- 
tina. The Chrysas is the modem Dittaino.] 

[* lb. ; Ifirci0'c rdr ^Ayvpiv avfi/iaxfi<fw> yrtfcUn.'] 



to get provisions. For the men of Agyrium naturally chap. x. 
knew every inch of their own land ; they could lie in 
ambush at every tum^ and cut ofE every party that set 
forth from the Punic camp in search of food '. By these 
means the Carthaginian army was slowly wasting away. 
Dionysios deemed it the wiser course to go on with this 
gradual process of destruction rather than to risk a pitched 
battle. What follows in our one narrative is strange. The 
l^nracusans called on Dionysios to lead them at once against 
the barbarians. When he refused, they left his camp ; he 
then called the slaves to freedom ^. The last words^ it is 
to be supposed^ mean that he armed the slaves who accom- 
panied the horsemen and heavy-armed on a campaign. 
But who were the deserters ? Are we by the word Syra- 
cusans to understand the force of Dionysios in general or 
the Syracusans as distingpiished from the mercenaries ? If 
the citizens are meant, it is somewhat strange that they 
^could desert so easily^ under the eyes both of the merce- 
'naries and of the forces of Agyris. In an earlier case where 
Dionysios refuses to attack the enemy and the refusal is 
followed by desertion^ the malecontents are neither Syra- 
cusans nor mercenaries^ but the soldiers from other Sikeliot 
cities^. But then the Syracusans and the other Greeks 
had distinctly different interests^ which does not seem to 
be the case now. And anyhow it is strange that Magdn 
did not choose the time for an attack when the Greek and 
Sikel army was weakened by the loss of a considerable part 
of its strength. It is even more strange when we read that Mftg6n 
the Carthaginians — whether Magdn is meant or any special terms with 
commission from Carthage — chose that moment to ask for ^^^7^^- 
peace. Strangest of all is it to hear that Dionysios then 

[» Diod. xiy. 96.] 

[* lb.; 'O 82 rd /ilv ir/wrc¥ ^koMn^ot Iv' IXcvtfcpiay litdXci riAt 

[* See pp. 119, 130.] 


CHAP. z. gave the slaves back to their masters^ the masters who had 

just forsaken him^. There must be some mistake or 

)| other in the story as it is told us ; but we have no means 

j of setting it right. But the confusion of the narrative 

is no reason for doubting the reality of the peace which 

ended this strange campaign of Agyrium. Its terms were 

doubtless^ like the terms of other treaties^ graven on the 

stone to speak for themselves. 

Terms of Those terms are well worth comparing with the terms 

iiho now 

peace with of the earlier treaty concluded between Dionysios and Car- 
\ Carthage, thage*. In both the great powers sat, with the usual 
calmness of great powers, to portion out the territory and 
the souls of all the lesser powers without asking their 
consent. The new treaty^ it is said^ was grounded upon 
the old one^ and re-enacted or assumed its provisions^ except 
when new clauses were f ormallybrought in. Yet it must 
have contained several such clauses which do not appear 
in the wretchedly meagre account which is all that we 
have. According to that, the only new provision was that 
the Sikels, and one set of Sikels in particular, should be 
subject to Dionysios ^. Sut this alone would mark the 
difEerence between the present treaty and the older one. 
The older treaty is one dictated to Dionysios by Carthage ; 
the present treaty is one dictated to Carthage by Dionysios. 
The lord of Sjrracuse had grown not a little in power in 
the twelve years between the two. The first treaty pro- 
vided that certain parts of Sicily, Greek and barbarian, 
should remain under the dominion or supremacy of Car- 
thage. It provided that certain other parts, Greek and 

\} Diod. xiv. 96 ; &yawo/*vifWvt rois Kvplois ^irolrffft (ro^ oUciras).'] 
[' Sicily, iii. 579 seqq. In 397 no formal treaty had been concluded ; 
see p. 147.] 

' Diod. liv, 96 ; if <rar 5* tU <rvy^«ai rd /xir dXka irapav\^ffiai nut itp6* 


barbarian, should be independent. It guaranteed nothing to chap. x. 
Dionysios^ except his dominion in his own city. Leontinoi, 
Messana^ and all the Sikel communities were guaranteed 
against him ^. In our meagre report, the chief feature of Meagre- 
the new treaty is that it guarantees the independence of details, 
nobody. As for the Sikels, instead of their independence 
being guaranteed against Dionysios, it is his dominion over 
them which is guaranteed. Sut it is absolutely inconceiv- 
able that the treaty contained no other clauses. It must 
have said something about the Greek towns whose con- 
dition had been so greatly changed since the first treaty. 
By that treaty Eamarina^ Gela^ Akragas, Selinous, the 
new Himera^ were all put under Carthage in one shape 
or another 2. They were now all, perhaps formally indepen- 
dent, but certainly under the practical power of Dionysios. 
That treaty guaranteed the independence of Leontinoi. 
Leontinoi was now occupied by the mercenaries of Dionysios. 
It guaranteed the independence of Messana. Since then 
Messana had been destroyed by Himilk6n and restored by 
Dionysios. The treaty must assuredly have contained clauses 
which in some way recognized the existing state of things 
on these points ^. We wish further to know whether the 
treaty provided anything about Solous, which was said to 
have passed into the hands of Dionysios. If we could be sure 
that its name did not occur, that would be no small argument 
against the truth of its surrender ^. Pity indeed it is that 
we have not its very words as they were graven on the 
stone. We should then know how the Syracusan state was 

^ See Sicily, lii. 58a. 

* See Sidly, iii 580, 581. 

' The thought does suggest itself whether the first Punic war was really 
ended by a treaty providing for all these points which DiodOros forgot to 
record at al]. This is quite possible, and it would make the present passage 
quite dear. But it is just as likely that DiodOros, having his head just 
now full of Tauromeiiion and the Sikels, copied only what oonoemed them. 
Only why did he not mention his own Agyrium f 

* See above, p. 159. 


CHAP. X. described in a diplomatic act of the time of Dionysios^ and 
we should know some other things as well. 
Sikeis The Sikels then were to be subject to Dionysios. One 

subject to , , , 

Dionysios. is inclined to ask whether no exception was made in favour 
of the lord of Agyrium. His services in the late war had 
been great; did he gain the increase of territory which 
Dionysios had promised him ? Perhaps these points were 
left for the two tyrants to settle between themselves without 
Carthaginian intervention. Nor do we hear anything special 
about the foundation of ArchdnidSs at Halaesa^ nor about 
Cephaloedium which Himilkdn had once taken into his 
friendship. But that one Sikel commonwealth which had 
come into being during the wars between Carthage and 
Dionysios, the one which had been called into being by 
a Carthaginian commander, as an ally of Carthage and 
a check upon her enemies, was cruelly betrayed. A special 
clause of the treaty authorized Dionysios to take possession 
of Tauromenion. 
Dionysios After the conclusion of the treaty, Magon sailed back 
Tauro- to Carthage. Dionysios did not delay in carrying out the 
menion. j^^^ clause, which guaranteed to him tbe possession of the 
mountain-city where he had undergone that utter dis- 
comfiture which had given the signal for the war which 
had just ended. It is provoking, after the vigorous de- 
scription which we have not long ago read of the tyrant's 
failure at Tauromenion, to be told now without a single 
detail, without the faintest explanation of means and 
circumstances, that Dionysios now took possession of the 
town. The Sikels of Tauromenion, when Dionysios came 
against them before, had the alliance of Carthage to look 
to ; now they were left to their own rescources. Still we 
should at least like to know whether the tyrant marched 
up by the steep sides of Tauros and entered in by the gate 
of Tauromenion without a blow being struck against him. 
What we do know is his treatment of the place when he 


had poBsession of it. The word went forth that those who chap. z. 
had boasted that they had come to abide on Tauros^ should Merce- 

•^ , uanes 

abide on it no longer. Most^ seemingly not all^ of the planted 
Sikel inhabitants were driven out. In their stead Dionysios menion 
placed there a body of his mercenaries, those who wei*»g|^ 
deemed fittest to hold such a post^. Are we to believe 
that some of the Sikel inhabitants endured to dwell on in 
their conquered city on condition of entering the tyrant's 
service along with the new-comer ? At any rate Tauro- 
menion now ceased to be a distinctly Sikel community^ the 
home of a nationality distinctly hostile to that of Hellas. 
But it did not as yet distinctly become Greek. It was not 
a national but a military settlement^ a settlement of the 
mercenaries of Dionysios, who might be Greek^ Sikel, 
Iberian, Campanian, anything else. Indeed, notwithstanding 
the romantic interest of the Sikel revival, we must allow 
that the foundation of Tauromenion, in this specially Sikel 
character, as a post of Sikels against Sikeliots, was out of 
place in the days of Dionysios. The decree had gone forth 
that the Sikel was to live and flourish, but that he was to 
live and flourish only by becoming a Greek. Tauromenion 
therefore, the embodiment of Sikel hostility to the Greek, 
was not fated to abide in its Sikel character. It was no 
gain truly in itself when the Sikel colonists of HimilkAn 
were displaced to make way for the motley hirelings of 
Dionysios, strangers many of them both to the soil of Sicily 
and to the life of Hellas. Still the conquest of Tauromenion 
by Dionysios was in some sort its admission into the Greek 
world. We hear nothing more of the town during the rest 
of his reign ; in the time of his son another change of 

^ See above, p. io8, and Appendix IV. 

* Diod. 11. 8. ; /iCTc^ 8i rds awBiiteas^ WLyojv ii\v dvivktvat, Atov^ios 8i 
9apakafi$jv rh Tavpofiiviw, rovs ii.\v vktttrroifs rwv ittu StircXwv i^4fiaX€, 
rS» 8* {8iW fu{r$o<p6pofy roiK iwiTTf^tordrom IrtX^^of tcaT^iet<r€, Thii ia 
all. Yet surely Dioddros had books before him which could have told as 


CHAP. X. inhabitants was in store for it which was to make it more 
purely Greek. 

§ 5. Frovjn the Second to the Third Punic War of Bumt/rios. 

B. c. 39a-383, 

Dionyaio. With this great strengthening of the power of the Syra- 
againBt cusan tyrant in his own island the nature of his power^ and 
Bhdgion. ^^ whole character of his history, begins to change. 

As yet Dionysios wished to avoid any direct warfare with 

the Italiot League^. It would come sooner or later; but 

his object was to secure for himself^ before it began^ a safe 

foothold on Italian soil. The position of Rhegion, the key 

and bulwark of Italy on the Sicilian side ^, the defeat which 

he had already undergone at the hands of its citizens^ all 

marked out the city on the Italian side of the strait as the 

His private first object of his attack. [Moreover he harboured against 

^i^t Rhegion a grudge of a more personal nature. Some years 

Khfiginei. earlier than this, when seeking support on every side against 

his Punic foes, he had asked a wife of the RhSgines. They 

however had refused him his request, adding, it was said, 

the gibe that he might, if he pleased, take the hangman^s 

daughter. He had then turned to Lokroi, where they gave 

him Doris, the daughter of one of the leading citizens ^.] 

^ Diod. ziv. lOO ; r^v iikv /ear* ix^ivovs [robs icar* IraXiav "EWsjvas] 
KOiirffif arpaT^lay cts tr€pov Koiphv &vt0A\(TO. 

* lb. ; Kpivas cvfiip4piiv lvtx*ip€t¥ irpdrrjf rp tw 'Frjylyaiv ir6\€t Sul rd ir/>o- 
woXtfJojT^ptoy ctMjv titnu r^s 'IroAiar. 

[' Dlod. ziv. 44 ; Plut., Didn, 3 ; and compare ^Elian, V. H. xii. 47, 
and ziii. 10. For the 'answer of the Rhdgines eee Diod. ziv. 107 (ipcurl 
robs *Pfiyiyovs dvQKpiBfjvai Brifiofft^ rc*s vpiirfitaty i&r fA6viji^ a{rrf <rvyxoap^(rat 
yafuTv r^ rod Brffuov Svyaripa). According to Plutarch (Timoledn, 6), 
Dionysios also met with a rebuff from Aristeidds at Lokroi. On the same 
day he also married Aristomachd the daughter of his friend Hipparinos 
at Syracuse (Dlod. ziv. 44 ; Plut., Didn, 3 ; Ml. V. H. zii. 47). Mr. Free- 
man remarks on this (Story of Sidly, 165) ; " For a man to. have two 
wives at once was utterly against all Greek custom. But Dionysios kept 
them both; he had children by both, and treated them with equal 


He set forth from Syracuse, not indeed at the head of such cbap. z. 
an anny as he had led against Motya^ but with a power which Expedition 
was great according to the older standard of Greek warfare. Rhdgion. 
He commanded twenty thousand footmen, a thousand horse- ' ' ^^ * 
men^ and a hundred and twenty ships. With these he did Dionyslos 
not sail straight to Rhegion, but made the friendly soil of J^^^i 
Lokroi the base of his attack. Prom thence his fleet sailed ^* *^*^- 
along the coast, doubling the cape [of Herakl^] and turning 
northward into the strait^. Meanwhile with his land-force 
he set forth from the border of Lokroi and Rh^on, and 
marched against Rh^gion^ plundering and burning as he 
went. The whole force by land and sea now began the siege RhdgioR 
of the city ; the Italian side of the strait was lined with the ^^^ 
invading forces of Sicily K But the Italiot League was not 
wanting to its threatened ally. As soon as the landing of 
Dionysios was made, sixty confederate triremes were sent 
forth from Krotdn to the help of Rhegion. Dionysios, with 
fifty of his ships^ sailed to meet them while they were still 
making their way up the strait. The Italiots, though their 
force was g^eater^ feared to meet the Syracusan vessels^ 
and fled to the shore. Dionysios followed and began to 
make prizes of the Italiot ships and to tow them off. We 
hear of no resistance on the part of their crews^ who must 
have escaped to land. But the spot^ not otherwise defined^ 
must have been near Rhegion ; for the whole RhSgine force 
came forth to help. One party succeeded in dragging all Naval dia- 
the ships on shore, while another, by a constant shower of ^f Djony- 
missiles, kept the ships of Dionysios off *. A storm came "^•" 
to their further help. Seven of the Syracusan ships were 

^ Theooane ii marked in the words of Diddorot, xiv. loo ; ffvfonxpiwkwat 
^l Koi 6 (rrdXos kwl Birtpa /Mpfj rrjs $a\aT'nis. 

* Diod. xiv. lOo ; wAajf rp Iiw6,ft€i w*fi rhy itopB^ Kar§aTpaTowi9wfft. 

' lb. ; ffwH^aas dvima rdt 'm»popfMai6<ns iy rp 7^. Mi¥9wtvowrSfv 9< rw 
l^^MOirra rpt^pMf dXwroi, 'Ftiytifot way^ful vaptfio^Btfrnu^t mi dvd r$s 'j/ift 
rf wK^tt Twr fiOMv iyttp^w r6p hior&aici¥. It Beemi dear that the 
eeamen of the sixty confederate ships were also on shore. 




returns to 

CHAP. X. dashed ashore ; their crews, amounting to fifteen hundred 
men, were partly drowned, partly taken alive by the 
Bhegines^. Dionysios himself, in his own quinquereme, 
soaring above the smaller vessels around him, fled to 
the opposite coast. The storm pressed heavily on him 
and the waves dashed over even the lofty sides of his 
ship^. It was not till about midnight that he found 
himself in the safer waters sheltered by the Zanklon of 

Bh%ion was thus rescued a second time ; the energy of 
her own citizens was favoured by the active help of the 
powers of nature. Not only were the Italiot ships and men 
saved from Dionysios ; but the winter was coming on, and 
the tyrant withdrew from his Italian expedition altogether. 
That is, he did not strike another blow till next year. 
But he was active in another way. Dionysios was ready 
to be at any moment, as suited his purpose, either the 
champion of Hellas or her betrayer. This time the latter 
character was more convenient. Before he left the neigh- 
bourhood of the strait, he formed an alliance with the 
Lucanian enemies of the Italiot cities \ Its terms evi- 
dently were that the barbarians should act against them 
by land and the fleet of Dionysios by sea. Just as after 
the taking of Motya, Leptines was left in command of 
the Syracusan fleet, while the tyrant himself went back to 
his capital ^. 

with Luca- 

^ Diod. ziv. lOO ; ro^wy &/ul reus vawrlv MpcLaQimwt^ M rijiy ^Ftjytvffiff 
ol *P7ytvoi woWovs rav vavrw iCirypijaav. 

' lb. ; voXX&KK vap dXlyoy 4\$oity {nro0pvxtos, 

' lb. ; ovTos fA€v vpi^ Acv«myo^9 irv/ifiaxioy voirjffdfiwos dm^TOYC tg^s 9wd- 
/xtts tls ISvpcucoviTas, That this means only the land-foroe is plain from 
what follows. 

* lb. I03 ; i)y 8i 6 <n&Koi 6 v/KxnrX^wr Aunnnriov rov rvp&yyou, Kot 
V€alfapXOt inr^px^y avr^ AeirrivTjs 6 dScA^dr, &vt<rTa\/jiiyof roiis Acv«avo» M 
fioffitioy. This comes a little later, but within the winter of B. o. 390-389. 
It is much more likely that Leptinds was left behind than that he was 
sent 0^ a second time. 



The barbarians did not fail to carry out their share of ohap. x. 
the aefreement with the tyrant. A Lucanian invasion of ?-^* 39^^' 

. . . Lnoanumi 

the territory of Thourioi followed while it was still winter ^. invada tei> 
Messages were sent to the other Italiot cities^ asking help Tl^2rioi. 
according to the treaty. The generals of the several com- 
monwealths did not loiter on an errand in which their 
lives were at stake. The forces of the other towns were 
making ready to march ; but the Thourians, in their self- 
confidence and perhaps wishing to win the credit of 
some exploit done single-handed^ would not wait for the 
coming of the main body of their allies '. An army of ThonrUns 
14^000 foot and a thousand horse entered the Lucanian Luoa^ 
territory, territory much of which had once been Greek. 
Within it lay the flourishing town of Laos, once the repre- 
sentative of Sybaris^ then the scene of the greatest blow 
which had been dealt to Hellas in those regions ^y now a 
dwelling-place and stronghold of the barbarians. Perhaps 
the recovery of Laos was the direct object of the enterprise 
from the b^inning \ at any rate it became so as soon as 
the invading Thourians tasted the first sweets of success. 
The Lucanians seem to have formed their plans with skill 
worthy of the Samnites or of the Romans. They withdrew 
into their own land and ofEered no opposition to the entry 
of the invaders^. The Greeks attacked a border fortress 
whose name is not given ; they stormed it and won a rich 
booty. The prize was, as our guide says, a bait thrown in 

r [^ Diod. xiy. loi. It is now that DioddroB givea the terniB of the treftty 
by which the Hellenic Cities of Italy had boand themselves to come to the 
asButance of any one of them that was attacked by the Lucanians.] 

' lb.; v/)o«£cu<o<mirrc9 roTr bpfuus^ muL r6 Twr ffVfifidxM^ vXSjBos oOm 
dtfOfuivairrts, Ayi^tv^ M roiis AcvjcayoiSf. This seems to imply that some 
part of the allies had already come. 

* lb. It should be noticed that Laos is brought in only through an 
emendation of the text. But in the sentence fiauKSfitPot Xadr «ci2 irdXir 
c^Soffcora wokiopK^ffoi, it seems quite safe to read Aoor r^Kxy for Xodr «a2 
ir6Kty, The transcriber had not heard of the town of Laos. 

* Ih. ; dwix^n^^**^ *'' ''^^ ^^^ X^^V^"^' 

N 2, 




marcb on 

by Luca- 






their way to lead them to destraction ^. Puffed up with 
their BuccesSj they now at least marched directly on Laos. 

Their road lay through a plain hemmed in by lofty and 
steep rocks on every side. They found the pass barred by 
a Lucanian force ; crowds of barbarians showed themsdves 
on every height. Surprised and disheartened by the sights 
the Greeks found themselves suddenly attacked by the bar- 
barians as they came down from the hills. Thirty thousand 
Lucanian footmen and four thousand horsemen was a force 
which far outnumbered the invading army of Thourioi. 
A battle followed in the plain ; the Lucanian orders were 
to spare none^; ten thousand Oreeks were said to have 
fallen. Of the rest^ some contrived to escape to a hiQ that 
overlooked the western sea ; another party^ seeing ships of 
war sailing near the coast, took them for those of their 
Bh^ne allies. They threw themselves into the sea^ and 
swam to the ships \ But the ships were not of Bhegion^ 
but of Syracuse; the Thourians found themselves on board 
the fleet of Dionysios^ under the command of his brother 
Leptin^s. To have sold them as slaves, or even to have put 
them to death, would have been no astonishing incident of 
Greek warfare. But Leptines was a man of nobler motdd 
than his brother^ and was under the influence of pan-hellenic 
feelings in which his brother had no share. He was sent 
to give help to the Lucanians ^. He would doubtless, as 
admiral of Syracuse, have zealously carried on any ordinary 
operation of naval warfare against an ItaUot fleet. But he 
would do no wrong to suppliants; he would not slay or 
enslave fellow Greeks whom a strange accident had placed 
in his power; he would seize the opportunity that was 
given him for trying to bring about a peace. 

^ Diod. xiv. 1 01 ; voXX^ 4f^cAc(ar levptt^ffayrts, KoBawpti liXtap iKafiw 
r$( kavrw dawKtias. 

' lb. ica ; mpiffyytKKov y^ ol Aevxavol fAijbiva (wyptsl^, 

' lb. ; awiftvyop €ts ri^y $dKaTTa¥ leaX Sior^x^i^o ^*^ ^^^ rpci/pcif. 

* lb. ; i,w«rra\fiivos rois Acv/rayoTs M fio^Bua^. 

LEFTIN£s and the THOUBIAN refugees. 181 

Leptin^ accordingly received the swimmers kindly; he ohap. z. 
then went on shore, and persuaded his Lucanian allies to ^^^nds 

' * raiiBomB 

consent to what our guide calls a peace with the confederate Thourian 
Italiots ^f but which is more likely to have been a temporary 
military convention. Its terms are not quite easy to under- 
stand. " He persuaded the Lucanians to take a mina of 
silver for each of their captives; they were in number 
above a thousand ; and he pledged his own credit for pay- 
ment */* Now it would not seem that there were at that 
moment any prisoners, strictly speaking, in the hands of 
the Lucanians. The orders given to the Lucanian army 
were to make no prisoners ; nor will the name strictly apply 
to the fugitives who had sought shelter on board the Syra- 
cusan ships, and still less to those who had escaped to the 
hill, and of whom we hear no more. Their numbers and 
those of the swimmers together would be much more than 
a thousand. Those who occupied the hill must have escaped 
by some path or other^ likely enough under the terms of 
the convention. The thousand who were ransomed would 
be the swimmers. The Lucanians were likely to demand 
that Leptinte should either give them up to his allies or 
himself deal with them as prisoners. Instead of so doing 
he purchased their freedom at the cost of a thousand mina. 

The generous act of Leptin6s won him the greatest Dbplea- 
admiration and thankfulness from all the Italiot Greeks. BionvBioe. 
But it by no means suited the purposes of his brother and 
master at Syracuse, and it awakened his heavy displeasure'. 
Nor from the side of Dionysios can we wonder at this. 
Looking at Dionysios as a lawful sovereign, or indeed as 

^ Diod. ziy. loa ; SiaXAiS^at raifs Irakdrras roTt AcvKoroTt, iwmvw nlf/timfw 
woii<nffOai, And direcUy after, ffWT€$wcin rdv w6k9ftow, 

* lb.; iwttat rovf AtvHoro^ (fw^p Uaffrw rwr alxf^^^^fv^ Ao^cAr 
dpyvplov lOfSir o^oi 8* f<my rdr dpiB/A^r Mp ro^r x^^ovs* ywi^fuwn 9k rwr 
XP^ft&Tonf iffvtfr^f 4r.rA. 

' Dioddros Myt expi-owly, /tfjfAXrit dwoioxnt 'rvx< *«y^ ToTt IniAi^SrfWf, 


oBAP. z. %i/ratego% auiohrcd&r of the Syracnsan oommonwealth^ Lep- 
tinfe had certainly exceeded his powers. His commission 
was to help the Lueanians \ instead of which he had brought 
aboat a peace^ or at least an armistice, greatly to the advan- 
tage of the Italiots. Dionysios had hoped, through his 
alliance with the Lueanians^ to make himself master of all 
Greek Italy. The act of Leptines^ stepping in to rob the 
Lncanians^ and thereby Dionysios^ of the advantage of 
Leptinte a gfreat success^ had altogether thwarted his plans ^. It is 
T?earidd8 i^ot wonderful that the tyrant deprived a brother who was 
M admiral, jj^ truth too good for his purposes of his post of admiral, 
and gave it to his other brother Thearides ^. The act of 
Leptines had stopped all further operations in Italy for that 
B.O. 389. year. With the beginning of the military season of the 
next year^ he would himself go forth to battle. 

Up to this time the direct warfare of Dionjrsios had been 

against Bhggion only. He was the friend of the Lueanians 

. only because they had come to his help against the Italiot 

confederates ; but he was the enemy of the Italiot conf eder- 

Campaign ates only because they had come to the help of Rhegion. His 

Bioaa^mst P^i^^^^t campaign was to be directly against the League as 

Italiot a body ^ Granting his position of hostility towards Rhe- 

gion, the action of the League had given him a ca9U9 belli 

which was convenient for one who was seeking for either 

dominion or influence in Italy. This time then he set forth 

from Syracuse^ but not for an attack on Rhegion as his 

first object. Twenty thousand foot and three thousand 

horse marched by land; forty ships of war and three 

hundred vessels laden with provisions sailed in concert with 

* Diod. xiv. loa ; fXvi^c ^ctp 6 Atoi^tos, rwr ^IraXtwrwy troXcfcovvroiy irp^ 
Acvirayo^, iinXBon^ fiql^Ms Ar Kpar^ffm rwif mr ^IraXiav wpayfidronf, diro\c- 
Xv/Uvcav 9^ TrjXueoihw woK4/mv, tvcx^fSn ^ 9€pty€wi<r^au 


' lb. 103 ; Aior^o'ios 6 rwv XvpaMOv<ritnf 9w6ffT7fs ^a»tpSh lavrbv di'o- 
M^at M T^v 'IraXlay ffrpaT€va6fiiwy, This Borelj in distinction from the 
language used at the beginning of cap. 100, 


them along the east coast of Sicily. On the fifth day the chap. z. 
combined force reached Messana. Thearid^s was now to 
act for the first time in his new command. News was 
brought that ten Rh^ine ships were afloat somewhere in 
the neighbourhood of the isles of Lipara-^. Dionjrsios Naval 
, sent his brother after them with thirty ships. Thearid^ againS 
.lighted on them at some opportune point not more clearly ^^8"^®*- 
described^, and brought the whole ten ships with their 
'crews into the haven of Messana. The captives were left 
as prisoners in the hands of the Messanians ^. 

This success was a good omen to begin with ; but the Dionvsio* 
main object of Dionysios was to make the Italiot cities feel Kaul^nia. 
his power more nearly. Kauldnia was chosen as the first ^*^- ^^9- 
to be attacked. It was the nearest town on the eastern 
coast, the first lying north of friendly Lokroi, whose terri- 
tory gave him a good base of operations. Dionysios made 
his attack on Kauldnia ; we hear no details except that he 
l)esieged the town all round, that is, we may suppose, by 
land and sea, and that he brought up his engines, and made 
many assaults on the walls K But we get no such picture 
of their action as we got in the tale of the siege of Motya. 
It is plain however that the men of SLauldnia must have 
held out for some while, as there was time for a good deal 
of both diplomatic and military action while the siege was 
going on. 

As soon as Dionysios was known to have crossed into 
Italy, the cities of the Italiot League began to take their 

)/ * Diod. xiv. 103 ; 
' ^o^t rSwcvs operas. 
Was it hostile or frit 

vtmafUyof y^p fjy diKa ravs rw 'Vri^ifWf w€pl iKtivovt 
One would like to have soine aooount of their errand, 
friendly f 

Does this odd phiase mean that these ten ships formed the whole Rhegine 

' lb. ; raifs olxfcoA^ovf cit dcaful KaraBifuvot rois Mfffoijpioit Idowc ^ 
Adrrciy. We seem not to hear of them again. 

* lb. ; srcptccrparoircScvcrc ri^ v6XtVy nd r^t fUfX'^^ wpo<r€ptiiras, wvkpAs 
wpofffioKis iwoittTO, 


OHAP. X. measures to withstand him. Kit)t6n was the centre of 
Krotdn action. A firreater city than Kauldnia and the nearest to it 

takes the ^ 

lead to the north, its own tarn might be looked for to come 

^^l^^g next. Moreover Krot6n was speciallj stirred up against 

the tyrant by the presence of many Syracusan exiles in the 

city. To Krot6n then the other cities of the League 

entrusted the management of the war, and seemingly put 


their own contingents under Krotoniat conmiand^. We 
should be well pleased to know the names of the cities con- 
cerned ; but that is refused to us. One thing is plain^ that 
the Krotoniats showed great discretion in the choice of a 
Hel6iig general. The chances of jealousy among the confederate 
™JJ^^^^™' towns were greatly lessened when the command of the 
chief of whole forcc^ Krotoniat and allied^ was put into the hands 


League, of the banished Syracusan Hel6ris^ by whose skilly as general 
of Rh%ion^ Dionysios had been driven away from the city 
which he defended. To his military gifts and to his hatred 
of the tyrant all fully trusted as making him the fittest 
man to lead the confederate force to the relief of Kaulonia*. 
As soon therefore as that force was gathered at Krotdn, 
fifteen thousand foot and two thousand horse— there is no 
• mention of any naval force — Hel6ris set out on his march. 
The siege was going on; it was clearly a toUsome and 
dangerous business. Heldris looked for the advantage of 
attacking men who were already beginning to be worn out 
by the enterprise on which they were engaged ^ 

^ Diod. xiy. 103 ; ol tk imrd -n^ 'IraXioy 'EXXi/vn, cbr hwvBfjvro ras rev 
Atwwdov dwdftfis wtpMOVfUyas r6y Ik^pyctrra wopO/idr, lud turrci irrpar^ 
iTf 8a ffuHi$poi{w. T^f Sk rw¥ Kponayteaw w6kttn fniXiffra wokvox^ovfiSpfff, 
teat irXtlmcvs kx^aitrrii Xvpaxoualovs ^tvyddos, robots ri)r ^yt/iwUnt rov voki^ 
fiov vapiitucay, 

' lb.; oSrof 9k 9§<p€»yi/t Acorvcrior ml diut&y rSk/Mw Ix^'*' i/Awpatcroy, 
wiffrSrartk rpbs rbv rvpawoy woKt/x^fftty 9id t6 fuaos inrtikiprro. See aboY^ 
/p. 1 58. I>iod6roB might almost aeem to haye forgotten what he had 
already recorded. 

' lb. ; i/UL Mfu{ty kirupaytU kdfftty ri^ woXiopiday, &/ga 9k mravtwinnf- 
gUyovs robs wo\€/jdovs vw6 r&y icaff ijfUpay wpocfiokSiy iiayotyt^<r$at. 


The Italiot army was on its march and had reached the ohap. z. 
stream of Elleporos between Krot6n and Kaulonia ^, when 5*'™®* 

. , , , , , the Blle- 

\Dion7Bio8^ bnsy in besieging the latter town^ led forth his porot. 
^orce to meet them. He had pitched his camp at an un- 
named point when he heard from his spies that the Italiots 
.Were encamped at a distance of forty stadia. Heloris^ on the 
pther hand, who seems to have known nothing of the move- 
/ments of Dionysios^ set forth the next morning at the head 
of a band of fiye hundred picked men in advance of his 
main forced Presently he met the army of Dionysios 
ready for battle and detennined to bring on an engagement 
at once^. The attack began. Heldris, startled at this 
unexpected meeting with the enemy, sent some chosen 
friends to quicken the march of the rest of his army^ and 
meanwhile bore up as well as he could with his small com- 
pany against the far greater numbers of Dionysios^. 
They bore up manfully; the orders of Heloris were obeyed ; 
the rest of the Italiot army, hearing of the danger of their 
general and their comrades, hastened at a quick pace to 
their support^. Bu^ their speed disordered them; they 
came up in small parties, while the Sikeliot army kept its 
line in good order ®. And they came only to find Heldris Heldria 
and the more part of his company already slain after ' 
a yaliant resistance"^. Still they fought as well as they 

^ It is rdy "Ekupor wcrafiSy in the mannioripU of Dioddros, dearly from 
oonfntion with the name of 'EXupis jut after. We may safely read 'EXX^- 
wopof from Polybios, i. 6. 

' Diod. xIt. 104; *E\a^f purA rSty dploTMF vtmutoffioof wpof/yttro rrjt 
tvirdiA€on. One would ianoy that the other Syraoosan exiles would be in 
this company. 

'lb.; Apw vpocMinSiXtroy mi2 9i€irK€wur/Airrpf ix"^ ^'^ 9^pafuv, dtyoxi^y 
M' Ijiirrtvovv i9idov rots iroKtfdoit, 

* lb. ; abri^t ph^ /xttf' £y ttxw M0T7 rots iiri^po/Uycts, rw tk ^iXwy 
riycb dwicTtikw kftl rd arpar&r^oy^ kwurw^wroi rdi wk^Btf wapaM€Ktv6fuyos, 

' lb. ; hpofuuoi wapfjaay M ri^ 0oifj$uay. 

* lb. ; r&y 9* IroXien'wr inrop6ir/y &d ri^r <rwcv^ iKfiotfOoihfroir, d Xi- 
/TiXidnu Tclt rdfcif Sco^X^hrrorrcti fi^^^" ^^ w9\€/duy vtpityivoirro. The 
name StxcAuvnu here takes in the whole mingled force of Dionysioe. 

^ Jh,; 6 di Aurt^iot d$p6^ rp 9vydftu vc^x^*^'* ^^ ^* 'K^/mt jmU roltt 


CHAP. z. could ; but^ disheartened by the loss of their general^ 
Defeat of coming np without order in parties which hindered one 
Elleporoi. another's action ^, they were no match for Dionysios and 
his trained mercenaries. They lost hearty gave way, and 
fled. Many were slain in the fight and in the pursuit; 
but the mass of the defeated army^ numbering more than 
ten thousand men^ found a place of temporary shelter on an 
isolated hill. Its steepness made it a good defence against 
any direct assaults of the enemy; but it was waterless and 
therefore impossible to hold against any long blockade ^. 
Fugitiyes On this natural akropolis the Italiot fugitives passed the 
^ ^^ ' nighty carefully watched by Dionysios and his army from 
below. The tyrant himself kept on his arms all nighty 
diligently keeping the sentinels to their duty ^. At day- 
break a herald came down from the hill with a message 
for the lord of Syracuse. The heat and the lack of water 
had told on the endurance of the besieged, and they pro- 
posed to the tyrant that they should be allowed to depart 
on the payment of ransom^. According to custom in 
such cases^ some of their number would have been left in 
the hands of Dionysios as hostages for payment. The 
lyrant is described as lifted up by his success beyond the 
bounds of moderation^; but the real motive for his conduct 

/icr* a&Tov ytv¥Qiofs A-ywynrafUyovs (rxcSdr wivras di^ciXc. This oomes before 
the extract in the last note. Heldiis was dearly killed before the rest of 
the Italiot army came np, and one would think that the new-oomen 
must have known this as soon as they came up. But in the actual order 
of Dioddros' sentences, it would seem that they did not find out his death 
till they had fought some time and were beginning to give way. The 
words d/s r^ rod crrparrfyw rfXtVTijv kml/Oorro do not come tiU then. 

' Diod. xiv. 104; did r6if $6pvfioy dXX/jKois kiimrwrts iiXarrtn/vro 

' lb. 105 : Kariipvyt rd wk^Qos M rtpa X6^w, IpuiiMhy 6rra vpdt rijir 
vokiopKiayf &yv9pov 8i mU Bwd^yw fiffilvs inr6 rw woKt/dnay <pvXdrT€ff$eu, 

' lb. ; Aiw^ios vtpiaTpaTovtMcas r^v re l^fUpca^ iKkimp^ luil r^v Vetera 
haiyff&wtnii(r€v iy rws ^Aotf, IviiieXSts nut <pvkaucius yjptic&iMvofi, 

* lb. ; iiriiajpvMvtrufiivw oMry vp6t r^ Atom&ffioy, mi mpcueaXowrwi^ 
XvTpa irp6{aff$cu. They are constrained did rd xavfia Kot ri^ 6yv9play, 

^ lb. ; oi fiirpun Iv t(hs tvfjpupififuuri ytySfWfos, 


seems to have been the wish to make an imposing display chap. x. 
of his power, and not of his power only. He refused 
the proposed terms, and demanded that the defenders 
of the hill should lay down their arms and surrender at 
discretion^. For this they were not yet ready; worn out 
and distressed as they were^ their endurance still lasted 
several hours. They knew not what might be their lot at 
the hands of such an enemy; many precedents would 
suggest death or slavery as the only alternatives^. At Fugitives 
last, at the eighth hour of the day, their spirits gave way ; ^t dii- 
the needs of the body were too strong for them. They ^'^*<>*^- 
made the unconditional surrender^ and came down from the 
hill, looking for the worst ^. We already have a touch 
from an eye-witness — Philistos was not yet banished — 
when we read how Dionysios stood with a rod in his hand, 
and numbered his captives to the tale of more than a 
myriad *. Their fate was not what they looked for. Clemency 
They were not slaughtered or enslaved; they were notnygjoe. 
even, as they had themselves proposed, put to ransom. 
The whole body were allowed to go away unhurt, each 
man to his own city*. 

This act of Dionysios stands out as one of the most 
memorable in Greek history. When the citizens of oppos- 
ing commonwealths did not scruple to slay or enslave their 
fellow Greeks by thousands, the tyrant dreaded and hated 
throughout the Greek world treats his prisoners with an 
excess of generosity which might seem to put him, for the 

^ Diod. ziy. 105 ; vpoffhurrfy dvo$iff$€u rd 6w\a Mojt <r^as aino^ ^yx^*- 
fliXau r{) icpartniyTt, 

'lb.; ifwh rip ^wrunfs ivdymp Kartfiapovtrro, vap49«Mtiaf alrobs wtpi 

* lb. ; vorrwr oArov ^wowrtvSvrvy rd 0rfpiui€s. 

* lb. ; Aiovvfftos 82 kafi^ f&fihw mX irff^as M rod Kd^pov ^pWfut ro^f 
mrafiabwirna alxA>a^^<wf» &^af w\*tous rw /wpUnf, 

' lb.; robvavriov I^Mbn7 vAnww intuti<rTaTos, rods ydp tdx/Mkinrovt 


CRAP. z. ' moment at leasts on a level with Eallikratidas ^. The 
Politic I ^^ jg ^)^Q mQj.g unexpected when we compare it with the 

clemency i ^ , ^ -^^ 

of Dio- displeasure which he had shown towards his brother Lep- 
Italiots. tines after an act of mercy of nearly the same kind^. 
/ But there is no real inconsistency in the action of Diony- 
sios in the two cases. While giving him whatever credit 
may justly belong to him for what was certainly an act of 
unusual mercy^we cannot give the tyrant credit for those feel- 
ings either of general humanity or of Panhellenic sympathy 
by which we may fairly believe that his brother was stirred. 
Dionysios^ we must remember^ was, after all, not a tyrant 
of the worst type. He could be frightfully cruel when a 
cruel deed either suited his policy or gratified his passion. 
How deeply passion did influence the acts of Dionysios 
we see both by his friendship for Lokroi and his hatred 
towards Rh^gion^ both which feelings he certainly carried 
beyond the bounds of any deliberate policy. But at no 
time does he appear as one of those oppressors to whom 
a massacre was a kind of sport. The men whom Leptinfis 
spared were Rh^ines, men of the city which Dionysios 
most hated ; but it does not follow that his hatred would 
have gone so far as to condemn them to indiscriminate 
slaughter. The fault of Leptin^ in the eyes of his brother 
was not that he had spared the suppliants, but that he had, 
without his master's authority, made engagements with 
the cities of the suppliants which were against his master's 
interests. With the men whom Dionysios now had at his 
mercy he had no temptation to special harshness. If 
mercy was likely to serve his policy^ no passion stood in 
the way of mercy. The Italiot captives were ordinary 
-enemies in war^ not objects of any special hatred. Had 
Heldris and the other Syracusan exiles fallen alive into 

*■ Xen. Hell. i. 6, 14, 15. Cf. Qrote, oh. Ixiv. To me Dionjiios 
to be equftlly Dionyiioa alike ia his mercy and in hi* cruelty. 
* See above, pp. iSo, 181. 


the hands of Dionysios^ their fate might have been dif- chap. z. 
ferent. But Heldris had died in battle, and we may be 
'tempted to think that the other exiles were among the 
five hundred who died around him. As for the men 
actually in his power^ Dionysios had no temptation to 
slaughter them. He had a strong temptation to fill his 
coffers by selling them or putting them to ransom. But 
he might well think that their price would be of less 
value to him than the effect in his &.vour on the minds of 
the Italiots generally^ if he cotdd gain credit for an act 
of unexpected, almost unparalleled generosity. He reckoned 
the cost^ and he held the advantage to lie on the side 
of mercy. And the event showed that he judged 

We are not surprised to hear that this act of generosity, Golden 
whatever were its motives, was looked on as the best deed ^^Dio* 
of the life of Dionysios ^, that he received universal ap- ?^f.^ ^^ 
plause^ and that golden crowns were voted to him by those cities, 
whom he had spared and by the commonwealths from 
which they came ^. It is harder to find out what common- 
wealths these were, and what was the immediate political 
result of the clemency of Dionysios. "We are told that he Treatiee 
made treaties with most of the cities, leaving them inde- uot cities, 
pendent ^. It is clear from what immediately follows that 
he made no treaty with Rhegion, nor yet with Elauldnia 
or Hippdnion. But we hear of no action of his against 
either Krot6n or Thourioi for a good while to coma • The 
army which he had defeated and spared must have largely, 
perhaps chiefly, consisted of Krotoniats, and the Thourians 
— unless they held themselves bound by the agreement with 
Leptines * — are likely to have sent what help they could. 

P Diod. xiv. 105.] [» lb.] 

[^ lb.; npcs rds v\ti<rras rw ir6Xtv¥ €lp^viiv ffvy$4/i€»0i i/tp^KtP airo- 

[* Seep. 181.] 




broken up. 

peace by 
of fleet 



The treaty would therefore seem to have been a treaty with 
Kroton^ perhaps with Thourioi and some other towns tm- 
named. Such a course would thoroughly suit the purposes 
of Dionysios. It broke up the Italiot League and isolated 
its members, and it made a good reputation for Dionysios 
among some of its cities. But there was no general peace. 
Against BhSgion the wrath of Dionysios did not slacken 
for a moment, nor had he any thought of giving up the 
siege of Kaulonia^ the town which Hel6ris and the Kroto- 
niats had come specially to relieve. 

* " The Rhegines finding themselves without allies sent 

Dionysios a himible message praying for mercy. The 

siege of Kauldnia was still going on, and he could put o£E 

his action against Rhegion, He spared them for the present, 

on condition of their giving up all their ships, seventy in 

nimiber, and putting a hundred hostages into his hands \ 

Then he went on to finish the siege of Kaulonia. Here 

again his different ways of treating different people comes 

out strongly. He had no special spite against Kauldnia; it 

simply stood in the way of his plans. So, when he took 

the town, he destroyed it, and gave its territory to his 

beloved Lokrians. The citizens he carried to Syracuse, and 

not only gave them citizenship, but an exemption from 

taxes for five years \ The next year he did the like to 

* These paragraphs are quoted from the author's Sicily, PhoBDidan, 
Greek, and Roman (Story of the Nations Series), pp. 187 seqq. 

\} They also paid Dionysios three hundred talents (Diod. xiv. 106).] 
[' Tobs ii\v kvoiKovvrai kv "XvpfUcoCaais fter^KKTM koI voXiTtiay Mrs ir4vT€ 
irri awtx^P^*^ At€\€is ttvai (Diod. ziy. 106). As no account is giyen of 
any fresh siege, Kauldnia now appeanf to have fallen without a struggle. 
The coinage of Kauldnia definitely ceases from this time, but a small town 
seems to have existed on the spot (cf. Plut. Didn, zxvi) till it in turn 
was destroyed by Campanian mercenaries in Pyrrhos* time (Pausanias, 
vi. 3. 13). According to Strabo (vi. L 10) its inhabitants then founded 
a new Kaulonia in Sicily.] 

SIEOE or EH&OIOX. 191 

the town of Hippftnion, its land, and people ^. Only we chap. x. 
do not hear of the exemption from taxes. The men of takwi!^^"^ 
Hippdnion had not endured so long a siege as the men of 

'' But all this was simply the beginning of what Diony- Pretext 

found to 

sios had most of all at heart, his attack on Bhegion. But, renew at- 
tack on 
as he had so lately made a treaty with Bh^ion, he had Khdgion. 

to find some excuse for renewing the war. He still had 

the hostages whom the Bhegines had given ; so they were 

greatly in his power. He first asked them for provisions 

for his army, promising to send back an equal store from 

Syracuse, whither he professed to be going. He seemingly 

hoped that they would refuse, so that he might treat the 

refusal as a hostile acL They did give him provisions for 

some days ; but, as Dionysios, pleading sickness and other 

excuses, stayed in their neighbourhood instead of going 

to Syracuse, they presently stopped the supply. This he 

affected to treat as a wrong done by the Bhegines ; to put 

himself wholly in the right, he first gave back the hostages, 

and then besieged the town. The siege of Bhegion was Siege of 


one of the greatest of Dionysios^ acts of warfare^. He had 
to use all his forces ; for the Bhegines, under their general 
Phyton, made a most valiant defence, holding out against 
all attacks under every possible disadvantage for more than 
ten months. They had no ships, no allies, and their stock 
of provisions had been lessened by what they had given 
Dionysios. The tyrant tried to bribe Phytdn to betray the 

\} IMod ziv. 107. Ten yean later Hippdnion was restored by the Car- 
thaginians ; Diod. ZY. 24.] 

[* For the siege of Khdgion see IMod. ziv. 108, iii, and oompare Front, 
iii. 4. 3 ; Philostrat. Vit. ApolL 7. a, and Azistot. (Ec. ii. 30.] 


CHAP. z. city^ as the generals of seyeial other cities had done. But 
the general of BhSgion stayed firm in his duty. Dionysios^ 
on his part^ took his full share in the work, and was once 
so badly wounded by a spear that his life was for a while 
Surrender despaired of. At last, under sheer stress of hunger, when 
many had died for lack of food and the rest had lost all 
^ strength, the valiant men of Bhegion were driven to sur- 
^nder at discretion. Dionysios had gained one of the 


Igreat objects of his life ; he was master of the city which 
the most hated. And now he showed in a more notable 
way than ever what manner of man he was. In one way 
he WBS really less harsh than many other conquerors had 
been. It was not very wonderful in Greek warfare to 
slaughter all the men and sell all the women and children 
of a captured town. Dionysios made no general massacre. 

Fate of He sent all the people of Bhegion to Syracuse, not indeed 
to be made citizens like those of Kauldnia. Those who 
could pay a certain ransom were let go ; those who could 
not were sold ^. But it was not usual in Greek warfare to 

Gruel put any man to death with torture and mockery. But 


of their now Dionysios seemed to gather his whole hatred of the 

Phytdn. Rhegines into the person of their brave general who had 

refused his bribes. He exposed Phyt6n in mockery on one 

of his loftiest war-engines ; then he told him that he had 

just drowned his son. And Phytdn answered that his son 

P Aristotle ((£c. ii. 30) giyee a blacker version of Dionysios' treat- 
ment of the Rhegians ; *F^yi6v rt KardKafiiw, iKtckifirUv tn/yayayiin^ cTirc &^rc 
iueaUtt fikv kif k£ay9pawoik<r$titv iv* abrov, vw fUvroi rd elf rdr v^c/ior 
AmjXupiira, xMa*^^^* KO/uffAfUvos leai inrtp i/cdarov odtfioTOs rfi€U f»as d<p^»p 
Qino&s' ol Z\ 'Ftfytvoif 60a wot ijr osbrais AiroK^Mpv/qUpa k/»p«u^ kwoiow icat 
o2 dwopoi wopd Tw t^mpoaripcav kqX wapdi rSi¥ ^^raur darci^i^/ui^oc k96pioa» k 
kici\§v€ x^/Mira* Xo^cbr 8i ravra wap' airrSfy rd rt oit/iora warra cMr ^rrw 
dvcdoro, rd re <r«c^ A r6Ti i}y 6MoiciMfiufi/Upa k/»^unj imrra lAo^cv.] 


was lackier than his £aiher by one day. Then he caused chap. x. 

Fhytdn to be led through the whole army with scoorging 

and insult of every kind. At last Dionysios' own soldiers 

began to murmur at his cruelty, and he had Fhytdn fmd 

all his kinsfolk drowned. He appears to have destroyed 

the town of Bh%ion and to have given its lands^ like those 

of the other cities that he took, to the Lokrians. 

" It was a memorable year for Greece and for Europe b.o. 387. 
in which Dionysios, by the taking of Rhegion, made 
himself, beyond all doubt, the chief power, not only in 
Sicily, but in Greek Italy also. It was the year of the Peace of 


Peace of Antalkidas, which established for a while thedM. 
power of Sparta in Old Greece and gave over the Greeks of 
Asia to the dominion of the Persian. [Three years before Rome 

tftken by 

this Home had been] taken by the Gauls. The presence Gaals. 
of these last barbarians in various parts of Italy supplied 
Dionysios with the means of hiring Gaulish mercenaries ^. 
Some of these, as well as Iberians, he sent at a later time, 
with other troops, to the help of his Spartan allies in the 
wars of Old Greece. The Peace of Antalkidas supplied 
patriotic orators with the opportunity of painting Hellas 
as enslaved at both ends, in the East under the Persian and 
in the West under Dionysios. So spoke the Athenian 
Isokrates ; so, with more effect, spoke Lysias, once envoy 
to Dionysios, at the Olympic festival next after the Peace 
of Antalkidas (b. c. 384). To that festival Dionysios sent a 
splendid embassy ^. Lysias called on the assembled Greeks 

^ [^ It WM now, aooordiiig to Jnstib (zz. 5), that the Gaulish tribes then 
oveiTunning centml Italy made a formal treaty of friendship and alliance 
with Dionysios. See Supplement I, p. ai<^] 
[' For the embassy of Dionysios to Olympia see Died. ziv. 109 and zy. 7 



CHAP. X. to show their hatred of the tyrant, to hinder his envoys 
dSSb""^ ^^ sacrificing or his chariots from running. His chariots 
feetilS?^*'' did run ; but they were aU defeated. Some of the multi- 
B.0. 384. ^^^g made an attack on the splendid tents of his envoys. 
He had also sent poems of his own to be recited; but the 
Dionysios crowd would not hear them. This was rather out of hatred 

wins prize 

for tragedy of the tyrant than for any fault in the poems ; for there is 

At Ldiuiia. 

B.C. 367. no doubt that Dionysios was a poet of some merit. He 
was now at peace with Athens, and he sent tragedies to be 
acted there. They gained inferior prizes more than once, 
and at last one of them won the first prize ^. 

(where he partly repeats the words used by himself in the preceding 
chapter). A fragment of Lysias* speech has been preseired (Lys. Or. 33). 
Lysias, himself of Syraousan origin, had as a boy accompanied his father 
Kephaloe to Athens, and afterwards taken a share in the settlement of 
Thourioi. Expelled from Thourioi on accoant of his Syracusan sympathies, 
he had again returned to Athens. (See Sicily, vol. iii. la, 13 ; Plutarch, 
X. Or. Yit., Lysias.) L>'sias in his speech at Olympia preached a kind 
of holy war against the Western Tyrant.] 

{} Diod. zv. 6, 7. Other scattered notices relating to Dionysios in his 
quality of poet have been collected by Holm (Gesch. Siciliens, ii, 150, 151, 
449). His works were chiefly Tragedies ; amongst which the names have 
been recorded uf an Addnis, a Leda,tai. AlkmSna, and perhaps a Linos. As an 
aid perhaps to his inspiration he had procured ^Sschylos* writing-tablets, but 
though he continually took part in poetical competitions at Athens, he bad 
for long to content himself with second or third prizes. At last his''E«ro/M>f 
Xirr/n gained the first prize at the festival of the Ldnaia in 367 B. 0., and 
the ezoessiye joy caused by the announcement is said to have been the im- 
mediate cause of Dionysios' death. (See p. 209.) In estimating the value of 
this tribute to his poetical skill, the powerful help accorded by Dionysios 
to the allied Athenians and Spartans in the two years that immediately 
preceded this award must be taken into consideration. Dionysios is said 
to have disliked laughter, but the quotations from him given by Athdnaios 
(iii. 98), on the authority of Athanis, reveal a comic vein ; T^y fiiv 
wapBivov kicaXu fUrayHpov Srt fiivti rbv 6v9pa . . . ictit rds rwv fw&y dttxHvcrttt 
ftvffT^pta k/cA\(i iri To^ iiw njptt. This punning identification of mysteries 
and mouse-holes is quite in keeping with the blaHphemous humour other- 
wise exhibited by Dionysios. If, as Hohn supposes, Athanis took these 
phrases from the tyrant's writings, there is no reason for doubting the 
tradition that he wrote Comedies as well as Tragedies.] 



It was said that DionjBios was so annoyed at the ill- ohap. z. 
fate of his poems that he began to suspect eveiybodj^ and 
to turn his rage against his nearest friends \ Whether Banish- 

ment of 

from this cause or from any other, he certainly banished Philittoe. 
two of the chief of them, the historian Fhilistos, to whom 
he owed his first rise, and his own brother the admiral 
Leptines. Leptin^ was soon restored; but Philistos re- 
mained in banishment till the death of Dionysios. Diony- Dionynos' 
sios, perhaps in his character of poet, affected, like Hierdn, of piato 

_ J A • 

the company of men of letters ; but they found that the stippoB.' 
poet was also the tyrant. The philosopher Aristippos of 
Kyrene and Plato of Athens both visited him ; but he ill- 
treated both, and he is said to have caused Plato to be sold 
as a slave ^. And his fellow-poet Philoxenos he is said to Philoxe- 
have sent to the stone-quarries for free criticism on his 
verses K 

[* Diod. XV. 7.] 

[' Whether Plato first came to Sicilj that he might study the lava- 
streams of Etna (r&y fivAteow x^P*^ — HSgSsandroe in Athen. xi. 507) or with 
XMonysioe' help to found a model state (Plataroh, Phil, esse cnm principibus, 
iv) must remain uncertain. According to Dioddroe (xv. 7), Plato was 
sold by Dionysios* orders for twenty minse. But Plutarch^s version 
(Didn, v) is preferable, according to which he was conveyed by the 
Spartan PoUis to .^Bgina, then engaged in a war with Athens, and sold 
there as a captive Athenian. This war fixes the date of Plato's captivity 
as 389 & 0. — a date which agrees very well with the statement contained 
in the seventh of the letters that bear Plato^s name (334 A), that he first 
came to Athens when he was forty years of age. (Of. H. T. Earsten, 
CSommentatio ciitica de Platonis quae feruntnr Epistolis, p. 128.) Plato was 
ransomed by his friend Annikeris of Kyrdnd.] 

[' The story runs that Philoxenos having been set free and restored to 
favour by the intercession of his friends, was again asked by Dionysios his 
opinion of a poem that he had just recited. "Take me back to the 
quarries/* said Philoxenos, turning to one of the tyrant's officers. Dionysios, 
however, pleased at his guest's ready wit, joined in the laugh (Diod. zv. 
^- S 4} 5> AX^d Suidas, s. v. ^tiK^tvot, and Amayi lu tit rits karo/tias). Accord- 
ing to another account, it was Philoxenos' passion for Dionysios' favourite, 
the flute-girl Gaiateia» that brought about his disgrace, and he profited by 

O 2 


CHAP. X. *' But however hated Dionysios might be both at home 

and abroad^ he was still strong both at home and abroad. 

His next field of enterprise was the coasts and islands of 

Syraousan the Hadriatic. Here the city of Ankdn or Ancona on the 


at Ancona. Italian coast was planted by Syracusan exiles trying to 

escape from his power. Other colonies in those seas he 

Ooloniea of himself founded or helped others to found. Thus the people 


on niyrian of Paros, with his help^ planted settlements on the islands 

coasts and 

islands. of Fharos and Issa, and he himself founded Lissos on the 
Alliance lUyrian coast ^. He then formed alliance with some of 

with Mo- , 

lottian the lUynans and with a banished prince of Molottis named 

Alketas. Him he was able to restore ; but he failed in a 

Designs on scheme of making his way into Greece on this side, and 

Delphian .... 

treasures, even, it is said, robbing the Delphian temple ^. This was 
too much even for his friends the Spartans, and a Lacedse- 
monian force checked all further advance. He next took 

Attack on up the old Syracusan quarrel with the Etruscans. For a 


war against them it was easy to find an excuse in their 
constant piracies. His real object seems to have been to 
plunder the rich temple of Agylla' on the west coast 

his enforced seclusion in the quarries to write his Ki;«Xa^ fj TakArtia, in 
which Dionysios played the part of the Kjkldps, he himself of Odygseus, 
(y. Athdn. i. 1 1).] 

[^ For the Adriatic colonies of Dionysios, one of the most important 
undertakings of his reign, see Supplement II, p. 220, seqq. Issa seems to 
have been a purely Syracusan colony. Reasons are given, pp. 223 seqq., for 
believing that Lissos was never colonized by Dionygios. The statement 
rests on what was probably a confusion of Dioddros between it and Issa.] 

[* The geographical difficulties in the way of a raid on Delphi from the 

Molottian side are so great that Holm (op. cit. ii. pp. 135, 441) considers 

it certain that Dioddros in relating this enterprise (xv. 13) confused Delphi 

with Ddddna. Yet it is hardly likely that lUyrians and Epeirots would 

'have joined Dionysios in plundering their own great sanctuary.] 

[' Died. XV. 14. The temple was situated at Pyrgoi, the port of Agylla 
or Caere. According to Strabo (v. 2. 8) it was dedicated to EOeithyia, 


of Italy^ whence he carried off spoil in money, slaves, and chap. x. 
other thmgs to the value of fifteen hundred talents. Even aI^Sa ^^ 
at Syracuse he did not fear to plunder the temples ; from P^°"^«^- 
the Olympieion he carried off the gpolden robe of the statue 
of Zeus, saying in mockery that such a garment was too 
hot in summer and too cold in winter ^/^ 

§ 6. The Third Punic War of Dionysios. 
B-c- 383-[378^]. 

* " The Etruscan campaign might perhaps win back for 
Dionysios some credit both at home and abroad as a Hellenic 
champion against the barbarians. He would get more still Third 
when, in the year 383, he began another Funic war. At 
no time in our story do we more lament the lack of a con- 
temporary narrative. Dionysios took advantage of the 
disaffection towards Carthage felt by some of her depen- 
dencies to contract alliances with them. We are not told 
what cities are meant ; some, we may suppose, of the Car- 
thaginian dependencies in Sicily, perhaps the Elymian 
towns. Carthage, on the other hand, sent, for the first 
time, a force into Italy to act along with the tyrant's 
enemies there. A campaign followed, the geography of 

aooording to .^ian (V. H. i. 20) to ApoUo and Lenkothea. Strabo con- 
nects this mid with a Corsican expedition of Dionysios.] 

{} JEl. V. H. i. 30. So too he robbed an image of Askldpios of its 
golden beard, remarking " that it was not seemly that the son should wear 
a beard while the father (Apollo) was beardless." He regularly took 
possession of the gold and silyer Victories and wreaths in the outstretched 
hands of divinities ; since why did the Gods hold them out if not to 
present them to men ? For other sacrilegious acts of Dionysios see Holm, 
G. S. ii. 149 and 449.] 

' [' Beloch, Impero di Dionisio (6 and 7, note i), gives some good reasons 
for supposing that peace was not concluded till 378.] 

* Story of Sicily, pp. 192, 193. 



CHAP. X. which is hopeless ^. Dionysios first won a great battle in 
pSi^oww which the Shophet Mag6n was kiUed«. The Carthaginians 
of Dio- ^jj^jj asked for peace; Dionysios refused it except on oon- 
^78 ^^^" dition of Carthage withdrawing altogether from Sicily and 
paying the costs of the war^. Such terms needed the 
Iconsent of the home government of Carthage. A truce 
was made ; while it lasted^ the new Carthaginian com- 
mander^ the son of Magdn, made every preparation for a 
new struggle. In a second battle ^ Dionysios was defeated 
and his brother Leptines killed ; the slaughter was among 
the greatest that Greeks ever underwent at the hands of 
^ barbarians. Envoys now came from Carthage with full 
Peace with powcrs. The terms of peace were now quite the opposite 


[B.C. 378.] to what Dionysios had proposed just before. He had to pay 
a thousand talents^ and to make the Halykos the boundary 
between his dominions and those of Carthage^. That is 

[^ See DioddroB, xv. 15-17. The two great battles took place some- 
where in the neighbourhood of Panormos. The result of the Carthaginian 
diversion on the Italian side was the restoration of Hippdnion.] 

[' The place where the first battle was fought is called by Dioddroe 
(zv. 15. 3) Kabala {KdfiaXa), The Carthaginians are said to haye lost 
over 10,000 in killed and 5,000 prisoners, and the remainder took refuge, 
like the Italiots (p. 186), on a steep and waterless hill.] 

[' Diod. ZY. 15 ; 'O d^ Aicv6aios dvc^l^aro fdaa^ alrrois cTfcu (rvWwrtw Idy 
lyX^fh^^^*^ ^^ MtTd T^ SurcAidr v<$Xcair wU rd 9mrainj$hrra x^futra Hard 
rhv w6\€fiw l/n'i<rca<ri,'] 

[* The second battle, in which the Greeks lost 14,000 killed, was fought 
at a place called Kronion, mentioned by Polyainos (▼. 10) as a town that 
gave shelter to Himilkdn when hard pressed by Dionysios* commanders — 
perhi^s a confusion ¥rith the present occasion. The Carthaginians (Diod. zv. 
1 7) returned with their spoils to Panormos, whence we may infer that it lay 
in that neighbourhood. The name recalls the hill of Kronos above Olympia^ 
and as Slionos was worshipped at Himera, his head appearing on some coins 
of that dty (ef. Imhoof-Blumer, Berl. Bl&tter, y. 44), Holm (G. S. ii 443) has 
suggested that it was Monte Calogero between Himera and Thermie. But 
from the hd that it was inhabited it can hardly have been, as Holm supposes 
(p. 142), the X^ipow iyt^pov ramXMs spoken of above (Diod. zv. 15).] 

[' Diod. zv. 17. 5 ; *A<rfjUvws 82 rov rv/xbrov wpocZt^aiUvov rovs k6y€vs, 


to saj^ he gave up to Carthage Selinous and its territory chap. x. 
and part of the territory of Akragas/^ 

The treaty by which the third war between Carthage and [b.c. 378.] 
Dionysios was brought to an end was indeed a falling: back Cartha^ 

J ^^ o recover! 

from that which had ended the second Punic war nine years HalykoB 
before. It was a small matter that the tyrant personally 
became a tributary to the barbarian, that a thousand talents 
had to pass from the hoard of Syracuse to the hoard of 
Carthage. A far heavier blow than this was struck at 
Hellas and at Europe. Whatever Dionysios had done^ he 
had been at least the means of freeing the Greeks of the 
northern and southern coasts of Sicily from that Phoenician 
bondage into which^ it must be allowed, it was partly 
through his fault that they had fallen. The campaign 
of Motya^ if it had failed to keep Motya for Hellas^ 
had restored Hellenic life^ if not Hellenic freedom^ along 
the whole south coast of Sicily. Mazaros was again the 
boundary of Greek and Phoenician. By the new treaty the 
borders of Hellas, the borders of European life^ fell back. 
So far as Dionysios acted in the matter by his own will^ he 
must take his place alongside of the men who betrayed 
Parga in the days of our fathei*s^ of the men who betrayed 
Macedonia before our own eyes. By the new treaty Seli- 
nous and its territory, and the western part of the territory 
of Akragas, were surrendered to the dominion of Carthage. 
Barbarian rule was advanced from the Mazaros to the 
Halykos, the stream which long remained the boundary of 
Greek and Phoenician on the south-western coast. Selinous 
. and its Thermal thus passed to Carthage, and, with them, 
\a point which from this time becomes of far greater 
moment in Sicilian history than it had ever been before. 

kyhowTo Ikakvctis itcr^ ^X^^ dfjuporipovs Stv wp6r€pc» Mjpxoy «rv/xoi* i^al- 
ptTW 8' ikafiov ol Eapxil96wuH r^y rSfy ScXivowrW w6\iv re leai x^l"^ ""^ 
rrjt *A*payayTiyijs M^XP* ^<^ 'AXtixov icaXoviUvw worafunf' ittct 8) Aiovi^- 
<riot roit Kapxil^iwloit rdAorra x^^^] 


CHAP. X. That Minoa which had become H^rakleia, whose Greek 
Hdrakleia fame is greater in legend than in history ^, now became^ in 

Minda now ^ 

Cariha- barbarian hands, one of the most important military posts in 
Md!kaH. ^^® island. Ras Melkart from henceforth ranks as a Car* 
thaginian possession alongside of the three older strongholds 
The of the West ^. On the north coast^ the fate of the other 

of Himera. Thermai^ the new Himera, is not recorded in our meagre 
abstract of the treaty ; but^ as it appears as a Carthaginian 
possession in the days of Timole6n^, we may safely set 
this down as the time when it sank from the friendly rela- 
tion into which it had entered when the needs of Himilkon 
called for gentleness ^. At the same time our one glimpse 
of the inner life of Thermai under Panic rule shows us that 
the cities did not cease to have Greek inhabitants. Their 
exact relation to the ruling city it might be hard to fix. 
Bas Melkart perhaps stood alone as a new Phoenician 
colony on Greek soil^ charged with the duty of watching 
over the Greek subjects of Carthage on the southern coast, 
as Panormos and Solous were still ready to do on the 
northern. The barbarian comer had spread beyond a 
Akragas comer. On the south coast Akragas, shorn of a large part 
derSty**'^ of her territory, was now a border city of Hellas. On the 
north coast there could hardly have been a strictly Hellenic 
post west of Dionysios^ own Tyndaris. Of the new Sikel 
settlements on that coast, practically no doubt more Greek 
than Sikel, we hear nothing. But they were doubtless, in 
some shape or other, under the dominion or influence of 

Hellas was thus cut short. The question may of course 
be raised, whether the rule of the barbarian was any worse 
bondage than the rule of the tyrant. Where the liberal 


[^ See Sicily, i. 430, 496, 497 ; ii. 96, 97, 479-481.] 
[' LilybaioD, Panormos and Solous. For Ret* Melkart, see below, 
p. 350, and note 4.] 

[* Died. zix. 3. Agathoklds was born at ThermM, then under Car- 
thaginian rule.] [* Died. xiv. 56.] 


Ipolicy of Magdu^ was carried out^ ifc most likely was not. chap. x. 
And even before Maerdn Greeks of their own free will^?,\®™"* 

. , . . . poucy of 

]^ad left the dominions of Dionysios for the dominions of Magdn. 
Carthage'. The subject lands of Greece^ tossed to and 
%o from one master to another, if they rejoiced when 
tihe Venetian drove out the Turk, sometimes also rejoiced 
when the Turk drove out the Venetian. But the Venetian 
was a stranger as well as the Turk ; if a Christian^ he was 
a Christian of another creed. Under a wise Carthaginian 
administration the Greeks of Selinous and Thermal might 
be personally as well ofE as the subjects of Dionysios. But Yoke of 
the wrong done to national life was the same as if they had and Gar- 
been cut off from a commonwealth which owned Hermo- *^*?J ®^™" 


krat£s or Timoledn as its leader. SeUnous ceased to be 
a member of the Hellenic body; Syracuse remained part of 
it. Within the realm of Dionysios^ if men served a tyrant^ 
the tyrant was at least their countryman^ and there were a 
thousand more hopes of better days under the rule of Dio- 
nysios than there were under the rule of Carthage. The 
power of Carthage might be deemed immortal ; the power 
of Dionysios was^ at the outside, not likely to last longer 
than his own life-time. And so it was in the end. The 
Halykos long remained the boundary; Selinous passed away 
for ever ; but Akragas, Gela, and Eamarina still have their 
place in our story. Akragas, above all, again lives something 
like its old life, if on a much smaller scale. Ras Melkart 
was not the last city to be founded on the south coast of 
Sicily. A tyrant or king of Akragas was one day to give 
it a Greek fellow. 

P Diod. XV. 15.] 

[' ThiB is given by Dioddros (xiv. 41) as one of the reasons wbioh 
weighed with Dionysios in nndertaking his first Panic War ; 'Opvy 9^ rwr 
'EXK^vcay rcMb tls r^r iiruepdT€tap r&if "Eapx^Zonflww &woTp4x<>''^<*^ '''^^ f* 
w6k€ts Kol TcU imf<rc{f ito/u(ofii¥ovt, |y^|u(c r$f irp6f roht Eapxiflo^tovt cl^ 
ytfs /upo^tnjf iroXAo^t rw h^* a^dr rarrofUvcim 0w)Jfff€ff9(u Kowwttif t^ 
lirt/iwr &mo<rr6ff*on, Icb^ tk v^f^cor 7^rai irayrcb ro^f KoraJb^ovXMfUvmn 




§ 7. From the Third to the LMt Punic War of Dionysios. 

B.C. [378]-368. 

C^lia- * u Of the last sixteen years of Dionysios* reign we know 

campaign next to nothing. But we can see that about the year 379 
both he and the Carthaginians were warring in Italy ^. 
They were seeking to set up again some of the towns which 
he had destroyed ; but they had to give up the attempt ^ 
and go back to Africa on account of a plague and the 
Dionyaos revolt of their subjects. On the other hand^ Dionysios 


Ki^ton. took Krotdn ^, which had escaped him in his earlier cam- 
paign^ and robbed the temple of the Lakinian Hera of a 
precious robe^ which he^ oddly enough, sold to the Car- 
thaginians for a huge sum ^. There is also a story how he 

* Story of Sicily, pp. 195, 194. 
P Diod. XV. 34.] 

[' According to Dioddros (xv. 34. i), the GarthaginianB did succeed in 
reitoring Hippdnion (Vibona) ; Kofixffi^vioi, arpart^aavrts tU ri)y 'IroAioy, 

teai wdirras robs w€^vy&ras <nnHiyay6irrts woKXifif imfU\€iav aOr&v ivaJfotitPToJ] 
[' DioddtoB is silent about this capture — an astounding omission, which 
surely indicates a serious lacuna in his history. On the other hand, Livy 
(xxiy. 6) mentions the seizure of the Akropolis of Krotdn by Dionysios, 
but does not tell us the date ; '* An. Grotonis una parte imminens mari 
altera vergente in agrum, situ tantum naturali quondam munita, postea et 
muro cincta est qua per aversas rupes ab Dionysio Sicili» tyranno per 
dolum fuerat capta." According to Dionyuioe of Halikamassos (zx. 7) 
Dionysios was master of Krotdn for twelvfi years. Holm (G. S. iL 154) 
thinks it therefore probable that the capture of Krotdn took place in 379 B. a, 
— twelve years that is before Dionysios' death, — and this opinion has .been 
followed in the text. A considerable break is now perceptible in the 
Krotoniate coinage (see Head, Historia Numorum, p. 82). At this time 
Dionysios appears to have made am unsuooessful attempt on Thourioi. 
His fleet of 300 vessels however was utterly destroyed by a northern 
gale, whereupon the Thourians conferred their citizenship, with a house 
and allotment, on Boreas (^lian, Y. H. xii. 61).] 

[* The price paid was lao talents (Athen. xii. 541. 6, who cites Aris- 
totle). This himaiion had been originally presented to the temple by the 
Sybarite Alkisthends.] 


planned the building of a wall across the narrowest point of csap. z. 
the south-western peninsula '. This was, he said, to keep out ^jf*|^^ 
the Lucanians ; but the Greeks north of the proposed wall SJ^JJJ^^^ 
saw that it was meant only to strengthen his own power in 

[' Strabo, vi. i . lO ; fitrd 82 KawXM^iav XtvAAj^tcok . . . dird 82 r^s ir^Xf wf 
Koi d it6\wos XrvAAi7ri«df i»6na<rrm, wotw rhw €tpfifjiivw ia$iihv irpdf rdr 
*lwmi^idrrpt k6\mw, krtx*^fl^* '^ ^ Atov^ffios ttat iiamxiCfo^ T^y IffO/i^ 
orpart^aas M Atvttoyobs, \6rf^ fi^v &s Aa^d\€uu^ dv6 rw kur^ 0apfidpca¥ rdis 
ivT^s MftoVf t6 82 dXffOh Xvcairifi^ wp^ 6XX^\ovt Kotyo»lcty rw 'EXAi^Mir 
0ov\6fityos Star Sipx^iy <l8coif rwv krrSr dW' IxifXvoay 61 lirrdt €latk$6wTts, 
The site of Skylldtioiiy the Roman ScyUcium, Is not, as generally rap- 
posed, the modem SqaiUaoe, but, at I have shown (of. Hodgkin, Letters 
of Gassiodonis, 68 Beqq.)» ib still marked by the eztensiTe ruins of an 
andent city at Boocella del Yescovo di Sqnillaoe. It overlooks at a short 
distance the mouth of the Coraoe, where was no doubt its port, the 
Castrum Hannibalis of Pliny (y. infra). But the ruins at Boocella are 
those of a great and populous city with more than one distinct quarter, 
one of the largest amphitheatres in Italy and a fine Christian Basilica 
Jktori le mura — the riral of the greatest buildings of the kind at Bavenna 
or Thessalonica. The distance, as the crow flies, between the two seas 
at this point is ihirty-two kilometers, or about twenty miles. The natural 
erossbig-line of the isthmus is howeyer formed by the course of the Corace 
and Amato and an intervening watershed, which at its lowest point, about 
three miles to the S. W. of Tiriolo, sinks to 230 meters. By this route 
the distance from sea to sea would be about forty kilometers, or 35 miles^ 
and Pliny's statement (iii. 15) that Dionysios had intended to cut through 
the peninsula has been taken to mean that he sought to cut a canal from 
sea to sea, utilising as £sr as possible the existing water-ways. ("Dein 
sinus Scyllaoeus et Scyladum, Scylletium Atheniensibus cum conderent 
dictum, quem locum ocourrens Terinsens sinus peninsulam efficit et in 
ea portus qui yocatur Castrum Heroulis, nusquam angustiore Italia: 
zx m. passuum latitude est. Itaque Dionysius Major interdsam eo 
loco adjicere Sidlie voluit.*') Pliny*s language however does not neces* 
sarily imply more than a ditch aocompsnying the wall. So in 1743 
(Lenormant, Grande 6r^, iii 23), on the occasion of the great plsgue 
at Baggio and Messina, O'Mahony, the Yicar-General of Calabria for 
Charles III, cut a ditch, lined by a palisade, from sea to sea at the 
narrowest point of the isthmus for the purposes of a sanitary cordon. 
Whilst exploring the site of Scyladum, I observed on the land side 
an ancient road-line marked by a trenchlike gap between two hills 
which had evidently formed a principal entrance to the city and pointed 
directly towards Tiriolo the natural crossing-paint of the isthmus. This 
ancient road and cutting may afford a due to the line of Dionyrios' 
projected wall.] 


OHAP. X. Italy. After this we hear nothing of his doings in Sicily 
or Italy for aboat eleven years. 
XKonyrios *' In Old Greece meanwhile, where, from the year b. c. 

and Sputa. 

369 onwards, Athens and Sparta were allies against Thebes, 
we hear more than once of his sending barbarian mercenaries, 
Gaulish and Iberian, to help the Spartans ^ And now 
(369-367) we find two Attic inscriptions recording the 
relations of the Athenian democracy with the tyrant'. 

[^ See Holm, op. cit. ii. 136 aeqq. The fint help given by Dionysios to 
the Spartani was in 387 B. 0., when the fleet, oonsiating of twenty Syraooian 
or Italiote vesaeU under Polyxenoe, met the Spartan envoy AntaUddas 
(who was then returning from Siua with the Persian treaty) at Abydos. 
Hus seasonable sapport decided the Athenians, Thebans, and the other 
members of the anti-Spartan alliance to accept the Peace of Antalkidas 
(Xen. Hell. v. i. a6~38). In 373 again, the revival of the Athenian 
power, marked by the appearance of an Athenian fleet in Ionian waters, 
and, above all, the defection of Korkyra from the Spartan alliance, seriously 
imperilled the Adriatic schemes of Dionysios. Accordingly we find him 
joining Sparta in an attempt to recover the island, which however ended 
in the defeat of the Syracusan squadron and the capture of nine vessels 
(Died. zv. 45-47; Xen. HelL vi. a. 33-3<S). For the third time Dio- 
nysios appeared as champion of the Spartan cause in 369, by dispatching 
an expedition, in which aoo Kelts and Iberians took part, for the relief 
of Corinth, then besieged by Epameinondas (Xen. Hell. vii. i. ao-aa ; 
Died. zv. 70), and in the succeeding year helped them to the " tearless 
victory " in Peloponnese (Xen. HelL vii. I. 38-3 a ; Died. zv. 7a ; Plut. 
Ages. 33.) 

[s For the inscriptions see Kohler, C. I. A. ii. 8, 51, 5a ; £. L. Hicks, 
Greek Historical Inscriptions, Nos. 71, 84 and 88. There are three 
inscriptions in all. The first two (Hicks, op. dt. 71 and 84) are purely 
honorary. The first, of 393 B. 0., was found in the Theatre of Dionysos on 
a stdl6 surmounted by a relief representing Athena giving her hand to a 
personified figure of Sicily holding a torch (Schone, Qr. Beliefs, t. vii. 49 
and i. 34). It contains part of a ilr^^fffUL in honour of Dionysios and his 
Ck>urt moved by the dithyrambio poet Kin^as. The second inscription is 
of B.O. 368, and contains a wpofio^ktv/ia of the Athenian Bould referring to 
Dionysios' proposals in furtherance of the Peace Congress at Delphi to 
which he had sent envoys. It praises Dionysios for upholding the Peace 
of Antalkidas (rj fioffikictt clp^rp), and grants him and his sons golden 
crowns and the fireedom of the city. The third inscription (ELicks, 88) is of 
368-367 B. 0., and consists of a decree of the Ddmos in honour of Dionysios, 
in which are inserted the terms of a treaty concluded with him. It 


All manner of honours are voted to him and his sons, and ohap. z. 
in the second an alliance is concluded between Athens and ^J^,^^ 
* the ruler of Sicily/ without any mention whatever of the ]^^^^^ 
people of Syracuse. Each is to help the other in case of 
attack by any enemy. It is some little comfort to think 
who the enemies of Dionysios at that moment were/' 

§ 8. Tie Last Punic War of Dionysios. 

B. c. 368. 

" For, just at the end of his reign, he renewed the greatest 
exploit of his earlier days, the invasion of the Phoenician 
possessions in Western Sicily ^. An excuse for a new Punic 
war could be easily found in real or alleged Carthaginian 

mentions tliat on the side o£ Athens, besides the Bould, certain officen, 
doubtless the Stratdgoi and others, swear to observe the treaty. The oath 
on the other side is talien by Dionysios, bat after his name there are some 
nnfortnnate lacunas which prevent as from knowing what Syracasan bodies 
and officials took the oath with him. The passage stands ; 


[i d\ Aio]i^<rioy tctu tov[s 

[ . • . . T]wy Xvfitueoal[jtm 

[ Ipipxovs, &0. 

In the last line Kirchhoff (Philologus, zii. 573) has restored <f>povp6,pxovSt with 
which Beloch (Impero di IMonisio : Memorie dei Lincei, 1881, 235) agrees. 
The Phroararchs were the second in rank amongst the tyrant's Uentenants 
(after the Nauarch), and acted as commandants in his chief strongholds, 
beginning with the Akropolis of Syracuse (op. dt. p. 230). Tet how com- 
mandants of the various strongholds could have taken the oath at Syracuse, 
as we may suppose, is not so clear. Both this and the preceding Athenian 
inscriptions describe Dionysios as rdv StxcAia; Spxcvra, See Supplement I. 
p. an seqq. Beloch (op. cit. p. 235) supposes that in the original copy of 
the treaty (of which this is only an extract inserted in an honorary decree) 
the name of the eponymous Syracusan magistrate would have stood beside 
that of the Athenian Arch6n, and that the name of the Syracusan People 
on whose behalf Dionysios nominally acted (cf. his coinage) must have 
also appeared.] 
[* For the last Carthaginian war of Dionysios see Died. xv. 75.] 


CHAP. X. encroachments on the dominions of Dionysios ^. In sach a 
Last Punic war as this he knew that Greek feelings in and out of Sicily, 

war of 

DionysioB. would go with him. Carthage was believed to be, as so 
often happened, deeply weakened by the usual causes^ pesti- 
lence and the revolt of her African subjects ^/' 

This last campaign of Dionysios led him into the same 
regions of Sicily in which he had won his brilliant momen- 
tary successes against Carthage seven-and-twenty years 
before. He set forth with thirty thousand foot and three 
thousand horse^ and three hundred triremes put to sea to 
join him in the waters of Western Sicily. His course is set 

Wing Sell- before us in a very few words. Selinous and Entella — the 

nous and ■,.... i ^ • -r -i • 

Entella. couplmg IS smgular — were soon won over by mm. In his 
earlier expedition the Campanians of Entella had been 
among those who withstood him most stoutly ®. But he 
had now to deal with another generation which had grown 
up under wholly different surroundings from those of the 

Eryx. valiant freebooters. He then began to ravage the lands of 
Eryx, and he got possession of the mountain city, whether 
by force, persuasion, or treason, we are not told. By what- 
ever means, it was a strange destiny for a man to become 
twice in his life master of the Mount of Ashtoreth. 

But what follows teaches us how much the topography 
of Western Sicily had changed since the first expedition of 

Siege of Dionysios. He had before besieged Motya ; he now be- 
sieges Lilybaion. The new city has thoroughly taken the 
place of the old. And we now begin to hear of a famous 
haven, which we have not heard of before, the haven of 

[^ The pretext alleged (Diod. xv, 73. i) was that the Phoenicians of 
the Carthaginian Dominion in Sicily (robs tcarii i^v imtepdrttav ^oivtKas) 
had made incurRione into Dionysios' territory.] 

[' Diod. XV. 73. 1 ; 8«i t« ti)v y€y€yfjfUvfpr vap* airrois Xoiitue^v v6<rov Koi 
r^v dv6<TTaaiv rwv AijStW.] 

[' Seep. 71.] 


Eryx K By this time at least the advantages of the site chap. x. 
which waato be so famous in later wars were fully seen. The 
haven of Motya is no more heard of; the haven of Lily- 
baion and the haven of Eryx are now the centres of all 
operations by sea. The haven of Lilybaion is indeed in Drepanon 
some sort the haven of Motya under another name; but^f^'r^^'^ 
the haven of Eryx is altogether new. The haven of Eryx 
is no other than the western fellow of Zankl£ on the strait ; 
it is the Drepanan or Sidle, the modem Trapani. We 
know it only by this Greek name, the translation possibly 
of some Phoenician equivalent. We say Phoenician; for 
Elymian nomenclature^ whatever its character, was likely 
to be by this time a thing of the past. It is clear that the 
haven of Eryx and Eryx itself are now fully under Car- 
thaginian supremacy ; the haven^ we may be sure^ was^ for 
all naval purposes^ an actual Carthaginian possession K Its 
importance as a haven has lasted to this day along with 
its name. And we must remember that^ at this time and 
ages later^ the narrow tongue of land on which stands 
Trapani stretched much further into the sea than it now 
does^ and that, just as at Motya^ points which now 
survive only as island rocks were then part of the main 
peninsula. With the mount of Eryx the haven of Eryx 
had doubtless passed into the hands of Dionysios, and it 
must have formed his naval head-quarters for his siege of 

Of the first of the many sieges of the new stronghold we Siege of 
have nothing recorded but its ill success. All that we hear paiicL*"** 
of the acts of Dionysios before Lilybaion is that, " as there 
were many soldiers within it, he raised the siege ^/' The 
new walls and the vast ditches had clearly stood the fortress 

[* Diod. XV. 73 ; rdv rwv *£^mr&^cvr Xifiira.] ^ 

[« See SicUy, i. aSi.] 

[* Diod. xr. 73 ; voWw 8' Syronf kv ain^ ^rrparwrw ri^r voKiopKlav 


oHAF. X. of Himilkdn in good stead ; but it is grievous to have no 
flSt°'^° means of comparing the attack of Dionjsios on ancient 
away from Motya with his attack on new Lilybaion. The lord of 
Syracuse was clearly beginning to weary of the war, a war 
into which he could hardly be expected to throw all the 
energy of his younger days. He listened to a false report, 
most likely cunningly spread abroad by the Carthaginians 
themselves, of a fire in the haven of the warships of Car* 
thage, by which — so he was told or so he inferred — ^the 
whole Punic navy was destroyed*. One would have thought 
that this was the very moment to press the siege of Lily- 
baion ; but the inference attributed to Dionysios is that, if 
Carthage was thus weakened, it was needless to keep the 
whole of his own vast armada afloat '. He sent a hundred 
and thirty triremes, the best in the fleet, into the haven of 
Eryx ; the rest were ordered to sail back to Syracuse. The 
Carthaginian commander, whose name is not given, was 
as ready to seize an opportunity as Himilkdn had been 
in times past. 
Sea-victory Bcyond all expectation, he was presently at sea with two 
giniana at hundred ships. He made a dash on the Syracusan fleet at 
Drepanon. Drepanon, and carried o£E the greater part of the hundred 
and thirty triremes, whose captains and crews were not 
looking for any attack ^ Here was a heavy blow, and the 
failure of the siege of Lilybaion must have lessened the 
credit of the Sjrracusan arms. Yet the campaign had given 
to Dionysios some substantial gain, if he could only hope 
to keep conquests at such a distance. He had won Selinons, 
Entella, the mount of Eryx ; the haven he had gained and 
lost again. Of Segesta this time we hear nothing. As 
winter came on, both sides agreed to a truce; but the 

[» IMod. XV, 73.] N 

[' lb. ; Tw l^onr rpi^peav kfearbv flip md rpi&Kmrra r^s &pl4rras A,iriffT€t\€V 
fls rbv tSjv 'Epviclvoa¥ Aifc^ya, rcb 8' 6Xkas Andffas k^iv^fopfv §ls t^s 2v/ni- 

[> lb.] 


tyrant of Syiacnse was not destined to renew the war with ohat. z. 
the next spring. 

* « Before long a treaty was again made between Syracuse R«di 

peaoe with 

and Carthage. We are not told its terms ; but as Selinoas^ Carthage. 
when we next hear of it, appears as a Carthaginian posses- 
sion, the Syracusan conquests were most likely given back 
to Carthage. 

** But it was not the elder Dionysios who made the treaty. 
We have come to the end of the reign and life of a man 
who had done such great things and had so largely changed 
the face of the world of his day. In the year 367 Diony- Death of 
sios the tyrant died, after a reig^ of thirty-eight years. The B.a ^. 
cause of his death is said to have been a strange one. 
It was now for the first time that a tragedy of his was 
thought worthy of the first prize at Athens ^. The news 
was brought to him with all speed. His delight was 
\mbounded; he sacrificed to the gods^ and indulged in an 
excess of wine which was unusual with him. A fever 
followed^ and he died ^. His career had been indeed a 
wonderful one. He had destroyed the freedom of his 
native city, but he had made it both the greatest city and 

 Story of SicUy, pp. 195, 196. 

\} See p. 194, note.] 

[' Diod. XT. 74. He is said there to have died from oTerdrinking on 
the occasion of his victory. In Justin (zz. 5) "insidiis snorum inter- 
fioitur.'* Plutarch (Di6n 6) following Umaios, says, that when Dionysios 
was in a hopeless state Di6ii tried to use his influence in favour of the 
tyrant^s children by his Syracusan wife Aristomachd, who was Didn*s 
sister. But the doctors, who &youred the interests of the younger 
Dionysios, his son by the Lokrian and his appointed successor, g^ve the 
old man a sleeping draught of such a kind that he passed from uncon- 
sciousness to death; Bay&r^ avviapavrts rbv Swov, A sleeping draught 
had been asked for by Dionysius, who himself had practised medicine. 
Cf. .XI. y. H. zi. it; irc^ rifi^ larpucifif iawovdaff€ icai air^s, itai laro sxd 
(rtfxyt Kol c«ac icai rd Xmmi.] 



CHAP. X. the greatest power of Europe. No man had won greater 
The reign successes over the barbarian enemies of Oreece ; but no man 


nysio*. had done more to destroy Oreek cities, and to plant bar- 
barians in his own island. With his great gifts, he mighty 
as a lawful king or as the leader of a free people^ have 
made himself the most illustrious name in all Greek 
history. As it was, he was a tyrant ; he reigned as such^ 
and he was remembered as such. All that we can say for 
him is that worse tyrants came after him. His reign was 
unusually long for a tyrant^ and he was able to. leave his 
power to his son. He himself had said that he was able to 
reig^ so long^ because he had abstained from wanton out- 
He heralds rages against particular persons. His reign marks an 

nian era. sBia in the history of OreecQ and of the world. He began 

a state of things which the Macedonian kings continued. 

It is well to note that when Dionysios died^ Philip son of 

Amyntas was already fifteen years old, and that eight years 

later he won for himself the Macedonian kingdom." 



{By the Editor,) 
The Mokabchy of Diontsios. 

With a Map of his Dominions. 

DiOKYSios had been named arpanf^s avroKparoip by the Syra- Diosyeios 
cusan Assembly (cfueXi^o-ta) at the time of the Carthaginian Invasion ^^^^** 
of 405 B.C. (see DiodoroB, ziii. 94; Sicily, vol. iii. 552, 553), ki-at6r. 
and the precedent of Gel6n had been publicly invoked by the 
proposers of the decree. In the only existing official documents, Also called 
however, of contemporary date in which Dionysios is spoken of, gj^-^ ^ 
the Athenian honorary decrees, one of them recording the alliance 
concluded between him and Athens, he is always called 'Sixtkias 
apxcity, (C. I. A., ii. 8, 51, 52 ; Hicks, Gr, Bist, InscriptionSf'ji, 84, 
88 ; cf. note, p. 204.) Beloch {Impero di Dioniaio, 1 9 seqq., Memorie 
dei Linceij 1881), with reference to this, goes so fBur as to maintain 
that Dionysios solemnly laid down his powers as Strat^gos Auto- 
krat6r, and that the new office of Arch6n was then specially created 
for him {op, cit, 19 ; "Bastava di creare una magistratura nuova, 
conferita a vita, e la cui competenza corrispondesse all' incirca a 
quella del collegio dei 15 strategi dei tempi repubblicani. Rivestito 
di questa competenza, e col modesto nome di arconte {&px^y), Dionisio 
poteva essere sicuro che la direzione degli afifari non gli sarebbe 
sfuggita di mano "). But this is pure supposition, in support of 
which there is no evidence whatever. (See, too, Holm, Jahres- 
bericht iiher d, Fortdchr. d. klass. AlterthtMnsunsseiuehafi, 1881, 
148 seqq.) 

The Athenian inscriptions may be certainly taken to show that 
a more or less vague use of the name Archon was found service- 
able by Dionysios. So too, according to Plutarch (DiCn, xii), we 
find Di6n hoping by Plato's influence to remove the despotic 

P a 



aiive of 

The "Ar- 
chdD of 
Sicily " a 

elements from the tyrannj of the younger Dionysioe, and make 
of him a law-abiding magistrate or "Arch6n." (^HXiri^c ftcV yap, 
&s louce, dih nXarnyos nofiaytpofitpov to dcffiroruc&v kcu \ia» oKparow 
d^Xuv rff TVfHunfi^t tfifteXtj rtva Koi pofUfiov &p)(OVTa t6v Aiovvaiotf 

KOTtttrniafiv.) But the very phrase used in the Athenian decrees, 
— liKfXias ^x^i — precludes us from citing them as evidence for 
the creation of a new magistracy at Syracuse. 

Nor would sach a formal innovation have been at all consistent ' 
with what we know of Dionysios' governmental system. It was 
clearly his aim to interfere as little as possible with existing 
constitutional forms. He has, in fact, summed up his policy him- 
self in the pithy injunction rovs fuv iroidar darpayakois rovs d* &yipas 

opKMs €$airaray (Plut. De Fort, Al, I. 9). It was not for want 
of oaths that Syracuse lost her liberties. And why should Diony- 
sios go out of his way to create a new office when the constitution 
already supplied him with one which he had only to make per- 
petual ? 2TpaniY6s axmncp&rnp was an existing title, and the powers 
conferred by it went far to satisfy the tyrant's ambition. It was 
that which Gel6n had borne, and there can be little doubt that 
it was in this capacity that the authority of Dionysios was recog- 
nized by successive Sjrracusan Assemblies. It was the precedent 
of Gelon, as Di6n reminded Dionysios, that had enabled him to 
assume the tifrannis (Plut. Didn, v). 

The wider title ScjccXuxs &px»^ rather suggests that it was 
intended to cover the more personal authority won by Dionysios 
himself outside Syracuse. To a large extent, it must be remem- 
bered, he ruled as conqueror of the Sikel lands embraced in the 
former realm of Ducetius. At Naxos, indeed, we find him handing 
back to the Sikels the site of the first Greek colony in the island, 
and at conquered Motya he employed them as his garrison (Diod. 
xiv. 53). There is moreover a certain amount of evidence to show 
that the Greek title of Arch6n had made way amongst the native 
elements of Sicily. Mr. Freeman {Sicilt/, ii. 381) remarks of 
Arch6nid6s, the Sikel prince of Herbita and the contemporary and 
ally of Ducetius; *'He would seem to be the Hellenic Archdn 
while his yoke-fellow is the Sikel or Latin Dux." Among the 
Sikans too we hear of an Arch6n of Guessa (Polyainos, v. i. 4). 
Thus the superior personal title which Dionysios found it con- 
venient to a£Fect in his dealings with foreign powers may well 
represent his claim to stand forth as much as the successor of 


Ducetius as of Qel6n. At the same time the territorial stjle 
avoided invidious distinctions between ZiiccXoc and 2ikm\i&t€u, 

At Syracuse itself, however, the title by which Dionysios claimed At Sy- 
the allegiance of the citizens was undoubtedly Irparrfy^s avroKpamp. ^^^^ 
The term "hp^^Vy so far as it was used with reference to the civic Stratdgos 
government there, was in fact only a vaguer synonym for Stra- ^^^ 
tdgos. And when Plutarch (Z>tdn, 29), speaking of the twenty 
colleagues who were elected to serve with Di6n and Megaklte, — 
the two Strat^i Autokratores, — calls them tnnmpxopras, we may 
venture to translate the phrase ''fellow Stratdgoi.*' In 0. 39 he 
directly calls the Strat^oi "Archdns." 

Of the ostensibly constitutional procedure which, when it suited Constitu- 
his purpose, Dionysios could observe among his own citizens there ^'J^^ 
is more than one piece of evidence. In 398 having completed obseired 
his preparations for his great war against Carthage, he first ^7 P*^ 
summoued an Assembly and harangued it in due form in &vour 

of his project (Diod. xiv. 45 ; [Aioyva-uw] avtnfyaynf cir cxxXi/o-uiy «cal 
irapcjcoXci rovr 'ivpaKoa'iovs ir6k€fiOP f^vryxciv np^ Kapxrfiwiovs, . • • . 
ov ftijv dKKa noXKovs \6yovt wp^ tovttjv tjiv irpoalpto'tM diaXtx^^^^^ ^^Xp 
(nryKaralwovt TKafit rovf 2vpaKoalovt), It was only after obtaining 
a formal decree from the Assembly that he sent a declaration of 
war to the Senate of Carthage (Diod. xiv. 47; Atopwrtos d* cfcVcft^fv 

€ls Kapxjrfiova tcffpvKa doitt nrcoroX^v irp6g r^v ytpovaUof' cV ravTff di 
yrfpapiUvov Ijv^ Sn Svpaxoiriois dfioyiifpop tltf woktfteip np6v Kap' 
Xi/doy^ovr, iav fiij t&p 'EXXijMdtfy irSK§»p §Kx»prj<rwruf), At a later 

Assembly (Diod. xiv. 64-70) Diouysios was able to overawe his 
opponents by the presence of his mercenaries, and to exercise his 
right of dissolution. In his financial needs, as we learn from 
Aristotle {CSkcn. u. 2. 20), he also made a point of summoning 
and formally consulting the Ekkldsia. It was not even without 
their formal ^^icrfia that he put his tin coinage into circulation 
(see Supplement III, p. 236). 

So, too, on his father's death, the first act of the younger Hii son*! 
Dionysios, though he took care also to be acclaimed by the army **'°?"**^ 
(Justin, xxi. i), was to summon an Assembly and to exhort the by At- 
citizens to continue to himself the good-will that had, as it were, *^i^hly. 
been handed down to him from his father (Diod. xv. 74; 'O di 
Atopvaiog 6 ptwr^pos diodc^/icvof rifif rvpanviha^ wpArop rii irX^^ crvi^ 
ayay^p ds iicKkfiaiap 9aptKi£ktin roit oucffux^ \6y019 rrfptip tjip varpor 
ffopaborop frp6t aMp tCpouof), It is to be observed in this connexion 


Ekkl^sift that the name of the popular Assembly at Syracuse always 

*t S appears in our authorities as cVicXi^a-ia, otherwise we should expect, 

cuse. as in other Doric cities, ^ia. That the Senate was known as 

BovXd appears from an inscription of the last days of Syracusan 

independence (C. I. G. 5367 ; Beloch, op, cit, 18), though there 

is no direct evidence of its earlier existence. (See Holm, Jahres- 

herieht, Sfc. d, Jdaas, Alt, 1881, p. 183.) Like the EkkUsia the 

BovXa or something answering to it may also have been nominally 

consulted by Dionysios, though the fact is not recorded, and it 

might not in practice be distinguishable from that Council of 

Friends with which both he and his successor consulted on critical 

occasions (Diod. xiv. 8 ; Plut. DidUf vi). 

DionysioB* The most characteristic institution of Dionysios' tyranms, — ^the 

OTArd body-guard of six hundred, accorded to him by the irregular 

Assembly at Leontinoi in 405 (Diod. xiii. 95), — ^may in some 

respects be regarded as only a reorganization of the picked body of 

six hundred hoplites which earlier Sirat^ci had at their disposal 

(cf. Beloch, op, eU, 21). The practical Presidency of the Chamber, 

the conduct of foreign affairs, the administration of the Treasury, 

all devolved on Dionysios in virtue of his StrtxUgia, In the 

case of appointments he had only to extend existing rights of 

Office of his office. Principal among the officers nominated by the tyrant 

Nsuarch. ^^^ ^^^ come to the fore is the Nauarch {yavapxos) or high 

Admiral of the fleet. Before Dionysios' time (cf. Diod. xiii. 61) 

Confioed there seem to have been several vavapxoi. Now, however, as in 

fkmilv"'* * *^® ^^*®® ^^ *^® Strat^gia, the office was limited to a single com- 
mander, always chosen from the members of the tyrant's family. 
It was first conferred by Dionysios on his brother Leptin^s, 
afterwards, on account of his conduct in the Italian expedition, 
t«ken away irom him and transferred to his other brother The- 
aridas (Diod. xiv. 102 ; [Acvrrii^i'] fiiv cnr^XXo^ r^g vavctpxiast Gea- 
pidtjv ti rhv mpop adcX<^y ^fi6va rov ort^ov icarcoTi7(rc). In 387 B.C. 

again the brother-in-law of the two former Nauarchs, Polyxenos, 
appears to have held the post (Xen. ffdl. v. i. 26). Under 
Dionysios 11. Philistos, the husband of Leptinds' daughter, suc- 
ceeds to the post (Diod. xvi. 11 and 16), but in this instance he 
is given the title of Strat^os, the only occasion on which this 
title appears attached to a citizen of Syracuse under the Dionysian 
dynasty (see Beloch, op, eit. 22). Opposed to him is Herakleid^s, 
who had been chosen Nauarch by the Assembly of the Syracusans 


liberated by Di6n. Althongb carried out under republican forms 
this- election throws great light on the importance of the office. 
Di6n, hearing of the appointment^ got the Sjracusans to rescind 
their vote on the ground that he could no longer remain Auto- 
krat6r if the command of the fleet was given to another (Plut. 

Didn, zxxiii ; ovjccrc y&p avroKparmp yApMipj d» ^(XXor rjyrfrai r&v Kara 
BaXaaaav), Afterwards, however, he had Herakleid^s nominated 
to the post on his own motion, and granted the same bodyguard 
as himself. 

After the Nauarcli the Phrowrarcha or Commandants take a Phrour- 
chief place among Dionysios' officers. To them was entrusted ^^"^' 
the safekeeping of the chief strongholds of his dominions, and 
first in importance among them was naturally the Phrcfwrarch of 
the Akropolis of Syracuse itself. This post, we are told, was 
occupied for many years by Philistos (Plut. Di&n, 1 1 ; ^Ckurros . . . 
rriv &Kpa¥ dcc^vXa^c <f>pQvp€tp\S»v «Vt froXvv ;(poyov). On the conquest 
of Motya and other cities a Phrowrareh was left in command of 
the Syracusan garrison (see Beloch, op. eit. p. 23). In Dionysios' 
Adriatic colony of Issa ('* Lassos," see Supplement ii. p. 223 seqq.), 
on the other hand, we read of an Epa/rch appointed by Diony- 
sios (Diod. XV. 14) who had numerous triremes at his disposal ; 
D6riko8, the commander left behind him at Syracuse at the 
time of the expedition against Herbessus, also bore this title 
(Diod. xiv. 7). 

The Syracusan dominions were divided into three main cate- S^rracusan 
gories ; (i) The ojd Syracusan territories including a large part j?^j^^"* 
,of the former realm of Ducetius. (2) The military colonies such into three 
as Hadranum, Inessa, Leontinoi, Messana, and apparently Issa, ^^^^^• 
where the authority of Dionysios was represented by Phrourarchs colonieZ 
or Eparchs ; to which may be added the Carthaginian and other 
towns captured from the enemy and garrisoned in the tyrant's 
name like Motya (for the time being), and Solous taken from the 
Carthaginians, Henna, Morgantia, Mensenum, Cephaloedium, and 
others from the Sikels, or Erot6n on the Italian side (Livy, xxiv. 3). 
(3) The allied cities, — wiinaxi^^s irdKnt, — such as what remained Allied 
of Akragas, Gela, Kamarina, and Selinous on the south-west, ^^^^^ 
Therma and the new foundation of Tyndaris on the northern coast, 
some Sikel communities like Agyrium under its tjrrant Agyris, 
Centuripa under Dam6n, Herbita and Assoros (Diod. xiv. 78), 
and above all the Italian Lokroi, aggrandized by Dionysios' favour 











ens Italic 
in Sicily. 


Aggimnd- into a considerable territorial power including in its dominions 
L^rd! ^'^ Skyllfttion, Kaul6nia, and Hippdnion (Diod. xiv. io6, 107). Of the 
respective relations in which the colonies and allied cities stood 
to Syracuse we know little. It is a significant fact, however, that 
in none, not even the most privileged, do we find any silver 
coinage belonging to this period. The older Syracusan colonies, 
to judge by the inscriptions of Akrai, possessed only minor magis- 
trates of their own. 

The military basis and sham constitutionalism of Dionysios' 
government suggest more than one comparison with the Boman 
Empire. In nothing is this more conspicuous than in the system 
of military colonies which he set on foot, as well as in their cosmo- 
politan character. He made free use of whatever served his turn 
whether Greek or barbarian, but as the mainstay of his empire 
he seems to have deliberately preferred non-Hellenic elements. 
As pointed out in the text, his " settlement of Italian mercenaries 
in the island foreshadows and prepares the way for the subjugation 
of Sicily, first of all lands out of Italy, by an Italian power." 
According to the author of the letters that bear Plato's name (Ep. 
viii. p. 353 F) the Oscan was already threatening to supersede the 
Greek language in the island. At Katand and Leontinoi Diony- 
sios planted Campanian and other mercenaries; his colony of 
Messana he largely peopled, if not with Italians, at any rate with 
Italiota. The site of Naxos he handed over to the Italic element 
in Sicily, the native Sikels. Nor must it be forgotten that among 
the mercenaries promiscuously set down by him within what once 
had been Hellenic walls were Gauls, Iberians, and Ligurians. At 
Syracuse itself we find him enlarging the franchise quite in the 
imperial style, and enrolling among the " new citizens " liberated 
slaves (Diod. ziv. 7). Ortygia itself was in the hands of his mer- 
icenaries. As a result of his government it is recorded that most 
I of the cities that had escaped destruction were occupied by hetero- 
geneous barbarians and disbanded soldiers (Plut. TimcMny i ; ai 
di n-XctoToi tr6k€is vn6 fitipPdpwp fnyadav koi (rrpaTuar&v dfju<rBt^v Korcc- 

There is even some evidence that Dionysios anticipated both 

MBume^v ^™®'* Emperors and the later Greek princes in taking to himself 

DionyrioB. divine attributes (see Holm, Geseh. SieilienSf ii. 459). According 

to Di6n Chiysostomos (Or. 37 Carinthuicat ed. Dindorf. 298, 299), 

the Syracusans being in want of money, owing to their prolonged 

of Sicily. 


darenAjOTL I^-ess. Oocford.- 



wars with the Carthaginians and ^' other harharians of Sicily and Dionydos 
Italy," melted down all the stataes of their tyrants except those of J^J^d w 
the elder Dionysios, which were fashioned in the form of Dionysos IHonysos. 
(irX^v &pa Tov Aiowalov rov irpfafimpov r»v r6 frxrjfAa rov ^uwwrov 
irtpuctifuvav). It is prohable that those who erected the statues 
of Dionysios thps deified also reared altars to his honour, as the 
cities of Greece were already doing to his contemporary Ljrsander. 
The irreligious cast of Dionysios' mind would certainly not have 
prevented him from availing himself of an imperial cult if it 
served his purpose. In the assumption of divine attributes he Dionysios 
was followed by his son, who proclaimed himself a son of Apollo ^f ' A^^i^^' 
(Pint. De Fori, Alex, ii. 5) in the boastful line ; 

So, too, we find the younger Dionysios naming his son ApoUdkratis, 
and his Bhdgine colony Phcihia. In the days of the Syracusan 
kings traces of the same deification are not wanting, and Philistis, 
queen of Hier6n IL, appears on coins in the guise of D^mdtdr 
or her daughter. 

The geographical extension of the dominions of Dionysios can Geographi- 
best be understood from the annexed Map. It represents t^^^on^f**^* 
possessions and dependencies of Dionysios as they existed in 379 Dionysios' 
B. 0. In that year he had, by the capture of Krot6n, achieved ^<*™""^"*"' 
his most brilliant conquest (after Rh^on) on the Italian side, nor, 
accepting Beloch's conclusions {op, eit pp. 6 and 7, note i), was it 
till the succeeding year that he was forced by his defeat at Eronion 
(see p. 198) to cede his westernmost conquests up to the Halykos to 
the Carthaginians. He still held, — on any showing till 383 B.a, 
— what remained of Selinous, Solous, and the Himeraian Therma, 
and the borders of his dominions stretched from the Mazaros 
to the Krathis. Within these limits the cities and communities 
not held in direct subjection were certainly in a position of 
dependent alliance. His new colony of Meesana gave him the 
command of the straits; Rhdgion, on the other side, though dis- 
mantled, seems neither to have been utterly destroyed as stated 
by Strabo (vi. x. 6), nor its aite handed over to the Lokrians as 
suggested in the text (cf. Grote, c. Ixxxiii), for Dionysios himself 
is recorded to have built a palace there (Pliny, xii. 7 ; cf. Beloch, 
op. eit. p. 8), and its value as an Italian outpost of the dynasty 
was further acknowledged by his son planting there his colony 


Italian of Phoibia (Strabo, Joe, cit). Beyond this the greater part of 

^fD^^^"* the toe of Italy was in the possession of the favoured Lokrian 

Dysioe. allies and dependents, to whom Dionysios had handed over the 

territories of Eauldnia, Skylldtion, and Hippdnion. On the other 

hand, the garrisoning of the Akropolis of Erot6n shows that 

Dionysios held the extensive dominions and dependencies of that 

great city under his direct government. Our informant fails us 

at this point, but it is safe to believe that Pandosia, Terina, and 

the other Krotoniate plantations stretching to the Tyrrhene sea 

followed the fortunes of the mother-city so far as to acknowledge 

the suzerainty of Dionysios. Between the Sicilian tyrant and the 

Lucanians fresh from the conquest of Laos and Poseiddnia, they 

could not stand alone. 

Members The '^Apx^'^i' ^uuXias thus included in his dominions, besides the 

L^j^g^* greater part of the Island, a large slice of the older Sikel land 

dependent on the Italian side of the straits. To a certain extent he may 

11 * 

be said to have anticipated the arrangement of a much later date 
and to have founded before its time a realm of '* the two Sicilies." 
Pliny indeed (iii. 15), when speaking of his projected wall from 
sea to sea across the Isthmus of Squillace, uses the significant 
words — " interetsam (j)emnmlam) eo loco adjicere Sioilias volmtJ' 

Beyond the eastern frontier of this continuous territory, the 

remaining members of the Italiot League, at the head of them 

the Tarantines (see Holm, G. SAL 134 ; and cf. Ath^n. xv. 700 d ; 

Strabo, vi. i. 8), had no choice but to accept Dionysios' hegemony 

AllianoeB and remained in close alliance with his successor. The warlike 

Wni»n.. i^<«^aja were his aUies, and the lapygiana and MeseapianB, in 

whose country lay the two harbours of Brundisium {Bptwiirtov) 

and Hydruntum, — afterwards the most famous crossing-points to 

the Greek lands beyond, — seem to have followed the same example 

Aptdians. (see Suppl. II, p. 228). To judge by the colonies founded by his son 

on the Apulian coast and their personal superintendence by the 

younger Dionysios (Died. xvi. 5 and 10 ; see Suppl. II, p. 228), 

Apulia too came within the sphere of Syracusan influence, — a 

strange foreshadowing of the days of Norman Counts and Kings. 

South On the opposite shore alliances had been concluded with the 

I ynana, eouthem lUyrians, and the Molottis under king Alketas might 

tian kinff. ^ regarded as a protected State. The keys of the Adriatic were 

thus in Dionysios' hands, and he took care to cement his dominions 

in the gulf by his plantations at Pharos, Issa, Adria, and perhaps 


other sites on the Illyrian and east Italian shores (see Suppl. IE, Adriatic 
pp. 228, 229), — a policy continued by bis successor. ooloniM. 

Over and above all this, an ominous notice, supplied by Justin 
(xx. 5), shows that Dionysios could reckon on the armed support 
of the greatest barbarian land-power of the peninsula* The Gauls, AlUance 
fresh from the burning of Rome, had despatched envoys to Diony- G^ulg in 
sios, then warring in Italy, with the offer of their *' frieDdship and Italy, 
alliance/* which the tyrant gladly accepted. He might employ 
them either in the van of his armies or against the rear of his enemies 
("gentem suam inter hostes eius positam esse, magnoque usui ei 
futuram, vel in acie bellanti vel de tergo intentis in proelium hos- 
tibus "). This formal alliance of the invading Qaulish tribes must 
be taken to mean something more than the casual employment 
of bands of Gaulish mercenaries. It opened out, indeed, unlimited 
possibilities of future aggrandisement in southern and even central 
Italy. Later on, — in 349 B.C., — we read (Livy, vii. 25, 26) of 
a Greek fleet, apparently despatched by the yoimger Dionysios, 
cooperating with the Gauls on the coasts of Latium, and extend- 
ing its ravages to the mouth of the Tiber. 

It is unfortunate that Dioddros, our chief authority for the Solid 
reign of Dionysios, becomes extremely defective during the period pj^^^^^* 
marked by the greatest extension of his rule and influence on the Italian 
Italian side. The capture of Krotdn for instance (see p. 202, dominion, 
note 3), an event of the first importance, is not even mentioned 
by the Sicilian historian. But the solid nature of Dionysios' 
Italian dominion is proved by the extent of the authority which 
his degenerate successor continued to exercise from the Straits 
of Messina to the Adriatic. The centre of gravity of the Dionysian 
dynasty finally shifted from Syracuse to Lokroi.] 


{By the Editor.) 

Thb Adbiatio Colonies of Diokybios. 

Thb planting by Dionysios of Syracusan colonies on the coasts 
and islands of the Adriatic is unquestionably one of the most 
Deeigns of interesting episodes of his reign. Looked at from one point of 
on°OW*°* view, it was the necessary corollary of his scheme for securing the 
Greece. transit-route from Italy to Greece proper, in the affairs of which 
he was constantly intervening, and whither, — reversing the designs 
^ of the Molottian Alexander and Fyrrhos, — he clearly hoped in time 
to extend his supremacy. But, over and above these more purely 
political aims, the Adriatic plantations of Dionysios must before all 
^ else be regarded as part of a deliberate and j&r-reaching com- 
mercial policy about which we have too little information. 
The An important trade-route between the East Mediterranean 

aI?*"? countries and the far North had from very early times followed 
trade- the eastern shores of the Adriatic, where the long chain of islands 
^^^' and sheltering fiords were very favourable to the enterprise of 
primitive navigation. The most ancient starting-point of the 
sea-route of which we have any historical record was Adria, 
near the mouth of one of the channels of the Fo, from whose 
early importance the sea itself took the name of the Adriatic. 
Old course The Baltic amber-trade, which from about the beginning of the 
^^'^^ ^ first millennium before our sera had for the most part superseded 
the earlier commerce with Jutland and the North-Sea strand, 
seems to have followed this route, and the Greek legends which 
connected the source of the amber supply with the Eridanos 
and the shores of Adria have been reasonably connected with 
this ancient trade-route. (See Genthe, Ueber den Etruskisehen 
Tauschhandd nach dem Norden, 1874 ed., pp. 103, 104.) The 
legends of Kadmos that have attached themselves to so many sites 
on the Blyrian coast attest the part which the Phoenicians took 


in this oommerce. In early days, if we may judge from the 
account given by Herodotus (iv. 33) of the transport of the Hyper- 
borean gifts to the temple of Ddlos, the products of this trade-line Commer- 
reached the D6d6naians, " first of the Greeks," through barbarian y^'^^*" 
intermediaries. At a later date Corinth and her colonies followed Greece 
in the PhoBnician wake. AM^t 

It is true that, whether owing to the violent interruption of con- ooMts. 
tinental trade-lines or simply to a change in Greek fashioD, amber 
itself ceased for some centuries to be an important item in Adri- 
atic commerce, and the flourishing times of its import in the 
Mediterranean countries did not revive till the days of the Boman 
Empire, when Aquileia had succeeded Adria as the chief emporium 
of the Gulf. But the trade-route still had its importance to the 
Greeks. The products of the plains of the Po, of the Alps and 
the lands beyond, of the lUyrian wilds, — the slaves and cattle, the ' 
hides and wool and other raw materials, — ^now no doubt, as in later 
times, still made their way by this Adriatic line. On the other 
hand, the discoveries of Greek bronzes and pottery on various 
sites on the Dalmatian, Istrian, and Venetian coasts, in the passes 
of the Alps, the Salzkammergut and Southern Bavaria, WUrttem- 
berg, Switzerland, and even the Hhine valley, stand in direct 
relation to this old Adriatic line, and show that the barbarian 
tribes were learning to value the refined productions of Greek 
art. It was Korkyra, the daughter of Corinth, who first reaped Colonies of 
the full harvest of this trade, and at Apollonia, Dyrrhachion, and ^^^J^**' 
finally in Black Korkyra (now Curzola, Old Slav. Karkar) found 
fresh stepping-stones towards the head of the Gulf. Taras also took TarantiDe 
a leading part, and the evidences of Magna Greecian imports are ^^^the- 
very marked on the ancient sites of the Dalmatian and Istrian terpriBe. 
coasts, and even in the lands beyond the Alps. (See ArchoBohgiaf 
1890, p. 30.) From the numbers of Attic vases found at Adria, 
Felsina (Bologna), and elsewhere in the country about the mouths 
of the Po, it would further appear that Athens too took a direct 
share in this Adriatic commerce. At a later period indeed (325 
B.C., cf. Genthe, oj), cit 104) the Athenians themselves contem- 
plated planting an Adriatic colony for the protection of their trade 
in those waters. 

It was on this artery of commerce that Dionyeios now laid Dionysioe 
hands in the most methodical manner. According to the account ^^riltic 

of Dioddros (xv. 13) his object was simply to secure his communi- trade- 



Adriatic cations with Epeiros on which he had designB of his own. Bather, 
^o^sioB ^^ should be inclined to regard it as part of his general scheme 
for securing control of the Gulf, with which the possession of 
the transit-route between Italy and Greece was necessarily bound 
up. For the would-be lord of the Adriatic two measures were 
before all things needful. One was the establishment of a chain 
of conyenieut stations along the eastern coast ; the other was to 
secure the alliance of one or more of the more powerful com- 
muDities of the Illyrian mainland. It was with this latter object 
in view that in after ages we find Venice constantly allying 
herself with Slavonic Krals and Byzantine Despots of the East 
Adriatic terra firma^ and there can be little doubt that Dionysios' 
alliance with the South Illyrian clans and his attempt to turn 
the Molottis into a protected State were in the main directed 
towards securing a stronger grasp on the mouth of the Adriatic. 
So too at a later date (see p. 204, note i) we read of him de- 
spatching a naval expedition to rescue Korkyra from the hands of 
Athens, still the most dangerous maritime competitor of Syrac^ise 
on that side. 
Points of But the formation of isolated alliances on the Illyrian mainland 
lUvriwtt ^^ ^*® ^^^ ^^ itself sufficient to secure Adriatic dominion. With 
coast the fiords and islands of the Illyrian shores still to a large extent 

toAdrk^io ^ Unchecked possession of piratic tribes, the navigation of Ionian 
dominion, waters was unsafe. The occupation of points of vantage on the 
niyrian coastB and islands has been from time immemorial a 
necessary measure of police for any civilized power engaged in 
those waters. Witness the later experience of the Macedonian kings, 
the long struggles of Rome with the Illyrians from Queen Teuta's 
days onwards, of Venice with the Narentines and Uskoks. 
Colony of In carrying out his schemes in this direction Dionysios found 
"' a welcome ally. The Parians had about the same time, in obedi- 
ence, it is said, to an oracle (Diod. xv. 13. 4), planted the colony 
of Pharos on the isle of Lesina, which in the Slavonic form of 
Hvar still preserves its ancient name. Dionysios from the first 
seems to have assumed a kind of partnership in this enterprise, 
and a combined attack of the Illyrian mainlanders soon gave him 
the opportunity of playing the part of protector to the new settlers. 
This help was forthcoming from a colony which he had already 
established on his own behalf on the same coast, and in whose 
haven his '' Eparch " had collected a naval force sufficient to deal 


a crashing blow at the armada of small craft mustered by the BionysioB' 
barbarians (Diod. xv. 14). The two passages of Diod6ros {^^<jl^^^ 
'3* 3> 14* 2) however which give the name of ''Lissos" to(Lusa). 
Dionysios' foundation have led to much misunderstandiDg, and 
there are good reasons for regarding this as simply due to a 
confusion with the island settlement of Issa, — now Lissa, — ^the Syra- 
cusan colonization of which is vouched for by other evidence. Issa 
moreover stands in a close geographical relation to Pharos, being 
separated from it only by a few miles of sea, whereas Lissos, the 
modem Alessio (Albanian Lesh), is sufficiently remote. 

It is certainly difficult to see with what object Dionysios could Not Lisios 
have planted a colony at Lissos at all. Holm indeed {Gesch. ^ 
SicUiena, ii. 135) brings the occupation of Lissos by Dionysios 
into relation with the assistance rendered by him to Alketas of 
Molottis. But it was too far north to be useful, as Au16n or Apol- 
16nia might have been, for a Molottian campaign. Moreover, 
Diod6ros in two passages (xv. 13. 4; 14. 2) brings the alleged 
foundation of Lissos into direct relation with that of Pharos. 
It must be borne in mind that the chief value of any Adriatic 
settlement to the Syracusan tyrant lay in the advantage it 
offered to his shipping. In this respect Issa is supreme. But 
Lissos, on its height above the mouth of the Drin, could never 
have been a good naval station. Its port — the Nymphseum of 
Csesar (Bell. Civ. iii. 26), now S. Giovanni di Medua — ^is a mere 
anchorage, exposed to the tciroceo, as Caesar himself had occa- 
sion to observe, and as those whose bark has been driven on 
that inhospitable shore are not likely to forget. The river 
itself is only navigable for a short distance, and that for ships 
of small burden. Neither is there anything in the later history 
of Lissos or its existing monuments that can be taken to con- 
firm the view that it ever was a colony of Syracuse. The akro- 
polis of Lissos, or Akrolissos, — the citadel of modem Alessio, — 
which I have had occasion to explore, contains remains of polygonal 
or so-called " Cyclopean " walls of a type known elsewhere on the 
Illyrian coast (see Yon Hahn., Alhanesisehe Studien^ p. 122), but 
no traces are to be found of Hellenic masonry such as was em- 
ployed by Dionysios' builders. The only known coin of Lissos, 
a small bronze piece with the inscription AISSIOTAN struck about 
the beginning of the second century b.o., shows rather Epeirot 
than Syracusan traditions (see Numismatic Chronicle, 1880; Reemi 


Discoveries of lUyrian Coins, p. 271 eeqq. ; the obverse is n head 
of Artemis with her qtdver, misinterpreted he, eit, owing to the 
bad state of the coin; the reverse is a thunderbolt). Down to 
211, when Philip Y. of Macedon captored its rock citadel, Lissos 
seems to have remained an niyrian stronghold. 
l88a(Li8Ba) The claim of Issa to have been the scene of one of Dionysios' 
A^atic ^^^^^<^ plantations rests on the most obvioos geographical as well 
as historical grounds. From its central position the island of 
Lissa has been long recognized by maritime powers as the key 
of the Adriatic. With Bavenna and Pola, it was a principal 
station of the Boman fleet in these waters. In after ages Venice, 
called on to cope with the barbarous Narentines who had revived 
^ the piratic traditions of the old lUyrian tribes, made Lissa one 

of its earliest prizes. At a later date the same considerations 
that had influenced his predecessors moved Captain Hoste, who 
commanded the English squadron sent to oppose Napoleon's admiral 
in Adriatic waters, to make Lissa his principal station. It was 
off Lissa that he gained his brilliant victory over the French 
fleet, as a consequence of which, from 1812 to 1815 the island 
passed formally under English government, and in the days of the 
''Continental System" became as much an outpost of our commerce 
as of our naval power. In more recent times (a.d. 1866) Lissa 
has looked on at the first struggle for Adriatic dominion between 
the fleet of its Austrian possessor and that of new-born Italy. 

To those who know the coast, the open sea to be traversed, and 
the exposed roadstead at the mouth of the Drin, the idea that such 
ready help as was accorded to the Pharians could have come from 
Lissos, or that Lissos would have been a gathering-point for any 
Issean naval expedition, seems in the highest degree improbable. On 
pl^tations ^}^q other hand, Skylax speaks of Issa as the site of a Greek city, 
mainland, expressly linking it with Pharos (23 ; vtos ^dpos vrja-ot 'EXXi;ififf mu 
"lean pfj<ro£ <cal iroKns 'EXKrjviiit avrat), and Skymnos (v. 4 1 4, 4 1 5), 
after significantly citing Timaiof> for the assertion that the neigh- 
bouring Hylloi were barbarized Hellenes, adds ; 

v9<rot gar* aitroin i* ttrnv "laffa Xeyofiimj 

The statement moreover of Strabo (vii. 5. 5) that Tragurion 
(Trail) was a colony of the Isseans (*Icr<rc«i>y la-iafAa), and the further 
notice of Polybios (xxxii. 18) that both that city and Epetion were 
part of their government (/act* avr&p rorroiiivas)^ finds its complement 


in Pliny, iii. 22. 141, who places in the same neighbourhood the 
town " Siculi " (the tnie reading, and not " Sicum/' cf. Mommsen, 
C. I. L. iii. p. 305). Both he and Ptolemy (ii. 16) also speak 
of '' Siculot® " in near connexion with the Naresii who occupied 
theNarenta valley. 

The probability that Diodoros confounded Lissos with Issa has 
been already suggested by C. MuUer (Skylaz, Geographt Minores^ 
30), and this view is accepted by Belooh {L*vm,2)ero SiciUano di 
Diomsio 9, Memorte <Ui Lincei, 188 1). Grotefend's suggestion 
{Zwr Geogr, u, Gesch, von Alt-Italien, iv. 45) that Lissos was 
the true foundation and that Issa was attributed by Skymnos 
to Syracuse by confusion with the mainland town seems altogether 
** preposterous and perverse." 

On Greek inscriptions found at Issa it is perhaps a note- Federal 
worthy fact that the name of Dionysios more than once occurs ^^^^^ 
(cf. C. I. G., 1836, — where the name appears alone and in solitary Pharos, 
prominence at the head of others to which patronymics are at- 
tached; — BuU, di Corr. Arch,, 18571 46; BuU, di Arch, e Sloria 
Dalmata, 1885, ^9)* ^® autonomous coinage of Issa reaches 
back into the first half of the fourth century b. c., and the earliest 
coin-types betray by their style their Syracusan parentage. (See 
Imhoof Blumer, Ntbm. Zeitschr.y 1884, 258.) They exhibit a dol- 
phin beside a youthful head, apparently of a mythical founder, 
whose name is supplied by the accompanying inscription I0NI02. 
It appears from a fragment of Theopompos preserved by Strabo 
(vii. 617) that the name of 'Uvtos was in some special way con- 
nected with Issa (fxciv an6 dvdp69 ^yriaafuvov r&p Ton»v c( "latnii 
^uTJii codd.]), and from the Scholiast to Apollonius Khodius (iv. 
508) we gather that he was the Eponymic founder of the original 
Illyrian settlement on the island, perhaps of that at Pharos as 
well. From the absence, indeed, of the civic name, and from the 
wide extension given to the name I0NI02, — including as it did the 
whole gulf, — we may infer that this was a federal currency in 
which both Issa and Pharos shared. The later coins of Issa, struck 
in its own name, show on the reverse a goat, an obvious symbol 
of alliance with the sister colony, upon whose coin- types the goat 
simply reproduces the monetary badge of the mother city Paros ; 

Apaxjtai Ttd U^puu r&y M<nj/ia rpdyos. 

On the other hand, the laureate head of Zeus that appears on the 
obverse of the Fharian pieces (some of them overstruck on coins 
VOL. IV. q 


reading lONlos) is in all probability taken from the head of Zens 

Eleutherios on fonrth-centnry bronze coins of Syracuse. 

TheVene- Dioddros does not expressly mention the name of any other 

colonized ^^^ planted on these shores by Dionysios, bnt he speaks in a 

by Biony- general way of his founding more than one city ''in the Adriatic " 


(xY. 13 ; Atoyvcrioff . . . tyiw Korh. ritv 'A^piop nSkttt ouufeur). Bat the 
Etymologicftan Magrvwn contains the direct statement (s.y. 'Adpuis) ; 
Atovvaios TuuXias rvpayvos ts irp6r€pov iiri rj . , , *0\vfiirtadi iroXcy cicruT-cy 
*hhpia» €» rf *I«Mie» mSXir^, a^' ijff Koi rh irikayos 'Adpoiff xoXccrcu. 
(So too Tzetzes — ad Lycophr^ 650 seqq. — and cf. Justin, I. 9.) 
By some this foundation has been referred to the southern Hatria 
(now Atri) in Ficenum (e.g. MUller, Etrusker, i. 140, ed. Deecke), 
and Mr. Freeman, when drawing up a map indicating Dionysios' 
possessions, adopted this view. But both its existing remains and 
its geographical position in relation to early trade-lines of the 
Gulf clearly point to the northern Adria, the original name-giver 
Not Hatrn of the Adriatic, as the more probable site of a Greek colony. The 
Q^^ ' Hatria of Ficenum stood away from the sea, and can show no 
antiquity compared to that of the Venetian town. Its coius, 
struck after the Roman conquest of 289 B.C., display a Latin 
Site and epigraphy and a somewhat rude Italic art. The Adria of the 
of AdriL ^^^^^i ^^ ^^® other hand, must in very early times have been 
an emporium of Greek trade. The numerous fragments of Greek 
painted vases discovered on the spot and collected in the local 
Museum (see especially R. Schoeue, Museo Boccki) show that in 
the sixth and fifth centuries before our sera a lively intercourse 
existed between Adria and Athens, of which the further course 
may be traced in the cemeteries of Etruscan Bologna. The 
graffiti ou these vases, moreover, show that already by the middle 
of the fifth century there must have been Greek merchants resident 
in this ancient emporium (Schoene, op, cit p. xii). Secure on its 
island-site, girt by its marshes and its seven lagoons, traversed 
by its canals, Adria was in more ways than one the true fore- 
runner of the later Queen of the Adriatic. Not only was it the 
northern point of embarkation for the early merchandise that 
found its way down the Fo valley and through the Alpine passes, 
but it ofiered just such a safe footing on the borders of the 
barbarian world as was habitually sought by the first Greek 
colonists on distant shores. 

But there are, besides, two definite reasons which lead us to 



identify the Adria that Dionysios is said to have colonized with 
the Venetian port. According to Plutarch (Didn, ii, cf. Holm, 
op, eit^ ii. p. 141), Philistos, when banished by Dionysios I., betook 
himself to friends on the Adriatic, — th r^v *Adpuiv, the same 
form of words as that used by Dioddros, xv. 13, in describing 
Dionysios' colonization. It was on this coast, in fact, that he 
profited by his enforced leisure to write his Histories. Later on, 
when in favour with Dionysios II., we find Philistos acting as 
Syracusan admiral in the Adriatic (Died. xvi. 11. 3; Plutarch, 
JDidn, zxY, xxxv). Now, from a passage of Pliny (H. N. iii. 20; CuiaU of 
cf. Holm, op. eit ii. p. 441) mentioning the faasiones PhUistinae in ^^^^^ 
the neighbourhood of the Venetian Adria it would appear that 
some of its canals were actually due to Philistos. Moreover, a ReiationB 
notice of Strabo (vi. i. 4) affords valuable evidence that the elder o/^^i^jy- 

8108 WltJl 

Dionysios had direct relations with the Veneti at the head of the Veneti. 
Adriatic. It was from here that he procured his race-horses, and 
though the Venetian breed was already not unknown, its great 
celebrity throughout Greece was said to date from Dionysios' time 
(fitrabo, V. I. .4 ; Koi Aioyvcrioff, 6 rrjg SixcXuw rvpavyof, tvrtvBtv (sc. 
t( 'EvfT&y) r6 iinroTp6<l>tov <FVP€<rni<raro t&p affkqrSiv cmrttv, Shot* nxii 
Svofia cy roc; ^EXXiycri y€P€a3ai rrjs 'Eptrutjjf froAXeiar koI n-oXvy ;(/N$voy 

€{tdoKifui<rat t6 ytvot). The connexion of the Keltic Boii with Adria 
(Steph. Byz. s. v., cf. Hesych. s. v.) further suggests that this may 
have been one of the sources whence Dionysios drew his Gaulish 

Adria was the natural terminus of the maritime trade-route 
down the Adriatic, and it may be reasonably asked why Dionysios 
should have taken the trouble to colonize a half-way station like 
Issa if he did not at the same time secure a foothold at the head 
of the Gulf) 

The old Adriatic line of maritime trade lay, as already pointed Land-route 
out, along the island-g^uarded eastern coast, and the central ^j^ ^ 
channels of this route were secured by Dionysios' plantation at Issa TarM. 
and the sister colony of Pharos. The opposite Italian coast from 
Ancona to Brundisium being exposed and comparatively harbour- 
less was little fitted for the coasting course of early navigation. 
^ The important line of traffic on this side was the land-route from 
Pelsina (Bologna) to Taras (Taranto) which Dionysios had less 
-occasion to hold. But ports like that of Brundisium always bad 
their importance, and from the fact that Philistos when lying in 


RelaiionB vait for Didn made use of the lapygian harbours (Plui Di6n, 
^^^ Py* xxv) it is probable that this and other tribes of the heel of Italy 
Citiee ^^ enrolled themselves amongst the allies of Dionysios L We 
founded in are further told by Dioddros (zvi. 5, and of. xvi. 10) that the 
Dionynof 7^^^^^^^ Dionysios founded two cities in Apulia to secure the 
II. passage of the Ionian straits, then infested by pirates {Korh dc 

TTpf *Aw€v\laM duo fr6k€is tisrwt, pov\6fiitwo£ atnfxikfj rots nkioun r^ 
*l6vtop v6p€» iTOi^O'cu* o2 yap rrfp frapa^akarnaif olxovPTis fidpfiapM Xff^ 
OTplo'i froXXois irXcoirrcff cbrXour rcSs 4fiir6pou vapiCKivaCop frSurap rijw 
W9p\ t6p 'AdpMiy Bakarrap). At a later date we find Agathoklte 
supplying the lapygians and Peuketians with piratical vessels to 
prey on their Greek neighbours (Diod. xxi. 4 ; cf. Horsemen 
of Tarenhimj p. 137). Holm (op. eii, ii. 158) confflders that the 
colonies of Dionysios II. played a very important part in the 
HeUenization of Apulia, which made great progress in the fourth 
century b.c. He seeks a record of Dionysios' plantation in the 
free horse on the coins of Arpi and Salapia, — a type common to 
Syracuse and the Campanians of Sicily, — and would in the same 
way explain the appearance of the Syracusan type of Persephond 
(taken from the "Medallions" of Euanetos) on the didrachms of 
Arpi, though this latter seems to be rather directly due to Agatho- 
kleian influence. There are reasonable grounds for supposing that 
the incorporation of Apulia in their Sicilian empire was the ultimate 
aim of the Dionysian dynasty. Syracuse was to have anticipated 
Wae Na- Numana {Novpawa) in Picenum has been sometimes reckoned 
col^y^of ft^^'^S ^^® Adriatic colonies of the elder Dionysios, but this is 
Dionysios 1 very doubtfrd. The only evidence on which the assertion has 
been made is the statement of Pliny (iii. 18) that it was founded 
by the " Siculi," and this has been taken to mean the Sikeliote 
Greeks of Dionysios. But there were traditions of aboriginal 
Siefdi in Central and even Northern Italy at a very early date, 
as for instance in Latium and Liguria, and Pliny here, as else- 
where, is certainly referring to these (see too Holm, op. cU., ii p. 
441). Thus in the succeeding chapter (iii. 19) he mentions that 
the Siculi and Libumi held many regions of the country beyond 
Ancona, then included in Gallia Togata, and adds, ^^Umbri eos 
expulere, hos Etruria, banc Galli." 

What value Numana could have had to Dionysios it is difficult 
to see. The port of Ancona however, in the ayKmp or " bent arm'' 


between two promontories, must have always played an important Anocma 
part in Adriatic navigation. It is in fact the nearest and most f^l^^^^ 
convenient crossing-point from the Blyrian island-chain. As such ooians. 
it must have been marked by the Syracusan merchantmen, and 
though not mentioned amongst the colonies of Dionysios, he seems 
at least to have been the indirect cause of its becoming a Syra- 
cusan settlement. Strabo (v. 4. 2) in enumerating the towns of 
Picenum calls Ank6n, — the " Dorioa Ancon" of Juvenal (iv. 40), — 
" a Greek city founded by Syracusans who had fled from the 
tyranny of Dionysios." Miiller {Etrutker^ ed. Deecke, L 140) 
considers Strabo's account a perversion due to hatred of the 
tyrant ; and the Syracusan occupation of Ancona certainly looks 
as if it had been part of Dionysios' far-reaching plans of Adriatic 


{By the Editor) 

The Finance and Coinage of the Eldeb Dionysiob. 

Finandal BoTH direct historical tradition and the evidence of numismatics 

mentsof*' P^^"^* ^ ^^® fact that Dionysios, in spite of the commanding position 

DionyrioB. that he achieved, was continually in financial difficulties. To 

understand this state of affairs it is before all things necessary to 

remember the circumstances amidst which the tyrant first came to 

Wide- the fore. The rapid growth of Syracuse itself must not make us 

rui^ forget* for a moment that the new Syracusan power rose amidst the 

Sicily and ruins of the flourishing Greek communities of Sicily, partly, it may 

' ^^y-' be added, on their asheff. Akragas, once the rival of Syracuse itself 

in wealth and grandeur, Himera and Selinous in the West, Messana 

on the East had been utterly overthrown by the Cartha^nian, 

Naxos and Kataud by Dionysios himself. Gela and Kamarina 

lived on as shadows of themselves. Leontinoi was absorbed in 

the ruling city. The capture of Motya by Dionysios, though its 

political value was transient, must have wrought lasting injury 

to Sicilian commerce as a whole. On the Italian side the ravages 

of the Lucanians in one direction, and the ruthless destruction of 

Oreek cities by Dionysios himself on the other, had produced 

Eifecto of a similar effect. Lokroi, hitherto of subordinate commercial im- 

^^^ portance, was iadeed aggrandized, but Kaul6nia, if we may judge 

by its coinage a much richer city, was overthrown; so was the 

still more impoiiant emporium of Rblgion, and the fall of Krot6n 

followed. The capture of Poseid6nia and Laos by the Lucanians 

not only wiped out two flourishing centres of Greek industry, but 

placed the land-line of commerce between the Ionian and Tyrrhene 

seas-opened up three centuries before by Sybaris— in barbariaa 

hands. The methodical seizure of the Adriatic trade-route by 

Dionysios may have been a partial set-off against the prevailing 


commercial depression, bat its fruits could not be gathered in 
at once. 

On the other hand, the continual wars in which Dionysios was Extrava- 
engaged, the colossal development that he gave to the Syracusan Sf *®*^''" 
navy, his elaborate equipments and artillery, his vast schemes of DioDysioa. 
fortification, such as that actually carried out on the ' Island ' and 
EpipoUe and the still greater undertaking left unfinished on the 
isthmus of Squillace, the market-halls and public buildings with 
which he embellished his capital, his palace at Kh^on, the 
gorgeous Theories with which, as on the memorable occasion at 
Olympia, he sought to dazzle the rest of Greece, — all these and 
other exercises of his power and ambition brought with them a 
vast and continuous outlay. But above all, Dionysios' wholesale Pecuniary 
employment of mercenaries on a Carthaginian or Asiatic scale of h^mer- 
needed a constant supply of ready money. For' many purposes oenarieB. 
indeed forced or slave labour and the financial tricks, about which 
so many anecdotes have been preserved, might serve his purpose. 
But the mercenaries, at least, must be paid in hard cash, — the 
Oreeks and Campanians in current coin ; the Gkiuls and Iberians 
at any rate in precious metals. 

That Dionysios succeeded in amassing from one source or another Outlay on 
vast hoards we know. In 402, especially, when intent on his great ^^^^tifi- 
Bchemes for the armament and fortification of Syracuse and the cation of 
development of his navy, we find him attracting by his high offers ^7™°^"®' 
of pay the best engineers and artisans of the day from every part 
of Greece and Italy, and encouraging the inventors of new engines of 
destruction by numerous gifts and prizes (Diod. xiv. 41, 42). The 
elaborate costliness of the arms then made to suit the customs of 
the various nations enrolled among his mercenary bands gives us 
some measure of the expenses thus incurred. Tet even after this, — on naval 
as we should have supposed,— exhaustive effort, which included the ^^ ^~ 
walling-roimd of Epipoke and the building of the biggest war-galleys, 
— the Fentekonters, — ^that the ancient world had yet known, we 
find him, on the occasion of the Carthaginian invasion of 397, with 
a sufficient reserve in his coffers to spend large sums in enrolling 
Feloponnesian mercenaries (Diod. xiv. 62 ; cn-cfiV^e dc ml ^yoX<^v( 
elff IlcXoin^yyi/a'oi' yutrh iroXXtty xP^V^^^ €VT€i\dfi€vos m irXc/oTov9 oBpoiCiUf 

What facilities, then, had Dionysios for drawing such supplies f 
The wholesale confiscation at Syracuse itself, the plunder of Naxos, 


YarioTis Eatafid, and other Greek or Sikel cities might sapplj him for 

sources of ^ ^hiie, as, later, the sack of Motya. But, except when he found 
such opportunities for actual plunder, there was little left for him 
in Sicily on which to draw. The bulk of the Sikeliot cities had 
already been overthrown by the Carthaginian. The condition of 
Sicily and a large part of Greek Italy was, as we have seen, 
ruinous, and the mere aggregation of transplanted citizens of other 
towns within the walls of Syracuse could not counterbalance the 
annihilation of centre after centre of former wealth and industry. 
Dionysics in short had been living on his capital, and when the 
sources of plunder which had been open to him during the earlier 
years of his reign were once exhausted he must inevitably have 
been reduced to great financial straits. Even the 300 talents paid 
him by Himilk6n (Diod. xiv. 75) as the price of the safe withdrawal 
of the Carthaginians after their defeat of 397 could have at best 
afforded a temporary relief. 

That the extravagant expenditure required by his government 
coupled with the exhaustion of supplies produced, at least during 
the later period of his reign, their inevitable effect we have more 
than one piece of evidence. 

Plunder of The hard measure meted out to Greek cities by Dionysios 
le^ was no doubt largely prompted by his fiscal necessities. At Motya 

dtizens. this took another form, tmd was shown by the tyrant's anxiety 
to stop the slaughter of the inhabitants that he might be able to 
secure their price in the slave market, in addition to the vast loot 
of gold and silver taken there (Diod. xiv. 53 ; Atovvcrior dc /SovXd- 

Extortion orpariayraff rov ff>ov€Uw rovi a2;(fiaXcorovff). By the date of his capture 

from Rhfr- ^£ Rh6gion his necessities had probably increased, and according to 
Aristotle {(Ekon, ii. 20. 7) he succeeded by a shameless device in 
securing the value of his human spoil twice over. First he made 
the citizens ransom themselves at the price of three mtTiaa a head \ 
a usual prisoner's ransom (see Boeckh, StaatshaushalPung, 1886 ed. 
i. 89). Next, having thus extracted their hidden hoards he neverthe- 
less proceeded after the receipt of the money to sell the wretched 
citizens as slaves. 

Another aspect of the desperate financial straits in which 
Dionysios was continually finding himself is to be found in his 
repeated robberies of the temples and images of the Gk)ds, of which 

^ Dioddros (xiv. iii) makes it a single mina. 


instances have been given above (see p. 197, and note). He paid for Plunder of 
an Italian expedition by plundering the temple of the Lakinian ^^^°^P^^- 
H6ra; one motive at least of his intervention in Blyria and Epeiros 
was to secure half-barbaric allies to anticipate the Gauls in a raid 
on the temple of Delphi. To indemnify himself for the failure of 
this adventure, and to secure the sinews of war for a new campaign 
against the Carthaginians, he made his piratical descent on the 
shrine of Pyrgoi. Oolden robes and tables of offering, plate and 
jewellery, the golden parts of chryselephantine images, the wreaths 
and Victories of precious metal in the hands of Qods, — nothing 
came amiss to his melting-pot, and sacrilegious plunder became to 
Dionysios a regular source of revenue. 

It cannot then surprise us when we find that in dealing with Fiscal 
his own subjects, Dionysios resorted to severe taxation and extra- J^^^*^ 
ordinary fiscal expedients. For ordinary revenue it is probable (see 
Holm, 6e9ch. SteUiens, ii. 145) that, like later Syracusan sovereigns, 
he took to himself the custom's dues and the tithes of the crops. 
He introduced a cattle-tax, which weighed so heavily on owners 
that they preferred to slaughter their beasts wholesale. Dionysios 
therefore limited the number slaughtered to the day's demand of 
the meat market. The cattle-owners preferred to sacrifice their 
beasts to the Qods, on which the tyrant forbade the sacrifice of 
female animals (Arist. (Ekon, ii. 20. 5). As another means for 
securing ready money he made himself official guardian of all 
orphans, and confiscated the incomings of the estates thus usurped 
till such time as his wards came of age (Arist. op. cU. ii. 2. 6 ; 
irdkw re dfiT^iff xPtf^^^ iKtKtvtrtp innypct^tr&cu xpfuwra vp6s (tMif 
&roc olKf^ thrnf SfHfxanKoi' airoypwfrafUviMf 6i ^XXdov n& rovroop xrif*^"'^ 
AirtxpoTo M»ff MaoTor tlr fjkuciaw TK6<h). This example was imitated by 
Agathokl^s (Died. xx. 4). Dionysios also levied ship-money in his Shi|>- 
own name, but he first levied the desired tax in a tentative way fts,[|^^^j[ 
if to establish a kind of constitutional precedent. Summoning the 
Assembly he informed them that a city was about to be handed ' 
over to him, but that money was needed for the purpose (Arist. 

op, eii, ii. 20. 2 ; Tpwjp€is rt vavnr/ytiadai fuXX^v j^det ^i dc^troiro 
j(pirifidr^p, 'Eiafktiirtap o^ avpoyayi^y ^hffti irdXiy avrf rtvh vpodilh<r$ai tls 
fyf butrBoi xp^porwff ff^iou rt avrf roitt iroKlras tla-tveyKot dvo aranjpat 
tmMrroy). The money was brought, but Dionysios, after letting a 
few days pass, as if to show that the afiair had fallen through, 
returned their contributions to the citizens. But needing the 


money to build his triremes all the same he again levied the tax, 
this time apparently in his own name. The citizens paid the 
money with readiness, thinking it would be again returned, but 
WM>taxe8. this time Dionysios kept it for his ship-building. He also levied 
extraordinary war-taxes. On one occasion the citizens refused to 
pay on the plea that their funds were exhausted. Dionysios 
accepted their plea, and at once gave orders that his own household 
possessions should be sold to supply the required sum. The 
Syracusans, we are told, not seeing the snare set for them, bought 
up the tyrant's goods. The money was paid, but the purchases 
were claimed with it (Arist. op, cU. iL 20. 4; eiret dc r^v rifuip 
Kurf/SoXoy, ^kcXcvcc t6 <rKtvof aim(l>€p€t» tKoorw b rfy6paa'€v). 
Heavy tax- The weight of Dionysios' taxation may be judged from Aristotle's 
ncuMi statement that in five years the citizens paid him the whole of their 
capital, — in other words, that they paid him at the rate of twenty 
per cent, per annum {Pol. v. 9. 5 ; Koi ^ tl^n^piL r&v rtk&v oiow iv 
IvpoKOwratt* iv iren-c yap Zrttrip im /^ioinnriov rrjp oiHrioM anavav ciir- 

tmfpoxivoi trvvipauftv). The same exactions continued under his 
successor, and when Dion entered Syracuse he found the citizens 
had not the money, even if they had had the will, to pay his faithful 
band of Feloponnesian mercenaries (Diod. xvi. 17; xPVf^^^ ovapi' 

Financial In view of the universal ruin, the great expenditure of Dionysios, 
of^on?^ and the desperate financial expedients to which he had recourse, it 
Bio0 react is natural to suppose that the tyrant's necessities would have left 
aeeT"*" *^®^ mark on the Syracusan coinage. 

That as a matter of fact this was the case we have more than 
one direct piece of historical evidence. By numismatists, indeed, 
the reign of Dionysios has been generally supposed to have been 
the most brilliant and prolific period of the Syracusan coinage 
(cf. Head, Coinage of SyracuM^ p. 20), and from one point of view 
this conclusion may seem natural enough. For, as regards the 
precious metals, the coinage of Syracuse had now become the only 
coinage for the whole of Greek Sicily, and even for the toe of 
Italy. The other great cities of this region had been either wiped 
out or reduced to a subject condition, and the coinage of the once 
prolific mints of Akragas and Qela, Selinous and Himera, of 
Hessana, Naxos, Katand and Kamarina, breaks off suddenly about 
the end of the fifth century, only to be partially renewed in inferior 
metal at a later time. The coinage of Lokroi had not yet b^un ; 


fih^gion had temporarily at least ceased to exist as a city ; so had 
Kaiil6nia ; Krot6ii itself was in Dionysios' hands. 

The Syracnsan coinage thus stood alone. And in a way this Synonsan 
solitary ascendancy of the Syracnsan mint worthily asserted itself ^^ 
in the beauty and splendour of the coins themselves. The new 
issne of gold pieces of the superior value of fifty and one hundred 
lUras, though it had begun during the years that immediately 
succeeded the Athenian siege, and before the seizure of the 
Tyranny by Dionysios, continued at least during the earlier period 
of his reign. There are good grounds for believing that the silver The silYer 
fifby-litra pieces or dekadrachms, the revived Ddmareteia^ ^®^® drachma 
originally struck on the institution of the Assinarian (James (see or " medal- 
A. J. Evans, Syracnsan MedaUiana, &c., p. 141 seqq., and Sicily y jj^^^^^ 
vol. iii. p. 719 seqq.), but it is to the time of Dionysios that the 
finest of those executed by the famous monetary artist, Eusenetos, 
must in all probability be referred (see Fl. I. fig. i). 

These magnificent pieces seem to have been in such repute IJBed as 
among the mercenary bands employed on either side in Sicily ?^^tJ^^ 
that, on a reduced scale, they served as models for the later Oartha- giniansand 
ginian ' camp-coinage ' in the Island. Their imitation by Pelopon- ^*"®'"' 
nesian cities like Mess6n6 and Fheneos is also perhaps not un- 
connected with the large sums expended by Dionysios in the hire 
of Peloponnesian mercenaries (Diod. xiv. 62, &c.), and the same 
tribute to the medallic work of his gpreat artist Euaenetos at Kn6sos 
and Fherse may contain a hint of the employment of Cretan 
bowmen and Thessalian slingers. But though the hirelings of 
Dionysios continued to be paid in part at least with his fine 
fentS^cntciUtrOy there is the clearest evidence that the tyrant's 
hoards were for the most part composed ndt of the new minted 
Syracnsan pieces but either of the earlier civic issues or of imported 
foreign coins. 

The present writer has shown (op. cit) in some detail, and from Intorrap- 
a variety of converging evidence, that the prolific ^^ra^^'*®^™ ^^ rilver' 
coinage of Syracuse suddenly breaks o£f about the end of theinaea. 
fifth century. It may indeed be confidently stated, extraordinary 
as the phenomenon may appear, that no tetradrachms or silver 
pieces of smaller denomination are known of this period as late 
in style as the jpen^ikontdlUra of Eussnetos, which seem to have 
formed the sole silver coinage of Dionysios during a great part of 
his reign. In the great hoards of this period that from time to time 


have come to light on Sicilian soil, freshly struck pent^korUalitra 
or " medallions " have been found in associadon with Syracusan 
tetradrachms of earlier style, and showing traces of wear, though 
newly coined pegasi of Coiinth and her colonies and brilliant tetra- 
drachms of the Carthaginian camp-coinage accompanied the same 
deposits. Dionysios, it will be seen, extorted from his subjects the 
hoards that they had laid by in happier times and, having no motive 
to recoin what was current money, used it for his own purposes. 

But, apart from this, his supply of bullion was not more than 
sufficient for the coinage of his great peni^kontalttra, and it is 
doubtful whether, during the last years of his reign, even this 
issue was continued. The activity of his great engraver Eusenetos 
cannot with any probability be brought down later than 385 b.g., 
nor would his dies have lasted for many years after that date. 
Alleged tin But this cessation of the fine tetradrachm series about 400 B.G. 
DioD^os. ^^i^^^^^ ^ ^^^ Hght on some notices preserved by Aristotle and 
Julius Pollux as to Dionysios* monetary expedients. We learn 
from these sources (Arist. (Ekon. ii. 20, and Pollux, ix. 79) that, 
being in want of money (ovx tv9rop»y dpyvpiov) and having levied 
a forced loan for the construction and equipment of his fleet, — 
this, no doubt, refers to his colossal armament of 402 b.g., — he 
repaid it by forcing on his creditors tin coins of the nominal value 
of four draehtncB, but which in reality were only worth one. This 
distinct statement that Dionysios struck debased '< tetradrachms " 
of tin or base metal affords an explanation of the fact that the 
Diioovery series of Syracusan silver tetradrachms now breaks off! Although 
deklr T^ojie of their tin or debased metal substitutes are now known 
drachm, to exist, a recent discovery has now revealed the existence of 
a debased imitation of a silver dekadrachm or " medallion" belonging 
to this period, and in all probability executed by Dionysios^ orders. 
The piece in question is of bronze, which has originally been washed 
over with tin, and the coin, so far from being an inferior imitation 
of the work of the great monetary artist who then had charge of 
the Syracusan Mint, seems to be from a die specially executed for 
the purpose by the hand of Eusenetos himself. A slight variation 
is perceptible in detail, but the style is that of the master, and 
warrants us in supposing that this debased coinage was officially 
issued by the Syracusan Mint in obedience to the tyrant's orders. 
(See my New Lights an the Moneiarf/ Frauds of Dionysios, Num. 
Chron. 1894.) 


Another monetary expedient of DionysioB is recorded, about Value of 
which numismatic evidence has been hitherto lacking. Aristotle JJ^I^^ *' 
{(Ekon, ii. 20) says that, having on another occasion borrowed raised, 
money from the citizens, he countermarked the coins in such 
a way as to double their legal value, and repaid his debt in the 
newly stamped coins, every drachm of silver thus standing for 

From another notice of Aristotle it appears probable that it was Reduction 
in Dionysios' time that the old Sicilian talent of twenty-four ^^JJj"*^ 
fwummoi was reduced to twelve (Poll. ix. 87 ; r^ /uvrtH iiKtkucbp 
r6iKarroif *\dxiorov toxvcp, t6 fUv dpxtuop, «»r *ApurroT€Xff£ Xcyvi, rirrapas 
Mu cucocri rovs yov^/xovr, r^ dc wrrtpov duttdcica, dvvacr^ai dc rhv vovfifutv 
rpia fffjuofiSKta), This passage has given rise to very various inter- 
pretations. Mommsen {Gesch. des rom. Mimzwesens, 50; ed. 
Blacas, i. 103) on the strength of Pollux' assertion that the noun^ 
moe was equivalent to one and a half obol, assumes that the 
Sicilian noummos was identical with the litra which Pollux else- 
where (ix. 80) equates with the Jilginetan obol ' (= one and a half 
Attic obol). But inasmuch as the Sicilian talent is known, both 
from Diod6ros (xi. 26) and the great Tauromenitan Inscriptions 
(C. I. G. 5640, 5641), to have contained 120 UtraSf Mommsen 
concludes that Aristotle's ''old Sicilian talent" of twenty-four 
noummoi had been preceded by an earlier talent of 120 naufnmai : 
and that therefore a reduction of the talent to one-fifth had 
already taken place. Finally, he brings Aristotle's reference to 
the reduction of the tetradrachms by Dionysios to one quarter of 
their value by his issue of base metal coins into direct relation 
with this reduction of the talent. In this he is followed by 
Hultsch {Or. u. rim. Metrologie, 663), Head {Coins of Syracuse^ 
13), and others. 

But, as Holm justly points out {Oesch. Sieiliena, ii. 445), the two 
passages in Pollux, ix. 79 and ix. 87, refer to quite different 
transactions, and the coinage of "tin" tetradrachms ont-fou/rth 
the value of the silver can in any case have nothing to do with 
a supposed reduction of the silver talent to a fifth of its former 
value. To suppose that by the ''old Sicilian talent" Aristotle 
could have simply meant a greatly reduced talent which only 
lasted a few years of Dionysios' reign, is to place an altogether 

^ In itself an inaocurate itatement, at a Sicilian litra ^^ one and a fifth 
Attic obol. 




value of 

Beduciion unwarrantable constmciion on his words. We have simply to 

of Sidliaa ^^j ^^|j ^ reduction of the old talent by one-half, namely, from 

twenty-four to twelve noutnmoi, and it is only the statement that 

the fummmos and litra were identical that is at fault. The Sicilian 

talent, as we know from other sources, originally contained twenty- 

, / four drackmcB, and it is preferable to conclude that the noummos 

. \ of Syracuse was in Aristotle's time a drachma. 

The statement of Pollux and Aristotle, then, amounts to this, 
that whereas the Sicilian talent had hitherto contained twenty-four 
drachmoe^ it was now reduced to twelve, or to one-half its former 
value. But we know from the great Tauromenitan inscriptions 
that for purposes of reckoning this reduced talent continued to 
be divided into 120 lUraa of account. A drachma therefore 
contained ten litrcu of account, though it still represented only 
five silver litras. (See Num. Chron. 1894, New LxghU, &c.) 

This reduction of the Sicilian talent, which there is every reason 
to refer to Dionysios, though it has nothing to do with his debased 
tetradrachm coinage, corresponds very closely with the monetary 
expedient already referred to by which the nominal value of every 
drachma was doubled. The redaction of the talent to half its 
former value would, as we have seen, have had precisely this 
effect. And in view of this coincidence of cause and effect it 
seems possible to attach a new meaning to Aristotle's statement 
that Dionysios, having stamped the coin in a certain way, repaid 
his creditors in coin every drachma of which had acquired the ficti- 
tious value of two drachmae. For we have seen that the coinage 
of Syracusan tetradrachms had been stopped by Dionysios, and that 
as a consequence of this the Corinthian staters of ten litraa — each 
equivalent to an Attic didrachm — ^became the almost exclusive 
currency of Syracuse and Greek Sicily. Supposing, then, that Dio- 
nysios had borrowed money of the old Syracusan stamp, and after 
reducing the value of the talent by one-half had repaid his creditors 
in imported 2)egasi which, though only didrachms, now had the 
same legal value as was formerly possessed by tetradrachms, a 
very slight perversion of the transaction would explain Aristotle's 
statement. And, in the absence of any countermarked Syracusan 
coins of this period, such as Aristotle's words, taken literally, seem 
to imply, we are almost bound to look for some such explanation. 
Fegasi, however, do not seem to have been struck by the Syra- 
cusan mint itself till Di6n's time (see Syr. Meda. 157).] 


B.C. 367-317*- 

*" rilHE great power of the elder Dionysios, the greatest Situation 

I ... ^'^ *^® 

-■- power, as it is emphatically said, in Europe ^, now death of 

the elder 

passed to the weaker hands of his son. The father had Dionymos. 

done great things, even if they were largely evil things. 

He had changed the old face of Sicily, and had thereby 

gone far towards changing the face of the whole Greek 

world. He had given Syracuse, as the capital of a ruler, 

a position such as Athens herself had hardly held as a 

commonwealth bearing rule over other commonwealths. 

He had done greater things against barbarians in their 

own land than any Greek leader had done before him. 

Yet, besides the loss of political freedom in his own and Career of 


other cities, he had on the whole done more against prejudicial 

. to Greek 

the Greek nation than for it. In his very first dealings nation, 
he had helped the Carthaginians to win more than he 
could ever win back from them. In Sicily itself he had 
destroyed some Greek cities and peopled others with 

^ From Story of Sicily, 197; "Our chief authorities now are still the 
nairative of Dioddroe and Plutarch's Lives of Didn and Timoledn. Plu- 
tarch is commonly the fuller. There are also Latin lives of both by 
Cornelius Nepoe. Something may be learned from the letters attributed 
to Plato, with the cautions already given.*' 

* From Story of Sicily, p. 197 seqq. 

' Diod. xvi. 9 ; fuyl<mf¥ twaarucaf rSiv icard r^ Eibpwrrir, 


CHAP. XI. barbarians. He had sacrificed several Italiot towns to the 

advancement of one^ and he had decidedly helped towards 

DionyaioB barbarian advance in Italy. It is only in his most distant 

Siciliaa enterprises, in his comparatively obscure Hadriatic colonies^ 

Greeks that he at all enlarged the borders of Hellas. His career 

tended, on the whole^ to a great lessening, not only of 

Sicilian freedom, but of Sicilian prosperity. From his 

time the Sicilian and Italian Greeks began to find that 

Interven- they could not stand alone. The main feature of the times 

Greece now that followed, for about a hundred years beginning with 

sought. the reign of his son, is the constant intercourse between 

Old Greece and the Greeks of Italy and Sicily. That 

intercourse takes a new shape. The Greeks of Italy and 

Sicily are ever sending to Old Greece for help against 

domestic tyrants, against barbarian enemies, or against 

Suocession both together. A succession of deliverers go forth, some 

liverers. of them to do great things. But we shall presently have 

to distinguish between the republican leader who goes out 

simply to deliver, and the prince who does indeed work 

deliverance, but who thinks that he has a right to reign 

over those whom he delivers. 

Feeble "The history of the younger Dionysios illustrates the 

character « t r>i 

of Diony- nature of the Greek tyrannies in many ways. As in many 

aioe II. 

other cases, what the &ther won the son lost. The tyrant's 
son, bom, as the phrase is, in the purple, was commonly 
a weaker man than his father. And the elder Dionysios, 
in his extreme jealousy of everybody, had kept his son 
shut up in his palace, and allowed him no share in political 
or military affairs ^. He was not without ability or with- 

[} The young Dionysios seems to have amosed himself in his sednsion 
with turner's and carpenter's work, making little carts and lamps, tables 


out tendencies to good ; but he w&s in eveiy way weaker ohap.xi. 
than his father. Not having his father's strength of Elder and 


porpose, he was easily impressed both for good and f or Dienyuoe 


eviL He was less crael^ because less determined, than his 
father^ but^ for the same reason, he fell into the vices 
from which his father was free. It is a characteristic 
story that the old Dionyrios found his son in an intrigue 
with another man's wife. He rebuked his son, and asked 
if he had ever heard of his doing anything of that kind. 
' No ; but then your father was not tyrant/ * And your 
son never will be tyrant, if you do such things ^.' The 
new tyrant could be base too in other ways on occasion. 
He was the son of his father's Lokrian wife Ddris, and 
was about twenty-five years old at his accession. He was Acoenion 

of Diony- 

acknowledged, perhaps as general with full powers, by bIob n. 

• A ratified by 

some kind of vote of an assembly which had no will of Msembly. 
its own'. He then gave his father a splendid fmieral 
and a tomb, contrary to Greek practice, in the Island'. 
The elder Dionysios, at the time of his death, was at 

and chairs. (Plat. Didn, ix ; *0 var^p 9t9oiieibs /n^ ^potf^/mTOf lurakafi^ 
seai <rvyy€v6/uros rovr ixovatv iar^pinfwi kwtfiovXtvffttw ttbrf teat mpikotro 
rijiif dpx4*'> i^poiiptt KarfiK\tiarw oUot, 8i* iptjfdtv biuKiat Mpca mi 
dwttpi^ irpayft&TCJWf &s ^offiv^ Af*&(ta not XvxWas int U^fovs ^vhSyom tmt 
rpcHr4(as rcxrair^/icvor. It is eharaotenstic of his meohanical bent that his 
chief recorded monument at Syracuse was a lofty sundial (see below, 
p. a6i).] 

\} Pint Beg. et Imperat Apopth. ; Elir^rrot 9^ rod rwpltfKov, S& 7d/» 
oOm c7x<t waT4pa rvpayrw, (M^ cb, tttw, vl6v l^cis, ^ f<j^ wadtrp ravra 

[* Diod. XT. 74; ^ 82 Aion$<riOf 6 v€^€pot StaZ^^A/t/tvot Ti)y rvpanflla 
9fSrrw rd vX^Ay aviwy9rfinf cit kiucXiiaiaaf waptit&Ktat roiV chc^loit X6jiK% 
TtipHV Ti)y 'uarfOfwapiAvrw irpdf adrdr cvvoiay. This summoning of the 
Eodesia shows that certain constitutional forms were still observed under 
the Tyrannis (see Supplement I. p. 213).] 

[' lb. ; cvtira rhv varipa futyaXovpiwws B&pai mrd r^ dicp^okir, ir^t 
reus fiaeiXlai KaXovpuvtus in$Aai$, ^ff^aXicaro rd /rard ri^yipx^*] 




oHAP.zi. war with both CarthagmianB and Lucanians. The new 
Peace con« tyrant presently made peace with both\ The Halykos 


with Car- again became the frontier between his power and that of 


Lucaniam. Carthage. In Italy he is said to have founded two new 
towns on the coast of Apulia K Otherwise he simply kept 
his &ther's dominion^ without extending it or doing any- 
thing memorable in any way. 

of Diony- 

sioB n. 




§ 1. Didn. 

'' Under a tyranny^ above all where the tyrant is weak 
and needs guidance^ family and personal relations, marriages^ 
and the power of men whom we may call ministers^ become 
of importance^ just as they do among lawful princes. 
Two men specially stand out during the reign of the 
younger Dionysios. The historian Philistos^ who had had 
so great a hand in setting up the power of his &ther, was 
recalled from exile^ either at the beginning of his reign 

{} Died. zri. 5 ; Aujif^ios 6 rw XopoKocUtw n&paypot 6 vUrr^pof . • . dvpcue- 
rof ^ Kot wokb rod varpbs icaTaJki<rT€poi, wpoanrxnuro Ikk r^v impa'^v 
dprfvue^ ^Cvai icat wp^os rdr Tpimw, hUmtp wp6s Eapxf^oyiovt SiodcScy- 
fUpos rhv w6\€fun^, wp6s re to6tovs tlpifftnpr awiStro «a2 irpds Atv/nyobSf 
6/ioicn 9tioaro\tfjt^<r€a dpyus M riva j(p6voVp ml reus tcXcvtcUcus /ti&xatt M 
Tov vportp^ftaros yw6fi«woSt AafUvcn wp6t ahro^ Kar^kicaro t6v w6ktfio9^. 
On the question of peace with Carthage Dionydoa, according to Plutarch 
(Didn, vi), consulted a council of hia friends. On this occasion Didn 
had proposed to carry the Carthaginian war into Africa. J. Zenaes (2>e 
JHonyBio Minors Syraeusanorum tyranno, 15, n. 6, of. Holm, op. dt. ii. 
45a) gives reasons for supposing that the Punic, like the Lucanian war, 
dragged on awhile. Plutarch (Didn, ziv) refers to a continued state of 
war with Carthage, and (in c. xvi) a war is again mentioned, but with 
whom is not stated. Zenses thinks that the Punio war continued to 
364 B. 0.] 

' [See Supplement U. p. a 38. A still more important colonial undertaking, 
however, of the younger Dionysios, was his partial restoration of Bhdgion 
under the name of Phoibia (Strabo, vi. i ; ftipot ri rmi in'iff/MTO$ Ai^aXafiify 

Di6n advisee op DIONTSIOS II. 243 

or somewhat later ^. He was now an old man, bat lie chap.zi. 
was still vigorous, and he was attached to the system of x 
the elder tyrant. The other was Didn, the brother of Didn. 
Dionysios' Syracusan wif e Aristomachfi. His father, Hip- 
parinos^ had had a hand in setting up the tyranny. 
AristomachS had two sons^ much younger than Dionysios^ 
and two daughters^ Sdphrosyng and Aretfi — mark the 
tyrant's choice of names for his children — who were married, 
the one to her half-brother Dionysios^ the other to her 
imcle Dion. It was only marriage with a sister by the 
mother's side which was a sin against Greek feelings. 
Didn was enriched and favoured by the elder tyrant, and 
was largely employed by him in public affairs, specially 
in embassies to Carthage '. He was an able man and a 
good soldier^ stem and haughty in manner^ yet capable of 
winning influence^ strict in lif e^ and with a tendency to 
philosophical speculations. He had had a hand in bringing 
Plato to Sicily in the days of the elder Dionysios. Now Didn'a^ 


that the younger tyrant had succeeded and he himself notions of 
stood high in his confidence^ he hoped to work great things ment. 
by the help of his favourite philosophy. He had no 
thought of restoring the old democratic constitution, which 
was by no means according to Platonic notions. But he 
wished to make Dionysios rule well instead of ill^ and 
even to turn him from a tyrant into something like a 

[} Plat. Didn, zi ; ol 82 rf hiv¥% woXt/wtyrtt, ^fioiifitvoi li^r rod Auh 
vwrtoo fUTafioXify, ivtivar alrr^i^ dird Trjs *^vy^ furavifivtaBat ^tkiaroVy 
d»9fta Koi ircvoiScv/icrov ircp2 k6yovt icai rvpcofPttewy i^cav iftwtipSraroy, (bs 
dirrirarffia vp^ XSXSerwa leal ^ikoffo^anf Uti^ov t^orrts. PhilistoB WM with 
friends on the Adriatic (see p. 327) writing his history.] 

[' lb. V ; Oir ft^v 6 7c AW lAarror c7x< npd r^ iaovwrup n/A^t fj vitrrtws 
6XKA vptfffittas re rcb fJMytaras 8i^«ci lai wtfurSfniyos wft6s KapxrfHoviouf 
hBavikMri ^uu^pwTWf,"] 

B 2 


cHAF.zi. constitational king^ To this end lie persuaded Plato 
Plato at to come again to Syracuse^ to act as a kind of spiritual 

the court 

ofDionv- adviser to the tyrant*. Not much good was likely to 

rios 11. I. . Tfci 

come of this. Plato was a speculator on constitations, 
but he had no practical knowledge of afEairs. Dionysios 
listened to the philosopher for a while with pleasure; 
geometry became fashionable at his court; he talked of 
making reforms and even of giving up the tyranny'. 

\} Plut. Dida, X ; ywSfuwos /ScurcXc^f !« rvpian^w. zii ; "BXtti^t iiXv y^ 
{6 Aloaw) &f loorc &<& UX&rwyot wapaytt^o/Upcv rb fkawru^v maik kiay Sutparw 
di^kS» T^s TPpayrlHot kmuXri riva Kol r6/ufuitf dpxoi'ra t^ Ator^fftow Kara* 
ffHffftof' cl Si dyrtfiaivoi icat //^ fidKouraoiTo, KaraX^ffos kictTyov kyyiuetg ri^ 
voXircioy dvoSiSoMu ^poMoaiois, oOm kwaawy ii^v ifjftoKparlay, vdtrreifs 9k 
BtXrlw rvpayviiot ijjo6fifPot roTs Ika/MprAyowTty ^yuuyovffifs djuarogpaTiOS. 
Dionjiios is reported to liaye been bo far carried away by Didn's reoom- 
mendationB that he himself declared his intention of taming his tprannu 
into ''a limited kingship** (tV dpx^v dirrl rvpawl^os cIs fiaffiKtiaa^ fura- 
(rHfffoyray Plat. £p. iii. 315 £. Of. Grote, oh. Izzxiv). Another excellent 
bat hardly realisable design with which Didn had inspired him was to 
** re-plant the dis-hellenized cities of Sicily " (1. o. rds 'EkkrpfiSea w6Kus kv 
SurcA/g obeiC*iv), Plato however, when he came, said that Dionysios most 
do his schooling first, and the oratorical conclusion is that his fine projects 
came to nothing. But this is not strictly true. He did re-colonise 
Rh^on as well as plant Greek foundations on the Apalian coast.] 

[* Holm (jGetch. SicUiem, ii. 1 59 and 453) cites an apposite passage in 
Plato*s writings (Legg. iv. 709, 710) which goes far to explain the motives 
and hopes with which the Philosopher answered Dionysios' invitation. 
The best chance, he says, for a badly governed state to be set right is in 
the case of one under a young tyrant of good parts (rvpawovfUinjv /mi iSrt 
lij/y tt^kofy T&poan^ot 9* tarw vim kuL fitf^/tuy teal t(fi»a$^ teal dyfljpcTot jimi^ 
/uyaXoirptwifi pdrti) if good fortune shall bring to such a tyrant a worthy 
lawgiver (c^rvx^y wpooB^s, ftf^ icar* d\ko, dXAd t6 ytviaOoA rt 4r* adrov 
voftoOirrjy d^iov i-raiyov icai riva ryxfy tls raurby dyaytty ttM/).'] 

[' Plut. Didn, xiii ; ^opd 94 rts ^y M KSyovt xat <pi\oawplay dvdmay 
Kot TO Tvpayytioy, &t ipaffif xwioprbs (nrd wk^Oiws r&y ywfitTpovyrcty 
/KarcTxcK. 'H/ac/wv ^k dxiycjy 9iayfvofUyvy 9vaia liky i{r viirpiof hr roTt rvpay- 
y^iois' Tou 9k teipvKot, £<rrc/> tHiOti tcaT€v(afUyov 9ia/i^rc«v ri^r Tvpawyt9a 
dffd\€vroy iroXAoi>s xpiycvs, 6 Aiovvaiot Xiy^rai jrap€orin " Oh vovtjp ** ^6tai 
" icarap^/iwos ^/uy" Of. Nepos, Dion. 3. Plato on his arrival had been 
conveyed from the landing-place in the state chariot, Dionysios accom- 
panying him <m. a male and proceeding to offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving 
(Plut. L c; -^ian, V. H. iv. 18).] 


But nothing was really done. Philistos and his party obap.xi. 
pressed Dionysios on the other side^ and set him against 
Dion. The peace with Carthage was not yet settled^ and 
Didn was charged with treasonable dealings with the 
enemy ^. He was accordingly suddenly sent away from Didn 
Sicily ^ bnt was allowed to receive the income of his 
property. His wife Arete^ the half-sister of the tyrant^ 
and his young son Hipparinos^ remained at Syracuse. 

** Dionysios meanwhile kept up a strange kind of friend- Dionynos 

II. and 

ship for Plato. He was jealous that the philosopher Piato. 
thought more of Dion than he did of Dionysios^. He 

[^ Plut. Did^ xiy. It was soggerted that Didn sought by Plato's 
penuaaions to oompan the volontary abdication of DionysioB in order that 
the Tyrannia should descend to one or other of DiOn*8 own nephews, — the 
children of Dionysios the Elder by his sister Aristomachd (of. Plat. Didn, vi ; 
and see p. 309, n. a). " Formerly all the forces of Athens, both by land 
and sea, had not prevailed against Syracuse, and was now a single Sophist to 
induce DionysioB to dismiss his 10,000 life-guards (popwp6pe») and turn 
his back on his 400 triremes, his 10,000 horsemen, and many times that 
number of hoplites ? and thia for him to seek for the wmmum bonum (rd 
Qtmtitiuvw 6rjiaB6v) in the Academy and find bliss by means of geometry T* 
But what finally turned the scale with Dionysios was an intercepted secret 
letter firom Didn to the Carthaginian Shophetim advising them when they 
wished to discuss terms of peace with Dionysios not to act without his 
privity (ji^ X^P^^ oirrov vot^caurBtu r^ tvrtv^iv, 6ft wAvra $^o/Uyovs 
d/ftCTa«T)6rft« St* ttbrav), DiOn's experiences as Syracusan ambassador at 
Carthage under the old Dionysios gave him of course special advantages 
for this negotiation. His letter to the Shophetim may have been inspired 
by the most patriotic motives,] 

[' The accounts as to DiOn*8 expulsion vazy. According to Plutarch 
(Di6n, xiv) he was sent off on a small vessel (dttdrtop) to Italy. So too 
Plat. Sp. vii. 339 ; e/uicp6r cit vKoSw k/ifiifiAaast l£^/3aAcr M/ua. Accord- 
ing to Dioddros (xvi. 6), Dionysios had resolved to execute Dido, who 
therefore fled to the Peloponnese. Cornelius Nepos (Dion, iv) on the 
other hand states that Dionysioe put a trireme at Didn's disposal and 
ordered him to sail to Corinth, giving as a reason, " se id utriusque facere 
causa, ne cum inter se timerent, alteruter alteram prsBoccuparet.**] 

[' Plut. DiAn, xvi ; ^jpAoBtj rvpnfvuthv Ipoira, i»&¥Of d^cwr M Ukkrvyos 
danr€paa$m Mat ^ov/idfia^ ft&kurra w6rrvi^f trotftos i» hnrpivtir tA vp^y- 
fmra leal lifif rvpaifyiia ^ wperifi&irn r^ wp^ hiava ^tXiaa^ r^ wflbn 


CHAP. XX. kept him for a while at Syracase^ and even persuaded 

him to pay him a second visit. Bat nothing came of it. 

Confisofr- Dionysios at last seized Didn's property and divided it 

Dion's among his own friends. This was during Phito's second 

^ ' visit; after that Pkto was very glad to get away \ Pre- 

of Flato. gently the tyrant took on him to give the wife of Di6n to 

another man named Timokrates^ and he took pains to lead 

her young son into vice. He also banished one of his chief 

officers, named HSrakleid^, who then passed for a friend 

of Di6n's. The tyranny in short was getting worse and 


*' All this happened during the first seven years of the 
Diftn reign of the younger Dionysios (b. c. 367-360). Mean- 

Greece. while Didn visited several parts of Old Greece, and was 
everywhere received with honour. At Sparta he received 
a most special honour, being admitted to full Spartan 
citizenship, a gift which was most rarely bestowed on 
any stranger^. At Athens he made the acquaintance 
of Eallippos, one of Plato's followers; indeed he made 
Plots friends everywhere. He began to plan schemes for up- 
Piony- setting the tyranny of Dionysios, and he met with en- 
couragement in many quarters. Hgrakleid^s too was 
planning for the same object ; but he and Didn did not 
agree, and each followed his own course. It is certain 
that no good came of the friendship of Kallippos ; as for 
the rivalry of H^raMeides, it is only fair to remember that 
we have the story only as it was told by the friends of 
Didn. At any rate Dion was ready for his enterprise 

P Pint. Didn, xix, xx.] 

[' lb. xvii ; Aoxcfleufi^noi cot Xwaprtirrpf aMv Ivoci^arro r^ At^rvcUm 
icaTa^po¥^ainr€s ^fY$t, tealwtp a^ots r&r* wpoO^fun M ro^ Oi/ZSoTovr 

DI6n*S expedition against DIONYSIOS II. 247 

before Herakleides was. He had gradually raised a small ohap. zi. 

force of mercenaries and volnnieers ^ ; but of Syracusan 

exiles, of whom there are said to have been as many as 

a thousand seeking shelter in different parts of Greece, 

he could get only twenty-five or thirty to join him. At Didn seta 

Mul to 

last, in the summer of the year b. o. 357, ten years after deliver 
the death of the old Dionysios, he set forth on his errand B.a 357. 
of deliverance. His force was so small that all could be 
carried in five merchantHBhips ^/* 

\} Plut. Didn, xxii. Amongst the reornits were some philosophers, the 
Cypriot Eaddmos, HmOnidds the Lenkftdian, Miltas of Thessaly Mpa 
pMantHf mt lurtcxvf^'^f'^ f^ ^^ *AKa9ijftiti^ Siar/N^^r. Didn oolleoted liis 
meroenaries at Corinth (Diod. zvi. d), where the cause of Syracusan liberty 
was popular. According to Dioddros (xyi. 9. 5) he brought with him 
1,000 mercenaries, — according to Plutarch, loc. dt., less than 800, — and he 
carried with him besides full armour for 5,000 hoplites (vwovXiot vcrra- 
xtfx*^^)* -iBlian (V. H. iy. 8) raises the number of meroenaries to 3,000 ; 
Aristotle (Rhet. ad Al. 9) to 3,000. Zakynthos was the starting-point of 
the expedition. Before setting sail Didn made a solenm sacrifice to the 
Zakynthian ApoUo at the head of his troops in full annour, and aftenrards 
gave a banquet in the Stadion with such a display of gold and silver cups 
and tables as to impress the beholders with a sense of his resources (tfov* 
fi&(oyTca dpyvpojy Kot xp**^^ iKwu/idrcay «a2 rpawtfftr ^tpfiAXXcwrw Vkou 
Tuvdr vXovToy ka/iwpAnjTa^ Plut. op. cit zxiii). Didn's name appears on 
the contemporary coins of Zakynthos (see Gius. Romano, Sopra aleune 
moneie, Ao^ and P. Gardner, Num. Chron. 1885, 95, 96), from which we 
may infer that he had been made a magistrate of that city.] 

[* Plut. Didn, zzy; rois 8i orparv&nas ro^f Aiatyos i£*94{arro trrpo^ 
T^Aoi 8110 pavSf Tptrw tk vkoiov o^ M^ya not i6o rpiwcinn'opoi mifnfMoko^ovv, 
Dioddros (xvi. 6 and 9) speaks of only two Tcssels— ^prijTO^ Mo your. 
Never before, he remarks (zvi 9), was such a mighty power, — ** the greatest 
power of Europe,**— 4tttaeked with such smaU means. He reckons the 
forces of Dionysios at 400 war-ships {vavs iiaiep6is\ 100,000 infimtiy, and 
10,000 cayalry. There were stores, he adds,, and money in proportion ; 
the tyrant had swarms of able-bodied allies to draw upon, and (he city 
to be attacked was ''the greatest of Greek cities," with harbours «nd 
docks and well-appointed and impregnable citadels (ir^Xir fc^y fuyiffngw 
rSt¥ *VKXfp^doiUf Xa/Uvos Sk itai vtitpta mt Mart(nnv€ur/Upttt ditpow6K€it dyo* 
kirrovt). JSIian (yi. la) gives us some further particulars as to the forces 
at the disposal of the Younger Dionysios. He reckons the ships, as 
Dioddros and Plutarch, at 400 (M^jptit Kot ircrr^it), the foot-soldiers at 
100,000, the hotsemea at 9,000. There were equipments (<rMi$7) for 500 


oHAP.zx. The five ships which carried the deliverer and his com- 
Expedidon paiiions now set sail from Zakynthos. The usual course 
of Greek seamanship was not to be followed* The usual 
path^ the coasting voyage along the coast of Korkyra and 
southern Italy, was blocked by the fleet of Philistos, who 
was watching for them off the lapyg^an shore ^. For once 
the open sea was to be the road from Zakynthos to Sicily. 
Twelve days of rowing under a gentle wind brought them 
on the thirteenth to the south-eastern comer of the island ; 
BeacheB the skill of the pilot Prdtos had brought them straight to 
^ ' Pachynos, whatever may be the exact spot which we are to 
understand imder that name ^. By this course^ so bold in 
the eyes of Greek navigators, they escaped all danger f nmi 
Dionysios and his ships in their Italian station ; they had 
reached Sicily while they were still looked for on the 
coast of lapygia. 

So &r the work had been done successfully. In the 
eyes of the professional sailor, it was^ as far as his own 
craft was concerned^ done altogether. The counsel of Prd- 
tos was to land at once ; he seems to have thought that 
any further progress by sea would be northward, along the 
coast from Pachynos to Syracuse ^. What was in his mind 
was doubtless a sudden entrance into the Great Harbour, a 
scheme not wholly hopeless while the tyrant's fleet was 
engaged in Italy. But he warned Di6n that such a course 
would be dangerous on other grounds. If they did not 

ships besides, 1,350,000 bushels (100 myriad Sioilisa /i^Sc/iroc) of com, and 
an Mrsenal fbll of shields, swords {/aaxoipais), spears, grsftyes, breastpUitos, 
and oatapttlts.] 

\} Flat Didn, zxv ; If lawvyi^ wwXoxovrra, The phrase shows thai 
he made use of one or other ol the two chief harbours of this part of the 
eoasi, Brentesion (Brindisi) or Hydrous (Otranto). This may be taken 
M a& indiofttion that the lapygiaos and their kin were on terms of altianoe 
with Dionjsios (see above, p. aaS).] 

[' lb. See Sicily, i. 64; "The real Paohynos seems to lie on the east 
ooast of Sicily by the modem Porto Palo.**] 

P Plat Di6n, xxv.] 


take advaniage of the knding^place of Pachynos^ the shipa chap. zi. 
might be scattered, and^ at that season of the year^ they 
might have to wait many nights and days at sea before a 
south wind came to carry them to Syracuse. Didn might 
have had to tarry like Agamemndn at Aulis, like William 
at Saint Yalery^ and that on the sea itself and not on a 
friendly shore. 

But the purpose of Di6n was neither to dash by sea DiOn's re- 
upon Syracuse nor to begin his land march at a point ^^J.^at'' "" 
so near to the city which was held by the enemy ^. Like S^**™ 
Oylippos, his call wail to go further westward, to stir ' ^' 
up aU Oreek Sicily to the work of deUverance, to give time 
for the kindling of patriotic feelings^ perhaps for the be- 
ginning of patriotic movements, in Syracuse itself^ and to 
march on the city at the head^ if not of a Syracusan, at 
least of a Sikeliot force. His orders accordingly were to 
sail onwards along the southern coast of the island. 

The skill of Prdtos in his own craft was presently shown. His ships 
With the rising of Arctums came a strong north wind, with Africa, 
heavy rain and thunder and lightning^. The ships were 
driven away from the coast of Sicily by the violence of the 
storm. They found themselves off a rocky and harbourless 
coast^ where they had much ado to keep themselves from 
being dashed to pieces ^. The land was unknown ; presently 
the storm ceased^ and they learned from a vessel with which 
they fell in that they were near the coast of Africa^ by the 
island of Eerkina at the head of the Oreat Syrtis K They 
were not the first men who had set out from Greece on an 

[} Plat. DiOn, zxv ; r^ ^TH^ ^^ woKtfdav 6at6fiam¥ Mkin . . .] 


[* Now Karkenah. In the same way the PebponnMiaiia sent to the 
relief of the STTaensans (Sicily, iiL 318, 319) had been carried from Tai- 
naron to the coast of Kyr^nd, and finally made their way to Selinoas 
from the Carthaginian port of NeapoUs.] 


CHAP. XI. errand of deliverance for Syracuse, and had made an African 
voyage against their wills. Bat Di6n and his companions 
had no call and no opportunity to tarry even for the object 
of helping Libyan Greeks against barbarian besiegers. A 
south wind presently blew^ not one of that strength with 
which Boreas had driven them out of their course^ but 
enough, when they had plucked up spirit to believe that 
the wind was really in their favour^ to bring them in five 
days to Sicilian soil \ 
DiOn's The spot of the Sicilian coast which they reached was^ 

Hdrakl^ in the state in which they found it, a commentary on the 
^^"'^ history of Sicily during the last fifty years. Minda or 
Herakleia, foundation of Minds, as the native historian does 
not fail to remind us % was, when the great Carthaginian 
invasion began^ an outpost of Oreek Akragas. The result 
of that invasion had made it a possession of Carthage. The 
first Punic war of Dionysios had won it back for Hellas ; 
the ill luck of the third had g^ven it back to Canaan. The 
treaty at the begmning of the reign of the yotmger Diony. 
sios had acknowledge the Carthaginian claim to the lands 
west of Halykos. Keeping the mouth of the border-stream^ 
Bas Melkart ^ was an important outpost of Carthaginian 
power^ coining moneys which do not scorn to imitate the 
workmanship of the Oreek^ but whose legends in the Semitic 
tongue proclaim what Herakles it was whose name the town 
still bore on Greek lips^ The officer in command was 

P Plat. Didn, xxt ; mt Blcrrts lAa^pfir w§/amuot icarA Mlr^/ca^ itpyiaaano^ 
vokur/idricv If ry %mXttf r^f Kapxil^oifiav hrucpartias,'] 

P Diod. xvi. 9.] 

p See Sicily, i. 430, 497 ; iL 96, 97 ; 479-481.] 

I* The ooinB (tetradbichms) bear the legend ntpVo VMi « Baa 
Melkftrt (B. M. Gat. Sicily, 251, aeqq.; Head, Hist. Nam. 124). They 
were mostly copied horn the Syraetuan Pentdkontalitra by the artist 
Bunnetos, presenting on the obrene the head of Penephond (see Syr. 
Med. 35, 107). The abundant issue of these pieces from about this date 
onwards shows the important part played by Bas Melkart in the Sicilian 
Dominion of Carthage.] 


himself a Oreek, Synalos or Paralos by name^ one wHo^ ohap.xi. 
like men of our own day, had sold himself to the service of 
the barbarian^ bnt who was bonnd to Di6n by personal ties 
of friendship and hospitality^. Didn^s embassies to Car- 
thage must have given him the opportmiity of forming 
many connexions of the kind. Didn was natmully not 
looked for at Has Melkart, and Synalos strove to hinder 
the landing of strangers who might be dangerous. I>i6n, Landing 
on the other hand, knew where he was and in whose 
government. He could not keep his men back from 
forcing a landing; but for his friend^s sake he forbade 
any slaughter. But the force of Synalos was driven back 
into the town and the town itself was taken. The two Friendly 
commanders exchanged friendly greetings ; Didn gave back ^^ q,^ 
the town to Synalos. and Synalos caused the troops of ^^■^^"'^ 

J ' J ^ -^ governor. 

Di6n to be hospitably received and supplied with all that 
they needed ^. 

The stay of Didn and his following at HSrakleia was 
short; it was there that they heard a piece of news which 
cheered them not a little for their enterprise. The departure 
of Dionysios and his eighty ships to Italy seemed as if it 
had happened expressly to forward their purposes ^ Every 
man who came with Dion felt the happy chance as a call 
to immediate action. When their commander bade them 
wait a while to recover their strength after their long toiling 
on the sea^ they bade him not to lose the favourable moment, 
but to lead them at once to Syracuse^. At once they made 
ready for a swift march ; all their stuffy all the arms that 
they had brought with them beyond the actual harness of 
the men on march, they left with the friendly commander 
of HeraMeia, who engaged to send them after them as he 

\} Pint. Didn, zxt; "^rvxc l\ va^ 6 ILoLfixyfi^iM (IfX!^ "SAvdKos kv 
r^ x^P^ i^^^ ^ '"'^ ^<^ Aiemft, In Dioddios (zvi. 9) he appears as 
" Paraloe."] 

[• Plut Didn, 1. c] [» lb.] [* lb. xxri] 


CHAP. XL found oppoitimity ^. We may believe that in this Synalos 
was not acting wholly out of personal friendship for Didn. 
The interests of Carthage were^ for the moment at least, 
certainly on the side of the deliverer. The experience of 
the last century showed that a Syraeusan commonwealth 
was by no means so dangerous to Carthage or to any other 
neighbour as a Syraeusan tyranny. The deliyeranoe of 
Syracuse was likely to lead to the break-up of the great 
dominion of Dionysios, and no event could be more eagerly 
wished for by Carthage than that. 
Didn*8 The deliverers of Syracuse now set forth from their Punic 

^^Jdeia. i^esting-place. The stream of Halykos crossed^ they w^e 
on Greek ground, on ground which was at least under the 
supremacy^ if not under the direct government, of Diony- 
sios. We should like to hear something a little clearer of 
Akngan- the state of Akragas at that moment. From every Greek 
other territory that Dion passed through on his march he drew 
recruts. volunteers to his standard. In his passage through the 
land of Akragas his force was strengthened by the accession 
of two hundred horsemen. But it is said expressly that they 
were furnished by those who inhabited or occupied the out- 
post of Eknomos, the furthest point of Akragantine territory 
towards Gela ^. It is not likely to imply any difference of 
feeling between the city of Akragas and the rest of the 
Akragantine land. It may imply that the city was more 
carefully kept under the hand of the tyrant than the out- 

[^ Plut. DidD, zzvi ; ^AnoaKtvaffd/Afuos rd wtpi6ifra rwr StAait icaJt rw 
^prriow kicu icat rod Xvy&\ov litrjBus 5tw f luupd^ dwocreiXai irpdr aurSv . . , 
Aocording to Dioddroe (xri. 9) he left behind 5,000 panoplies with the 
governor of H^nkleia Minte, charging him to send them on in wagons. 
They are sent on in c. 39.] 

[' Plat. DiOn, zxvi ; wopwoiUv^ V adrf) wpQrw fikw * Ajcparfnrrbrvif 
vpo<r€xif(nj<r€fy Imrw iuueSfftoi rw wtpl r^ "Eityofu/y oUco^irmw, Cf. Died. 
XTi. 9. In Agathoklds' time (Diod. ziz. 104) Eknomoe was reckoned 
as lying in G«ldan tenitory. In aSo B. 0. Phintias^ tyrant of Akngas, 
transplanted the citizens of Gela to a new city named after him on this 
spot. It is now licata.] 


lying districts; now that the whole coast eastward was ohap.xi. 
under the power of one master, Eknomos must have lost its 
importance as a border-fortress. Just now at least it was 
not needed in that character. Oela was of the same mind Beeraito 
« Alm^ J «, was Kamarina, nearer to the Beat of fcyi«my. ^^ 
All poured forth their volunteers to join the army of the ™^ 
deliverer^. The days of a himdred years back had come 
again. Men of all races were as zealous to put down Dio- 
nysios as their forefathers had been to put down Thrasy- 
boulos K As in the days of Duoetius, Sikels came to their Sikd 
help as well as Greeks; and a march which began at^^^ 
Akragas began &r enough to the west to draw Sikan 
helpers also. When we read ^ of further succour of men from 
Messana and even from Italy, we may well be sure that 
they came, but their coming must have been at a somewhat 
later stage. In any case the power of Dionysioe was 
threatened by a general union of men of all the European 
races of Sicily. And Carthage too— for we must suppose 
that the Greek commander of Has Melkart knew the mind 
of his masters — was ready to give precious help to the 

It was not an easy moment for Timokrates, left as he Timokratte 
was to bear the whole burthen of the defence, when thCofSyra- 
man whose domestic life he had most deeply wronged was °"^ 
marching against him at the head, rumour might well 
say, of the forces of all Sicily. He had to send the news sendB 

nowi to 

to his master. Things had changed since the days of Dionyaos. 
Nikias, when a written dispatch was something unusual, 
something which needed the voice of the living messenger 

{} Diod. XTi. 9 ; iv mpSd^ 8i robs 'AKfioyarriyovt teat FcX^vf Koi rams 
rS^ T^ /uff6y€toif fAKon&rrvif ttitaafStv re itaii XiictXSa^, tri tk Kafiapiraiovt 
9€iaas (TvrcXf vtfc/Ntfaoi robs XvpoMoeiovs. Th« MSS. have Jrai2 Ma&Muovf for 
Kattapamious, The KamarinManis however, are mentioned by Plataroh 
(Didn, xzyii) as joining the others.] 

P See SicUy, ii. 306, 307.] 

P Diod. xri. 9.] 



CHAP. XI. to. enforce it^ Not only did Timokrat^ tell his story 
in the form of a written letter, but without the letter the 
messenger felt himself to be helpless. The bearer of the 
docmnent sailed to Rh^on or its site^^ and then set 
forth by land for ELaulfinia in search of Dionysios ^. That 
was one of the towns which his &ther had destroyed; 
as it again acted a part in history at a later time^ it had 
most likely already spnmg up afresh, more likely as a 

Mishap of Lokrian outpost than as an independent city^ But 

kratds' neither the messenger nor the letter ever reached Eau- 
meBBenger. j^^^ rpj^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^j^^ ^^lej were hindered by a 

strange accident indeed. On the road he fell in with 
a friend who was carrying part of the flesh of a newly 
sacrificed victim. He gave part of the flesh to the mes- 
senger, who walked on with this addition to his baggage. 
Night came on ; after a while weariness caused him to lie 
down to rest in a wood by the roadside. Meat and letters 
were seemingly in the same bag. Their bearer slept. A 
wolf was drawn to the spot by the smell of the meat^ and 
carried off the letter also ^. The messenger feared to 
appear before the tyrant without his credentials; instead 
of going on to Eauldnia^ he turned away from his errand^ 
and sought refuge where he might find it. 

Dionysios was thus left to hear of the advance of Di6n 
by common &me, without the help of official dispatches. 
Timokrates meanwhile did what he could to keep down 
the expected movements of the Syracusan people. He 
tried in vain by persuasion to keep them back from revolt ; 
but the beauties of tyranny were enlarged on in vain to 


[} Plat. Didn, zxvi; Ti/toKpAnjs . . . l/nr^/circi Mxrd rdxos dyytXcv r^ 
Aiovwri^ yp&fifiara icofdiovra w€fi r^s AWor d^i^cws. See Sicily, ill. 363, 

[' Pint. L a ; AttwhtJ^aas *ls IraXiay teat r^ 'Friyimrfv dicX^Uur . . .] 

[' lb. ; l«ci7^/icyo9 cZr EavXoiyiav wp^ Atov^iw . . .] 

[^ See p. 190, and note a.] 

[* Plat. Didn, zzvi. As it stands it is a yeiy pretty story.] 


thankless ears ^. He had to rely on the sorer means chap, xl 
of keeping his mercenaries ready to act at any moment K 
Under this pressure the people kept themselves from any Dion's 
open disturbance tiU Di6n was quite close to the city ^ ; 
but many contrived to make their way to join Dion on the 
Syracusan frontier, and he was joined by not a few of the 
inhabitants of the Syracusan districts which he passed 
through. He had struck inland from Kamarina. and the Arrival at 
next point where we distinctly hear of him is at the old 

who had joined him on the way had reached the number 
of five thousand ; but^ owing partly to the measures lately 
taken by Dionysios, many were unarmed or armed but 
poorly *. 

At this stage^ or perhaps at an earlier one^ he contrived, 
more luckily than Timokrates in his correspondence with 
Dionysios, to spread abroad a rumour which reached the 
ears of the soldiers of the tyrant who guaided Epipokd^ 
who guarded above all the strong castle with which 
the elder Dionysios had crowned its western point. There Campanian 
were Campanians from the settlements which the elder JJJJJJ^"*"** 
Dionysios had planted at ^tna and Leontinoi®; Didn^^^^y 
men told them^ meant first of all to march against those EpipolaL 
towns. The Campanians believed; they forsook their 
post, and went off to the defence of their own dwellings ''^ 
It would seem that Timokrates himself, either believing 
the report or trying to restrain the soldiers from desertion, 

[^ Diod. xvi. 10.] [• lb.] 


[* Plut. DiAn, xxvii.] 

[' lb.; dfwXdafihoi ^pavKws U rov irpo<mfx6rrot dytwk^pow rp wpo$vfdif 
rj^ rrjs mpourKtv^ ivZtwv, Cf. Diod. xvi. lo.] 

[* See pp. 113, 113.] 

[^ Pint. 1. c. ; ol tk fitrd Tifuuepdrovs rdr 'EmiroAeb <^v>Aaaarra Awyrtpin 
mt KaparoMol X6yw ^^cvS^ iipo<rir4pBffayTos elf a^o^f rov Aian^ot in M riis 
w6kfu itpSfTW rpkwoiro rds lirciVoir, dvoXiir^rrcr ^/xo^^o r^ Tt/tOMpdniP rocf 
oUfiots /SpiT^^orrcf.] 









the ford 
of the 

was at this time on Epipolai; lie was at anj rate not 
within Ortygia^. 

This movement of the Campanians was no small gain 
to Didn. It left so much of Syracuse as stood on the 
mainland without defenders on behalf of Dionysios^ and 
it left those who held the Island for him without a com- 
mander. Both Didn on his march and his friends within 
the city — ^that is pretty well the whole^ population of 
Syracuse — were thus able to act as they pleased. He was 
able to enter the city without resistance^ and the last 
stage of his march wore the air of a religious procession 
rather than that of a warlike entry. 

The news that the Campanians had left Epipolai was 
brought to Didn while he was encamped at the foot of the 
hill of Akrai ^. It was nighty but the favourable moment 
was not to be lost^ and he called his followers to an imme- 
diate march. That march took him over part of the same 
ground which had been^ fifty-six years before, crossed by 
the retreating host of Nikias and Demosthenes in their 
first attempt to reach the Sikel hills. The latter part of 
his course would coincide with the modem road from Syra- 
cuse to Floridia. At daybreak of the third morning after 
his landing at Herakleia' his force came down from the 
low hills to the passage of the Anapos which the Athe- 
nians had forced from the left bank in the teeth of Syra- 
cusan defenders on the rights But now the bank on 
the side of Syracuse stood undefended; the deliverers 
could advance without hindrance on their errand. 

They reached the stream at the moment when the sun rose 
from the waters between Sicily and Greece, lighting up the 
Island which they had to deliver and the long hill which 

\} Pint. DiOn, xxviii; Tiftoicpirrjs 82 avmu^ai rois ^povptnkri j^ AMp6- 
p Op. oit. xxvii; ittpi r^s''Ajcpat (JUdxfica MSS.) orparoirvSciWra.] 


[• Sicily, Ui. 374.] 


might be said to be deliyered already. Didn^ with the ohap.ii. 
sacrificial wreath on his head^ with the attendant prophets 
aronnd him, went through the fitting religious ceremonies. 
He prayed, he offered victims, to the local god of the river, Didn'i 
so famed in Syracusan legend, and to the god of day who ^^ j^ 
so happily revealed himself at this stirring moment. The P^* 
prophets, by the rules of their art^ were able to say that 
the sacrificial signs were favourable, and that Didn might 
march on to victory K At this saying an enthusiasm at 
once religious and patriotic seized on the whole army, 
citizens and strangers. All would have full communion 
in the devotions of their general ; each man wove himself 
such a wreath as he could at the moment, and they marched 
on as an armed procession, warriors and worshippers at 
once'. Not a few were but feebly armed; but in the 
high-strung feelings of the moment men deemed that zeal 
would make up for the lack of weapons. At the bidding of 
the general, they went on at a quick step, amid shouts of 
joy, and words passing from man to man, each calling on 
Ins fellow to strive for freedom ^. 

But perfect order was kept. In front marched Di6n Triamplud 
himself in brilliant armour ; on one side of him marched gyraouwr^ 
his brother Megakles; on the other his Athenian com- 
rade Eallippos, fresh from the speculations of the 
Academy and the worship of the powers common to 
Attica and Sicily^. The wreaths were still on their 

[^ Plataxoh, Didn, xzTii; kffi^id(ero np^t t^p vom/i^, dvariXKotrri 
rf 1j\l^ wpofftv^dfuyot* d/ia 5' ol f/b&yrtts wapd rw $€wy ¥ueip^ i^pa(oif 

[* lb. ; &<rr9 mr^frcarret rev AWof 5p^/i^ X^P^** M^ X^P^' ^ ^^ 
AKkffXovs vapcunXovrraf M lijip ikiv$*pi€».] 

[^ Platoroh (Didn, liv) speaking of Kallippot aayi ; 5r ^^cv i HXdroir 
obx dwd mudciar, dXX* l/r /w<rrarfvyuu¥ ttdl rijs w€piTp€xownjt ircuptlas yi^pi' 
fwv aifT^ y4y4a9(u »oi avmrfOri. In o. Ivi we find him when siupeoted of 
treMon taking the moit itolenin oath in the Syracusan sanotnary of the 
Nether Goddesaee (rd rwv 9*<r/w(p6pvy W/icyor). See bebw, p. 285.] 



oHAP.zi. browB, as on the brows of the whole army^. Next 
after them came a band who were in a special manner 
the brethren of Didn in his toils and in their reward, 
those few, thirty only^ of all whom the tyrants had 
driven into banishment, who had dared to cast in their 
lot with the deUverer^ But was it a dim foreshadow- 
ing of evil to come that that deliverer was attended 
Didn*B by something like the tyrant's spearmen? Or may we 
gQ J^ think of the true comrades, the Hetairoi, the GestSas, who 
fought aroimd the heroes of old^ when we read that Di6n 
and his special friends were followed by a select hundred of 
the Peloponnesian troops picked out as the generaPs special 
guard ^? After them followed the rest of the army^ led in 
array by their captains ^. From the Syracusan hill, now 
clear of enemies^ the citizens, already half delivered, looked 
down on the men who marched along the rock below. An 
army was drawing near to their gates, but an army which 
seemed in their eyes to be holding a solemn and holy pomp 
in honour of the powers of Freedom and Democracy who 
were being brought back to the rescued city after a 
banishment of forty-eight years ^. 
Rising of The moment the news of the approach of Di6n had 
MM°"" reached the city, all Syracuse rose except the fettered 
Island. In every other quarter the adamantine chains 

[» Hut. Didn, xxvii.] 

[' Diod. zyi. lo ; in Plat. Didn, zzii, their number iB given m twenty- 

p Plut. Di6n, zzTiii ; rSfw tk ^hvi^ kKarhv fUr ^ftwro ^Aoircs wtfk rdr 

[* Aooording to Dioddrot (zvi. lo) the number of these had by now 
been swollen to 50,000. When he lay before Syracuse the number waa 
ao,ooo (zvi. 9). Plutarch (op. cit. zzvii), whose object is to dwell on the 
moral triumph of his hero, reduces the number of those who entered to 
5,000 recruits in addition to the small band of 800 with which he had 

[* Plut. Di6n, zzviii; $€0§iUwv¥ rS^ XvptucoffiM^ «al IkxofUtwi^ &aw€p 
Ufiof rvu KoL $€owp€inj woftw^ kK(v$tpUtt leal 9^i»oKpaTtag Zi Iruv ittrif seal 

di6n enters SYEAOUSE. 259 

were broken. The guardians of Epipolai were gone; the chap.zi. 
guardians of Ortygia kept within their defences ; the other 
mercenaries of the tyrant who had quarters elsewhere than 
in the two strongholds or whom chance might have led 
into other parts of the city were at once set upon by the 
delivered citizens. They were too few to keep down the The tv- 
multitude ; but with soldierly instincts they contrived to withdraw 
form, and to withdraw to Epipolai^ to hold its fortress for *oEpipol»i. 
their master ^. Timokrat^s, at whatever exact point he Flight of 
found himself, wished in vain to reach the Island and con- kratte. 
tinue its defence. But he was cut ofE by the press, and 
had to seek only for his personal safety. He moimted a 
horse^ and rode away^ doubtless by the northern road 
towards Leontinoi and Katane. On the way he spread 
the most terror-striking tales about Didn and his army, 
lest men should charge him with having forsaken his post 
in the presence of a slight danger^. Anyhow he had 
forsaken it^ and he had yielded it less to the soldiers of 
Didn than to the revolted people of Syracuse. The mer- 
cenaries of the tyrant were left without a general. They Synouae 
held as they could the two fortified ends of the city^ the 
Island which might pass for one great fortress and the 
lesser fortress on the neck of Eury&los. All between was 

An Athenian poet said that a people which had just won 
its freedom was given to be harsh in mood ^. There were 
those in Syracuse with whom none was disposed to deal 
gently. Dionysios had his spies like Hier6n^ and the names 
that had been invented for them in the days of the earlier 
tyrant had come again into use^ The enraged people 

P Cf. Diod. rvi. lo, ii, and Plat. DiOn, xzix.] 

[' Plat. DitxL, xxTiii ; cEv /li) HoKoirj lUr^in^ n Mna dvofitfikifKintt rifif 

[* rpax^ 7< iUvr<H. 9Si/m9 kMfuyinf kokA, MkAi, Theb. 1044.] 

[* Plot. Didn, zzyiii ; irvy^fprna^op roi^ mtXovfiiirout wpoaafwn/iZa$, Slse* 
where (Be Coriot. xvl) Plataroh ealli them mpoaarforfus^ and layt that 


oBiip.zi. seized on the spies and eavesdroppers who had carried to 
^^ the ty«nts lie words ihat each nuu. spoke in his i™ 
d6Ath. chamber and beat them to death without mercy ^. It 
would have been well if the feast of Freedom and Demo- 
cracy had been kept clean from all ill^^ vengeance ; but 
unlaw ever begets unlaw. The more honourable citizens 
who had no share in such eroesses, pnt on their hoUday 
garb^ and went to meet the deliverer at the gate*. It 
was by the gate of Achradina that Hermokrat^ and Dio- 
nysios had made their way into Syracuse ; but in the en- 
larged city of the tyrants that gate was no longer in the 
DiOn en- outer circuit of the walls. It was at a new gate in the new 
Temenitid wall of the elder Dionysios, a gate which took the name of 
<^- Temenit^ from the new quarter caUed after the holy pre- 

cinct of ApoUdn^, that the chief men of Sjnucuse stood 
ready to welcome the champions of Syracuse, the wreathed 
votaries of her gods. The gate stood open for the deliverer 
and his army to march in. Without a blow struck, without 
a voice raised against him^ Didn again stood on the soil of 
his native city. 

The storm of delight at his entrance was wild. But the 
object of Dion was to give as soon as possible a l^;al 
character to his acts. He first bade a herald announce by 
sound of trumpet that Didn and Megakles were come to 
put down the tyrant and to free the Syracusans and all 
the other Sikeliote from the tyranny^. The first act 

they were employed by both Dionysioi. Their name implies that they 
were something more than mere spies, and that they rather answer to the 
agefnU provooateun of the continental police system. From Aristotle (Pol. 
▼. 9. 3) it appears that HierOn L had already employed female agents of 
the same kind — mrayvyi^t — a ** Cythenean cohort." (Of. Th. Lau, Leben 
Dion's, 63).] 

p Pint. Didn, xxyiii ; oSroi fiiv c^ wpthot ZUcrjif IfitSo^or ^nh rw npoff' 
rvyx!iiv6vTW dirorv/iirai'if<$|icyoi.] [• lb.] 

[* lb. xxix ; «ard rdt TtfAwwiniea wiXas, For the Temenos or Temenitis, 
Sicily, iL 4a, 43.] 

[* Pint. 1. 0.] 


of the restored commonwealth was to be the holding of ohap.zi. 
an assembly of the Syraensan people in their accustomed 
place, in the wide agora on the flat g^nnd of the Lower 

As they passed to the spot men crowded to either Didn ad- 
side of his path with victims and tables and cups ; they aiBembiy. 
poured out their drink-offerings, and hailed their deliverer 
as a god with prayers and vows'. Through such a re- 
joicing crowd he made his way to the lofty sundial of 
Dionysios that stood in front of the five gates which 
shut in the hostile Island '. On this lima Didn mounted 
and spoke to the multitude around him as to the 
assembly of the Syracusan people that day restored to the 
exercise of their lawful rights^. It was a Convention 
Parliament^ not summoned in any regular form by any 
regular magistrate, and it would have been hard to say 
who had and who had not votes according to laws which 
had slept for eight-and-forty years. But when the work 
was to set free, not only Syracuse but all Oreek Sicily, no 
one could grudge the presence^ even under arms^ of the men 
from other cities who had joined Di6n on his march^ or of 
the men from the older Oreek lands who had jeoparded 
their lives in the cause of Sicily. As in the assemblies of 
the days of the tyrants^ the people of Syracuse voted in the 
presence of armed strangers, but this time the strangers 
were not enemies but protectors. From his lofty place, in 
his shining harness, with his wreath upon his brow^ Didn 
harangued the people. They were now free; let them 
cleave to their freedom and strive for it. To that end they 

[> Plat. DiOn, zzix.] 

[* lb. ; r^ JivpoKocUn^ Icpcia nt rpawiCas KtH Kpar^pas IcrAtmnf, nX Kott 


[* lb. ; ^Hr 8* lw6 ri^ dKp6iwokuf mt rd vcrr^wXa, AiomHrUnf MaraffMvA^ 
earrot ^ktorpSmov miTO^orif nH t^tfk&i^.l 

[* lb. ; M TovTo vpofiiLs lA^/i^/n^^c mi2 wapifpfaiffM ro^ woKbm$ dt^r* 


CHAP. XL mast choose leaders. With one voice the rejoicing assembly 
Didn and xiamed Di6n and Megakles as generals with full powers ^. 
Msembly. That was the office by the abuse of which the elder Diony- 
sios had risen to the tyranny and under the name of which 
he had striven to disguise the fact of tyranny. Didn, at 
this stage of his career, shrank from accepting so invidious 
^ power alone or in partnership with a single colleague. 
Others^ he said, must be joined with them in command. 
Twenty Bushing into the other extreme^ the assembly named twenty 
chosen. others as generals ^ ; m the days before the Athenian inva- 
sion SjHACuse had not got beyond fifteen^. The number 
fixed on was one sing^arly ill suited for peaceful debate^ 
and yet more unsuited^ one would think^ for military com- 
mand. Ten of the twenty were chosen from among the 
thirty comrades of Dion in his exile and return^. One 
would be glad to know the special qualifications of the other 
ten. But for the present, we may be sure, Didn was the 
soul of everything^ and the will of this large military college 
was his will. 

Epipolai * " Dion now attacked and drove out the barbarians on 


Island Epipolai; he set free those who were shut up in the tyrant's 
prisons^ and built a wall of defence between the Island and 
the delivered parts of the city *. Dionysios^ owing to the 

P Pint. Didn, zziz ; ttbro/cpdropas ffrparriywh.'] 
[• lb. ; ffwdpxovTQsJ] 

[> See Sioily, iii. 177. Beloch (Imp. di Dioniiie, 16, 34) who main- 
tains that the whole body of Stratdgoi oontinaed to be appointed nnder 
the Dionysian Dynasty, acoomits for the increased nnmber in Didn's 
time by supposing that there had been a eoirespondisg increase in the 
nomber of the tribes (^vXoi). The original nomber of ^vXof he assomes 
to hare been eight, as at the mother-city Gorinth. These had already 
been added to by Geldn, and the number of the Stratdgoi at the same 
time increased in due proportion.] 

[• Plut. Didn, xxix.] 
* From the Story of Sicily, p. 205 seqq. 

[• Plut. 1. c; T^ dKp6vo?iiw dircr«/x<0'O'* Dioddros (xvi. I a) deseribes 
it as dvd Bak&rnjs sif ^dkarray Scorccx^^MOTa. The walls of Acfaradinft 

walled off. 

di6n's unpopular attitude. 26S 

loBS of Timokrates' letter^ did not come back with his fleet chap. xi. 
till seven days after Didn's entrance. And then he found Diony,ios 
that all Syracuse^ except the Island^ had passed away from ^ ^7^- 
his dominion. 

'' Never had any man enjoyed such a nm of good luck Unpopular 

attitude of 

as Di6n up to this time. It was now that his difficulties Di6ii. 
began. It was always easy to raise suspicion against 
I)i6n on account of his long connesdon with the house of 
the tyrants. And in truth, notwithstanding his popular 
bearing on the day of his entry, it may be doubted whether 
Didn at any time really thought of restoring freedom to 
Syracuse in the sense in which most Syracusans would 
understand freedom. He had not lived in a democracy; 
he and his friend Plato seem to have dreamed all manner 
of impossible constitutions. There should be a king with 
limited powers, or perhaps more than one king, after the 
manner of Sparta. In short the Syracusans wished to rule 
themselves, like any other free Greek city ; Di&n wished to 
rule them himself or with a few colleagues. He wished 
no doubt to rule them justly and well ; but still to rule 
them. His haughty manner too helped before long to 
make him personally unpopular. We hear casually that 
he had a body-g^uard| like a tjrrant ^. 

'^ Bionysios was quite clever enough to know all this, Dionysiot 

profits by 

and to make his advantage out of it. His first trick was DiOn's un- 
to try to open negotiations with Bidn personally, and not 

ran down to the Great Harbour on the S. W. and to the Little Harbour 
on the S. E. The new wall muit hare been drawn from dock to dock 
South of the Agaok (wee Schubring, Aohradina, 45).] 

[7 This appears from Plutarch (Didn, 33), who» speaking of Didn*s 
attitude towards HtoJcleidds, says ; mt rev c^ftarot Itcwc ^Kaucifif Souroc 
rcht woXlroi &cv€p o^dr ^x^»] 


CHAP. XL with the Syiaciiflaii people. Didn told the tyrant not to 
DionysioB speak to him, bnt to the people. Another message then 


came ; Dionysios, like more modem oppressors, promised to 
make various reforms. At this the people had the sense 
to laugh^ and Didn told the tyrant's envoys that no offer 
oonld be listened to except a complete abdication of the 
tyranny. If he did this, Di6n would, out of old friend- 
ship, prooore good terms for him personally. Dionysios 
pretended to agree; he asked that envoys should be sent 
UDrao> into the Island to settle terms. But when they came, he 
sUuglit on kept them there, and sent his mercenaries to make a sudden 
waU. attack on the wall which now hemmed in the Island by 

land. A sharp battle followed, in which DiAn showed great 
courage, and received a wound. In the end the barbarians 
were driven back into the fortress ^. 
DionyiioB '* Dionysios now sent letters to Didn from his wife and 
popular sistcr whom he still kept in the Island. These Didn read 


against out to the assembly. But one letter was headed 'From 
Hipparinos to his father^; ^ this the people told him to 
keep to himseU; it was too private to be opened publicly. 
But Di6n opened and read it aloud. And it proved not to 
be from his son, but from the iyrant. Dionysios called on 
Didn to remember their old friendship, and not to serve an 
ungrateful people \ He did not wish to rule any longer 
himself; he would willingly give up his power to Didn. If 
Didn refused this, he would do dreadful things to his sister 
and wife and son. 

p For iba baitle and preceding aegotiationa, lee Diod. xvi. ii, la, 
and Pint. Didn, 3a] 

[* Pint Didn, 31. Flntaroh adda that, according to Timaioa, the ion's 
name waa Aretaioa from hia mother Aretd.] 

[* lb. ; /ufi kktvBtpow /uffowms Mpintmn «a2 fu^eimuecwras,'] 




''It IS not perhaps very wonderful that the reading of obap.xl 
this letter raised sospicions against Didn among the people, ufiddsand 
And these suspicions grew stronger when a rival to Bidn ^^^ 
for the g^ood will of the Syracosans presently came on the 
field. This was Hdiakleidgs, who now came with a nmnber 
of triremes^ some say twenty, some only seven^ and 1^500 
more soldiers^. He was skilful in warfare and of more 
popular manners than Di6n; so he easily won the favour 
of the people. The assembly presently elected him ad- 
miral^. Then Di6n said that this could not be without 
his own consent; but he presently himself proposed the 
election of Hfirakleidds with a guard equal to his own^ 
This satisfied nobody; men b^^ to call Didn a tyrant 
and to say that they had only exchanged a drunken master 
for a sober one. And presently HSrakleidis was able to do 
real services which might seem to equal those of I>i6n. 

** Dionysios had come back to Syracuse with only part Meet of 
of his fleet ; the rest was still off the coast of Italy under retunui to 


the command of Philistos. The historian of Sicily, vigorous 
in his old age, was now the mainstay of the power of the 
tyrant. He came from Italy with the ships and troops 
which had been left there ^. He failed in an attempt to 

(^ Plntarah (Ditn, 33) wyB (hat HteakleidAi Bafled from PeloponnaM 
with aeyen triremei and three tranaports. DiodOroe gives him twenty 
gaUeys (rovt fMMp&t)J] 

[* Plut. Di6n, 33 ; [of XvpatiSiTUH] cir IxirXi^kr d^' a&rfir cwtpafUvm 
cZXorro rbr 'BpaM\ti9rpf vai6apxov» Por the Kaoaroh'i office, lee SnppL L 
p. 214.] 


[* Flfztanh (Blta, 35) hringt Fhilietoe "with many •hipe," from 
lapygia (ot p. 237). Dioddroe (xri. 11) teUs hb that Dionyiiiie had 
already lent tor him hefbre he himeelf quitted Eanldnia. He it there 
deaoribed aa being wtpt riv 'ABpbof, and hii orden were to Bail to Syraonae. 
From ch. 16 we leaxn that he aailed to Bh^on, traaaported over five 




over Phi- 

death of 







win back Leontinoi which had revolted from Dionysios. 
He next met Herakleid^ in a sea-fight^. Some of the 
crews of the tyrant's ships must have joined the patriots ; 
otherwise Herakleid^ could not have had sixty ships to 
face the same number which Philistos commanded. The 
Syracusans had the better^ and Philistos^ after doing his 
best for his master^ was taken alive. To the disgrace of 
the delivered commonwealth, the old man was put to death 
with insult, and his body was dragged into the streets and 
thrown into the stone-quarries K 

'^With the death of Philistos Dionysios began to lose 
heart; but he still went on with his tricks to discredit 
Didn. The victory had naturally made Herakleidfis the 
fiivourite. Dionysios now sent another message to Didn^ 
ofEering to give up the Island on condition of being allowed 
to withdraw safely to Italy and to keep the profits of a 
large private estate in the Syracusan territory^. Di6n 
again told the tyrant to make his proposal to the people 
and not to him. At the same time he counselled the 
assembly to accept the terms *. But the people hoped to 

hnndred horsemen to Syracuse^ and with another more ntunerons body of 
horsemen and 3,000 infiemtiy made his attempt on Leontinoi.] 

[} For the sea-fight, see Died. xtI. 16, and a referenoe in Plut. Didn, 35. 
PhUistos had sixty ships ; Hdrakleidds not less.] 

[' Aooording to Dioddros (xti. 16), Philistos killed himself rather than 
fall into the enemies' hands. Plntarch (Didn, 35), though hostile to 
Philistos, says that he was treated itfms icai fiapfiapueSk, He quotes 
Ephoros for the statement that he killed himself, bnt prefers the aooonnt 
of Timdnidds, a follower of Didn and eye-witness of what had oocorred, 
who wrote an aooount to the philosopher Speusippos, describing how 
Philistos' trireme was drlren on shore, how he was taken alive, stripped, 
pelted with mod, beheaded, and dragged by his lame leg through Adhra- 
dina to the quarries.] 

[' Plut. Didn, 37. The district was called Gyarta, and lay away from 
the sea in the interior of the Syracusan territoiy.] 

[• Diod. xvL 17.] 


take the tTxant alive^ and refused to hearken. Dionysios ohap. xi. 
now thought mainly of his own personal safety. He con- ^J^JSjf^ 
trived to escape by sea, taking with him most of tisjj^^^® 
treasures and furniture^ but leaving the best of his mer- 
cenaries still in the Island under the command of his son 
Apollokrat^^ who must have been young for such a trust ^. 
This rather discredited HerakleidSs, as men said that he 
ought to have kept better watch. And the story goes that 
he was thereby stirred up to make yet further attacks on 
Didn, setting on men to propose measures which Didn had 
to withstand. At last he was able to carry a vote by which Didn de- 

priTed of 

Dion was deprived of his generalship^ and twenty-five new his general- 


generals were appointed^ of whom Herakleides himself was 
one '. Hitherto he had not been one of the body of generals^ 
but had held a separate command at sea. And it was further 
voted to refuse pay to the men who had come from Pelo- 
ponnesos with Didn \ These men were not common mer- 
cenaries ; they had come from zeal in the cause^ and had 
done great things for it ; but they could not afford to serve 
for nothing in a strange coimtry. 

'^ The Peloponnesians gathered round Di6n, and prayed Pelopon- 
him to lead them against the Syracusans. Meanwhile the stand by 


party of Herakleides tried to win them over by offers of 
citizenship *. There had been a talk of division of lands, 
and most likely they were to get land instead of their pay. 
But the soldiers clave to Didn^ and Didn refused to act 

[» Pint. Didn, 37.] 

[* lb. 38 ; ol 2vpait6ctoi wiyn «a2 tUofft <rrp9nfYohs kx^tpfn^rtfiray, £r cfr 

[' Diod. zvL 17. The reaion given for the non-payment of the Pelo- 
ponnerian meioenaries Is that there was a icaroity of money in the dty.] 
[^ Plat. Didn, 38 ; IffvyTcXX^ficroi «a« r^s woKirdas l<rofioif(ar.] 


oHAP.zi. against the Syracnsans. He accordingly went away with 
5^^ to ' his followers, 3,000 in number. They marched towards 
bJo^sSt I^eoiitinoi; on the road they were followed by the new 
Syracnsan generals with their force. Didn's men were 
mnch better soldiers than the Syracusansi and they easily 
drove off their assailants, Di6n striving to shed as little 
Syracnsan blood as might be^. He and his men were 
welcomed at Leontinoi and received to citizenship '. 

*'The Syracnsans had thus (b.c. 356) got rid of their 
deliverer about nine months after their deliverance. There 
were faults on both sides; but DiAn undoubtedly had an 
honest purpose to get rid of the tyranny, whatever kind 
of government he may have wished to set up in its 
Siege of '* The Syracusans had now to besiege Ortygia for them- 
oonSnaed ^^^} without Di6n's help or that of his men.'' [For 
^7^^ a time their prospects of success seemed good.] The 
tyrant's garrison in Ortygia were at their wits' end. Pro- 
visions had utterly &dled them ^ and they had no better 
commander than the young son of their master. The story 
reads like a kind of parody of the memorable moment when 
Gbngylos came with the good news that help was coming 
to Syracuse, where a capitulation to the Athenian invaders 
had been all but decreed^ Then it was the men of Syra- 
cuse who had despaired of any longer defending their own 
city. Now it was the enemies of Syracuse who held her 
strongest quarter against her own people, and who were 
driven to the thought of giving up that stronghold of 
tyranny to the commonwealth which had again come to 
life. It marks the d^^ree to which the barbarian mer- 
cenaries of the tyrants had put on the habits of Greek 

[} Plai. Di6ii, 39 ; Diod. xvi. 17.] [* Hut. Didn, 40.] 

I* Diod. xwL 18.] [« See Sletty, iii. 337.] 


militaiy and civil life tliat the soldieiB came together to ohap.zi. 
discuss the questioa of surrender in a f onnal assembly. If GkoriBon of 
the stronghold was to be given up^ it should not be the votes^ 
secret act of a few traitors; it should be done by the general ■'"^™"^«'- 
assent of the whole body. Apollokrates can hardly have 
presided at such a meeting; but, whatever were the forms 
of procedure, a regular vote was passed that^ as soon as it 
was day^ the Island and its garrison should be surrendered 
to the Syracusan people^. While it was still night, heralds 
were sent from the army to announce the vote to the Syra- 
cusans, and doubtless to arrange the terms of surrender. 
The heralds had perhaps set out^ they had certainly not 
come back \ when, with the first dawn of day, deliverance 
came. The Gylippos of tyranny was an officer of Diony- Airival of 
sios; Nypsios by name, a man of the Campanian Neapolis^^ ypmos. 
who is described as a brave and skilful soldier, and, how- 
ever bad was the cause for which he fought, certainly showed 
himself so to be. He had sailed from Lokroi with a rein- 
forcement of soldiers and with a number of merchant-ships 
filled with provisions. He escaped all notice on the part of 
Herakleidls, and brought his precious freight through the 
mouth of the Great Harbour to land hard by the fountain 
of Arethousa^. He and his troops went on shore; his 
first act was to summon a military assembly^. All g^und 
for any thought of surrender was now taken away; the 

[^ Diod. xvi. i8 ; ol d) fuoBa^poi rod Tvp6y¥ov . . . ffvySpafi6rr€i cir 
kiCKXrjfflcaf yvitr^ l}lnf^<rcarro vapaHowai ri^ dicp6vo\iv Koi cr^s abrtAfs rots 

[* Dioddroi (loo. oit.) and Plaiaroh (Di6n, 41) describe him m Siiiffioy 
rdv NcairoX/n/y. Holm (G. S. ii. 460, 461) points oat that Nv^ios is an 
Oscan name-form. It appears as KTMYIOS on an inscription in Ischia, 
and Mommsen, Unteritalieniscbe Dialekte, 28 a, ftirther cites the Oscan 
form NumtiuB, From Nutimtu oomes the later Numimu and Roman 

[^ Diod. 1. c; KorivX^wrt furd rov (niKou, mt MoBatpfdahj wtpi r^y 

[* lb. ; tcou^ U/ckiiffiay avyayo'y^.'] 


oHAP.zi. n^otiations ^th the Syracusans in the city, if any had 
l^/^®' actually b^un^ were broken oflE; the assembly listened 
resolved gladly to the call of the new commander to make them- 
selves ready for a new straggle ^. 

It seems to show strange carelessness^ but a carelessness 
such as we have already heard of^ that Nypsios could thus 
make his way into the Great Harbour while the Syracusans 
had, or ought to have had^ the full command of the sea. 
But Herakleid^s or whoever was in fault was not slow to 
repair the error. It may be that the coming of the heralds 
from Ortygia had put the citizens on the alert; at any rate 
they learned with daylight what was going on. The one 
thought in the Island was to bring the welcome stores to 
land^ All were engaged in this work when the Syra- 
cusan ships suddenly put to sea and came to the attack. 
Dionysios must have left some triremes behind him or 
Nypsios must have brought some with him. The service 
of the mercenaries was a land-service^ and all were a moment 
Sea-victory before engaged in quite another business. The ships were 
kleidte. hastily manned^ and put to sea how they could, naturally 
in bad order ^. Victory was for the fleet of the common- 
wealth. Four^ of the tyrant's ships were taken, others 
were sunk, and the rest were driven ashore. Whether any 
of the good things that Nypsios had brought fell into the 
hands of the Syracusans we are not told. 

If we may again compare small things with great — 
remember that they seem so much smaller mainly through 
the difference of the telling — ^we seem to be reading afresh 
the day when Herakl^, on his auspicious day, gave victory 
to Syracuse on the same waters^. Again the toils and 
dangers of the sea-fight were followed by the wild revelry 

[» Diod. xvl. i8.] 

[' lb. ; 9tpl rijiy k^alptaiy r^s dyopSs Starpifioviraf.'] 

[* lb.; rt0opiufiiffi4van.'] 

I* Pint. Didn, 41. In Diod6ro8, 1. c, tlie number is not given.] 

[• See Sicily, 34a ieqq.] 


of the feast of yictoiy. Men sacrificed thank-offerings to chap, xl 
the gods, they ate and drank and made merry \ as on the 
night when Hermokrates counselled in vain to bar the path 
of the retreating Nikias ^ But H£rakleid6s was not Her- 
mokrates^ and Nypsios^ safe in the fortress of Ortygia, was 
another enemy from Nikias making ready for his march of 
sorrow. Day had not dawned when the mercenaries of the Suooeflsfol 
tyrant came forth in soldierly array from the gates of ^q^yjpsiog. 
Ortygia^ They came forth with special orders from 
Nypsios to deal with the Syracusans as they would and as 
they could K There was indeed a hindrance in their path 
before they could reach their victims. The new-built wall 
stood before them. But the mercenaries had scaling-ladders^ 
and those ladders could be used without hindrance when the 
guards of the wall were sleeping their drunken sleep ^. They 
were easily slain, and before long ten thousand barbarians 
were in defenceless Achradina^ carrying out the bidding of 
their captain against its doomed inhabitants. Of Herakleid^ 
we hear nothing personally; the commonwealth had many 
generals, but they were as drunk as the rest. When some Nypsios 
glimmering of what wa« going on had reached their minds, X^L 
they tried as they best might to call the citizens to arms. \°^^]^?fj 
But the attempt was hopeless. The generals reached the 
a^ora — ^the spot where Didn had been so lately welcomed 
as the deliverer of the city — ^to find it in the hands of 
the enemy^ to be themselves cut down in the confusion or, 
the more lucky of them, to escape to some place of shelter*. 
It would not be hard for both generals and others to make 
their way into some of the other parts of the city^ and there 

\} Pint. Didn, 41 ; c2f w^ravs Htd ffwcvctas luofutkt rphf/tarrn, Ct Diod. 
X¥i. 18.] 
[• See Sicay, iii. 358.] 
[* Pint Di6n, 41 ; Diod. xvL 19.] 
P Flat. L o.; «cXci$tfar XP9^^ ^^ wpoorvyxSannfffOf As fiddkorrm mt 

[» Diod. 1. c] [• lb.] 


oHAP.zi. to gather in some kind of order while Lower Achradina 

was left a defenceless prey to the enemy. 
Sack of th« ' The bidding of Nypsios gave the city and its people over 
j^j^otf to the will of his mercenaries. Of slaughter there was 
plenty; but slaughter was but a secondary object; the 
barbarians^ in possession of part at least of a wealthy and 
luxurious town^ had to reap the reward of their toils. The 
first work of the mercenaries in possession of the agora was 
to break open and sack the houses of the citizens. Every 
man who came in their way, all who strove to withstand 
them in the darkness of the narrow streets, were slain or 
disabled. A f ew^ but a few only^ of their own body were 
Hnnutti killed by the citizens. But plunder^ human plunder above 
^ off. ^i ^^^ ^^ fi^t thought of the barbarians. The darkness 
did not hinder them from seizing and bearing away the 
rich spoil of the Syracusan houses^ least of all from carry- 
ing off the women and children whom they found in those 
houses^. Lust and greed had a rich feast that nighty 
and it was to lust and greed that it was mainly devoted. 
The mercenaries of the tyrant had toiled and waited and 
hungered; they now had their reward. 
Continiied The dawn of the next morning revealed to those of the 
of A§ir». citizens who had escaped to the upper parts of the city 
<iii>** what the horrors of the night had been ^. Nor did those 
horrors cease with daylight The mercenaries went on 
with their work during the whole of the next day; but 
seemingly in the lower city only. Epipolai at least was 
dear^ and in the hands of the citizens \ With daylight 
they were able to come together in some kind of assembly^ 

\} Diod. zvi. 19 ; obit hXlya tk irdfftara ymfoutw /nl voidftir in 8* obttr&v 
i(firtpawo9i(9ro. Pint. Di6n, 41 ; ywmxw tk teat waiieay 6iyoiUw¥ els ri^ 
djrp^oXiir fcc/ lAiiwyrp^ [* Diod. zvi. 20.] 

[* This appears from the finct that the Seatapyla (Diod. zvi. ao) wm 
•till in the hands of the Syracusans. Plntaich (Di6n, 4a) has the odd 
phrase ; rev iciv^ov «pds ri^ *Axpa8iri^ wktiut&^ovrof : but a good part 
of AchradiDa must have been already xavaged.] 

BEOALL OF Di6k. 273 

while the barbarians were etill working their will in the chap.xi. 
parts nearer to the Island. The general feeling in men's 
minds was that there was no hope save in the recall of 
Didn ; but for a while none dared for very shame to utter 
his name^. But it was not a time to keep back from 
speech or from action. After a while the horsemen and Syraooflans 
the aUies found a voice, and called aloud that there was j^ecall 
but one chance, to send at once for Didn and the Pelopon- ^^^ 
nesians at Leontinoi. The moment the names were uttered, 
a general cry of assent and delight went up from the 
assembly. Men longed and prayed to see him again ; they 
wept as they thought of his valiant deeds, of his zeal and 
energy in his own person, and it was he who had stirred 
them up to face the enemy as he did himself \ Seven Their 
messengers were at once sent to Leontinoi; five were Syra- ®"^^^y"- 
cusan horsemen ; the other two represented the allies. The 
name of one of them, ArchdnidSs, raises a thought. Not a 
few Sikel allies had joined the march of Didn^; was the 
present envoy a descendant or kinsman of the two famous 
Sikel bearers of his name, the friend of Ducetius and the 
rounder of HalsDsa^? Biding at full speed, they reached 
Leontinoi in the afternoon ^. They first spoke to Di6n Appeal to 
only. With tears in their eyes, they told him all that Leontinoi. 
Sjrracuse was at that moment suffering. Their coming 
naturally awakened curiosity; Leontines and Peloponne* 
sians crowded around Didn to learn what the news was 
which called for the earnest pleadings which the envoys 
were pouring into the ears of Dion^. With the true 
instinct of a Greek, Didn led the way to the theatre, and 

\} Flut. Di6n, 43 ; w6yT4s fttv ^p6ww, lAryc 8i M^U, alcrxyi^6fur<H tijr 

[» Plot. Didn, 4a.] 

[• See p. 353.] 

[* See p. 40, and Sicily, n. 320 seqq.] 

[* Flut. loo. dt. ; rift IliUpas f|8ij xaTa^/wfUr^Y.] 

[* lb. ; iwcifoovi^a ttrai n im9ifr%fw,'\ 



oHAF.xi. there the crowd took their places in an orderly assembly^. 
Two of the envoys, Archonides and the Syracusan horse- 
man Hellanikos, stood forward to tell in short and pithy 
words of all that was still going on in Syracuse. They 
called on the soldiers of Di6n to come to the help of the 
city, to forget their own wrongs. They must themselves 
allow that the punishment of the men of Syracuse was yet 
greater than their vnrong-doing ^. 
Didn re- The envoys ceased speaking and a deep silence followed, 
^^of Then Didn arose; tears for a while checked his speech. 
Syracuse, gjg soldiers bade him be of good courage, while they wept 
with him^. At last he spoke. He had brought them, 
the Peloponnesians and other allies, to take counsel as to 
their own course. As for his own course there was no 
question. When Syracuse was perishing, it was his duty, 
if he could not save her, to go and bury himself in the 
His appeal flames of her ruin ^. But his hearers had a choice before 
ponnedan them. If they could forgive the most foolish and most 
*"><>P«* unhappy people who had cast them forth, if they could 
still bring themselves to go to their help, in setting up 
again the Syracusan city, they would be setting up their 
own work^. If, after the treatment which they had 
undergone, they judged otherwise, he would pray that the 
gods might ever show them meet &vour for the zeal and 
valour which they had ever shown towards him. And he 
would pray them to remember Didn as one who had 
neither forsaken them when they were wrong, nor yet 

\} Pint. Di6]i, 43. That tlie kiueXrjaia took place in the theatre appears 
from 0. 43.] 

[' lb. ; dfs fi(l(wa Huetfy ZtZeatcSrcay ainw 4 kafitiy hxf ol leaitSfs vtrovBSrts 

[* lb. 43 ; dya<rr(irros 52 rov AIm^os mt X4y€ir dp^aftivov woXXA rw 
9<uepi6Mf kmriwTotfra rj)^ <pon^ Mffx^' ^ ^^ i^^o*^ waptK&kow Oapptiv mt 

[* lb. ; f I aSfaai /li) hnfoliKqw dwtifu r^ 9vpl mt rf rr^fum. T$r waTpl9ot 
{* lb. ; h/UT€pov ipyoy cZcrea^ 6p$cvT€ r^r XvpoKwyto/if vtfAiy.] 

Di6n MABOHBS to the belief of STBAOUSB. 275 

forsaken his own citizens in their day of suffering. The ohap.xi. 
answer to his speech was a common shout of assent from 
the whole body of Peloponnesians and allies. They sprang 
to their f eet^ and called on Didn to lead them to the rescue 
of Syracuse with all speed. The envoys from Syracuse 
embraced him and embraced his soldiers^ calling every 
blessing from the gods upon their heads. As soon as the Didn's 
shout ceased, Didn bade them go and sup and make ready x^ieye 
for a march. They were to meet him in arms in the place Syraouae. 
where they were now gathered. It was a march by night 
that he designed. 

The second night since the sea-fight was now drawing in. 
The soldiers of Dionysios had now been for a night and 
a day revelling in every form of outrage through at least 
the lower parts of the city, at the cost of a very few lives 
of their own number. As night came on, their wary cap- 
tain thought it wise to call them back into the stronghold 
of the Island. Meanwhile Difin was on his march. A Contrftdio- 
ernes of contradictory messages met him from the city. ^'^ 
One came from the generals, telling him that his help was 
no longer needed; the enemy had withdrawn into the 
Island, and the Syracusans were able to defend themselves. 
This message, it was said^ was the work of demagogues 
who bade the people to think no longer of Di6n nor to 
receive him if he came with his band of strangers ^ 
There was, so it was argued, no immediate danger; the 
enemy after their late success would keep quiet for a 
while. To receive Didn and his Peloponnesians would be 
to acknowledge them as their betters and to confess that 
they could not save their city for themselves ^ It is 
not clear whether the message was sent out early enough 
to tell Di&n of the next stage of the evening's work by 
which, as night came on, a guard was set to keep the 
gates against him. In any case the message from the 

E» Plttt. Di6n, 44.] P lb.] 

T 2 

376 THE DELIYEBEBS. generals did not come alone. The horsemen and better 
class of citizens contrived to send another message, calling 
on Dion to come on to their help all the same. In this 
picture of the action of demagogues we see, as ever, the 
signs of that literary and philosophic dislike to all forms 
of popular government which marks all our later guides. 
Still nothing is more likely than that, even at such a 
moment, there should be two opinions in Syracuse as to 
the expediency of again receiving Di&n and his soldiers, 
and that two opposite messages should be sent to him. 
The effect of the two was that Dion kept on his march, 
but somewhat slackened his pace^. More decisive news 
might come before he reached Syracuse. 

When the day, the third day, began to dawn, Di6n was 
about sixty stadia from the city, not far from the site of 
Urgent Megara. About this point he was first met by some of 
Dito/* ^^ Syracusan horsemen, ever friendly to Di6n, who had a 
grievous tale to telL The city was again in the hands of 
the enemy \ They were presently followed by men bear- 
ing news more frightful still. The party most hostile to 
Didn had brought themselves to crave his help. They had 
to crave it with greater earnestness and in a deeper necessity 
than when the first appeal had reached Di6n at Leontinoi. 
A formal message was brought from the general Hera- 
kleid^, a message brought by the general's brother and 
his unde Theodot^, calling on Dion to come and save 
Syracuse. There was no other hope; at the moment there 
was no resistance to the enemy; Herakleid^ himself was 
wounded; the city was on fire and well nigh destroyed. 

The tale was a true one ; help was needed as it had never 
been needed before ; the horrors of the first night had been 
but a mild prelude to what was to come on the second. 
Nypsios, in his stronghold in the Island, clearly knew all 

[^ Plttt. Didn, 44; fifioSiws &/m ccU KordL irwov^v irop€v6/itvot wpoajjti,'] 



tiiat was going on. He had heard that Di6n was coming, obap. xi. 
that he was bidden not to come, that the gates were shut 
against him, that, in answer to other messages, he was 
still on his march. Now, from the point of view of Nypsios, 
was his own time and the time of his mercenaries, before 
Di6n could come, while Syracuse was still defenceless. 

In the middle of the night the barbarian mercenaries The sack 
were again let forth from Ortygia, in greater numbers and ^i|[l:re"i^ 
in a fiercer mood than on the TLishb before. Of the first ^^^^ ^^ 
night the work had been mainly plunder, plunder in all its 
forms; slaughter had been its casual accessory. This 
second night of the barbarians in Syracuse was to have 
slaughter and destruction of all kinds for its main work. 
Nypsios despaired of permanently maintaining his master's 
power in Syracuse; he would reverse the saying once 
spoken at the council-board of the elder tyrant ; he would 
bury the tyranny with the fallen city^. The wall with 
which Di6n had cut ofE the Island from the mainland^ the 
wall which they had scaled the night before, was now 
broken down to make an easy entrance into the city'. 
Then the work began, a work of thorough havoc, a work The dty 
of massacre and burning. Not only men, but women and SSf^". 
children, were slaughtered. The city was systematically 
fired. The nearer houses were set fire to by torches ; fiery 
arrows were shot into the more distant ^ Men were 
burned in their houses, or came out of them either to be 
cut down in the streets by the soldiers or else crushed by 
the fall of the burning buildings ^. It was the last and 

\} Plut. IMdn, 44 ; £<nrf p hroi^iAffat rfjy rvpamfiZa rj w6\u vhrovcev 
l/Se^Xtro. For the Mjing about DionyiioB L lee p. 19, and Appendix 11.] 
[* lb. ; rd /akp wpor^x^^f"* *^ f M^y «ar^<r«avrc.] 
[* lb.; kftl rhv i^rharcw &c^ wup6t wirrcty iK§$pc¥ koL d^avi^/idy Ix^ 

ep^tfw Zmffw^forru dvd T^wr infpofi6kovt. Dioddroe (x?i. ao) laya that 
Nypeioi let fire to the hooBes and bnildingi abont the agora.] 

[* Plut. Didn, 44 ; woXk&v (plia&r) Ifitf ^9yofiiron^ Kot /raro^po/i^rwr 
Ifli rodf fiiaMerraf.] 


CHAP. XI. wildest revel of tyranny. Over how laige a part of the 
city these horrors spread we are not distinctly told. But 
when the message reached Didn they had clearly not reached 
the whole of the high ground. The Hexapyla were still 
in the hands of the citizens; they were no longer shut 
against the deliverer, and through them a helpless multi- 
tude, women and children and old men^ to the number of 
ten thousand^ poured forth to meet him on his way^ and 
to implore him to hasten to the rescue of what was left 
of Syracuse \ 
Forced The prayer was needless. Since the last message Didn 

PI5j^ ^ and his comrades had been pressing along the road by the 
sea-shore with the quickest speed of which a body of 
armed men is capable. The final message once heard, 
he set forth the case to his army^ he told them of the 
fearful danger of the city which they had come to rescue^ 
and bade them hasten'. The soldiers failed in no sort 
of the zeal of their leader; each man sped on and bade 
his comrade to speed on^. The north side of the hill 
He re- was clearly free from enemies. Didn and his men marched 
racuBo by" ^P ^7 ^^ roads which led to the Hexapyla ; they went in 
Hezapyl*. ^thout hindrance, and once more^ as they had done at the 
Temenites when need was far less pressing, they stood 
within tiie walls of Syra^mse on an errand of deKverance. 

The joy of the delivered citizens was boundless. The 
shouts of delight with which Didn and his men were 
greeted were long and loud. The names of honour which 
were showered upon the general outdid those with which 
Hailed as Ocldn had been welcomed on his return from Himera. If 
^ ^ the deliverer was not hailed as a king^ men went a step 

further and called him a god^. But the philosopher of 

P Died. xvi. 20.] [« Plut. Didn, 45.] 

[' Pint. Di6n, 45 ; oMn 06SvfP ^cy dXXd 8/mS^ rb arpATtu/Aa wp6s ri^y 

[* lb. 46 ; rdv fA^v Aioira aorrfpa tctd $€hv dwoMiXotWttii'. Geldn had been 


the Academy had his fellow-gods to praj to^ and he called ohap.xi. 
on them again to bless his enterprise^. His soldiers 
were greeted as brethren and f ellow-citizensj and such of 
the Syracusans as had saved their lives and their weapons 
amid the plundering hastened to join the ranks of the 

Di6n, entering by the Hezapyla^ found himself atDidndean 
the head of the long street called the Hekatompedon^ 
answering to the road across the hill leading from modem 
Syracuse to Catania. He was, in a military point of 
view^ in much the same position as the Boman general 
Marcellus when he entered Syracuse at the same point 
a hundred and forty years later. It is plain that the 
whole of Tycha and Epipolai was free from the enemy; 
but between him and his work of deliverance stood the 
old west wall of Achradina carried down by Dionysios to 
the Great Harbour ^. Within that defence the mercenaries 

iiailed m €b€py4npf icat ffvr^fta icat fiankia (I)iod« zi. 26 ; tee Sicily, ii. 
aoa, 303).] 

[^ Plut. DidD, 46 ; TOK 0€6is vpo<r€v$A/uvos» So at a later stage (Diod. 
ztL ao) f0v<rt rclis Btois inrlp t^ (Twrrfpias,'] 

P Pint. Didn, 45.] 

[' lb.; ^v /uv €^ Mtd r^ vap^ rur -roktfiUn^ ^/9fpd wurrdftaffiy dv- 
fjypwfiiyciw md wapaTtray/JLiytuv wapd, t6 Tdx^fffta xa^<«4'' ^X^*^ *^ Sv(rc«- 
fiiaarw r^ vp^oSor. Mr. Freeman in the text suppoees that by the 
TtixurtM IB meant the W. wall of Achradina. Schabringj on the otheir 
hand (Achradina, 47), takes it to be the mined cross-wall built by Di6n 
to wall off Ortygia : and this appears the more probable view. Didn's 
obvious strategy would be to try to out off at its oonverging pointy near 
the gate of the Akropolis, the line of retreat of the plundering mercenaries. 
But in his endeavour to do this he would be impeded by the ruins of his 
own croas-wall. Nypsios indeed had overthrown it, but it yet might serve 
as a breastwork behind which to draw up, as he appears to have done, 
a covering force to prevent Didn's troops pressing on to the gate of the 
Akropolii, and forcing an entry with the zetreating mercenaries. The 
cross- wall itself is caUed simply r6 rdxt^fa by Plutarch (ch. 41), — ^maric 
the use of the article, — otherwise indifferently wtptrtixifffia (ch. 30), 
diartlxiff/tfi (ib.), and wpordxifffta (ch. 44). Dioddros (xvi. 19) calls the 
new work simply raxot. Plutarch's words, then, must be taken to mean 
(i) that part of the enemy were engaged in plundering at large ; (a) but 
that one division had been drawn up in battle array behind the ruins 


oHAP.xL of the tyrant were still doing as thejr willed with the 
Jjj^j^?^ unhappy city and its people. Di6n now marshalled his 
followers in snch order as suited the work to be done. 
The light-armed troops were sent on to make the first 
attack ; their coming would at least surprise the enemy 
and do something to raise the hopes of the citizens^. 
The heavy-armed^ his Feloponnesians and allies and the 
Syracusans who had joined them, were arranged in divisions 
tmder their officers, so as to act at several points at once'. 
Dion himself marched in the front rank of all '. 

We have no clear account of the operations ; but it is 
plain that the wall of Achradina had to be carried in some 
way. There such of the mercenaries as Nypsios could 
form in military array made a stand. They were most 
likely no large body. The more part were busy burning 
and slaying; this time plunder was secondary; yet some 
were plundering; they are set before us as carrying off 
on their shoulders various objects that tempted them^. 
When the deliverers had made their way in^ they had to 
advance and the soldiers of Nypsios had to withstand 
them how they might. The fight had to be carried on in 
the narrow streets^ not on level ground, but among the 
slopes and rocks and tombs of Syracuse, amid the smoke 
of the burning city, and with the burning houses foiling 
at every step, over ground strewed with their ashes ^, and 
choked up with the bodies of the slain. Fighting could 

of tbe orotB-wall. The pitched hnttle, m we eee below, took place near 
the AkropoUs.] 

P Pint. Didn, 45.] 

[' Ih. ; 6p$lov9 Kixovt fm&v koSl 9iatpSj¥ rds ^ytfuvlas 5iiwr [d/iov] iroX* 
hax^Bof fya wpotn^povro ^o0€p£n€pw> Diod. xvL 20 ; mrA voAAo^f r&uout 

[* Plot. Didn, 46 ; dyw M roht vokf/iious.'] 

[^ Diod. xvi. 20]. 

[' Pint. Didn, 46 ; Mi HiawApiHf kmfiabtowTtt iptiwloit Mat mra^pQ/ihoit 

90psv6fuyot Koyioprdv In ipfirro mrix^ar /cai fti) duunaw ti^ t^it.] 


only be done by small parties on either side ; but the zeal chap. xi. 
of the foUowers of Didn, their better discipline too under 
the circumstances^ in the end carried all before them. 
When the wall of Achradina had been carried, no further 
defence stood in their way till they reached the immediate 
entrance of the Island. The wall which Didn had built 
to hem in the enemy and which they might now have de- 
fended against them^ had been broken down by the mer- 
cenaries themselves. The last struggle then was in theBavagen 
Lower Achradina haid by the Isthmus. The more part of \^^^ 
the enemy were able to escape into Ortyg^ and to fasten ^^ygi** 
the gates ^. Those who were left outside were slaughtered 
without mercy; no one could say that they had other than 
the just reward of their deeds. The number of slain 
enemies during the whole struggle was reckoned at four 
thousand ^. Di6n had for a second time set free all Syra- 
cuse save the special stronghold of the tyrant. The first 
time his entrance had been little more than a military and 
religious procession. The second had been made only with 
frightful toil, and it was made into a half -ruined and still 
burning city. 

The enemy were overcome; but there was still work to 
be done; neither citizens nor strangers could sit down 
to enjoy their victory at ease^ The first work was to 
quench the fire that was still blazing among the houses^ 
and to clear the streets of the dead bodies of friends and 
foes^. We hear nothing of any burial-truce being sought 
for by Nypsios ; the laws of Hellenic warfare were perhaps 
not held to extend to barbarian robbers, murderers of un- 
armed citizens and women. But the trophy was not for- Didn*B 


\} Plat. Didn, 46 ; xal ri /cir vXuorw o&rShf As rj^ (tr/M^voAir 177^ 
tXifw dro^ciryoy Icn&Ccro. Diod. xvi. 20; nl Kovwoi ffw(<pvyw €ls ri^ 
dirp^voXir, ttal rdf w^kas kktifforrts k^ifvycfif rhv «ly8iryor.] 

[« Diod. 1. c] 

[» Plut. Didn, 46.] 

[* Diod. 1. c ; Flat. 1. c] 


CHAP. XI. gotten ^. The agora of Syracuse had become a battle-field^ 
and had to be marked as such. 

Didn Mid *^' Didn had thus saved Syracuse a second time, and his 
kleidds. second entrance was of a very different kind from the first. 
As soon as might be^ an assembly was held. The more 
part of Di6n^s chief enemies had fled ; HSrakleides and his 
uncle Theodotes confessed their fault and craved his pardon. 
Many of Didn's friends urged him to put them to death 
and to free the city from their intrigues. But Didn for- 
gave them^ after a somewhat pedantic speech'^ saying that 
it was his business as a philosopher to outdo his enemies in 
virtue. He then repaired the wall which hemmed in the 
Island; he buried the dead, and ransomed the captives. 
In another assembly Herakleides himself proposed that 
Didn should be made general with full powers by land and 
sea^. But it is said that the sailors who had shared 
Herakleides' victory objected ; so the command was divided, 
HSrakleid^s taking the command by sea^. War with 
Dionysios went on for some while, but each side charged 
the other with negligence and treason, till Didn and Hera- 
kleides were again formally reconciled through the inter- 
vention of a Spartan named Gaisylos, who had come from 
Sparta to act, if need be, the part of Oylippos^. We 
should like to know something more about his mission; 

P Diod. 1. 0.] * Stoiy of Sidly, p. 21 a seqq. 

[' The flpeech is given by Plutaroh (Didn, 47 ; see Grote, ch. Izzjdv). 
Aooording to Plutarch it wm addrened to the friends of Hdrakleidds 
previoQS to the meeting of the Kkkl^a. Didn's friends hsd niged him 
to execute Hdnkleidds ; muL rov wokirtjifumK l^cXccy drf/uuiifwlav, Infiayiff 
v6<nifia, rvpayvilkn oint IXarrof.] 

[B Pint. Didn, 48; xat waptXBin^ *HpaM\dStis tlai/y^aaro yy&firiy obrO' 
Kp&ropa, arpoTjf^v Ihio^ai Aioava mrd y^ xat $6Xaffaaaf,'] 

[* Plut. 1. c] [» Plut. Didn, 49.] 


but our account is most meagre in eyerything but what ohap.xl 
personally concerns Didn. At any rate Oaisylos behaved 
thoroughly well^ claiming nothing for himself^ but binding 
Herakleides by the most solemn oaths to be faithful to 

'' Soon after this came the full completion of deliverance. Di6n re- 

coven tho 

We do not hear again of Nypsios ; but Apollokratte the island. 

son of Dionysios found that he could hold out no longer. 

He sailed away under a truce which he made with Didn^ 

by which he was allowed to take away his mother and 

sisters and so much of his goods and treasure as he could 

take in five triremes \ But the fortress and the military 

stores in it were given up to Didn. And as nothing is 

said of the mercenaries, it would seem that they passed 

into Di6n's service. Didn now went into the Island and 

was welcomed by his sister Aristomache, the widow of the 

old DionysioSj by his wife Arete, whom he took back 

again^ and by his son Hipparinos. 

*' The joy throughout Syracuse was great ; but it was 

soon damped. Didn went to live in his own house and not 

in the fortress ; but he kept possession of the fortress when 

men hoped that he would destroy it altogether. We cannot 

blame him when he refused^ what many wished^ to destroy 

the tomb of the elder Dionysios, and to cast out his bones. 

But he kept power in his own hands, and kept on hisAruto- 

cntic so- 
haughty demeanour. He had no thought of restoring the vemment 

democracy as it had stood before the tyranny began. He 

was still corresponding with Plato and with friends at 

Sparta and Corinth', cities used to aristocratic govem- 

[» Plut. DiAn, 5a] 

[' Among the ptfaioipBl Mcmatioiis agwiut Didn made by HteiJdeidds 


oBAF.xi. ment. Among them they dreamed of another beautiful 
scheme of government, in which what we may call Idng^ 
lords, and commons were all to have their proper places ^. 
Herakleid^ and his party, whether they knew anything of 
all this or not, at least knew that Didn had not restored 
the old Syracusan commonwealth, but kept all power in 
his own hands. They naturally complained. And now 
Di6n yielded to his friends who again suggested the death 

Murder of of HerakleidSs. Dion had refused to put him to death 


kleidds. when it could have been done^ if not by a legal sentence, 
at least by military execution ; he now sank to connive at 
the secret murder of HSrakleidds^ Whatever he had 

and bis followers (Plutarch, Didn, 53), besidee bis preflervation of DionysioB' 
tomb and hit maintenanoe of the ** Syracoian Baitille " (jSri rijy &Kp€» ob 
KariffKm/ft : of. Grote, ch. Izxziv), was that he sent to Corinth for oounsellon 
{<nf/t0o6Kow) and fellow-Stratdgoi (awdpxoyrf^s, of. Pint. Didn, 39). He sent 
for Corinthians, adds Flatarcb, because he thought that they would be 
readier instruments for introducing the form of government that he wished 
to establish at Syracuse (6/wy «a2 toi>s KopipBtovs i\iyapxuc^tp6v re voXi- 
TWOfUrovs Kot /i^ voKKSl r&y leoa^ kr rf ^11^ wpAfrrcvras), An interesting 
trace of Didn's Corinthianizing policy may be found in the issue by him 
of a Syracusan coinage, modeUed on the '* P^gasi " (ZIw\oi) of Corinth. 
The coins of Corinth and her colonies had already, inP the days of the 
Elder Dionjsios, attained a large currency in Sicily (see Suppl. III. p. 349), 
but it is at this time that ten-litra pieces {htic&XjLrpoi orar^pis), as they 
were known in the island, were first struck in the name of the Syracusans. 
A fellow coinage, evidently the result of a monetary convention with 
Syracuse, was at the same time issued by Leontinoi, — an evidence of the 
equal alliance between the two cities under Didn (see Syr. Medallions, 
&c., 156 seqq.f and SuppL IV).] 

{} Pint. Didn, 53 ; 'Evcv^ci 9^ rifi^ iikv htforw dtj/aomparlaa^f c&t oi voXi* 
rdav, dKKi^ wayrov^aktcv o^aw voXirciarv, Hard t6p UXdrcava^ Kw\6tty, Aa- 
MMUtt^ 94 n icai KpfjTiitbv ff)^fa fu^ifttyot !« df/iov «a2 fiafftkiias Apurro* 
KparUa^ tX""^ ^ Ivcororovaar muL fipafitikwray riL /Uywra ito0i<n6vai muL 
mcfui^. Plat. Besp. viii. 551 d.] 

[' Plat. Didn, 53 ; *Cis o^ fdXicra vpdr rnvra rdr *BpaMX€i9tpf kvarrtdf 
0W$ai wpoaMita leal riXXa rapaxii^ not c^/cfr^crot Mti <rra(riaoTi«d$ j(r, 
odf 96X01 ficvXoiUifonn tKbrdw ktt&kww drcAccV^, roirois IWrpc^c r6rt. To 
soothe the Syracusans who were greatly excited by this act of violence, 
Didn gave Hdrakleidte a state funend with militavy honours.] 

HUBDEB OF Di6n. 285 

done before, whatever he dreamed of doings he was now cfHAP.xi. 
practically tyrant. 

" As such he was before long to undergo the tyrant's fate. 
With the position of a tyrant he had not learned to practise 
the system of caution and suspicion by which tyrants 
maintained their power. He still put faith in his Athenian 
friend Kallippos ^, who all the while was plotting against 
him. He had warnings and visions^ and his son threw 
himself from a window and was killed. His wife AretS, 
and lus sister Aristomach^, knew better what was going 
on. They made Kallippos take the Great Oath, the most Mnzder of 


solemn of oaths in the name of the great goddesses of 
Sicily, that he was planning no ill against Di6n '. But he 
cared not for the oath, and he presently compassed the death b.o. 354 


of Di6n at the hands of some young Zakynthians. These, 
one would think^ must have been men who had followed 
Di6n when he set saQ from their island, but who turned 
against him now that he was looked on as a tyrant." 

§ 2. Tauromeniou re/bunded by Audromacios. 

About this time yet another change took place in the 
settlement of the still youthful city which looked down 

P See p. 257.] 

[' Pint. Didn, 57. In order io Bwear "ih» great oath'* (d/i^oi t^ 
lU'yav SpMw) the votary deioended to the Temenoe of the Theimophoroi — 
Ddmdter and Penephond — which lay, in later times at least (see Cicero, 
Verr. iv. 53), within the limits of the Neapolis,— doubtless in oontignity to 
the great cemetery, now known as the NecropoU del Fusoo (the mention 
of the descent almost suggests that the sanctuary lay below the lower 
teirace). He who todc the oath was first wrapped round by the priests 
with ** the purple robe of the Goddess** (r^y vop^piZa tQs Bwu) and took 
in his hand a burning torch. Kallippos carried his impiety so iu (drrsi 
Kar€y4kaa€ rarr ^cwr) that he waited for tlie festival of the Xoreia and the 
actual day of the Goddess to break his oath by accomplishing Di6n*s murder. 
ThefeastoftheKorftwisatharvesi-tim«-thatis,inJuM. Cf. IKod. t. 4.] 


OHAP. zi. from the height of Tauros on the site where Naxos once 

Colonyof had been. We have seen Dionysios plant there a colony 

nysioBat ^^ ^ mercenaries, without being able to do more than 

Taoro- mess at their nationality ^, To make room for them he 

memon. o j 

had driven out the mass of Himilkdn's Sikel settlers, but 
seemingly not alP. In such a state of things the in- 
habitants of Tauromenion would be of very mingled birth 
and customs. But there would be a Oreek element among 
them, and it was the Greek element which would naturally 
assimilate the others. Greeks would settle at Tauromenion, 
and would bring with them the Greek language and Greek 
manners. That tongue and those manners would be 
adopted by Sikels, Campanians, and Iberians ; there would 
be no fear of the Greeks being assimilated by the bar- 
barians. And we may go further and say that the older 
Greek element in Tauromenion, from whatever quarter it 
came, must have been mainly Doric; for the official 
speech of Greek Tauromenion remained Doric ^ in the teeth 
of a large Ionic immigration. 
New Ionic It is to this lonic settlement that we have now come^ 
^trlT^^ a^ event which fixed the character of Tauromenion as a 
menion. Greek ciiy for three hundred years. Our account is 
provokingly meagre. We hear of Tauromenion without 
any hint as to its condition or constitution, except that 
Andro- it still stood open to receive fresh settlers. We hear of 
a citizen of Tauromenion, Andromachos by name, who is 
described as holding the chief position in the city by virtue 
of combined wealth and character. It is no doubt his own 
son who gives this report of him ; for Andromachos was 
the &ther of the historian Timaios^. Was he a popular 

^ See above, p. 175. ' See above, loo. cit. 

[* This results from the coins whioh bear the legend TATPOBfENITAK 
and AFXATETAS, and from the language of the great Tauromenitan in- 
scriptions. C. I. G. 5640, 5641.] 

* Diod. xvL 7 ; 'Ar9p6fmxo9 6 Tavpofttrlrtft, Ti/mmIov /lip rod rcb larofias 
cvyypafftarros vmi^p if¥, wko^r^ tk mi |fvx$' ^a/irp6nfTt dio^pttir. 



leader, a magistrate of the commonwealtli, or something chap.xi. 
more? Whether demagogue, magistrate^ or tyrant, he 
had power or influence for a great work« And^ as it was 
a work in direct opposition to the policy of the late tyrant 
of Syracuse^ we may safely believe that Tauromenion had 
taken advantage of the death of Dionysios to assert its 
independence. One class of his victims^ or rather their Andro- 
children, found at last a resting-place at the hands of pi^^^ 
Andromachoe. The remnant of the scattered Naxians, *^?J°^^ 

exiles at 

driven from Naxos, driven again from Mylai ^, after wan- Taoro- 
dering for years up and down Sicily, were at last brought 
together by the Tauromenitan leader, and were received to 
the citizenship of the city on the mountain-side \ 

It was a turning-point in the history of Tauromenion 
when these Naxian settlers first looked down from their 
new home upon the forsaken home of their fathers. From 
the youngest of the Oreek cities in Sicily they looked 
down on the site of the eldest. Naxos in a manner sprang 
to life again in the now Oreek Tauromenion. The city Naxian 
did not indeed adopt the ChaUddian speech of the uew^^Q^y^, 
settlers ; but it did adopt their traditions. For the Naxians 
came with traditions ready made; the mixed multitude 
whom they found in Tauromenion could have had no com- 
mon traditions of any kind. 

The story of the origin of the name^ told once before 
of the Sikel settlers under Himilkdn^ is told again of 
the Oreek settlers tmder Andromachos. They would 
abide on Tauros, and the name of Tauromenion, with 
better luck than in the former case, set forth their 
purpose of so abiding'. By this last change the holy 
place of the patron god of Sikeliot settlement came back 

* See above, pp. 157, 158. 

' Biod. u. 8. ; 'AySp^^iaxof f^potirc roit l« t^ N^ov T^f KaTooKa^^Unif 

' Diod. n. ■. See above, p. 108. 


CHAP. XI. to his own people^ to his own people in the stricteBt 

sense, to the children of those who had first reared his 

Caltof altar. That altar now again stood within the territory 

ATChd^tdB of ^ Greek city, and Tauromenion^ in the persons of her 

at Tfturo- Jfaxian settlers, devoted herself with all zeal to the worship 

of Apollon Archegetes^ and commemorated him as her own 

upon her coins \ The whole story of Tauromenion is sin* 

gularly like the story of the Thermai of Himera \ In both 

cases the Carthaginian founder had called a town into 

being whose special object was to stand in the way of 

AiuJogy Greek advance. Thermai was settled by Phoenicians^ Tau- 

Thermai of romenion by Sikels ; one was a part of the Carthaginian 

imera. dominion in Sicily, the other was at most an ally bomid to 

Carthage by ties of gratitude. In both cases the new 

foundation came to answer purposes exactly opposite to 

those for which it was founded. The spots which were 

meant to be outposts of the barbarian against the Greek 

were presently admitted within the Greek fold^ and each 

took the place of a lost Greek city. The tale of Sikeliot 

commonwealths was not in the end shortened by the over* 

throw of Himera and Naxos. Thermai and Tauromenion^ 

towns still abiding and keeping their ancient names, were 

added to the roll in their stead. 

Later hiB^ The city thus strengthened by new colonists grew and 

Taaro- prospered^ and became specially remarkable for the wealth 

of its citizens \ Greek Tauromenion ran through the 

usual course of a Sikeliot city in later times. Settled 

again by a Boman colony \ it lived on till the days of its 

\} The coins bear on the obverse a head of Apolldn and the inacription 
APXArSTASE. On the reverse they show a lyre or tripod, also a bolL 
(See £. M. Cat., Sidly ; Head, Hist Num. 165.)] 

' See vol. 111. pp. 511, 51a. 

' Diod. n. s. ; rdxy '^ ^' v6\tcat M9octv kotfifiai^oii<nft, ol fi2y cbc^Top€t 

fUytf, «.rA. 
* Diod. o. B» 




greatest gloiy, as the last of Sikeliot cities to hold out for obap.xl 
Christ and Csesar against the assaults of the besieging 
Saracens \ But even that greater memory does not shut 
out the thoughts of the stirring early days of the city. 
There is much on the spot to call up the names of Himil- Site and 
kdn and Dionysios and Andromachos^ and above all to set of T^uro- 
bef ore our eyes the night-attack of the tyrant and his dis- °^^<^^' 
comfiture. The rocks and the heights are there still, and 
not the rocks and the heights only. There is the wall 
with the work of the Sikel and the Oreek side by side '. 
There is the temple of the Greek changed into the church 
of the Christian apostle of Sicily. There is the theatre, 
the work of the Grreek enlarged and modified by the 
Roman, the theatre which, unlike those of Syracuse and 
Argos, still keeps so large a part of its 9cena, and where 
we hardly mourn the loss of the rest as we look out 
on the hills and the sea between its fragments^. The 
so-called nanmacAia abides, and not a few other traces 
of the presence of the Boman. His lasting traditions 
too may be often seen in the survival of his manner of 
building long after the rule of even the Eastern Rome 
had come to an end. The Saracen has tombs and walls 
assigned to him; but no defender of Tauromenion, from 
Himilkdn onwards, seems to have thought it needful to 
fence in the city with any wall on the steep mountain- 
side above it. But beside the gates at the two ends of 
the town, there is another gate in the middle, and from 
each of these gates walls are carried up to join together 
the defences of the town with those of the castle. All 
these things, though of later date, may well represent 
earlier arrangements. Of the days of the Norman kings 

1 Buneita held out l<»ger than Taarmina, but Eametta waa hazdly 
a city, and oertainly not a Sikeliot city. 

* See above, p. 109. 

' The »cena at Taarmina is imdoabtedly Boman ; and there is the 
oomiog question whether there was any Greek $eena at all. 

you IV. V 


CHAP. XL there is no perfect work ; but Taormina is ricli in graoefal 
Taormina. pieces of building of yet later styles. The matchless site 
would be something even without a story^ but at Taormina 
the story is for ever written on the site. On the long 
ridge of the town^ on its walls and gates^ on the rocks on 
which it stands^ on the prouder rocks which rise above it, 
we may truly say that^ of all who have assailed or de- 
fended the mountain-city^ alongside of the names of 
Ibrahim and of Roger, the first names in the long story of 
Tauromenion dweU there also. Himilkdn the Carthaginian 
founder — Dionysios the Oreek who undid the founder's 
work — Andromachos who decreed that the work of both 
should turn to the behoof of Hellas — the names of all 
live there. They live not only in the echoes which have 
reached us from the writings of the comrade of Dionysios 
and the son of Andromachos ; they are stamped upon the 
spot itself, graven with an iron pen to be read on the rock 
for ever. 

§ 3. Period of confimon at Syracuse from DiStCs death 
to the coming of Timoledn, B.C. 354-344. 

Reign of * " Several years of confusion followed the death of Didn, 

KaUippoB ^ 

at Syra- who had beg^ so well and ended so ill. Kallippos kept 


[354-353O himself in power for about a year ^. He gave himself out 
as a deliverer, and wrote a letter to that effect to his own 
city of Athens. He threw Aristomache and AretS into 
prison^ where Aret€ gave birth to a son. Next one 
Hiketas^ a friend of Didn^ professed to have the two 
women released and sent to Feloponn^os^ but he had them 
drowned on the voyage. The child seems to have lived. 

* Story of Sicily, p. 215 seqq. 

[^ For KallippoB* rule at Syracuse, lee Plutarch, Didu, 58, and Died, 
ni. 36.] 


Presently men began to complain of Kallippos ; but for a ohap. zi. 

while he got the better of his enemies^ who f onnd shelter 

at Leontinoi. Then a new claimant appeared^ Hipparinos^ Hipparinos 

■eizeB the 

son of the old Dionysios, by AristomachS, nephew there- tyranny, 
fore of Di6n. He would naturally strive to get dominion 
in Syracuse if he could^ and he might even give himself 
out as the avenger of his mother and uncle. When 
Kallippos was warring against KatanS, Hipparinos con- 
trived to enter Syracuse with his brother Nysaios and 
to get possession of the Island. Kallippos had to put 
up with the tyranny of Katane ^ instead of that of 
Syracuse, and Hiketas got hold of the tyranny of Leon- NyuioB. 
tinoi. Hipparinos was presently killed in a drunken fit^ 
and Nysaios kept the Island ^. Lastly, their elder half- Restora- 
brother, Dionysios himself (b.c. 346)^ tried his luck again, nyiioe IL 
He had been living at Lokroi^ his mother's city, since he ' 
had left Syracuse^ and had made himself hated there by 
his cruelty and debauchery ^. He now saw another chance, 

\} It was said thftt Elallippoe remarked on this that he ** had lost a city 
and gained a cheese-scraper" (Srt w6X»f dvo\cu\Cira« rvpStaffjartv (1Xfj4p€r, 
Flnt. L c). This points to a play on the name Kaiani otherwise explained 
as the Sikel word for a dish, — ^the Lathi etxtimtm (of. Sicily, i. 377, 561 ; 
Holm, das alte Katania). Elallippoe subsequently made an onsuooessfiil 
attempt on Messana, and, unable apparently to maintain his tyranny on 
Sicilian soil, saoceeded (350 B. 0.) in seizing Bhdgion, where Dionysios II 
had recently planted his oolony of Phoilna. There he was killed shortly 
afterwards by his companions, Lepdnds and Pdysperohdn, with the same 
ornamental knife, it was said, wherewith Didn had been murdered (Pint. 
DiAn, 58).] 

[' For the drunken end of Hipparinos and the dissipation of his suc- 
cessor Nysaios, Athdnaios (z. 47) cites the histories {PhUippica) of 
Theopompoe of Chios, books 40 and 41 (cf. .£1. V. H. ii. 41). Nysaios as 
the emblem of his tyranny wore an embroidered robe and set up a four- 
horse chariot {KarwKw&aaro Ti$/nTfw Koi r^v ia&tjra 71^ 'midXtjp iy- 

[' Dionysios had seised the two dtadels of Lokroi (Justin, zzi. 2, "aroem 
occupat ; " but later, livy (zxiz. 6) speaks of ** dun aroes hand multum 

U a 


dUF.zi. and lie contrived to drive liis brother Nysaios from the 
^®'*^. Island, which, with his son ApoUokrat^, he occupied, and 
nyaioBll. y^^^ tyrant once more. And all this time Plato was 
dreaming dreams and writing letters and sketching an- 
other constitution for Syracuse, in which Dionysios and 
Hipparinos and the young son of Didn should all be con- 
stituted kings at once ^. 

" It would seem that none of these tyrants who came in 

one after the other had occupied all Syracuse ; they could 

have held only the Island. At any rate there were some- 

Distracted where citizens of Syracuse who were able to act. Besides 

state of 

SyiacuBe all these tyrants, the Carthaginians were again begianing 
to be threatening. Men feared lest, not only freedom but 
Greek life altogether, should be wiped out in Sicily^. 

inter bo distsntes"). He slew or banuhed the ricfaeet citizens; allowed 
his soldiem to tear off the omamentt of the Lokrian women in the temple 
of Aphroditd, where they were gathered together in fulfilment of a vow 
(Justin, xxi. 3). He tnmed the largest house of Lokroi into his harem, 
and there in chambers strewn with thyme and roses insulted the daughters 
of the citizens. (Athdn. zii. 58 ; ^£L V. H. iz. 8.) He appears moreover 
(Just. loc. dt.) to have claimed and exeroised a kind of ^tis prifMB noeOs. 
According to Justin (1. c.) the attempt of DionysioB to recover Syracuse 
was the result of a successful uprising of the Lokrians who succeeded in 
expelling him and his mercenaries. The revenge now taken by the out- 
raged citizens on his wife and daughters outdid the worst harrors of the 
French Revolution. After undergoing every conceivable outrage they 
were tortured to death with pins thrust under their nails. The very flesh 
was torn from their bones and the passers-by made to partake of it. What 
remained was burnt and the sea sown with the ashes. (Athdn. xii. 58 ; 
iSa. Y. H. iz. 8; Strabo, vi. i. 8; and cf. Plut Beip. Ger. Pnec. 28.) 
Dionysios' efForts to secure thdr liberation had been seconded by the 
Tarantines (Strabo, L c.).] 

[* put. Ep. Fiii. p. 356.] 

[' The author of Plato's letters (Ep. viii. p. 353 P) goes so fur as to 
say that throughout Sicily the Greek language was in danger of dying out, 
and that the island seemed about to be turned into a Phoenician or Oscan 
state ; ff^ci 8i lianrtp rcDv (Ut&ren^ ylytnfrai ri teat dvtvtnw <rx!ft6v els kpii' 
/dav r^ 'ESXrivue^s <pwnlt SciccAia vacro, ^oufUMV ^ *09iMQy furafiakovaa 
€15 riva dvyaartlay Kok Kp&rot.^ 



They sought for help, they sought it in Old Oreece, at the ohap.zi. 
hands of their metropolis Corinth. Hiketas too at Leon- Hiketas 


tinoi was believed to be making plots in concert with general 
Carthage ; but he openly joined in the appeal to Corinth, ensans. 
and the free Syraoosans chose him general ^/' 

§4. TimoleSn, B.C. 344-338. 
^' And now the purest hero in the whole tale of Sicily^ 
till his likeness came again in our own day, steps on the 
field. What Didn had professed to do^ what at one time 
we may believe he really meant to do^ Timoledn did. 
During our whole story we are struck with the true and 
generous zeal for the suffering Sicilian colony which is 
shown by the Corinthian commonwealth generally. In 
Timoledn this zeal reaches its height. He was a noble Earlier 

tiiBtorv of 

Corinthian^ son of Timod&mos, and he first distinguished XimoleOn. 
himself by saving the life of his brother TimophanSs in 
battle^. But when Timophanes presently seized the 
tyranny^ after exhorting him in vain to give up his ill- 
gotten power^ he joined with Aischylos the brother-in-law 
of Timophanes in putting him to death, though he did 
not himself strike the blow^ To slay a tyrant was 

[* Plut. Timoledn, i.] 

[* The battle wai fought against the Arglvee and Kle6naianfl (Plat. 
Timoledn, 4). This was perhaps the battle of the year 368 B. 0. mentioned 
bj Xenophdn (Hell. vii. i. 35) in which the Corinthian detachment took 
part with the Athenians under Ghabiias against the Argives near Epidauros. 
The Klednaians indeed are not mentioned in Xenophdn*s account. (See 
Holm, G. S. ii. 464, 465 ; Kehdants, Yitn Iphikratis, Chabris, Timothei, 
Atfaeniensium, p. 106, N. 57 : and of. F. J. Amoldt, Timoledn, pp. 34, 35.) 
Held is solitary in his opinion (Flat. Vitt. i9BmiL Pauli et Timol. 539) that 
the battle connects itself with the Bceotian-Oorinthian War, and took place 
in 393B.0.] 

[' Plat. Tim. 4; cf. Com. Nepos, Hm. i. Timoledn stood apart weeping 
and mantling his face. Dioddros (xtL 65) makes Hmoledn himself murder 
his brother in the public agora,'] 


CHAP. XI. among the Greeks counted as the noblest of deeds ; but 

some doabted whether it should be done by a brother-in- 

Enforoed law and a brother. Men^s minds therefore were divided; 


of 1^1110- some honoured Timoledn as the slayer of a tyrant, while 


others loathed him as the murderer of a brother. And 
among these last^ to Timoledn's great grief^ was Dama- 
rista, the mother both of himself and of his slain brother. 
According to one account^ the Syracusan embassy came 
very soon after these evente. while, according to another, 
a space of twenty years had passed ^ In any case^ when 
the Syracusan embassy came to ask help from Corinth, 
He u sent Timoledn was called to take the command. He was bidden 

by Corin- ^ ^ • 

thianB to to go forth as a kind of ordeal ; his former act should be 


Syracuse, judged by his acts in his new character ^. 

*' Just as in the case of Oylippos, more turned on the 
man that was sent than on the force that was put under 
his command. Corinth gave Timoledn only seven ships, 
but one of these was specially consecrated to the goddesses 
of Sicily \ For the priestess of Ddmeter and Persephone 

[^ Aooording to Dioddros (zri. 65) Timophanes was murdered 364-5 b. 0., 
■horUy before the arrival of the Syracusaii envoyi at Corinth. Plutarch 
(Hm. 7 and cf. Gomp. Timoledn. et P. JBmiL 2) gives an interval of twenty 
years during which l^moledn lived in mourning and retirement, avoiding 
the agora and hima and aU public affairs. He had thought of starving 
himself to death but had been dissuaded by his Mends.] 

[* Plutarch says (Tim. 7) that the leading citizen Tdlekleidds remarked 
to the Assembly that if Timoledn succeeded in his enterprise they would 
decide that he had shun a tyrant, if he failed, a brother (*' Av fily ydp *' 1^ 
**KeiXwt dywtirgj rdpnufvov it^fnjMiviu 96{ofify, dm Z\ ^twiKon, dScX^y"). 
Dioddroe (xvi. 65) who represents the Corinthian Qerouna as debating at 
the same time the question of Timoledn's guilt and the request of the 
Syracusan envoys, makes them come to the formal decision — 1^ filr icaXws 
dp^\f rSnf 'XvpCLKwrianf icpb^tir oirriv rvptanfominfoir Icb' tk w\t<M^€itTUi^€pw 
d5<X^o9 fw4a. Plutarch's version is the more probable.] 

[» Plut. Hm. 8. Cf. Diod. xvi. 66.] 


at Conntli dreamed that the goddesses told her that they obap.zi. 
were going on a voyage to Sicily with Timoleon ^. And Voyage of 


he and his men had many signs on the voyage to show 
that the goddesses were with them ^. They were further 
strengthened by human help; for of the sister cities of 
Syracuse Leukas gave one ship, and Korkyra^ once more^ 
as in the days of Hippokrat^^ forgetting her (]^uarrel with 
her mother, gave two \ But the force that went was but 
small, a few Corinthian volunteers^ and about 1,200 mer- 
cenaries^. And these were mostly men of bad repute, 
who had served with the Phokian leaders who had robbed 
the Delphian temple. For we must remember that we 
have come to the days when Philip of Macedon had be- 
come a great power in Greece. He had already taken 
Olynthos, but he had not yet fought the battle of Chaird- [b.o. 344.] 
neia. With such a force as this Timoledn set forth to 
drive Dionysios a second time out of his stronghold in the 
Island of Syracuse. And oik the way^ when the fleet 

\} IMod. XTi. 66 ; 'O 9k Tc/ioXl«r wpooKtiseoin ^y h rf Kopi^ rwr r^ 
Afj/ajrpos jmU K&fnfS UpuSaVt trt KafriL rhw thryoy aureus al $«at wpo^yytiXay 
cvfjnr\ti&a€a$ai rcik rtpi rdr Ti/AoKicrra Mard rdw wKow rhw cb ri^y 2cp^ 
aJMgy yrjcor. Gf. Plat. Tim. 8.] 

[s Timoledn himself on hia way through the Gulf of Corinth paid a viait 
to Delphi. Am he deeoended, after the customary saerifice^ to the shrine of 
the oraole (rd ftarrtiov), a YotiTO diadem (roiWa) embroidered with wreaths 
and Victories fell down from the waU and rested on his head (Plat. Tim. 8). 
A burning torch, — ^the mystic symbol of the Groddesses, — appeared at night 
in the heayens and led the way across the Ionian Sea to the Italian shore 
(Diod. xvi. 66 ; Pint 1. c), which they reached at Metapootion (Died. 1. c), 
—itself a chosen seat of Ddmdtdr and her daughter.] 

[* Plut. Tim. loc. cit] 

[* Dioddros (xtL 66) speaks of 700 meroenariea. According to Plntaitsh 
(Tim. 11) his total force, counting the recruits from Korkyra and LeukaSi 
was 1 ,000. Dioddros giyes Timoledn stiU 1,009 men at Hadmnum (zvi. 68), 
Plutarch (!nm. la) makes it i,aoo, but Dioddros (1. c.) mentions that he 
reoeiyed some reinforoement at Taurom e mon.] 

nUn fleet. 


oHAF.xi. reached Rh^on^ now again a free city^ they found there 
atRh^on * Carthaginian fleet of twenty ships, with envoys from 
Embasiy Hiketas ^. He had^ he said^ defeated the tyrant ; he had 


Hiketas. lecoveied Sjrracuse^ all but the Island, and there he was 
going to beside Dionysios with the help of the Cartha- 
ginians K He would be glad to receive Timoledn himself ^ 
and to consult with him as to operations ; but the Cartha- 
ginians would not allow the Corinthian ships to come to 
Syracuse. There was more reason than ever to go on^ 
as Hiketas now plainly showed that he was in league with 
Carthage; but it was hard to go on in the face of the 
Timoledn Punic fleet. By a clever tricky planned with the Rhegines, 
Garthagi- who were zcalous in his cause, he contrived to get his ships 
out and to land at Tauromenion without the knowledge of 
the Carthaginians \" 

He knew whither to sail. The direct voyage across the 
strait to Messana would in any case have been dangerous 
with a stronger Punic force at Rhegion ; and however the 

{} Plat. Tim. 9 ; Diod. xvi. 68. A Carthaginian trireme had already 
(Diod. xvi. 66) met 15moledn*8 squadron at Metapontion, and forbidden 
thepi to proceed to Sioily. The Bhdgines meanwhile had offered him their 
alliance (ib.).] 

p Hiketas had oaptm«d Syracuse three days before llmoledn*s arrival 
at BhegiOn (Diod. xvi. 68 f. ; of. Plat Tim. 9).] 

[* Pint. Tim. I3 ; ef. Diod. zvi. 68. Timoledn pretended to be ready to 

accept Hiketas' proposal that he shoold send back his fleet to Corinth, but 

niged that for his own secority and in order that Hiketas' own Intention 

folly to liberate Syracase might be better known, he should make the 

Bhdgine D6mos a witness to the agreement, as being a Greek dty on 

terms of friendship with both parties. The Rhdgines in furtherance of 

Timoledn's plan called an Assembly {(jvrriynw kiekkfiffiay) and dosed the 

gates. Their orators made long speeches so as to give Timole6n time to 

complete the embarication of his tnx^ while the enyoys of Hiketas and 

the Carthaginians were engaged in the disoassion. Timoledn himself kepi 

his place near the Bdma, as if waiting for his turn to speak, while his 

fidlowers made off, and finally, when all the other triremes had pat to 

slipped away himself and joined the last.] 
• ,* 4 * 

• • 


people of Messana may have been ready to welcome the ohap.zi. 
deliverer^ there was a power over them to which Timoledn 
must have been hateful^ and to which the barbarian fleet 
would have been ready to give its best helpi The tyrant 
Hippdn, of whom nothing more seems to be known, 
was lord of Messana \ A little to the souths not within 
the strait, but on the open waters of the Ionian sea^ the 
deliverer was assured of a safe refuge. The heights of 
Tauromenion are clearly seen from the haven of Rh^g^ion, 
and there freedom and Timoledn had a sure friend. An- 
dromachos, who had given the hill-city new citizens and 
a new life, was still in power there ^. Whatever was the 
eract nature of his authority, he was eager for the freedom 
of Syracuse and of all Oreek Sicily, and a zealous enemy 
of the tyrants who held so many towns^ Oreek and Sikel. 
He had already sent invitations to Timoledn^ and offers 
of help in his work \ To Tauromenion then TimoleAn Landiiig of 
guided his handful of ships, and beneath the hill of Tauros |^^ i^nro- 
the new ddiverer first set foot on Sicilian ground. He ™«"<'tt- 
was treading the soil trodden by the first Greek settlers in 
the island; if Naxos sat no more on her peninsula, her 
scattered children had found a new home on the height 
which looked down on it^ and Apolldn Archegette st9od 
ready to bless the work of those who came to free Oreek 
cities as well as the older work of those who came to found 
them. Timoledn and his followers w^re warmly welcomed 
by Andromachos and by the whole people of Tauromenion. 
He made their city his starting-point for the work of 
deliverance, and his eloquence strengthened the hearts of 
the citizens in their firm purpose to be true allies of the 

P Plut. Tim. 34.] 

[* lb. 10; ffoXovFTOf tAre^ fn wdkoi wpMiJuon 'AyZpofi&x^ "^^ ^^ 
w6kty txovTos Koi SvMMTciWrof. Diod. (xvi. 68) calls him 6 r^r w^Xcwt 
^^To^ftcvoff. Plntarah (L c.) adds rw re lovrov mXirdr Ifpt^vro rofUfton int 
Simi£m, and that he was an enem j of tynnts.] 

[* Plut. 1. c. ; o£ Diod. 1. c] 


CHAP. XT. Corintluans, their fellow-workers in the setting up again of 

Sicilian freedom ^. 

Punic en- An enemy might have spoken — ^no doubt enemies did 

at Tanro- speak — of the men thus honoured by the Corinthian name 

memon. ^ ^ gang of temple*robbers led by the murderer of his 

brother. It does not appear that so high a moral line was 

taken by the Punic envoys who presently came to Tauro- 

menion with a message of threatening. Great was the 

wrath of the Carthaginians at Rhegion when they found 

out the trick that had been played on them. But all the 

comfort that they got from the Rhegines was the taunting 

answer that Phoenicians ought to be well pleased with those 

who knew how to carry their point by guile K A trireme 

was at once sent to Tauromenion, bearing Carthaginian 


Dialogue Their brief and pithy dialogfue with Andromachos must 

^^ have taken pkce in the general assembly of the Tau- 

™*<^^^*^<* romenitan people. The usual place for such assemblies 

was the theatre, and it may be that the elder theatre of 

Tauromenion, the Oreek building some parts of which 

still abide beneath the work of Roman days which has 

usurped its name^ may have been already in being and 

may have been the place of audience. The Punic speaker 

ended in a proud and barbarian &8hion ^ with a parable 

after the rhetoric of the East. He turned the palm of 

his hand upwards, and said that, if the Corinthians were 

not presently sent away from Tauromenion^ the whole city 

should be turned upside down in the like sort \ Androma- 

{} Plut. Tim. 10 ; Mud Ti/ioX^orrc r^rc r^r w6kip ipfujr^pKm wap4<fxf 
^ mU robs woXinu Ivcktc cwayMfiito^at rots Kopiw^ots leat trvytKwOtpow 

ri^y XcircX/ar.] 

['lb. II ; ct ^obnM€s Strrts obx dpioxoiwro rois St* Mmp wparro' 

[* lb. ; kwaxB&s /cai fiapfiapuMS,"] 

[* lb. ; rikos ^irrfay r^ X*^P^ M^of, cTr' aStfir itaraffrp^^ ^wtikiffft 
rotavTifv o6ea» airr^ t^ st6Xuf rouaunpf vovfyjHV,'] 


cho8 was ready with an answer in kind. He tamed his hand chap.zi. 
first downwards and then upwards^ and told the barbarian 
that, if he did not sail away speedily, his ship should be 
turned over in the like sort ^. 

We hear nothing more of any Carthaginian action either 
at Rheg^on or at Tauromenion ; twenty ships might be 
deemed too small a force to attack both cities, and^ as their 
Syracusan ally sent to demand their immediate presence^ 
they sailed away to the scene of more pressing need \ and 
left Timole6n and his force untouched under the keeping of 
their friends on the hill-side of Tauros. 

His position was hardly a hopeful one. His force was Po§ition of 
small^ — a few yolunteers and mercenaries, strengthened by ^ ^' 

such help as Tauromenion might give him. That one 
town was his only foothold on Sicilian soil. Of the Syra- The 
cuse which he had come to deliver, the Island was held by tjnnts. 
Dionysios, the rest of the city by Hiketas^ now a tyrant 
ahnost as openly avowed as Dionysios^ while his Punic 
allies held the Oreat Harbour^. A crowd of lesser tyrants 
ruled in other cities, Greek and Sikel; by this time a 
Greek and a Sikel town, a Greek and a Sikel tyrant, are 
hardly to be distinguished from one another. It must not be 
forgotten that the presence of a tyrant in a Sikel town was 
itself a sign, though a sad one, of advance in Hellenic ways. 
Hiketas himself kept Leontinoi. Of Hippdn of Messana 
we have already heard. A Leptin^, seemingly the mur- 
derer of the murderer Kallippos, had by some means won 
for himself a dominion among the Sikel towns of the 
north ^. Among others he was lord of inland Engyum, 

[^ Pint. Hm. II ; ytk&ffat V 6 'Aydpo/taxos ^l^o M^'' o682f iarwpivoro rifif 
S) X*^P^ ''vr fjAv inrriav dn iicuvof rvr 8) vfH/i^ wporttwas IWAcvo'cv dvovXciV 
airrbtf, cl p^ fioi&Kotro rijff vqvv iirrl row&np ywwia^at roca^^K.] 

[' They were sammoiied by HiketM (Flat 1. e.) to the Great Hwboiir 
of Synonse.] 

[* Ci. Plat. Tim. 24 and Diod. xvi. 7 a. There ie no direct evidenoe 
that thii WM the Bune Leptinte mentioned by DioddroB (xvi. 45) as the 


CHAP. zi. holy place of the Mothers^ and also of ApoUftnia, looking 
The ^ down from its height upon the northern sea \ Nikod^mos, 
tynntB, of whom nothing else is known, mled on the fivefold crest 
of Centuripa^; and our guide from Agyrimn does not 
fail to tell us that his own citj^ once famous under the 
rule of Agyris^ was now held hj a certain ApoUdniad^, of 
whom he has nothing further to record \ Leptin^ was 
seemingly a Oreek reigning over hellenized Sikels ; Niko- 
demos and Apolldniadte may have been the same ; but it is 
quite as likely that they were hellenized natives, recalling 
in nomenclature^ but in nothing else, the two Sikel princes 
who in earlier days had borne the name of Archdnidte \ 
Mamercus A greater interest is awakened by the name of Mamercus, 
tyrant of Katane. His Italian name^ illustrious in the 
^milian house of Rome ^, had been borne by a brother of 
Stdsichoros *, and it sug^pests the no less Italian name of 
Marcus, borne in days to come by the man of Keryneia 
who called the League of Achaia to its second being ^. It 
implies Italian descent or connexion ; it is hardly enough 

joint liberator of Bhdgion, and by Platajroh (Bidn, 58) ai one of the 
mnrderen of Elallippoe and as acting in the interett of mercenary troopi. 
As a leader of meroenarieB, however, he was at any rate in a position to 
aeiie the tyrannis in Sicilian towni.] 

\} See SicQy, i. 144.] 

[• Died. xvi. 82.] [» lb.] 

[« See SioUy, u. 381, iiL 336.] 

[' The first Mameroiu of the ^milian gens was, according to one 
tradition, a son of King Numay who is said to have named him after a son 
of Pythagocas (Plat. Nimia» 8). From his winning manners {alfwXia) he 
is further said to bave giyen his name to the Gens (see Mommsen, Unterit. 
Dial. 356). The name is of course Oscan, connected with Mamers^Mars 
(d Festns, s. r.) ; and according to another account this iShnilian Mameroos 
was a son of Mars and Silvia (Pint. Parall. Gr. et Bom. 36).] 

[* According to Suidas, Stdsichoros had a brother called Mamertinns. 
Stdsichoros himself, though his activity as a poet is connected with Himeim, 
appears to have been bom of parents who had migrated hither firom 
Matanms or Metanrum, on the W. coast of what was afterwards the 
Bmttian conntiy. This would account for his brothel's Italic name.] 

17 PoL ii. 10. 41, 43. Gf. Freeman, Hist, of Fed. Gov., ist ed. 348 ; 
and ed. 193.] 

timole6n at TAUBOMENION. 301 

of itself absolutely to prove that he had risen to power as ohaf.zl 
a captain of Italian mercenaries ^. He waa at all events 
either Greek by name or speech^ or else he had gained a 
command of that tongue remarkable in a stranger. Like 
the elder Dionysios^ he aspired to literary fame; he wrote 
poems and tragedies, and sometimes^ it would seem^ tried 
his hand at satire ^ 

To all of these men the coming of Timole6n was 
threatening ; his errand was to clear, not only Syracuse, 
but all Sicily^ of the class of which they were members* 
And if Timoledn was the natural object of the hatred of Timoledn 
the tyrants, he had not yet won to himself the love ^etyruiti' 
or the trust of the victims of the tyrants. Deliverers ****'^- 
had been rather plentiful in Sicily, and the distinction 
between the deliverer and the tyrant had not always 
been clearly drawn. It was on errands of deliverance 
that Pharax had come from Sparta and Kallippos from 
Athens, and men feared that the new deliverer from 
Corinth might prove no better than they^. And though 
the piety of his biographer shrinks from adding the name 
of Didn to his list, the latter days of that deliverer also 
had not been such as to win much confidence for the new- 
comer whose promises were not more hopeful than those of 
Di6n had once been. 

For a while Timole6n abode at Tauromenion, T^angiTig 

[^ It is to be obserred, however, thftt Gomeliiu Nepos (Tim. 2) speaks 
of MameroQS as " Italicum dacem . . . qni tyrannos adjatnm in Sioiliam 
yenerat. J 

[* Platazoh (Tim. 31) relates ihat after his victooy over the Syracnsan 
mercenaries Mamercos dedicated their shields to the Gods, with the 
inscriptioD — 

Aff-wtdas Aawiilois dXoficy c&rcX^<rc. 

The trophies at which this gibe was aimed were probably shields taken 
by Timoledn from the Carthaginians and their barbarian allies at the 
KrimiBos (Diod. xvi. 80). We recall the enamelled shields of the Gauls.] 
[» PlutTim. II.] 


oHAP.xi. on to Sicily^ as his biographer says^ by a narrow fringe^, 
Timoledn but meeting: with no general welcome or acceptance. Men 

Alt Tauto- w . o * 

menion. did not at once flock to his standard, nor, for some weeks 
at least, did the people of any other Sicilian town call 
on him to come to help them against either foreign enemies 
or home-bred tyrants. 

The time of waiting however could not have been very 
long. And when an invitation did come to Timoledn, it 
came from a place whose good will might pass for a favour- 
able omen. Timoledn had been guided and guarded on his 
voyage by the Hellenic goddesses of Sicily; they had steered 
his course to the friendly shelter of Tauromenion ; he was 
now to receive his first welcome from the votaries of the 
native powers of the land, and to count as his first ally the 
Hadrannm fire-god of the Sikel in his own person. Hadranum on the 
fii6-gocL ledge below the southern slope of JBtna, the town which 
the elder Dionysios had called into being under the shadow 
of the ancient Sikel temple, did not as yet reckon among 
the great cities of Sicily, but it was looked on everywhere 
as holy, as the home of the god of the land whom all the 
nations of the land agreed in reverencing ^ But the 
sanctity of the spot did not keep its people from civil dis- 
cord. We are told nothing of the form of government in 
Hadranum; but it was one which admitted of vehement 
Its divided dissension and debate among its citizens. When we read 
^ * ^' that one party was for calling in Hiketas and the Cartha- 
ginians and another for calling in Timoledn^, we are 
tempted to think that the latter call was the true voice of 
the people, and that the allies of the barbarian were at most 
an oligarchy, perhaps only the following of a tyrant, who 

p Plat. Tim. ii ; TiftoKioyra &ffvtp kx KfiO/awidov rty^ Xcirrov t^ 
Tavpo/uviTw voXlxyV^ ^V ^^<^? wpocffprq/UvorJ] 

[* lb. la ; {^AUpca^irQ^] wdAiK fiucpSty fikv, Updof S* oZca» 'Ad/xsvov Otnv 
rofos rtfua/Uyov 9ia^p6rrcn h 6kQ XuctXi^, See Sicily, i. 184, seqq.] 

[• lb.] 


f elfc his dominion passing from him. Each side called on chap, xl 
its ally, and neither ally failed his partisans. If Hiketas 
started from Leontinoi, his march thence to Hadrannm 
would be, in the nmnber of stadia, perhaps a little shorter 
than that of Timoleon from Tanromenion ^. But the march 
from Leontinoi was an easy one^ largely across the famous Timoledn 
fields. The path of Timoledn was harder. The easiest road ^^a^um. 
to Hadranum would have been by way of Katand ; but we 
may doubt whether Mamercus, at this stage, would have 
given a free passage to Timoleftn. The deliverer had there- 
fore, like Himilkdn when his path was stopped by the 
lava^ to make his way by the toilsome inland road round 
the foot of ^tna. By that path among the eastern moun- 
tains Timoledn and his Thousand ^ set forth from the shore 
of Naxos^ as a later Thousand made their way on the like 
errand from the shore of Marsala through the less toilsome 
mountains of the West. 

The end of the first day's march found them at a point 
still seemingly nearer to Tauromenion than to Hadranum. 
There they bivouacked. The second day^ a day of slow and 
hard marchings was far advanced when they had reached a 
distance of less than four miles from this ground. At that Hiketas 
point news was brought that Hiketas had drawn near to HMlnuium. 
Hadranum from the other side^ and had pitched his camp out- 
side the town ^. Here was the work for which they were 
oome^ to save Hadranum from falling into the hands of the 
traitor. The officers of Timoleon's little army at once halted 
their men. Let them rest and take f ood^ and they would faU 

\} The difltanoe of Hadranum from Taoromenion ib giyen bj Plutaroh 
(1. o.) as 340 Btadia, — ^aboat 40 miles.] 

[* According to Plutarch (Urn. i a) the number was now i,aoo. Timoledn 
had received some reinforcement at Tauromenion. (See above, p. 395, 
note 4.) But, as in the case of Garibaldi, the force with which he had 
actually landed was 1,000.] 

[' Plut. Tim. 13 ; ^jtovo'cf Afirt wpocfuyy^eu rdr 'Ixirfir rf wokixvt^ leal 


CHAP. XL upon the enemy with a better heart ^. Bat the genenJ 
coming np prayed them to attack at onoa They would 
find the enemy in no battle array^ but resting in their tents 
Timole6n and busy with their suppers^. Timoledn then seized his 
^^n^ shield for the charge and marched on at the head of his 
atHadra- n^gj^ ^s advancing to certain victory. The like spirit 
seized the rest; they followed their chief; they reached the 
camp of Hiketas with its disordered occupants, who fled at 
the first onslaught of a foe one-fifth of their own numbers. 
About three hundred were slain ; about six hundred were 
taken prisoners ; the camp of Hiketas passed into the hands 
of Timoledn, and the deliverer^ fresh from his first battle 
on Sicilian ground^ stood victorious before the gates of 
Temple The gates stood open to welcome him. The men of 

of Hadra- Hadnmum^ temple-keepers of the local god^ received him 
nmn. ^^.j^ reverence and sacred awe. For the fire-god himself 
had spoken. The dogs of Hadranus^ with their g^ of dis- 
cerning good and evil^ might have been no ill judges of the 
question which had divided the public mind of Corinth. 
They might have been appealed to whether they would tear 
Timoledn in pieces as the murderer of his brother^ or greet 
him with whine and bound as the righteous slayer of a 
tyrant \ But that ordeal was not needed when Hadranus 
himself had declared his will by signs more speaking than 
God any words. While the fight was going on, the innermost 

aidsTimol doors of the temple opened of themselves, and the statue of 
^^^ the god was seen waving his spear, and with his face drip- 

ping with sweats That the graven form of Hadranus 
showed these outward signs of toil and war&re was proof 
indeed that Hadranus himself, like Aias by the banks of 

[} Plat. Tim. la. The offioen are spoken of as Xoxnyol got ra^iapxoi.'] 
[* lb. ; w€pl ffKrfvds koI 8f nrvov Aax^^^'^^ Atos.] 
[» SeeSicUy,i. 187,188.] 

[* Flut. Tim. la ; d^titf 9k rov tfcov rd fi^y 96pw aHSfUwoy kx r^t <ilxft$t 
ditpat, t6 9k wp6awwoy IZpSrn iroAAj; /Sc^/icvor.] 


Sag^ras ^, had taken his place unseen in the ranks of Timo- chap. xi. 
ledn. The god of the Sikel had shared in the struggle 
and the victory which were to bring freedom to Sikel and 
Sikeliot alike. 

After this solemn entrance of Timoledn we hear no more 
of the party in Hadranum which had sought to bring in 
Hiketas and the Carthaginians. Hadranum, instead of 
Tauromenion, became for a while the head-quarters of the 
libeiatiDg army. 

Meanwhile Timoledn kept his head-quarters at Hadra- 
nimi. Under the protection of the god, he needed no 
body-guard ; he dwelled without state, without suspicion, 
among his local worshippers ^. Hiketas accordingly framed Attempt 
his scheme for getting rid of him. He sent two of his S^^n's'^Ufe 
mercenaries * to Hadranum with a char^ to slay Timoledn. ** Hadr&- 

" " num 

They reached the holy city and found that Timoleon was 
about to sacrifice to the local god in his temple. The 
murderers, carrying daggers hidden under their clothes, 
mingled with the general congregation^ and gradually drew 
nearer and nearer to their intended victim as he stood by 
the altar. The moment had all but come when they were frustrateil 
about to give one another the word to strike, when a ^ 
blow, as if dealt by the spear of Hadranus himself, lighted 
on one of the intended murderers. A man in the crowd, 
men knew not who, drew a sword, and smote one of the 
guilty twain on the bead with such a stroke that he fell 
dead before the altar. The slayer rushed from the temple, 
still holding his bloody sword. The holy place itself 
stood not far from the wall of the town and from the edge 
of the hill of Hadranum ^. But behind the town there is 

[' Pa us. ill. 19. I a.] 

[* Plat. Tim. 16 ; o&rc d^Awt v<pi rd w/ta ovrrtraytUvtpf IxoHfri ipnKoucriv, 

TWK 'A2pavi7wr. There is not a word to explain Timoledn's inaoiiyity while 
the defeated Hiketas wai acting and plotting.] 
[> lb. ; Uo £^FOuf.] [« See SicUy, i. 185.] 



CHAF. XI. higher ground again, partly covered by the streets of modem 
Ademb. Here the slayer climbed a rocky point and sat 
as if seeking sanctuary ^. Meanwhile the survivor of the 
conspirators, unhurt, untouched, unsuspected, but stricken 
in conscience as he saw the bolt of vengeance fall upon his 
comrade, grasped the altar as a suppliant, and called on 
Timole6n to spare his life and he would tell him all^ 
Timole6n knew not what he was to hear ; but he made the 
promise, and the penitent told him how he and the man 
who had just been slain had been sent together on their 
errand of murder. Meanwhile others had followed the 
slayer, and brought him down from his perch. He called 
out loudly that he had done no wrong, that he had only 
slain the man who had in past days slain his father in 
Leontinoi. Many in the crowd witnessed that his tale 
was true. And all men wondered at the mysterious power 
of destiny, which wrought its hidden purposes by means 
which human wit could not fathom, by bringing men and 
things together in a way which no forethought of man 
Timoie/^n could foresee. The god who guarded Timole6n, the god 
Maunder doubtless of the spot on which they stood, had made use 
pivme pro- ^f ^j^g injured son's righteous vengeance ; he had kept back 
from him all opportunity for avenging his &ther, till the 
moment came when, in avenging his father, he could save 
Timoleon also ^. Of the surviving emissary of Hiketas we 
hear nothing more. To the avenger of his father and pre- 
server of Timoleon his grateful followers voted a crown of 
ten minse ^. And the deliverance of Timoledn from such 
a danger raised men^s hopes of his success on his great 
errand higher and higher. They held him as one who 
was to be guarded and reverenced as something holy, as 

\} vPlut. Tim. i6 ; ^ttjywv wp6s riva wirpav infnfki^ dytw^fitfctv,'] 

[' lb-] 

[^ lb. ; dXKd fxtr alrtas IBias vpds rijp kK€iyov aojrrjplaif dird n^xi/s 

[* lb. ; rov /Atv oZv dySpojiroy farttpapwacv ol KoplvBtOi iitta fomis,'] 


one who had come into Sicily under the express guidance ohap. xi. 
of the gods^ and not least under the guidance of the local 
god of Hadranum ^. 

^ ^^ Timoleon now for a while kept his head-quarters at Aooesdons 

^ to Timo- 

Hadranum. His wonderful success made men believe lean's 
that he was under the special care of the gods ^. Allies 
now began to flock in to him. Several cities joined him, 
specially Tyndaris'^ the other foundation of the elder 
Dionysios on the northern coast. And the tyrant Ma- 
mercus of KatanS sought his alliance. And presently a 
more wonderful message came than all. Dionysios grew Dionyiios 


tired of being besieged in Ortygia, and he gave up all to the Co- 
hope of being able to win back anything beyond Ortygia^. 

And of the two he liked better to fall into the hands of 

Timoledn than into those of Hiketas. So he offered to 

surrender, as it is put, to the Corinthians^. He would 

give up the stronghold and the horses and arms, and the 

[} Plut. Tim. i6 ; &s hp6v Mpa kqI air 9*^ rifuap6y,] 

* Fnim Story of Sicily, p. 320 seqq. 

[' Timoledn refruded himself as a chosen instrument of the Grods. He 
dedicated his house to his good D»mdn and set up a shrine ihere to the 
Goddess Automaiia, the fortune that comes of itself. (Plut. Tim. 36 ; M 
di T$f ol/das Itpiy lUpvadfMvot A^ro/Aarlas i9v€v oM^y 8i t^i' oltelav Upf 
9aifiovt KaBtifoxrw, Cf. Reip. ger. prsE)c. ao.) Plutarch (Tim. 36) contrasts 
the spontaneity of l^moledn's successes with the laborious triumphs of 
Epameinondas and others. So too, he adds, there is something forced about 
the poetry of Antimachos and the paintings of Dionysios the Colophdnian, 
compared with the ease of Kikomachos' brush or Homer^s lyre. But it b 
difficult to detect " the great Captain *' in Plutarch's portraiture of Timoledn, 
and the insistence on luck is not very complimentary to generalship.] 

[' Diod. xyi. 69. According to Plutarch (Tim. 13) several cities 
joined Timoledn before Mamercus' adhesion. According to Dioddros (loc 
cit.) it was after that event.] 

[♦ Plut. Tim. 13 ; Diod. 1. c] 

[' Plut. 1. c. ; rh Z\ fUytaroVf a^r6s Aiwricios Avti/njKios 1j9rf reus IXviVc 
Kcd fuKpiiy d«oXc(v«iK itcvoXiopttttff^ai, rov fiky *lWrou KaT»pp6vffirty alaxp&s 
ijrmffUyov, rby 8i ti/toXioyra $avfi/&(wy ivti»iiff€y ixtiy^ tcai KopiyOtott wapaZ^ 
Ms a^rdr mH ri^y dxp^okiy,] 

X 2 


CHAP. XI. mercenaries, on condition of being sent safely to Corinth 

with his private property. This offer Timole6n gladly 

Dionyslos accepted. He sent two Corinthian officers with a small 

exiled to 

Ccrintli. body of men to take possession of the Island ^, and Dio- 
nysios, with his goods and a few friends, was sent in a 
trireme to Corinth. There the &llen tyrant lived as 
a private man for the rest of his days. It was thought 
the great wonder of the time to see one who had been so 
powerful living in a private station, more wonderfal than 

Anecdotefl if he had been slain or kept as a prisoner. He became the 


tyrant. great sight of Corinth, and many stories are told of the 
sharp sayings that he made to people who came to see 
him K One may be enough, as it was made to so famous 

[} Plui. Hm. 13; Timoledn sent 400 troops under the Clorinthinns 
EnJdeidte and T41emaohoe, but on account of the enemy they had to be 
introduced privily and in imall bodies at a time. How they made their 
way through Hiketas* lines is not explained. They succeeded, however, in 
oooupyiog the Akropolis and the Tyrant's Castle (rd Tv^ayvcra). Among 
the stores and munitions were 70,000 weapons, a quantity of catapult 
bolts {fitXw) and every kind of military engine. Dionysios further 
transferred a, 000 of his meroenaries to Timole6n*8 service. Dioddroe (xvi. 
70) speaks of Dionysios as having had his possessions guaranteed to him by 
a treaty (pw6<nnuf9ov), so too Justin (xxi. 5) ; " reoepto privato instrumento, 
Gorinthum in exsilium proficisoitur.'' Cknnelius Nepos (Tim. 2) makes 
Tlmole6n spare Dionysios on account of services rendered by him and his 
£sther to Corinth.] 

[* The accounts of Dionysios in exile have been carefully coUected by 
Amoldt (Timoledn, no, seqq.). For later writers he naturally became 
a peg from which to hang anecdotes of fallen greatness, and it is difficult to 
distinguish the genuine tradition. He is said to have gone in deliberately 
for every kind of low dissipation in order to avoid any suspicion of 
political intrigue, and to disarm by his present abject condition the 
personal enemies that his former tyranny had called into being (Justin, xxi. 
5 ; Pint. Tim. 14). He preferred to make the market-place the scene of 
his drunken brawls, put on rags, prowled about the butchers' shops with 
hungry eyes, and consorted with the lowest of the low. Plutarch (Tim. 14) 
adds that he gave instruction to singing girls and discussed with them 
theatrical pieces and the music to which they were set. According 
to other accounts he turned schoolmaster ("novissime ludimagistrum 
professus pueros in trivio docebat ; " Justin, xxi. 5. Cf. Yaler. Maximus, 


a man. King Philip of Maoedon asked him how his ohaf.xi. 

father^ with so much else to do^ had found time to write 

tragedies. Dionysios answered that he wrote them in the 

time which himself and Philip and all the rest who passed 

for happy spent at the wine-cup \ His old friend Plato 

had died before he came to Corinth^ or we might have had 

some reflexions on his fall. 

'' The surrender of Ortygia to Timole6n happened within 

fifty days after his landing in Sicily ^ The Corinthians Reinforce- 
ments from 
now thought it worth while to send out a larger force ^ Corinth. 

When they were off the coast of Italy, they were hindered 

from going on by a Carthaginian fleet; so they spent the 

yi. 9; Cicero, Tuac. iii. la), whether, as varioosly stated, to keep himself 
before the public, or to gain a livelihoody or, as Cicero suggests (L c), 
because he stiU felt the need of tyrannising over somebody. Finally, we 
are told (Klearchos cited by Athdnaios, xii. 58 ; 541 e) he became a 
Mdtragyrtte or begging-pricet of Kybel^, and went about beating a drum 
and whining for alms like a wandering dervish.] 

[^ Pint. Tim. 15. The interview with Philip probably took place in 
337 B. 0., on the occasion of his summoning the representatives of all Greek 
states to that city. Some of Dionysios* remarks show a good deal of his 
&ther*8 biting wit. His reply to a friend who asked him what Plato and 
philosophy had done for him is full of bitter irony, — '* Do you think I have 
gained nothing from Plato when you see me bearing my altered lot as I do I " 
(Plut. loc. cit. ; cf. Apophth. Reg. et Imp.) To one who was contrasting the 
careers of the father and son he made the shrewd rejoinder (Plut. Ap. ^. et I.), 
** My father rose to power when Democracy was hated, I myself when 
Tyranny was envied.'' His beatitude is also worth recalling ; " Blessed are 
they who have been brought up to misery 1 ** (*A$ fuut&ptoi ol ig valbow 
Svo'Tvx(<V. Jo. Stobaios, Florileg. tit. ox. 13. p. 582.)] 

[' Plut. Tim. 16; littfids XtmtXlat \y ^/i^pats warHiin^ra^ Hjv r' d/c^oXty 
rSSfy JivpaMova&y wap4kafi€ xci Atomhtoy tls TltXowSyyifffoy k^iwiftf^w, 
Dioddros (xvi. 69, 70) (apparently confusing the account of Timoledn's. later 
demolition of the tyrant's strongholds on the island with the account of its 
capture) turns the whole story about and makes Timoledn only take 
possession of Ortygia alter his expulsion of Hiketas from Achradina and 
Neapolis, — well on, that is, in 343 B. o. (G£ Amoldt, op. dt. 98, seqq.)] 

[' Plut. Tim. 16; Diod.xvi.69. The names of the Corinthian leaders were 
Delnarohos and Ddmaretoe. They sailed with ten vessels^ bringing with them 
2,000 heavy-anned troops and aoo horsemen, as well as a sum of money.] 



uHAP.xL time in a work of the same kind as that on which they 
were sent^ namely in helping the people of the Greek town 
of Thourioi against the neighbouring barbarians \ Mean- 
while Hiketas went on besieging Ortygia^ while Timoledn 
still stayed at Hadranum. 
Timoledn'8 '< Hiketas now prayed the Carthaginian commander Ma- 


struggle gdn to come to his help with his whole force ^. The Punic 


Hiketas ships now filled the Great Harbour^ and^ for the first time 

and Ma- 

gdn. in all the wars between Carthage and Syracuse, a Punic 

force was admitted into the Syracusan city '. Timole6n^s 
men in the Island were now in great straits ; but he con- 
trived to send them in provisions in little boats ; and when 
Hiketas and Magdn went to besiege KatanS, Neon, the 
officer in command in Ortygia, made a sudden sally and 
occupied Achradina ^. And about the same time the 
Corinthians in Italy contrived to elude the Punic fleet 
there and to cross the strait^. Timoleon now took the 

[^ The barbarian foes of the Thourians were the Bruttians (Bpcrnoi, 
Pint. 1. c.)> elsewhere described as the revolted tJaves of the Lucanians, and 
who first come into notice shortly before this date (in 356 B. c). From 
c. 19 it appears that the country between Thourioi and Rhdgion was 
already occupied by them.] [• Plat. Tim. 17.] 

[* lU Magdn brought with him 150 ships and was able to land a force 
of 60,000. Every one thought, says Plutarch, that the long prophesied 
iufiapfidpcaffis of Sicily was now about to be fulfilled. See above, p. a 16.] 

[* Plut. Tim. 18. The passage relating to Achradina is worth noting; 
iKp&T7jff€ Kci Kariax^ ''^ Ktyofiiytjv 'AxpaSci^, t tcpdriaroy i^K€i tccd 
iBpavaTOTOTOV Mipxuv r^ ^vpaxofflcay /lipos wSKton, rp&itov rtvd ovy- 
tc€tfiiinfs Kol awrjpfioafUvTfs itc vK€i6v<uu ir^Xcivr. The outer defence of 
Achradina, on the side of the islaud, that Nedn had first to carry was Di6n's 
cross-wall. Schnbring, Achradina, p. 48. See above, p. 26a.] 

[^ Plut. Tim. 19, 30. They forced their way through what was now 
the Bruttian country to Bh^gion. Arrived at Rhdgion they found the 
Carthaginian admiral, whose duty it was to watch the straits, had sailed 
away to Syracuse to terrify Timole6n's garrison with sham trophies which 
they pretended to have taken firom the relieving force. The Corinthians 
accordingly crossed the straits in coasting boats and were welcomed by 
Timoledn near Messana^ of which he forthwith made him.»elf master.] 


command^ and marched to Syracuse^. There Hiketas ohap.xi. 
and Magon still held all the city outside Ortygia and 
Achradina^ as well as the Oreat Harbour. But Timoledn 
was able to encamp by the Anapos, the old camping-ground 
of so many armies^. Magdn presently grew suspicious of Mag6n 

sails away. 

Hiketas^ and sailed away^. When he reached Carthage^ 
he was so fearful of the punishment of this cowardice that 
he killed himself^ and the Carthaginians could only crucify 
his dead body^. 

*^The gods had thus again fought for Timoleon. He 
now planned a threefold assault on those parts of Syracuse 

P Pint. Tim. ao.] [« lb. ai.] 

[' The cause of Mag<^D*8 snspicioxiB, as related by Plutarch (Tim. ao), is 
of great interest from the light it throws on the temper of the Greek 
mercenaries of the day. It appears that the good eel-fishing that was to be 
had on the marshy borders of the Syraousan haven, where the Anapos runs 
into the sea, afforded a favomrite sport for the hired soldiers on both sides 
when off duty. The mercenaries happening in both cases to be Greeks, 
though willing for their pay to fight bravely 'against each other, harboured 
no personal enmity against their opponents, and, when thrown into each 
others* neighbourhood by their common sport, joined in Mendly conversation 
(pla VEKkfi^fs oyT€SKat vpds dXX^Kovs oh* ix^^^*^ llUvy dw^x^^iS/y vp6<paciv, 
iv fi^y reus ftdxous Sic/KivSv^cvor tCf>&arwSf iv 82 reus iyoxjous itpoijipoirSjvrts 
&KKfi\oa 9i€kiycvTo). In this way one of the Greeks in Timoledn*s service 
was able to address to those on the other side some words in fn vour of the 
common cause of Hellas against the barbarians, which went the round of 
Hiketas* troops and excited Magdn's suspicions. ** Were they then," he 
remarked to some of the other side who were admiring the greatness of the 
city and its prodnotiveness, — '* Greeks as they were, — to assist in planting 
Carthaginians in its midst, when Hellas needed many Sicilies as its 
bulwarks against them ? Or did they think that this great host had been 
collected from the pillars of Htotklte and even the Atlantic shores for the 
benefit of Hiketas and his dynasty ! If Hiketas were a good general he 
would not be trying to drive out those whom Syracusans should look to as 
their fathers, but would find his true glory and power in coming to an 
arrangement with Timoledn and the Corintbians." Plutarch puts this in 
a rhetorical form little apprc^niate to the occasion, but something like it 
may well have been said.} 

[* Plut. T^m. aa; wvir0a¥6tuvot (pi XvpoMdotoi) rols Kapxtf^oyiovs rov 
Mywos kivr6y ia^tkiwros darttrravpoucivai t6 odtfuu Holm (G. S. ii. 90$) 
connects Mag6n*s sudden departure with the conspiracy of Hanndn.] 




Hiketas at 
B. c. 343. 

Diaster of 
all Syra- 




tion of 

ation of 
and other 

which were still held by Hiketas. He himself attacked on 
the south side of the hill^ and other Corinthian officers led 
on their troops on the north side and from Achradina^. 
All the posts were taken ; Hiketas contrived to escape to 
Leontinoi^. All Syracuse was delivered, and it was a real 
deliverance. Timoledn did not do this time as Dion did ; 
he did not give the least suspicion that he wished to keep 
more than lawful power in his own hands. Didn had kept 
possession of the stronghold of the tyrants; Timole6n called 
on the Syracusans to come and help with their own hands 
in destroying it'. The whole fortress was swept away^ 
and courts of justice were built on the site ^. But Syracuse 
and the other Sicilian cities were in a sad state through 
all these tyrannies and wars. Some towns were quite 
forsaken ; the tyrants and their mercenaries held the fort- 
resses^ while the citizens lived in the country. Stags and 
wild boars were said to occupy some towns, and in Syracuse 
itself the grass grew thick in the agora *. 

" Timoledn saw that one great need of Syracuse and all 

Sicily was an increase of citizens. He wrote to Corinth^and at 
his request the Corinthians made proclamation at the various 
games of Oreece^ and sent messengers to the islands and to 
many parts of Asia, calling on all banished Syracusans and 

[» Plut. Tim, aa.] [• Died. xvi. 7a.] 

[' Diod. zvi. 70; rhs icard r^r i^ffov d«/)oir^Xci; mX rd rvytayi^fia kox' 

iaKwIft, Plut. Tim. aa ; oh ft6yw rij/y aMpav, dAAd mt rds oUelas icat rd 

fUf^ftara rSav rvpAvvem^ ivirpepaif Mctt KarioKOilfaif.l 

[* Plut. Tim. 1. c. ; titSvs 8i rir rowov cwoiidKv9as Iv^icMiaiat rd dt- 

[^ lb. ; ii iilv kv Xupaico6<Tais dyopdi Hi ifnffjdatf oOrwt voAAi^ xai fiaJBttav 
k((ipwr€v dkfjy, &CT€ Tol^ twirmn kv aur$ KaTav4fi€a$cu r&y lwwoic6f»u9 Ip rp 
XAi$]7 Korajcuiihrwify al tk AKkau v^Ack rX^ mQ.vTtXSn dXiycay iKAipeay kyivovro 
§A(ffrai not cv&v irffiuVf |y tk rois wpoturrtioii koI w€pl rd rtlxf voAAiLvts ol 


other Sikeliots to come home again ^. Many such flocked to chap. xi. 
Corinth; but the number was by no means so gpreat as was 
needed. Another Corinthian proclamation invited all Greeks Corintliiau 


everywhere to take a part in what was in truth a second ment at 


Corinthian settlement of Syracuse^ with Timoledn as its 
second founder ^. Many came at this invitation^ and were 
carried to Sicily under the auspices of the metropolis. 
Others flocked to Timoledn of their own accord from 
various parts of Sicily and Italy. At last as many as sixty 
thousand returning exiles and new-comers were brought 
together in restored Syracuse*. Two Corinthian citizens^ 

[' Plot. Tim. aa, 33.] [^ lb. ; *^ik 4£ inrapx^ ohciirrdsj] 

[* Plat. (Tim. 23), who cites the Symcusan histarian Athanis as his 
authority for the number. Of these, 50,000 came from Italy and Sicily, 
10,000 from Greece, especially from Connth. Dioddroe (zvi. 8a) makes 
5yOoo come from Corinth, and speaks in general terms of the others being 
drawn from Greece. He says that 50,000 lots of land were divided among 
the new colonists, — ^40,000 in the Syraousaa territory, xo,ooo in that of 
Agyrinm, which (adds the Agyrian historian) was laige and good. Cor- 
nelius Nepos (Tim. 3) speaks first of Sicilian and then of Corinthian 
colonists. The above numbers (cf. Holm, G. S. ii. 469) refer simply to the 
new citisens, not counting the women and children, so that the total amount 
of immigrants would be nearer The arrival of such a vast 
body of new settlers must have been a gradual process, and the proclama- 
tion by heralds at the great Games of Greece (^n^rrcs rovt Itpcvs dywas 
Ik rp *£XA48i /ui rdis /u^trras rw warrfy&pHitf, Plut. Tim. 33) must itself, 
as Amoldt (op. cit. p. lay) points out, have taken time. Plutarch (1. c.) 
places this re-colonisation and re-foundation of Syracuse between 343 and 
the date of his great campaign against the Carthaginians, Ol. ex. i (340- 
339). Dioddros (L c), whose dates however are confused (cf. Amoldt, 
op. cit. J 36), mentions it under 01. cz. a (339-338 B. 0.). Nepos (Tim. 3) 
cannot be taken as an authority for the chronology. It is however evident 
that that part of the colonization whicl» rtlates to the territory of Agyrium 
could not have been carried out before the overthrow of its tyrant, about 
338 B. a The land seems to have been distributed gratis to the colonists 
(tV ftii' x^pf^^ Ztiwtifit), but the houses were sold for 1,000 talents, — nearly 
a quarter of a million of our money, — ^the old Syracusans, however, bttng 
given the right of preemption. The want of money was still so much felt 
by the Syraonsan Treasury that the bronie statues of the tyrants were 
melted down, Geldn's however being spared out of gratitude for his victory 
at Himera (Plut. Tim. 33), and those of Dionysios the Elder because he 


CHAP. XL Kephalos and Dionysios, were sent to legislate for what 

lationa?" DMght almost be looked on as a new commonwealth. 

yracuBe. Citizens of an aristocratic city, they were wise enough to 

restore the old constitution of the democracy^ and to enact 

the laws of Diokles afresh ^. 

wft8 represented in the guise of Dionjsos (Didn Ghrysostom, Or. zzxvii. 
See above, SuppL I. pp. 216, 217).] 

[} Timole6n, ever eager for religious sanction (of. Nep. 'Dbi. 4), sought^ 
as a set-off to the purely democratic element of the constitution, to ballast 
the ship of state by conferring the supreme magistracy on the Amphipoloa 
or minister of the Olympian Zeus (Diod. xvi. 70 ; learicTrfa^ 82 itai r^y «or* 
kviavrby lvTi/u)T6rfjy dpx^f ^ *Aft<pivo\iay At6s 'Okvfiviov 61 J^vpcucSctoi 
KoXovat), DioddroB adds that the first 'A/i^vo\os was Kallimente, that the 
Amphipolos gave his name to the year, and that the office continued to 
his own time, when the Romans changed the constitution and conferred 
on the Syraousans their own citizenship, that is, the Jus LeUii, granted 
B. c. 44. Besides KaUimends, the names of only two other Syracusan 
Amphjpoloi are known, Theomnastos and Hdrakleios, both of Verres' time 
(Gic. Yerr. Act II, ii. 51 ; iv. 61). On the election of the Amphipoloi a 
valuable notioe is supplied by Cicero, from which it appears that they 
were chosen by lot out of three genera, — ^a restriction of the franchise 
quite natural in the case of a priestly officer, but which nevertheless 
has an aristocratic look (Yerrin. Act II, ii.*5i; ''Syraousis lex est 
de religione quas in annos singulos Jo vis saoerdotem sortito capi jubeat, 
quod apud illos ampliasimum sacerdotiom putatur. Quum suffiragiis tres 
ex tribus generibus creati sunt, res revooatur ad sortem ''). On the Am- 
phipolia, see especially Ebert, JUfetXianf, 108, seqq. The office is shown by 
inscriptions to have existed at Genturipa (G. I. G. 5743 ; Holm, G. S. ii. 
468 ; Ati dfpi^ dfufHtroKtiuaca;), at Argos, where the God ministered to was 
Apollo, and at Melita, where there was an Amphipolos of Augustus. 
The priesthood of Zeus Olympics at Syracuse was itself of very old 
standing ; thus we hear of Hippokxatte of Gela after his victory over 
the Syraousans in 492 encamping in the Olympieion (Sicily, iL 117; 
Diod. fr. lib; x), and taking the priest of Zeus prisoner {learikafit ^ 
aMy rhy Upia), What Timoledn seems to have done was to make the 
office annual and convert it into the chief magistracy. The special aspect 
under which Zeus was honoured would be as Zens Eleutherios, whose cult 
' was, as in Thrasyboulos' time, the symbol of the triumphant democracy 
at Syracuse (cp. Diod. xi. 7a). About this time was struck a fine series 
of coins with the head of Zeus and the inscription ZBTS EABT6EPIOX 
(See Supplement lY. p. 350.) The reverse type of some of these coins 
is equally significant — a free horse, already in Dioklds* time selected as 
a monetary symbol of democracy at Syracuse.] 

[" The accounts of Timoledn*s legislation are meagre in the extreme. 


''All these reforms took time. And while they were going ch^p.xi. 
on, Timoledn had other work to do. He had to set the rest oampalOT' 
of Oreek Sicily free both from domestic tyrants and from ^JJ^ 
barbarian masters. Of the tyrants the nearest was Hiketas 
at Leontinoi. Timoleon marched against him, and, accord- 
ing to one account, he now underwent the only failure that 
is recorded of him^. The walls of Leontinoi were too 
strong for him. He therefore marched northwards to the 
inland town of Engyum, and to Apollonia near the northern 
coast ^. These were Sikel towns which had by this time 
fully taken to Greek ways. They were held by a .tyrant 
named Leptines ^, who submitted on terms, and Timole6n 
sent him to Corinth, that the Greeks of Old Greece might 
see another fallen tyrant ^. A little later, it would seem, Sabmiflsion 

. . of HiketftB. 

Hiketas thought it time to submit, to give up his mer- 
cenaries to Timole6n, and to pull down his stronghold at 
Leontinoi. He was then allowed to live there as a private 


'' The Carthaginians were still threatening, and making 

(Compare Diod. xvi. 8a and xiii. 35 with Plat. Tim. 24.) The laws of 
private contract and inheritanoe {w€pi rSfy Hwr&v crv/i^oXcuW ^ itKifp<h 
vofiietfy) as laid down by Dioklda were left unaltered, ihoee relating to 
public afiain were amended according to the needs of the time. It is 
thus, perhaps, that Kephalos, like the later legislator Polyddros, was 
spoken of (Diod. xiii. 35) as having been rather an interpreter of the old 
laws and translator of antiquated legal phraseology (ol tk Svpaic6<rtoi . . . 
oMrtpov alrw i»6iuuftaf voiM0krrj¥, dXX* ^ H^TVP^^ "^^^ voftoBirov* 8id rd 
To^s v6fiov9 y^ypafifjUvovt d/>x<i^? itaXiicT^ 9o*tty c7mu 9uaicaTayo^ovs). 
Such a political gap had intervened in the last two generations that it is 
quite possible that a good deal of Dioklte* laws had become quite un> 
intelligible ; but the Dorian dialect of Syracuse could not itself have been 
so completely changed.] 

[} Diod. xvi. 7a. See Appendix YI.] 

[• Diod. 1. c. ; Plut. Tim. 34.] 

[» See above, p. J99.] [* Plut. Tim. 1. c] 

[> lb. See Appendix VI.] 


CHAP. XI. ready for greater efforts in Sicily. Timolefin, like Diony- 

sios, thought it well to strike firsts the more so as he was 

Raid into in great straits for money to pay his mercenaries. He sent 

fiuian two of his Corinthian officers on a raid into the Carthaginian 

territory (b.c. 343-342) ^. There they won over several towns 
to the Greek side^ and brought back great spoils which was 
useful both for paying the soldiers and for making ready for 
the greater campaign that was coming." 

Carthage The Carthaginians by this time saw that their dominion 
for the in Sicily was likely to be seriously endangered by the 
^^^^ advance of the new champion of Hellas in the island. They 
B. 0. 344. b^an to make good their ground against him both by 
warlike and by politic means. To their allies in Sicily they 
made friendly advances ^. One would think that this re- 
ferred to such allies as they had among other races rather 
than to the Phoenician cities which are now commonly 
spoken of as actual parts of the Carthaginian dominion. 
They further made up any differences that they had with 
Allies her- any of the Oreek tyrants. To withstand the man who came 
Hiketas. ^ ^^"^ Sicily alike from tyrants and from barbarians was 
the common interest of both. With Hiketas above all^ the 
most powerful of the order and so directly threatened by 
Timoleon, they entered into specially friendly relations^. 
Moreover they sent a powerful force into Sicily under the 

[} Diod. xvi. 73 ; Plut. Tim. 24. Timoledn sent 1,000 men under the 
Corinthian officers, Ddnarohos and DSmaretoa. The ohief oonquest made 
was Entella. DioddroB describes this as a plundering expedition to which 
Timo1e6n was led by want of money to pay his mercenaries. But the 
money thus acquired could not have gone very far, since at the time of 
the mutiny in Timole6n's camp, just before the battle of the Krimisos, 
we find Thrasios demanding long arrears of pay for the mercenaries 
(Diod. xvi. 78).] 

' Diod. zvi 67 ; rois fciv Kard SurcXiav av/i/iax(Vi 96k€(rt ipiXay0pctnnn 

' lb. ; li&Kiara Z\ jtp^ 'hciray rby rS/y Xvpaieoaujy dvKa<rT<i/orra, Scd rd 
Tcvrcv irKuoy l<rx(^(v< 


command of Hannftn. We hear of a hundred and fifty chap.xl 
ships of war. fifty thousand foot, over two thousand Expedition 

^ , . . of HaimAn. 

chariots^ with a great stock of warlike engines and 
missiles^ with a store of food and all things needful. 

But we hear little of the results of the expedition. Its Cai-tba- 
first object seems to have been to get rid of any enemies Sck^^m- 
who still barred the Punic advance towards the eastern part 6f °j^ *^* 

* Entella. 

of the island. Such enemies were found on the rock of 
Entella. Its Campanian occupants had taken the side of 
the elder Dionysios in his last Punic war ^. They may have 
kept up friendly relations with his son ; at any rate they 
were enemies of Carthage and therefore of Hiketas. The 
Carthaginian army laid waste the lands of Entella and 
besieged the town. The Campanians, seeing so great a 
power brought against them^ sent^ we are told^ for help to 
the other towns that were hostile to Carthage. Two only 
are mentioned by name, and those are both far away. Sikel 
Galaria had learned Greek ways of warfare, and sent a 
thousand heavy-armed to the help of Entella. The Cam- 
panians of ^tna, moved by the danger of their kinsfolk ^, 
werennaking ready a force to go on the same errand. But Defeat of 
the men of Galaria outstripped them. They fell in with a 
Punic force ; the Sikel phalanx was overpowered by num- 
bers, and was cut to pieces to a man *. The news reached 
^tna before the relieving force had begun its march. The 
men of ^Etna feared the same fate as the valiant warriors 
of Galaria. They stayed at home^ and left their kinsfolk 
at Entella to their fate ^. 

[} Diod. xvi. 67. Dioddrofl' words are ; ipfmra rpuueSuia awijapUkLs 82 Iwip 
ras &<rx< Ajar. Here the ffvyotpidas are evidently two- hone chariots ; bat how 
the opfMora. were dUtinguiBhed from them is not stated by Dioddroe. The 
explanation may, however, be found in Plutarch (Tim. 25) who mentions 
riBptwva. Plutarch (loc. cit.) gives aoo triremes, 1,000 transports, and an 
army of 70,000 men.] 

p See p. ao6.] 

P Diod. xvi. 67.] 

[' lb.] [• lb. ; Uptvay 1i<rvxi<a^ dy^.v,] 




Fate of 


nianB and 





B. c. 339. 

What that fate was we are not distinctly told. Five 
years afterwards, in the great expedition of Timoledn, the 
battle-ground is in the neighbourhood of Entella, and the 
march of both Greek and Carthaginian armies towards that 
point suggests that the object on the Punic side was to 
attack Entella and the object on the Oreek side to defend it. 
But we are told nothing distinctly. We know not whether 
its Campaniau citizens held out for five years against 
the Punic attack, or whether the Carthaginians had been 
driven to raise the siege. Still the campaign of which we 
have this very imperfect account has its interest in the 
story of the spread of Greek influence over Sicily. The 
attack on Entella and its defence are as clearly part of the 
warfare of Greek and Phoenician as any Carthaginian siege 
of Syracuse. But, as far as we can see, not a Greek was 
there. The cause of Europe was represented by the older 
and the newer inhabitants of the island. The Sikel marched 
across a large part of Sicily to g^ve help to the Campanian. 
In face of the Phoenician, Greek, Sikel, and Campanian 
were all one ; all were gradually becoming fused into that 
undistinguishable mass of Sicilian Greeks which Cicero 
found in the island. The Ga,larian heavy-armed, march- 
ing in Greek order to rescue another Sicilian town from 
the Phoenicians, felt themselves as Greeks marching against 
the barbarians. The Campanians themselves, with their 
name wrought on their coins in Greek letters ^, were fast 
hastening towards the same change. 

A resolution was now come to at Carthage to make a 
greater effort than all that had gone before, with the 
deliberate purpose of altogether driving the Greeks out 
of Sicily'. Two commanders, Asdrubal and Hamilkar, 

[' B. M. Cat., Sicily, p. 60 ; Head, Hist. Num. 119, lao ; and cf. Coinage 
of Syracuse, p. 36, note. For these coins see Supplement lY. p. 352.] 

' Plut. Tim. 35 ; &s olic in woirju6iuyoi leard fiipos rdy v^Xc/iof, dAA' 
6/jiiov wdffjis ZcivcXicit J^cXdaoKrcr rm/i "EXXtfifas. They came this time, 
" Non cauponantes beUum, sed belligerantes." 


were sent with this commission. But the mere numbers^ ohap.xt. 
as they are given us, of the force which they led do not ^^*"^" 
reach the tale of the host which Hannibal had led seventy pedition 
years before to the destruction of Selinous and Himera^. milker and 
The force that was sent from Africa, with the troops that -^^^^^^^l- 
Carthage already had in the island ^, did not by land reach 
a higher number than seventy thousand footmen and ten 
thousand horses, those of the hordemen and the chariots both 
being reckoned. The naval force was two himdred ships of 
war^ and a thousand transports and ships of burthen for the 
horses, artillery, provisions, and all that was needed. But 
what specially distinguished this expedition was not its 
mere numbers, but the character of one class of the troops 
that were employed. It shows that a special effort was 
designed, when Carthage, commonly so chary of the blood 
of her own citizens, sent forth a chosen body of the noblest 
among them to take their part in it. The Sacred Band, all 
men of birth and wealth and personal repute, all armed 
with the goodliest harness and weapons, now crossed into 
Sicily, to defend, not Carthage herself, but the choicest of 
her foreign possessions. Their numbers are reckoned in 
different accounts at two thousand five hundred and at the 
less likely figure of ten thousand \ 

The fleet sailed to Lilybaion, and found that the Cartha- Airiyes at 
ginian province was already harried by the mercenaries of ^ °^* 
Timole6n. A party under a leader named Euthymos of 

* See Sicily, iii. 455. 

' The larger number comes from Plutarch, the sniaUer from Dioddros 
(zvi. 77). Experience fairly allows us to believe that Plutarch followed 
Ephoros and Dioddros Timaios. Dioddros distinctly says that his numbers 
were 0^ rets vpoJhtApxowrty Iv rg rffff^, 

' It is singular that neither account mentions the sending of the Sacred 
Band at this stage. It comes in in the account of the battle (Diod. zvi. 
80 ; Plut. Tim. 27). Dioddros describes them as EapxH^*^^^^ <>' f^^^^ "^^^ 
l€pdv Koxoi^ dvawX.i^pmhfr€Sf leal r^v ii\v dpi$fi6v Svr^t ZiayiKiot. koSL vcvra- 
K6ctoi, rais h* dptrdts iro) &$£cur, Ire Si rtus o^itus vpctfrctforrct. The larger 
figure comes from Plutaroh. 


cHAF. XT. Leukas seemB to have been in possession of letai, a point 
well suited for action against Panormo»^. At all events 
some action on the Greek side was already going on 
within the Punic boundary. Hamilkar and Asdrubal^ 
stirred up to wrath, left these smaller enemies^ and de- 
termined to march^ as one account puts it^ against the 
Corinthians *. That is, they resolved on a land march all 
across the island with SyTiacuse as its goal. Of the fleet 
we hear nothing at this stage. 
Tlmoledn The news of the landing of the Punic host reached 

xnarohes , 

against the i^o foremost of the Corinthians. Timoleon at once de- 
ere. |^3f]^|]^ed on an immediate march against the Cartha- 
ginian territory. He wished, if possible, to carry the war 
into the enemy^s country, and to spare his allies the 
burthen of a barbarian host passing through their land^. 
The two armies in short set out for the two ends of Sicily, 
each seeking to invade the territory of the other. When 
we remember that the Carthaginians had the advantage of 
the time that the news of the landing took to go from Lily- 
baion to Syracuse, and still more when we read the circum- 
stances of his march, it shows the inherent superiority of 
Oreek warriors and the special energy of Timoleon that the 
armies met for the decisive battle at a spot more than three 
times as &r from Syracuse as it is from Lilybaion. 

But so to do Timole6n had to set forth with such forces 
as he could command at the moment, and the odds in point 

^ I hope I am right in patting this together firom two passages of 
Plutarch. In Tim. 25, he says of the Carthaginians on their landing, 
n$6/i€iKn vop$€t<T$ai r^ imtcpdrtiav abrS/v, By whom was it rayaged I 
Not by Tiinoledn*s main army, which did not set out till the news of the 
Panio landing had reached Syracuse. But in Tim. 30, after the battle 
and quite unconnected with it, we hear of mercenaries in Timoledn's 
service, robs /icr* EM6fU)v rov AcvsoSfov fucBo^povt, a person not men- 
tioned before, w€pi tSls leakovfiivas ^€r6s. 

' Plut. Tim. 25 ; tUfi^ 6pyi vpdt rohs Ko/nvBiovs ix^pow. 

' Diod. XTi. 78 ; fdo^c 8* aihr^ rhv wp6s roits ^oivucat dywa avarrfffaffBai 
Marii r^ rwv Kapxfjioyiogy kntcpdrtuiVf ivats ri^v rw cvikit&xwf x^P^^ iaiv^ 
UteupvK&^jf, rJ^F 8* (nrd roits fiiipfiapow oZcav dicu^ilpff. 


of numbers were frightfully against him. He made peace orap. xr. 
with Hiketas, and increased his own force by taking the 
soldiers of that tyrant into his service ^. Still, after this Odcb 
increase^ his whole army of Syracusans, allies, and mercen- 5&™iii. 
aries reached only the tale of ten thousand — ^it is surely a 
foolish spirit of romance which cuts the thousands down to 
seven or five \ He summoned a military assembly; he spoke 
as Timoledn would speak at such a moment ; he was an- 
swered by an universal shout bidding him march at once 
against the barbarians ^. He may have told them that the 
odds after all were not so great as those against which the 
Athenians and Plataians had marched to Marathdn, and the 
Carthaginians were at least not, like the Medes on that day, 
unknown enemies whose very name was a name of fear^. 
But Miltiades and Kallimachos commanded only true- 
hearted citizens and allies ; Timoledn was less lucky. He 
had men in his army who not only served merely for hire, 
but who were held to be under the special curse of the gods. 
Moreover, through the poverty of the Syracusan treasury, 
large arrears of pay were due to them \ They had gone 
a long way on their march ; they were in the Akragantine 
territory, seemingly at some point further from Syracuse 
than the city of Akragas, when a mutiny broke out ^. The 

* Diod. xvi. 77 ; wpoaXafi6fitvot ro^f /irr' airrov [*Lr^Tow] ffTpart^ras, 

' AgMn it is Diod6ro8 who gives the more prosaio number and Piataroh 
the more exciting ; but Pliitaiofa*s figures do not seem consistent through- 
out. In c. 35 he hM three thousand Syracusans and four thousand mer- 
cenaries ; but directly alter the whole force is five thousand foot and a 
thousand horse, an unusually large proportion of cavalry in a Greek 

' Diod. xvi. 78 ; ndyrcay ^iroit^€ifUyo» rohs K6yovt, kcu. fiodnrrwy dytir 
r^ raxifrniy M ro^s fiapfidpovs, 

* Herod, vi. 112. 
» Diod. xvi. 78. 

* It would seem from Dioddros (xvi. 79) that the Punic camp was not 
very hr off; vporiy^y M robs voXc/ilovf ob /uucpay crparowt^iaoims. But 
no site that is at all possible for the battle can be said to be 06 luucp^ 
from Akragas. 



CHAP. XI. ringleader was one Thrasioe^ a bold and desperate man 
Insnb- according to his name^, who had had a hand in the 


of Thranofl. Phokian sacrilege at Delphoi. He harangued the mer- 
cenaries on the madness of the enterprise of Timoleon^, 
how he was leading them against an army six times their 
number^ to a battle-field eight days' journey from Syracuse, 
where there would neither be shelter for those who fled, nor 
any to bury those who might be slain ^. Timoledn, who 
Mercen- had left his soldiers so long unpaid, was clearly playing his 
^j^/*'^' game with their lives as his counters*. And we may 
believe that in the eyes even of Timoledn the life of an 
adventurer who fought simply for hire was of somewhat 
less value than the life of a citizen of Syracuse or of 
Corinth. Let them, said Thrasios, go back to Syracuse 
and demand their pay; let them not march a step further on 
an enterprise which was doomed to destruction^. 

It was a moment of trial. Roman commanders, the 
Dictator Ca&sar foremost among them, could bring back 
mutinous soldiers to their duty by a single word or a single 
act. It was enough to seize the ringleaders for punish- 
ment, or to appeal to the military instinct by the change 
of a familiar formula ®. But the soldiers of Csesar were 
Romans by race or by long service ; they were bound by 
the military oath; their leader was their Imperator^ not 
their paymaster. The Roman method would hardly have 

' Diod. zvi. 78 ; fua9o<f>6pofy ra Syofia epdaiot . . . dwoi^olq. leai Bpdtrti 
^a<l>4puif, Plutarch does not mention him. 

9 In DioddroB, Thrasiofl calls Timoledn wapcuppoyoihrra; in Plutarch 
(Tim. 25) the thousand go away, ctv oi/x ^aiyovros rov TiftoKioirros dAAd 
/iCuyofUrov itap* ^XiKlav. 

' This touch is from Plutarch (Tim. 95), as well as the number of 
days; SBtr oi/rf cca$jfveu rots tptiyovffiv oCt€ reup^tu rots wtcovaty ainStv 

* Diod. XYi. 78 ; kvaitoKvfiv&wf rms rw /uff$o^6pw ifnfxots. 
' lb. ; crrpartiay dwtypwr/ihnjy fi^ crvMuroXov^Cik'. 

* Ciesar addressed the insubordinate soldiers (Suet. Gsbs. c. 70) as 
"Quirites.** Thereupon they protested that they were "milites" and 
returned to obedience. 


succeeded even with Greek citizens; it would have been ohap.xi. 
utterly useless with Greek mercenaries. And the mer- 
cenaries after all had a case. Their service was a matter 
of buying and selling; they had agreed to jeopard their 
lives for hire, and they were called on to jeopard them 
while their hire was unpaid. Timoledn had to yield to 
circumstances; he had to entreaty to promise^ and by 
entreaties and promises he won back the greater part 
of the mutineers to his service^. But Thrasios, at theThrasios 
head of a thousand of his comrades^ remained stiff-necked ; meroen- 
they would follow Timoleon no further. Violent measures ^JJ^''*^* 
against them would have been useless or impossible; he 
therefore put off their punishment for the present. He 
even wrote letters to those who were left in authority at 
Syracuse, bidding them receive the deserters friendly and 
pay up their arrears '. 

With the rest of his force Timoledn marched on. We Cariha- 
are told that the Punic camp was at no gpreat distance ; it ^^ 
was on the further side of the river Krimisos ; that is, not ^Jjj^ 
the Krimisos that flows not &r from S^^sta, but the 
southern Krimisos, the right branch of the Selinuntine 
Hypsas or Belice. Even this site is not very near to 
any part of the Akragantine territory; but the northern 
Elrimisos is still further away. Notwithstanding the delay 
that the mutiny must have caused, Timole6n had far out- 
stripped his enemies. If he had not actually entered the 
Carthaginian territory, he had come near enough to it to 
deliver a friendly city on its borders. For the position of 
the two armies seems to show that the immediate object 
was on the one side to attack Entella^ and on the other 
to defend it \ We again ask, Had the Campanians, left 
to themselves, kept on their defence through all these 

* Diod. zyL 79 ; fiAyis, voXAct 9«fi$€ls alrw, teal SuptAs iwaYftXSfuyos. 

* He writes vpds robs ir XvpoMovcats ^ovs, Bnt they mutt haye 
been penoni in office. 

* See above, p. 316, n. i. 

Y 2 



oHAP.zi. years? Or was the expedition of Euthymos and his 
mercenaries meant as a diversion on their behalf ? 


on the 


The Greek 

The time had now come for the greatest pitched battle, 
simply as a battle, ever fonght between Greeks and Phoe- 
nicians. The stake was at least as great as it had been in 
the days of Gelon ; the jBghting was far more in the open 
field ; and, if at Himera we almost forget that Gel6n was 
a tyrant^ with Timole6n by the Krimisos there is nothing 
to forget. The topography we must take as we find it ; 
but the march seems a long one. Before it began^ Timo- 
ledn again summoned the military assembly; he reminded 
his hearers of the great deeds of Geldn which they were to 
renew. He further dwelled^ we are told^ on the cowardice 
of the Phoenicians^. Such a charge could hardly be 
brought against the Sacred Band of Carthage ; it could 
assuredly not be brought against the mercenaries from 

The march began; it led over a hill^ from which 
the Greeks expected to see the full multitude of the 
enemy 2. On the ascent, they were met by a train of 
mules, bearing burthens of the herb of Selinous^ the wild 
celery, to be used for fodder \ To the soldiers the omen 
seemed an evil one. Celery was the herb with which men 
crowned the monuments of the dead; a proverb spake of 
one who was sick unto death as one who would soon need 
his celery*. Such thoughts, call them what we will, do 

' Biod. zvi. 79 ; Si^K$9 fikv lilv rSfv ^boivlxwy dycofSplay, vwifaniff€ dk rTJs 
TiXuifos tinjfupias. 

* Pint. Tim. 26; \6<l>0¥, hw {nr§p0aX6yTfs I/acXXok Kar6nl/wBm t6 ffrpd- 
Ttvfta tcai T^r Hwafuy rw voXt/duv, 

' Plutarch, whose purpose it exactly suited, tells the story of the 
parsley at greater length than Dioddros, but it is from the shorter account 
that we get the use of the ffiKira th rds crifiAdat. 

* Plut. Tim. 26 ; irapoifjda ris i/e roihov yiyovt^ rdv l«x<r^aXa)( voawyra 
9€i&0ai atXivov, Needing parsley was like becoming a god in the case of 

"iri — . * : . -». 


come into the minds of large bodies of men in all times chap. xt. 
and places ; and it shows very small knowledge of human omen of 
nature to see in them mere matter for smiles ^. But it ^^^^T- 
is for commanders^ like Timoledn^ Csesar^ and William^ to 
turn the impression the other way by their own ready wit. 
To a man of Corinth the plant which the Syracusans and 
mercenaries dreaded — ^the mercenaries, we may be sure^ more 
than the Syracusans-Hsug^^ested an omen of the happiest 

The general ordered a halt; he again harangued his 
men. The crown of victory^ he told them^ had come into 
their hands of its own accord before the battle'. The 
plant whose sight had troubled them was the very plant 
which the sacred and ancestral custom of Corinth twined 
round the heads of the victors in the Isthmian games ^ 
He took a handful of the well-omened herb, and twined a 
wreath for his own brow; the officers and the whole army 
did the like. At the same moment the soothsayers who^ Omen of 
as UBual^ accompanied the army, pointed out two eagles in ^]|^^ 
the sky. One bore in his claws a struggling serpent ; the 
other sent forth a loud cry of daring and defiance ^. The 
host marched on with the Isthmian crowns on their heads, 

* Sir T. Enkioe Mfty (Hiat. of Demooracy, i. pp. iii, iia) "cwuiot 
bat smile at their Buperatition.*' Grote (ch. Izzzy) takei things more 

* Pint. Tim. 36 ; r^ ari^aifw a^ou iffj irpb rft rtMift in/u{6fuvw 
alro/idrws ds rds x^Qmis (jtciy. We ahall presently come to Timoledn's 
worship of Abro/Mrku 

* Pint. u. s.; l€p6¥ »al vdrpiop ar4fAf/a r6 rov aXiwov vopd^oyrts, 
Plataroh goes on to mention the later change by which at the Isthmian 
games a wreath of pine was ased instead of one of parsley, while at Nome* 
the parsley still went on. 

* lb. ; 6 8* fvToro Mtttkarfiiit fUya mi $appa\i€w. One thinks of the 

[For an apparent ailunon to thid omen on coins of Timol6on*8 time, see 
Sapplement IV. p. 354.] 


cHAP.u. deeming that the gods had promised them victory^ and 

raising their voices in thanks and vows to their divine 

protectors ^. 

Thehill-top It was in the heat of snmmer, the midst of the month 

Timoledn'8 of June. The sun was still climbing the heavens^ and 

®"^' had not reached his noontide height^ when the army of 

Tiinoledn gained the top of the hill^ We more than 

ever crave some further topographical detail. Had they 

marched all nighty or had they halted for the night at 

some point not recorded? They might well have passed 

the night at EnteUa; they could not have marched in 

the course of one morning from any point in the territory 

of Akragas to any hill overlooking the Elrimisos. On 

the hill-top the army — ^the Corinthians they are called — 

stopped to rest; and laid aside their shields^. The low 

ground below them was still covered with a thick mist 

rising from the river^ while heavy clouds gathered round 

the height which they had reached. Nothing could be 

seen; but a loud hum of confused noises told the men 

on the heights that a mighty host was on its march 

below *. 

Puuo anny At last the mist cleared away from the low ground^ and 

ErimisoB. they saw the river Krimisos and the Punic army in the act 

of crossing it. Ten thousand men^ so the Oreeks reckoned, 

had already crossed. First came the war-chariots, each drawn 

by four horses, an array well fitted to strike an enemy with 

f ear^ but less fitted perhaps to do him actual damage ^. Far 

more really dangerous was one division of the ten thousand 

^ In Plutarch the soldiers seem simply to copy the action of the 
general ; Diddoros makes them crown themselyes vapayy^tXairros rod Ttfio- 


* Plat. Tim. 37 ; rod ^Xiov 7rtpi<f»gpo/iiyov leat lirrttopt^orros ri^v dya$v- 
fdaaiy, • 

* lb. ; $4fAtyoi r^s AcrviSas StorevavoKTO. 

* lb. ; 4x4 ^<^ dicpiTOS «a2 (nffn/uyils . . • vp6acj$ty dancraikhnp arparias 

' lb. ; Ttpdrrois fikv roiu r€$/irrwots itcjr\riKTUcSf$frp6s dywyaMarttrMtvafffxiyois, 


which came behind the chariots. They were heavy-armed chaf.xi. 
foot^ with a harness of greater weight than that of the Sacred 
Greek phalanx ; their bodies were fenced in with iron breast- carthage. 
plates ; they wore brazen helmets on their heads^ and they 
bore huge shields of burnished white^ like Adrastos when 
he marched against Thebes. As they marched on^ a 
moving shield- wall^ with slow and firm and steady step^ 
men knew that these were no pressed subjects^ no hired 
mercenaries^ but the very hope of Carthage^ the wealthiest 
and bravest of her sons^ the Sacred Band itself. Hellas 
had that day to match herself with Canaan^ when Canaan 
showed himself in such a guise as he had never before put 
on on Sicilian soil. 

With this sight before him^ Timoleon formed his plans The attack 
in a moment. He would come down with all speed from le^n. 
the hill ; he would attack the enemy while only part had 
crossed the stream^ and while those who had crossed had 
not yet fallen back into their perfect order. DSmaratos^ 
with the horse^ should first charge the Sacred Band, and 
try to put them into disorder before their line was fully 
formed. After a moment^s pause^ he would himself with 
the phalanx follow up the charge of the horse. He came 
down the hilL In the wings he placed the Sikeliots of 
other cities than Syracuse^ mingling with them a few of 
the mercenaries ; he himself^ with the Syracusans and the 
most valiant of the mercenaries^ held the centre. Dema- Advance 
ratos obeyed his orders as he could ; but the chariots stood by the 
in his way. His horsemen could not reach the Sacred*^ * 
Band face to face; they were driven to movements back« ^ 

wards and forwards to avoid the rush of the chariots. 
Timoleon then sent orders to Ddmaratos to keep out of 
the way of the chariots and to make a flank charge on 
the Sacred Band behind them. 

Meanwhile he himself led on his phalanx. How he 
escaped the annoyance of the chariots we are not told; 


CHAP. XI. men were too busy in painting the striking moment of 
Timoledn the fight that followed. Lifting up his shield^ Timoledn 
en^!* called with a mighty voice to his men to follow him 
with all boldness. The shont was louder than his wont. 
His biographer^ calmly telling the tale ages after^ hints 
that all might be the enthusiasm of the moment. To 
the men who stood by Timole6n on the day of battle 
it seemed that some god was calling to them by the 
voice of their general^. The host took up the shout 
in answer; they bade him lead on and not delay; the 
trumpets sounded; the first rank of the phalanx, closing 
tight together^ charged the enemy. With shield and spear 
they bore down on the Punic army, where the noblest of 
Carthage fought in the foremost ranks. Two masses of 
heavy-armed men met face to face, to decide the day by 
Bedstance the mere physical force of push and thrust. But the thick 
Bi^n^^® array of the Sacred Band, their huge shields locked close 
together, withstood the thrust of the Greek spears like the 
wall of a fortress. The Greek was driven to forestall the 
war&ire of the Roman ; the spear was cast aside and the 
sword drawn. And now the more active frames, the more 
highly trained skill, of the Greek warriors, were too much 
for the massive force of Carthage'. The Sacred Band 
fought on with courage worthy of their fame ; they were 
cut to pieces to a man by the Greek swords. The rest of 
those who had already crossed the river took to flight ; of 
the war-chariots we hear nothing more. 

But the fight was not yet over. Thus far the Greeks 
may have had a slight advantage in point of numbers, as 

' Plat. I^m. a 7 ; ^So^cv ifw*p*pvu ^cai^ mU tul(opi «cx/>9<r0cu riff avi^ovs, 
cfrc rf vd$*i vafA rdw dySiva leal rdy Mowriaaithv oCrai dmrdvdfjteyos, cfrc 
Zai/ioviov rcydsi &s rdis woXXots r&r* wap4<mif cvrtwt^€y^a/Uvov, 

' lb. a8 ; Ivf2 92 els ^iipvf aw^X$€if 6 Ayify, tcai rix^is o^x i^^<«^ 4 f^M* 
iyr>f6¥H rd tprfw, Cf. the battle of Goiinth (Xen. HelL iy. 4, lo). 
Livy*B fiunouB blunder here comet true. '*Abjeotu haatiB gladio rem 


they certainly had in position. Bnt now the whole Punic obap.xi. 

host had crossed the river : and. in numbers at least, the Cartiia- 

• * 

advantage lay wholly on their side. The fight began |^f"^" 
again ; but at this stage^ so men deemed at the time^ the ^f^ *^® 
gods of Hellenic Sicily openly put forth all their strength 
to crush the barbarian invader. The clouds from the Storm 
heights come down on the plain ; a fearful storm of rain> ^^ of the 
hail, and thunder broke forth. The elements were on ^.•^^**" 
the side of Greece. The storm fell only on the backs of 
Timoledn's soldiers, while rain and hail dashed right in the 
&ces of the barbarians. The sound of the rain and hail, 
and the clashing of the weapons, made such a confused 
din that no man could hear the orders of his officers. 
The ground was now muddy with the rain; the heavy- 
armed Carthaginians were exposed to the nimble attacks 
of the lighter Greeks ; many stumbled and fell, and under 
the weight of their harness they could not rise again. 
Still for a while they fought on. A band of four hundred 
who held the first rank in what we may call the second 
army was cut to pieces by the Greeks. Then the whole Rout of 
host fled as it might, horse, foot, and chariots, in utter ^[ 
confusion. Some were trodden down by their comrades or 
smitten by their weapons^; many strove again to cross 
the river, but the Greek horsemen followed them, cutting 
them down from behind^. But by this time the stream 
of Krimisos was swollen by the rain; torrents, fiumare, 
were pouring wildly down every gorge and combe in the 
hills '. Many, perhaps men from the Iberian mountains^ 
looked to the hills for help, and strove to climb ; but the 

^ Diod. zri So; inr' dXXifAMr cvftwaro^/itra aai roTs twk avfifidxM' 

* lb. ; vw6 rStnf mo^ roTs voXc/i/oif Iwriw elf t^ r€^ vom/iov ftiBpov 

* Wherever the site of the battle mftj be fixed, Plutarch's deecriptioii 
will fit many a Sicilmn hillside ; t6 vcSfor hw6 woXkds mmxymias mt ^• 
paiyyas intoictiiuvw M/twXaro ^vfidrwr el icard v6pov ^pOfUiwi^, 



oHAP.xi. Greek light-armed could deal with them^. The more 

Numbere part^ horse^ foot, and chariots, were swept away by the 

torrent. waters. The stars in their courses once more fought 

against the chariots and horses of Canaan, and Elrimisos, 

on that day of deliverance, did well the work of elder 





Spoils of 


The great salvation was wrought, and the spoil was now 
to be gathered in. The human part of it numbered fifteen 
thousand captives, of whom the soldiers, like the Syracusans 
after the surrender of Nikias, took the more part to their 
private profit ^. Ten thousand of the barbarians had died 
by the Greek sword, beside those who were swept away by 
the waters. The blow to Carthage was heavy, such a blow 
as she had never felt in any earlier fight. In other wars 
the loss had been that of hireling Spaniards, Numidians, 
and Libyans ; never before had she lost so many of her own 
sons, of her own noblest. The camp was sacked, a camp 
in which iron and brass went for nothing, so rich was the 
store of gold and silver^. Mules, waggons, and their 
burthens were in abundance ; of the war-chariots two hun- 
dred fell into the hands of the victors. The store of arms 
was comparatively small ; Krimisos and his fellows had so 
well played the part of VirgiFs Simois*. Yet a thousand 
breast-plates of splendid workmanship, and ten thousand 
shields, were piled up before the tent of the general. So 
busy was the whole army in gathering up the plunder that 
it was not till the third day that the formal trophy was set 

' Plut. Tim. 28 ; vXc/(7tow 82 rojy \i<fwr i<pi€fAivovs i7ri$iovT€s ol ^ikcH 
KartipydcravTo, Who were the ^1X0/ in Timoledn's army ? 

' lb. 29 ; rwv 8' alxfo^J^«nf ol fxlv woWoit ditKk&wrjffoy (nr^ rSi¥ tnfa^ 

' lb. ; \yAxi(nw y^p ^v "xfiyjcw luil ffidrfpS/r rovs <ricv\€vovffi \6yos. 
ovTOfS &(p$ovos fxiv ^¥ dpyvposy &ip$ovcs 82 XP^^^^' 

* ^n. i. 100, loi. 

timolb6n's VICTOET. 331 

up ^. Of the arms some were hung up in the temples of chap. xi. 
Syracuse and the other allied cities. The goodliest were Arms 
sent by Timoleon to his own Corinth, a special gift to Po- ^ igthmian 
seid6n of the Isthmos. It was the glory of the city which l*<««id^°' 
had sent forth the deliverer to receive such a prize. In other 
temples might be seen spoils which Greeks had won in war- 
fare from kindred Greeks. Here were spoils of holier and 
more righteous victory. Men read on the armour from the Votive 
Krimisos how the Corinthians and Timoledn their general, *"*^P **^ 
having freed the Greeks of Sicily from the Carthaginians, 
made these thank-ofEerings to the gods K 

Within a few years another inscription, marking other 
votive weapons, told how the Greeks, save only the Lace- 
dsemonians, offered their spoils from the barbarians of Asia. 
But by that time the style was changed. Then it was 
''Alexander and the Greeks;" now it is "the Corinthians 
and Timoledn.'' And the Corinthians and Timoledn made Timoledn 
it their boast that they had set free the Greeks of Sicily. ^^ 
Alexander and the Greeks say nothing about having set Alexander, 
free the Greeks of Asia*. Yet they might fairly have 
claimed the credit of having done so ; the Macedonian con- 
quest might &irly pass for the deliverance of all those 
Greek cities which were subject or tributary to the Persian. 
But their deliverance was not the most obvious, it was 

^ They were delayed (Plut. u. i.) ; IXiyot 8i voAXo^f c/evkti^oPTts teal 

' Dioddrofl (zyi. So) says only ; nvA 8* ctf KSpivOw Ttfiokiwy dwiartikt, 
wpoifrA^at clf r6 rov UoauHcavos Up^v dva$€iyai, Plutarch does not mention 
the partioolar temple, bat he points the contrast between this offering and 
those won from fellow-Greeks, and adds the inscription, KopivBioi mi 
Ti/wXiof^ 6 (rrparrfydt ^\9v$€pif<rarrts rols SurcAiay oUoihrras 'EXXiivas dw6 

[* For Alexander's inscription see Plutarch, Vita Alex. i6 ; << *AA^£. 
awdpos 6 ^cAiwov Mat ol^EKkip^ti wXifi^ AaxtZoAiMviw datb rS/y 0ap0dpvy rvv 
rifif 'Acdav KaroiMo^rrvy.** The inscription accompanied the trophy sent 
to Athens after the battle of the Granikos.] 




of Timo- 
ledii*8 de- 





hardly the foremost, object of the expedition of Alexander. 
And their deliverance was in any case less complete than 
that of the Oreeks of Sicily. The subject and tributary 
cities of Asia passed from a barbarian lord to a lord who 
waS; or wished to be deemed, one of their own people. But 
they still had a lord. The deliverance wrought by Timo- 
ledn was perfect ; with him to set free meant to shut out 
the power of any lord^ whether barbarian master or native 
tyrant. All this marks the difference between the king 
and the republican leader. The princely deliverer holds 
that he has a right to reign over those whom he delivers^ 
the republican leader seeks to reign over no man. The 
princely deliverer Sicily has not yet seen ; but he has already 
shown himself in the neighbouring peninsula, and before 
many years he is to show himself in Sicily also. But for 
a thousand years and more it is only for a moment that he 
shows himself. Then the Norman came to do in Sicily 
what the Macedonian could do in the East, but what the 
Epeirot could not do in the West. But two-and-twenty 
ages were to pass, the words kingship and freedom were 
to become words which no longer shut out each other^ before 
Sicily again saw the likeness of Timoledn. 

The moral greatness of the victory of Timoledn cannot 
be surpassed ; no battle was ever fought and won in a purer 
cause. And as a military exploit^ as a defeat of the many 
by the f ew^ it ranks high among the great battles of history. 
In Sicilian history^ as a victory of Greek over barbarian, it 
ranks along with Himera^ perhaps before it. And, as men 
thought in those days^ the glory of Timoledn and his com- 
rades was in no way lessened, it was rather not a little 
enhanced^ because their victory was not wholly their own, 
because the gods almost visibly stepped in to help them. It 
was much for Timoledn to be the smiter of the barbarian^ 
the liberator of the Greek ; it was more to be the special 
favourite of Heaven^ the man for whose behoof a special 


goddess was as it were to be called into being. A dis- chap.xi. 
tingoished historian of Sicilj compares the yictoiy of the 
Krimisos^ as a victory of the few over the many^ with the 
English victories at Cr^cy, Poitiers^ and Agincourt ^. As 
those can hardly be called victories of freedom^ an English- 
man would rather compare it with the victories of the Con- 
federates over the might of Austria and Burgundy ^ Un- Transient 

ejf octfl of 

happily its fruits were less lasting. Timoledn gave Greek victory. 
Sicily a moment of freedom and happiness^ of freedom and 
happiness more perfect for the moment than that which the 
land had enjoyed between the fall of the old tyrants and 
the beginning of the Athenian invasions. But it was yet 
shorter. In a few years after Timoledn^s death tyranny 
was again a power in Sicily^ and it was only by a tyrant's 
arm that the barbarian could be withstood. 

* ^* Timoledn had beaten the barbarians ^ ; he had still to 
deal with the tyrants. Mamercus at Katand had turned 
against him and had asked for help at Carthage. Just 

\} Holm, Qeschiohte Sidliens, ii. 210, 211.] 

P Morgwrten, Sempaoh, Granion and Morat.] 

* From Story of Sicily, p. 227 aeqq. 

[' What 18 not stated is how Timoledn followed up his victory over the 
Carthaginians. Dioddros (zvi. 81) says that the remains of the Carthaginian 
army made its way with difBcnlty to Lilybaion, bnt adds that they were 
afraid to sail away to Libya. No account is given us of any attempt 
on the great Carthaginian dties, Bas Melkart (Hdrakleia Minda) or 
Panormos, not to speak of Lilybaion itself. There is something incon- 
sequent and inconclusive in llmoledn's conduct, perhaps due to the wish of 
his mercenaries to return with their booty, perhaps to the fear of enemies 
in his rear. It is however too much of a piece with his loitering at 
Hadraaum after the defeat of Hiketas. Plutarch (Tim. 29) complacently 
relates that three days were spent in erecting the trophy; and though 
a body of mercenaries, insuflScient, as it proved, even for that task, was 
left to harry the JEpikrateia, Timoledn himself, so far from trying to drive 
the Carthaginians into the sea, returned to Syracuse. Carthage showed 
greater energy, and we find her dispatching a fleet of seventy ships to the 
assistance of her Sicilian subjects and allies. It is noteworthy too that 
Hiketas so far from being overawed by Timoledn's victory chose the 
moment to revolt, and was given time to receive Carthaginian help.] 


oHAP.zi. now Carthage could only send a body of Greek mer- 
Bevoltof cenaries; but they seem to have set up Hiketas again in 


the tyranny of Leontinoi ^y and there was another tyrant 
Hipp6n at Messana^. These men gained some yietories 
over some of Timoledn's mercenaries^ men who had had a 
share in the sacrilege at Delphi. So men said that the gods 
fcivoured Timoledn wherever he went himself^ but that they 
punished his guilty followers when he was not with them ^. 
Presently all these tyrants were put down by Timoledn. 
Hiketas Hiketas was taken at Leontinoi ^ and put to death as a 

and Ma- 

mercoB tyrant and traitor. His wife and daughters were sent to 

taken and 

executed. Syracuse^ where the Syracusans condemned them to death 
in vengeance for the murder of the wife and sister of Dion 
by Hiketas. It was held to be the one stain on the character 
of Timoledn^ that^ though he did nothing to promote this 
cruelty, he did nothing to hinder it*. Mamercus^ sur- 

[* See Appendix VI.] 

[' Plut. Tim. 34. To these tyrants DioddroB (zvi. 8a) adds Nikodemda 
at Gentoripa and ApoU6niad68 at Agyrium.] 

[» Hut. TiuL 30.] 

[* It is strange to find (Plat. Tim. 3a) Hiketas for a while overranning 
and ravaging at will the Syracusan territory and the victorious Timoledn 
with only a small body of troops to oppose him (&\lyovs arpartirras). The 
geography of the campaign is obscure. Hiketas with superior forces 
mocks at 'Hmoledn, then encamped by Kalauria, an otherwise unknown 
town. Finally, Timole6n, with horsemen and light-armed, attacks Hiketas' 
army drawn up in a strong position on the further side of the Damyrias, 
which had therefore to be forded in the face of the enemy. To chose the 
leaders of the assault where many were clamouring to be first, Timoledn 
collected the rings of his cavalry officers (lAd^x^) in his chlamys, and the 
first he drew, having on it a trophy engraved for its device, was greeted as 
an omen of victory.] 

[^ Plutarch himself is compeUed to remark (Tim. 33), kojL 8o/ctt rovro 
rSfv lifioXiovTos tpyo/y i^x"'^^^^^'*'^^ 7cyi<r0cu.] 

[' On the occasion of successes gained over Timoledn's mercenaries near 
Messana and leta (Plat. Tim. 30), Mamercus had written the insulting 
lines quoted above (p. 301). He was defeated by the river Abolos, — 
perhaps the Alabon (cf. Holing G. S. ii. 314, 471, 47a), — ^with a loss of a,ooo 

TIMOLEON's peace with CAETHAGE. 335 

rendered to Timolefin on condition that he should have a chap. xi. 
trial before the Syracnsan assembly and that Timoleon 
should not speak against him. Timole6n held his peace ; 
when Mamercus saw how strongly the Syracusans were 
against him^ he tried to dash his head against the stone 
seats of the theatre where the assembly was held ^. But he 
failed^ and he was put to death as a robber. As for Hippdn^ Hipp6n 

^ ezectited 

he fell into the hands of the Messanians themselves^ who by Mes- 


put him solemnly to deaui^ sending for the boys to see^ as 
the punishment of a tyrant was held to be an edifying 
sight ^. These things seem harsh to us; but we should 
remember that all Greeks held that a tyrant who had risen 
by trampling all law underfoot had lost all right to the 
protection of law, and that he might be rightly dealt with 
as a wild beast. 

'' And now peace was made with Carthage. The Haly- Penoe with 


kos was still to be the boundary^; so Carthage still kept 
Selinous and Herakleia ; but those of the inhabitants who 
chose were allowed to move freely into the Greek territory. 

men, a large part of them Geekdn'g oontiiigent (Plut. Tim. 54). Hui first 
reaonroe was to try and obtain the assistaaoe of the Lncanians, but his 
fleet deserted him and handed over Katand to Timoledn. He was finally 
captured at Messana where he had taken refuge with Hipp6n (Plut. 1. c.).] 

\} Pint. Tim. 34 ; $op6fi4HS Sk vtpiwiwrMy tcai Ti)r UttKffaUiy dpSa^ dMApai" 
V71TW i$ti fibf^a rd Ift&riov 9tiL fUcov rov B^rpov, tai vpdf re rSfy fidBpcty 
Zp6ik^ ^p6fA(¥os cwipptf^t Ti)y Kt^aXijiy dn d«otfiivoi$/icror.] 

[' lb. ; «a2 wapakafiirrti txbrbv el Mtffo^uHf /eai robs wrnHas ktt iw 818a- 
CKtt\dej¥ &s M $4af»a tc&Kkurrw ri^ rov rvpianfoo rifwpiav dyayArrts cit 
$4aTpov, TJKlffcarro nl Ui^pBtipta^^ 

[' Diod. zvi. 8 a ; /tcrcl b\ ravra iw Vsipxrfloi^iofv ^a7rp9<r0tu(raf»iiwy Koi 
7roK\A drrfiimw^ aw^x^P^^ airroU r^ €lpiffwijv, &<rTt rcU fiir *Ekkipr(9as 
v6\tii d«<l<ra$ i\€v$4pas ttvai rbv 8 j 'AXviror ita\ovfuyoy vora/idr Spiov cfrcu 
r^s l/rar^pctir l«i«parc(as* /a) l^ciVcu 91 KapxT^oWocs fimfiriffai t<mV rvp6anffnz 
voktfiovffi wp6s ^vpaKociovs, Plutarch (Tim. 34) — or his MSS. — erroneously 
calls the boundary river the ** Lykos.*' As in Dioddros (xv. 1 7), this is the 
Eastern Halykos or Platani.] 


CHAP. XI. And the Carthaginians bound themselvee hj a clause most 

unlike their first treaty with Dionysios, not to give help to 

Remainiog any tyrant. There were still some to put down at Cen- 

tyrants put 

down. turipa and Agyrium ^. The people of the last Sikel town^ 
when set free from their tyrant ApoUdniades, were admitted 
to Syracusan citizenship, and they received Greek settlers 
in their territory *. So greatly had the distinction between 
Greek and Sikel, so clearly marked a hundred years before^ 

Campui- now died out. Timoledn also put an end to the Campanians 

ians of 

.£tna at ^tna ^, and he sent fresh settlers to Gela and Akragas ^. 

Gelaaad Akragas now again became a place of some importance, 

^^^^ though it never rose again to its old greatness. Thus^ if 
not all Sicily, yet nearly aU that part of Sicily which had 
ever been either Greek or Sikel, was now free. It became 
again a land of free commonwealths, without either foreign 
masters or domestic tyrants. 

Abdica- ^* Timolcdn^s work was now done. He laid down his office 

tion of 

Timoledn. of general^ and with it all extraordinary powers^. He 
became a private man^ and^ as a private man^ he chose 

{} Diod. xTi. 8a. About thiB time too (Diod. 1. c.) Timoledn seized and 
executed the Tyrrhene pirate Postumius, who with twelve piratical yesseis 
had put in to the harbour of Syracuse " as a friend.*'] 

[* Diod. 1. c. ; roibt iXtvO€pv$ims "SvpaKocUnfi ivohftr^. For the diyision 
of part of the Agyrian territory among the new colonists, see above, 

P- 3 3-] 

{^ Diod. L a ; rc^ 8* Iv AIttq Kd/tirayo^ ImroXio/Mrtitfor iii<^€tpt.'] 

I* Plut. Tim. 35. Akragas was colonized by Veliami (Eleates) under 
MegelloB and Pheristoe ; Gela by Gotgos of Keos. The remains of the 
old citizens were also collected. Fresh inhabitants were further sent to 
Kamarina (Diod. ztL 82) ; but the Leontines were transplanted to Syra- 
cuse (Diod. 1. c.).] 

p Plutarch (Tim. 37) uses the phrase &wo$4a9at r^ furapxiai^. He 
makes Timole6n abdicate his powers immediately on his return to Syracuse 
after putting down the tyrants. The cause of his retirement was his 
blindness which had come upon him when encamped at Mylai (Milazao), 
in his campaign against Hipp6n of Messana and Mamercus.] 


rather to live in the land which he had delivered than to go ohap. xi. 
back to his own Corinth. He sent to Corinth for his wife Timoledn 

u a private 

and children^ and spent the rest of his days on an estate citizen, 
close to Syracuse which the Syracusan people had given 
him \ He became blind^ and he seldom visited the city or 
took any part in public affairs. But when the Syracusan 
people wished for his advice, he was brought in a carriage 
into the theatre, and he told them what was best K Once 
or twice men spoke against him ; then all that he said was 
that the wish of his heart was now fulfilled ; every man in 
Syracuse could speak as he pleased ^. At last, about eight 
years after his first coming into Sicily, he died (b. c. 336) *. Death of 


As a special honour, he was buried within the city, and b.o. 336. 
around his monument in the affora was built a range of 
public buildings called after him the Timoleonteion *. So 

P Pint. Tim. 36.] P lb. 38.] 

[' lb. 37. Upon one, Lapbystios, making an accusation against him, 
Timoledn would not suffer the Syracusans to howl him down. It was, 
be said, in order that any one who wished should be able to have 
recourse to the laws that he bad endured such toil and danger on their 
behalf. His other utterance of the same nature was on the occasion of 
Ddmainetos making many charges against his conduct as stratSgos ; «/)d$ 
iictiyov ftiv ovd^K drrcfvc roa 8i Ofws i<pff X^P^^ 6<p€i\€iv. oh tv^aro Xvpa- 
Koaioui iiri9€iv r^r vap/nf<r(as icvplovs y€vofi4vovs, Cf. Com. Nep. (Tim. 5), 
where ^'Lamistius " is given for Laphystios.] 

[_* Diod. xvi. 90. Dioddros' words — trrparify^oras irrj Iterw — take in the 
period of bis retirement as well as his stratdgia. 01. ex. 4 is here given 
as the date of his death, that is, the last half of 337 or the first of 336 b. 0. 
But as Amoldt (op. dt. 191) points out, the numerous accounts of Timoledn 
as a private citizen by Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos weigh in favour of 
the later year, 336.] 

[^ Plut. Tim. 39. His bier, supported by youths chosen for the purpose 
by lot, was carried over the site of the levelled castle of Dionyaioe. Many 
myriads of people, with wreaths on their heads and clothed in white, 
gathered together from the whole of Greek Sicily, followed, as in some 
great festal procession, but real weeping and wailing mingled wiih the 
ritual channting of the dead man's praises. As the body, still resting on 
its funeral oouch, was laid on the pyre, the herald Ddmdtrios, who had the 




CHAP. XT* diedj and so was honoured, the man of the worthiest fame 
in the whole story of Sicily^ the man who thought it enough 
to deliver others and who sought nothing for himself. 

Example of 
Didn and 

moe of 

^^ But though neither Sicily nor any other part of the 
Greek world ever saw such another as Timoleon, and though 
the immediate work of Timoledn lasted only a short time^ 
yet the example of Di6n and Timoleon had a great effect. 
It became the custom now for the Greeks of Italy and 
Sicily, when they were pressed by any enemies, at once to 
ask for help in Old Greece. We must remember the state 
of Old Greece at the time. When Timole6n sailed for 
Sicily, Philip of Macedon was fast advancing to the supre- 
macy of Greece, and before Timoleon died, the battle of 
Chaironeia in B.C. 338 had actually given him that su- 
premacy. This was a state of things which made many in 
Greece dissatisfied, and anxious to try their fortunes in the 
West. Presently came the wonderful conquests of Alex- 
ander, and the establishment of Greek kingdoms in Asia 
and Egypt by his generals stirred up ambitious princes to 
attempt the like in other lands. There were now no great 
citizens like Timoleon or even like Di6n ; but seveiul kings 
of Sparta and of Epeiros showed themselves eager for 
western adventure. The first of these was Archid^os 
king of Sparta, who had played a considerable part in 
the older state of things in Greece, and who was glad to 

BtrongeBt voice of any, read a decree of the Syracuaan people, proclaiming 
that a public funeral, at an expense of two hundred mins, had been voted 
to Timoledn as liberator and refonnder of the chief Sicilian cities, as 
conqueror of the barbarians and lawgiver to Syracuse, and announced the 
establishment in his honour of musical, equestrian, and gymnastic games. 
The Timoleonteionf built about his tomb, itself served as a gymnasium 
and paUestra. (Cf. Diod. zvi. 90 ; Com. Nep. Tim. 5.)] 


escape from the new by trying his fortune elsewhere. The chap. xi. 
Tarantines, pressed by the Lucanians and Messapians^ 
asked help of their metropolis Sparta^ just as the 
Syracusans had asked help of their metropolis Corinth. 
Arehid&mos came out to their help ; but he was slain (b.c. 
338) in a battle with the barbarians at Manduria or Man- 
durion, on the same day^ men said, as Philip's victory at 
Chair6neia \ 

'' We can only guess at the objects of Archidamos. The 
next who came, the Molottian king Alexander^ uncle of the Alexander 

the Mo* 

more famous Macedonian of the same name^ certainly came lottuui. 
to found a dominion for himself over Greeks and barbarians 
(b.c. 332^-331) ^. He b^^n the work with some success; 
he even made a treaty with Bome^ then a strong power in 
Central Italy but which had not reached so far south. But 
he was presently murdered, and his schemes died with him. 
Neither of these princes actually touched Sicily ', though 
some of those who came after them on the same errand 
had directly to do with Sicilian affairs. Meanwhile we 
have nothing to say about Sicily itself for several yeai*s^ 

\} Diod. xyi, 88. For Archidamoe' Italian expedition, of. Diod. xvi. 63 ; 
Pans. iii. 10; vi. 4; Strab. yi. 3; Plut. Agis, 3; Theopomp. ap. Athen. 

xii. 536.] 

C For the Molottian Alexander, see Diod. xvi. 72 ; Joatin, viii. 6 ; 
ix. 6, 7 ; xiL 2 ; xtU. 3 ; xTiiL i ; xxiii. i ; livy, viii. 3, 17, 24.] 

[' I have elaewhere (Horsemen of Tarentum, 83) shown from nmnis- 
matio evidence, that the Epeirot Alexander, dming his campaigns against, 
the Lncanians and Bmttians, had concluded an alliance with the Lokrians, 
and have further caUed attention to the fact that some bronxe coins struck 
at Syracuse shortly after Timoledn's time, point to the conclusion that the 
Syracusans also claimed him as their ally. On these pieces (see Supplement IV. 
p. 350) the head of Zens Eleutherios is coupled on the reverse with the 
thunderbblt and seated eagle which on the contemporary coinages of 
tlie Italiot cities were the badges of the Molottian alliance. It may be 
inferred that the Western Alexander included Sicily in his far-reaching 

Z 2 


oHAP XI. till a new power arises which brings Sicily into a wider 
connexion with the world in general than any that came 
before it." 

TimoleAn*8 [On the other hand the careers of the series of princely 
deliverers from over sea called in by the Italiot Greeks 
who had been to so large an extent the subjects or de- 
pendents of Dionysios suggest many points of comparison 
with those of Di6n and Timoleon in Sicily. The chief 
moving cause in this case was the advance of the Lu- 
canians, a Sabellian race, and the forerunners of their 
greater kinsmen of Latium in South-Italian conquest. The 
Greek city which now took the lead among the Italiot 
confederates was Taras, and from Taras on each occasion 
came the first invitation of foreign help which brought 
over in succession the Spartan king Archid&mos, the Molot- 
tian Alexander, the Spartan princes Akrotatos and Kle6ny- 
mos, and to which in the next age the intervention of 
Pyrrhos was to be due.] 
T»mo|e^ii The western enterprise of Archid&mos was begun and 
chidamos ended while Timoleon still lived. And there arlB some points 
oompap . ^j^^jj connect the two, in opposition to those that came 
after. Both came from the ancient and acknowledged 
cities of Old Greece, while Alexander and Pyrrhos came 
from a land whose Greek character had hitherto been doubt- 
ful, and which their career did much to establish as a Greek 
state. Alexander and Pyrrhos too were kings in the fuU 
sense, not Eastern despots certainly, but still fully kings. 
Timoleon was a simple citizen of a commonwealth^ and if 
Archidamos was a king, he was king in §> city whose 
kings were rather hereditary magistrates than kings even 
in the Epeirot or Macedonian sense. 

Again, there is another point of union, incidental but 
very significant. Few as are the years which part the 
enterprises of Timoleon and Archid&mos from that of 

TIM0Le6n compared with the later deliverers. 341 

Alexander of Epeiros, it marks a g^eat advance in the state chap. xi. 
of Italy that Rome has no dealings with Timoleon and 
Archid&mos, while the dealings of Rome with Alexander 
form an important part of his story. Between Timoledn 
and Archidamos again there is this marked difference, that 
the career of Timoleon is wholly Sicilian, while that of 
Archidamos is wholly Italian. But this difference is little 
more than incidental. Timoleon's career of deliverance 
might have been extended to Italy as easily as were careers 
of aggrandizement on the part of Dionysios before him and 
of Agathokles after him. And Italian success on the part 
of Archid&mos might well have opened a career in Sicily 
for him. 

All alike, Timoledn, Archidamos, Alexander, Klednymos, Mace- 
Pyrrhos, mark that the later age of Greek history, the age of the" *^^ 
in which Macedonia plays a leading, often a dominant part, I>eliverep8. 
ha^ already begun. They belong however to three dif- 
ferent stages. Timoledn and Archid&mos set out when Philip 
is already threatening Greece but is not yet her master. 
Archid&mos certainly^ perhaps Timoledn, turned his face 
westward because Sicily and Italy offered a better field for 
Greek eneigy than Old Greece itself. Alexander of Epeiros 
strove to repeat in the West what Alexander of Macedon 
had done in the East. P}nThos was one of the successors 
of Alexander whose destiny led him westward instead of 
eastward. But all belong to a time distinguished alike 
from the old days of Athens and Sparta on the one side 
and from the later days of Aehaia and Aitdlia^ of Rhodes 
and Byzantion^ on the other. That is, Timoledn and 
Archid&mos belong to it as far as their western career is 
concerned. The slayer of Timophanes, the winner of the 
Tearless Battle, belong in their birth and their earlier years 
to days before Philip had sprung to greatness. 

But, to look at things again from a more general point 
of viewj all come within those two or three generations 




Range of 
Greek in- 

decided in 
E&Bt and 

of Greece 
in Asia ; 

a lasting 

which saw the question decided^ what parts of the world 
were to be brought under direct Greek influence in any 
shape, and what was to be the range of such influence in the 
East and in the West, in Asia and Eastern Europe on the 
one hand, in Italy, Sicily, and the lands beyond Italy and 
Sicily, on the other. Old Greece, lying between these two 
outlying seats of Greek influence, had, from the earliest 
days of her colonial settlements, been led to look in both 
directions. On both sides the outlying Greek settlers had 
to strive with barbarian neighbours, and from both sides 
the threatened outpost of Hellas often called on the mother- 
land for help. 

The cry had come first from the East, because it had 
been by the great Asiatic kingdoms, first Lydia, then Persia, 
that the freedom of Greek cities had been first threatened 
and overthrown. The Persian invasions of Greece, the 
Greek invasions of Persia, the tale of Miltiades and The- 
mistokles, of Kimon and Xenophon and Agesilaos, of Jas6n 
and Philip and Alexander and Seleukos, form a long drama 
which begins with the taking of Miletos and the help given 
by Athens to her colony. The age of Alexander and his 
successors fixed what was to be the results of the struggle. 
A Greek dominion — for from our point of view a Mace- 
donian dominion must count as Greek — stretching from the 
Hadriatic to the Hyphasis, was proved to be a day-dream. 
But a vast extension of Greek dominion, a still vaster ex- 
tension of Greek influence, was found to be no dream at all. 
It was found possible to extend the bounds of the immediate 
Greek world by the recovery of the Greek cities and a good 
deal beyond the Greek cities; it was found possible to 
make the eastern coast of the ^gean, the southern coast 
of the Euxine, more thoroughly a Greek land than ever, 
and to begin the process by which all Asia Minor gradually 
became a land essentially Greek. Alexander and his fol- 
lowers were able to found great Greek cities as capitals of 


Syrian and Egyptian kingdoms, and to spread a certain chap.xi. 
varnish, sometimes more than mere varnish, of Hellenic 
culture, not only over the lands ruled by Greek kings^ but 
to a great extent over the lands of their barbarian neigh- 
bours. Greek colonization^ Macedonian conquest, had laid 
the foundation *of the state of things when Rome should 
move to a colonial Greek city of Europe, and when the 
solid peninsula of Asia Minor should be before all others 
the Roman land, the Romania which neither Slave nor 
Saracen could conquer, in days when the name of Rome 
implied the speech^ the culture, and the later faith of Greece. 

The cry from the West was later in coming, because any Interfer- 
serious danger to the Greek settlers in Sicily and Italy g^^ in 
came later. For the most part the Greeks of those lands *^® ^®**- 
fight their own battle. The earlier applications to Old 
Greece are not strictly cries for help for the Greek against 
the barbarian. Least of all can that name be gixen to 
a cry from Segesta for help against Syracuse. Didn, if he 
could be said to be invited at all, was not invited to give 
help against barbarians, nor did he wage any warfare with 
barbarians. With Timoledn a change comes. He is 
sent for to deliver Syracuse from a domestic tyrant ;^ but 
from the very beginning he has to strive against Carthage 
as well. In this sense then the cry from Syracuse which 
brought Timoledn from Corinth was the forerunner of the 
oft-repeated cry from Taras which brought the princes of 
Sparta and Epeiros on errands which were equally fruitless 
whether we look on them as errands of deliverance or as 
errands of conquest. 

For the main distinction between interference from Old FruitlesB 
Greece in the East and in the West is the utter fruitless- r^ults. 
ness of the westward action. In the East the various 
stages of Greek colonization and Macedonian conquest led 
to an abiding Greek influence, in the end to what on one 
side was a Greek dominion. In the West the traces of 




of Greek 
action in 
the West. 

Timoledn a 



Greek colonization died out slowly but surely. A Greek 
dominion, answering to the Greek kingdoms of the East^ 
was never formed. Every attempt at it was shattered. 
No Spartan or Epeirot did in Sicily or Italy what the Mace- 
donians did in Asia and Egypt. None of them founded 
any power which could be called Greek in the same sense 
as the kingdom of Pergamon or even as the kingdom of 
Baktria. Agathokles and Hier6n were native rulers^ and 
as founders of a Greek power their work was not lasting. 
The barbarian of Africa was driven out, but only to make 
room for the barbarian of Italy. And Rome in the West 
did not put on the same half-Greek shape as Rome in the 
East. The utmost that can be said is that the fact that 
Sicily and southern Italy clave so long to the Eastern 
instead of the Western Empire undoubtedly did something 
to keep up Greek life in them. In this sense Belisarius, 
though he certainly came on no such conscious errand, was 
a more effectual missionary of hellenism than Archiddmos 
or Pyrrhos. In dealing therefore with the remote fore- 
runners of Roger, we have to record^ not a series of successes 
but a series of failures. But there is a kind of poetical 
justice in the story that the one man who did carry out the 
errand on which he came was the one man whose career 
was wholly pure, the one who sought nothing for himself ^ 
the one who was only a deliverer, a conqueror only towards 
the enemies of those whom he delivered. 

Here then comes the main distinction between Timoleon 
and the princely adventurers who came after him. The 
errand of Timoleon was purely an errand of deliverance. 
A citizen of a commonwealth, he came to free a common- 
wealth from the enemies of its freedom within, to defend 
it from the enemies of its national being without. As the 
reward of these services he took, we can hardly say that he 
asked, such honours and such influence as a free common- 
wealth may rightly give to its worthiest citizen. The 


errand of Archidamos, of Alexander, of Pyrrhos, was, in one ohap.xi. 
sense, an errand of deliverance no less than the errand of 
Timoledn. Their object undoubtedly was to act as cham- L»ter 
pions of Hellas, to secure the Greeks of Italy and Sicily adven- 
from all danger of overthrow, or even of dependence, at the ,^"0^ 
hands of barbarians. The Western Greek world was to be dominion, 
strengthened, its bounds were to be enlarged, not only 
against Bruttians and Lucanians, but against Rome and 
Carthage. But we cannot give to the deliverer from Sparta, 
still less can we give to the deliverer from Epeiros, credit 
for doing this work in the spirit of Timoleon. They were 
minded, whenever they had the chance, to set Greeks free 
from barbarian rule. But they deemed that the deliverer 
had a right to reign over those whom he had delivered. 

In the later expeditions it cannot be doubted that the 
Macedonian conquests in Asia were before the eyes of 
Alexander and Pyrrhos ; what may have been before the 
eyes of Klednymos it is less important to enquire. The 
purpose of the two Molottian kings clearly was to do in the 
West what other Greek princes were doing in the East. 
They designed to form a Greek dominion West of the 
Hadriatic to match the Greek dominion which had arisen 
East of the JSgeean. 

But their designs came to nought. Their age proved, as Failure 
I have already said, what were to be the bounds of Greek designs, 
dominion and Greek influence in the East and in the West. 
In the East temporary dominion was to lead to abiding 
influence. Dominion and influence alike were to be spread 
far over new lands ; Hellas, politically subdued at home, 
was to make the most wide-spreading of her conquests 
abroad. In the West no new Greek power was to be 
founded, no old one was to be extended. The decree which 
had called an Italian city to the rule of the Mediterranean 
world was not to be turned aside in favour of any prince 
from Sparta or Epeiros, not even in favour of the purer 











deliverer from Corinth. One form of Greek influence was 
indeed to spread over Rome and the whole West. But 
it was not an influence of the same kind as that which 
made some Asiatic lands really Greek and which spread an 
outward tinge of hellenism over a far wider range. In the 
West no more lands or cities exchanged their own national 
life for that of Greece. Many lands and cities which had 
been thoroughly Greek gradually fell away from the Greek 
fold. No part of Italy or Sicily is now Greek ; Asia Minor 
is Greek to this day wherever Greek life — one might almost 
say human life — has not been stamped out of it by Turkish 

[The attempts of the series of princely adventurers from 
Old Greece or its border-lands to found for themselves 
a dominion on Italian soil had thus no lasting result. 
Nor was any Sicilian power destined to succeed where 
Spartan and Epeirot failed. The Italian conquests of 
Dionysios had indeed foreshadowed these later enterprises, 
and he at least had been able to hand on to his son his 
Italian possessions and dependencies. The conquests of 
Agathokles in this direction were still shorter lived.] The 
Sicilian commonwealths and tyrants had^ as a rule^ too much 
to do at home. There was ever before them the g^reat struggle 
in their own island^ the struggle between the Greek and 
the Phoenician. The far-reaching policy of Dionysios and 
Agathokles stands almost by itself. Sicily for the most 
part remained a world of its own, a house largely divided 
against itself ^ and ever threatened by a single powerful 
enemy who always kept his hold on some possessions^ 
greater or smaller, in the island itself. It is only by fits 
and starts that the history of Sicily takes a wider range 
than the local history of the island. It is only by fits and 
starts that Sicily has much to do either with Italy or with 
Old Greece. Throughout the fourth century before Christ 
there is no dread among the Sikeliot cities^ as there con- 


TIM0LE6n as a champion of HELLAS. 347 

stantly was among the Italiot cities^ of interference on the chap. xi. 
part of any native Italian power. Bruttians^ Lucanians^ 
Samnites^ Romans^ were all seen from a distance. With Fitful 
Old Greece too dealings are rare and fitful. The Athenian between 
invasion in the fifth century and the consequent appearance oidG 
of Syracusan forces among the enemies of Athens in Old 
Greece are events that stand by themselves. Less important 
than the warfare of Hermokrates on the coast of Asia^ but 
in some sort more striking as showing the wider range which 
the Greek world was takings was the occasion when among 
the allies of Sparta, fighting her Peloponnesian battles, 
there appeared Gauls and Spaniards in the pay of a tyrant 
of Sicily. Later in the same century come a more whole- 
some form of connexion from the other side^ in the expedi- 
tions of Didn and Timoledn to give freedom to Syracuse in 
name or in truth. The work of Timoleon has several sides. 
As the deliverance of a once free city from a tyrant, it may 
pass as one of the last and worthiest exploits of the elder 
day of Greek freedom. It has no fellow till the deliverance 
of Sikydn and Corinth by Aratos began its later day. In Timoledn 
this aspect the expedition of Timoleon is the very opposite champion 
to the attempts of princes from Old Greece to found realms ^^ ^ellfts. 
for themselves in Italy or Sicily. But in the general his- 
tory of the world it ranks along with them. Timoleon^ 
like Archid&mos and Pyrrhos^ went in answer to a cry for 
help sent by the Greeks of the West to the Greeks of the 
mother-land. At first indeed it was a cry for help against 
a domestic tyrant and not against a foreign enemy. But 
he who overthrew the domestic tyrant had presently to 
struggle with the foreign enemy also. Strangely as the 
name of Timoledn sounds if we place it between those of 
Dionysios and Agathokles^ yet^ in the list of champions of 
Hellenic Sicily against the Phoenician, Dionysios^ Timoledn^ 
and Agathokles find their places side by side. But Diony- 
sios and Agathokles were native Sikeliots ; Dionysios was 


CHAP. XL a native Syracusan ; in that character, as well as in their 
character of tyrants, they continue the same series as 
Gelon and the elder Hier6n. Timoledn, a deliverer from 
outside^ belongs, from that side of him^ to the same series as 
Archidamos, Pyrrhos^ Gedrgios Maniak^s^ and Roger of 
Hauteville. That he alone came with the single-minded 
object of restoring a free city to its freedom does not change 
his position in the general history of the battle-ground of 
the Mediterranean powers. 


(J?y the Editor,) 

Numismatic lights on the Sicily of TimoleOn. 

The Sicilian coinage of Timole6n's time throws a welcome light 
on the economic results of his enterprise, and is besides of great 
historical value as an authentic contemporary record of his work 
as a liberator. 

At Syracuse itself, where since the time of Dionysios the Elder 
the mint had almost ceased its activity, the whole monetary system 
was reorganized, and a new and prolific currency was put forth 
in the name of the refounded Commonwealth. The reform was 
made the more profitable by the issue of electrum pieces, from Electrnm 
lOO to lo litras in value, which though containing some 20 per °*^™*^®' 
cent, of silver passed for the value of their weight in gold (see 
Head, Coinage of Syracuse, p. 26 seqq.). The coinage of silver Issue of 
" Pegasi " (irwXoi), like those of Corinth, had already in all proba- <« pJjL^gj*!^ 
bility began in Dion's time, but it now for the first time attained 
large dimensions (See PL, Ag, 2). By the coinage of silver i^ 
liti*a pieces, answering very closely in weight to the Corinthian 
diobols, a further approximation was achieved to the monetary 
system of the mother city. A great developement was further given Increase 
to the coinage of bronze pieces ^, which from their imitation by money *^ 
more than one of the Sikel cities seem to have been specially useful 
for the commerce with the interior of the island. 

In the types chosen for this new coinage we find repeated 
references to the divine sanction under which Timoleon had accom- 

' I am not able to follow Mr. Head, however, in his view {Coina of Syracuse, 
30) that "copper coins of labstantial weight" were now for the first time 
struck at Syracuse. There seem to be good reasons for sapposing that the 
large bronze coins with the head of Pallas and the '< webbed *' star and the 
smaller pieces with the same head and the sea-horse go back at least to Didn*s 
time (see Syr, MedM. T59). 

' .'•■. 

^ . r 

r , . 

(* *i ' I I 

I i « . I * 

.; •.•! 

4 * 

I • . 

1 ' 

1 M .^ 


V V •••• 

^ • 


',1 ' 


;.i 1. II 

'<• .»' t I 

I • 

•I I ' I n ' • 'i"^ 

JJ .. 

' I 

I . r 

i ) : I 


r T . .^ t 


. I 

 a ^ t 

t s 


lUAIHOlil.e-S, «,. tw./c' 


that of the restorer of Democracy, the bridleless horse was omitted 
on the reverse, being replaced by the seated eagle of his own 
Dodona, beside the thunderbolt. It was in this Molottian guise, 
and not without regard to the new champion of Hellenism in the 
West (who seems like his successor Pyrrhos to have included 
Sicily in his far-reaching schemes), that Timole6n's type was 
modified at Syracuse itself soon afber his decease, and spread to 
Mtn& and Agyrium \ 

The appearance of the same head of Zeus the Deliverer, coupled Zeus the 
on the reverse with Aphrodite and her dove (Head, op, cU. p. 36, ^^^j^of 
PI. vii a. 5), on coins of Eryx, overstruck on large Syracusan bronze &yx. 
pieces of somewhat earlier date, is a still more interesting pheno- 
menon. The earlier coinage of Eryx with its Greek and Elymo- 
Greek epigraphy had been but sparsely continued affcer its occupa- 
tion by the Carthaginians at the end of the fifth century. The 
small silver pieces, however, that for a while at least were still 
struck there, reflected the new political conditions by their Phceni- PhoenicUn 
cian legends, — the civic name now for the first time appearing as ^I^ ° 
*pK (cf. Salinas, Seaverta del name fenicio di Eriee : Arch. Storico 
Sic.<i i. 498; C, 7. S.<i i. 172). Later on, in the fourth century, 
" Pegasi " with the same Semitic legend were also struck at Eryx 
(Head, Hist, Nv/m, 120, 121), and may well represent the influence 
of Timole6n's coinage. But in the case of the bronze pieces, cited 
above, we have not only Syracusan metal and a Symcusan type, but 
the Greek inscription EPYKINON. The revived autonomy which this Greek dow 
coinage indicates, as well as the adoption of Timole6n*s type, may be J^*^^ ^ 
taken as sufficient evidence that either his earlier campaign in the 
west of the island which resulted in the liberation of Entella, or 
his later victory on the Erimisos, encouraged the men of Eryx to 
throw off for a while at least the Carthaginian yoke. As showing 
the extent of this defection we may recall the statement of Diodoros 
(xvi. 73) — immediately following the account of the capture of 
Entella — that many SiJcan as well as Sikel cities then revolted from 
the Carthaginian dominion and formed alliances with Timoleon. 
Under " Sikan " Diodoros may have roughly intended to describe 
the prse-Hellenic population of Western Sicily in general, including 
the Elymian element. 

^ In both these cases the reverse presents a thunderbolt, at Agyrium 
coupled with the seated eagle, which from contemporary Italian parallels we 
may justly regard as a compliment to the Molottian. 


Coins of An altogether new light on Timoledn's re-colonization of the 

Ana from ' 3^<^^l^i^ cities has heen thrown by some remarkable coins presenting 
Kephaloi- the inscription HPAKAEIfiTAN £K KE«AAOIAIOY (Imhoof-Blumer, 
*^^' Berliner BldUer, v. 40). These pieces, which exhibit on one side 

a youthful head of H^rakl^s, and on the other a butting bull, are 
shown by their style to belong to about this period, and they have 
been supposed to commemorate a re-foundation of Hdrakleia Min6a 
at the hands of Timole6n (Holm, G. S, ii. 478). But there are 
grave objections to a too literal acceptance of this view. Hdrakleia 
in Di6n's time was still the Carthaginian Has Melkai-t, and as 
Timoleon by his treaty with Carthage only regained the territory 
up to the Halykos, Has Melkart itself appears to have remained 
in Punic hands (see p. 335). In Agathokl^s' time it is still 
a Carthaginian city, nor is there any evidence of a break in its 
prolific coinage of fine tetradrachms with the civic name in Phoe- 
nician characters. The small silver pieces of the " Herakleians 
from Kephaloidion " point to a less flourishing community, and it 
seems more reasonable to suppose that Timoledn, desirous to per- 
petuate the old name among the cities of Hellenic Sicily, founded 
a new Hdrakleia, perhaps as a Qreek outpost on the left bank of 
Halykos, and for some reason colonized it with citizens of Kepha- 
loidion — now Cefald — on the northern coast. 
The free The free horse — that speaking symbol — which characterizes more 

coins of ^^^ °°® ^^ Timoleon's Syracusan dies, now appears on the autono- 
Syraoune mous coins of Entella, and no doubt commemorates the liberation 
*®"' achieved there with Timoledn's help. At Nacona, another city in 
Campanian occupation, the same loose-bridled steed also makes its 
appearance (Friedlander, Berliner Blatter, i. 266, and cf. Imhoof- 
Blumer, op. cit. v. 53 ; Head, Hist. Ntum. 139). At JStna on 
the other hand, where it also occurs, we must rather regard it 
as a manifestation of alliance with the other two Campanian 
cities of Sicily, and as struck therefore about the date of Timo- 
le6n's first campaign in the west of the island, than as due to 
its liberation from its own Campanian occupants by Timole6n 
himself in 339 B.C. At Tyndaris, however, where the same 
design is linked with the head of Helen on coins of the same 
date, it may once more be reasonably connected with Timoledn's 
enterprise. The free horse also marks the coins of two other 
Greek foundations of Sicily re-colonized and called into new life 
by Timoleon — Qela and Eamarina. 


trpon other contemporary pieces (PL fig. 5) the same horse is asso- The " new 
elated with the legend KAINON, which has been interpreted to mean *'***"*fi^- 
*' the new coinage/' and was evidently struck by one of the iniined 
cities restored by TimoIe6n (Gardner, in Head's Coinage ofSyracuaej 
38, note). These coins stand in very close relation to the alliance 
pieces struck at this time by Alsesa, but the remarkable parallelism 
between the griffin on their reverse and the pard on the slightly 
earlier bronze coinage of Centuripa may incline us to refer their 
issue to that city ^. That this ** new coinage " was issued before 
339 B. c. may be inferred from the fact that a coin of the Campa- 
nians at ^tna (Berliner BlaUer, i. 271) is overstruck on one of 
these pieces. 

As in the case of Eryz, numismatic evidence farther supple- AlliAnoe 
ments our historic sources by the clear light that it throws on the ^^^ 
prominent part played by Alsesa in the war of liberation, about 
which Plutarch and Dioddros are alike silent. Timoledn's type of 
Zeus Eleutherios is found on coins of this city (Head, Coinage of 
Syracuse, 37), coupled on the reverse with the legend AAAISlNfiN 
SYMMAXIKON, which has been justly brought into relation with 
the alliance entered into with Timole6n by the Sicilian cities 
against the Carthaginians in the period immediately preceding the 
battle of the Erimisos (op. ct^ 38, 39; cf. Diod. zvi. 73). The 
reverse type of these AlsBsan coins shows two ears of barley, — the 
emblems of the Sicilian Gk)ddesses, — and between them the lighted 
pine-torch of Fersephon6, which recalls the fiery torch that guided 
Timole6n's ships by night across the Ionian Sea to his Italian 
landing-place, Metapontion, — itself a chosen seat of the Goddesses*. 

Upon other examples of these alliance coins appears the inscrip- Hend of 
tion 2IKEAIA and the head of personified Sicily, occupying ^^^^^^M^of*^ 
place otherwise filled by Zeus the Deliverer. This personification Timoledn's 
is itself of great historical interest as showing how the common '^' 
interests of Hellenic and Hellenized Sicily, as against the Cartha- 
ginian stranger or the mercenary and barbaric hordes in the pay 
of insular tyrants, were giving birth to a new and wider form of 
patriotism as distinguished from purely local feeling. This idealized 

^ One in the writer's poe8e«non b plated over and was intended to pass as 

' Upon other coins of this class the symbols of "The Groddessee" are 
associated on the obverse with a head of Apollo Axohd^tds-^thus combining 
a tribute to both the goiding powers of I^ole6n*s expedition. 

VOL. IV. A a 


image of Hellenic Sicily was a protest against that prophesied 
wfiappdpwris of the island, — the realization of which had seemed 
so near, — when Greek itself was to die oat there and Pnnic or 
Oscan should take its place. At Hadranum, the scene of Timole6n'a 
earliest victory and of the special manifestations of divine fieivoar 
towards him, the same head of Sikelia occurs with a crown of 
myrtle, on what we may safely regard as another alliance piece 
parallel with those of Alsesa. 
Head of We shall find the same ideal representation elsewhere on con- 

oonfiDed to ^i^porary coins. It is however to be observed that the head of 
SIkel dies. Sikelia that appears at this time on the coins of several Sicilian 
cities is confined to the originally Sikel communities, and does not 
appear on the dies of any true Hellenic foundation. It was natural 
that the Hellenized descendants of the aboriginal inhabitants of 
Sicily should be the first to merge their civic particularism in 
the commonweal of the whole island. At the purely Greek cities 
whose coinage was revived by Timole6n, the types, except so far as 
they took over the free horse as the emblem of recovered liberty, 
remained local, — the crab at Akragas, the head of Athtod at 
Kamarina, of Helen at Tyndaris, of Poseid6n at Messana. The 
first embodiment of the interests of Sicily as a whole on the dies of 
a city originally Greek is to be found on the Syracusan coinage of 
the time of Agathoklds, where the tyrant's claim to lordship over 
the whole island is symbolized by the triquetral 
Omen Contemporary with these coins of Alsesa and her allies is a very 

^^]^^ beautiful representation of the personified Sicily, myrtle-crowned, 
on coins of struck over bronze coins of Syracuse with the head of Zeus 
^?Mot^' Eleutherios (PL fig. 7), by Herbessus. The same myrtle-crowned 
gantina. head recurs at Morgantina (PI. fig. 8 ^), and in "both instances it 
is found associated with a reverse design of an eagle and serpent. 
The ''minister of Zeus" destroying the noxious reptile was accord- 
ing to Greek ideas a symbol of victory, and in the present case 
this symbolic device seems to have an actual reference to the omen 
which was said to have preceded the battle of the Erimisos. 
Plutarch, it will be remembered (see p. 325), relates (Tim. xxvi) 
that, on the eve of the fight, the soothsayers who accompanied 
Timole6n's army pointed out to the host two eagles, one of which 

' The impressionB from which the figures 7 and 8 of the Numismatic Plate 
are taken were courteously supplied me by Cav. Ign. Virad of Palermo, from 
originals in his collection. 


held a serpent in his claws and screamed triumphantly as if pre- 
saging victory. The same victorioas omen had already appeared in 
the Iliad (xii. 200 seqq.). In another form — ^the two eagles seizing 
a hare— it had supplied the design for the most splendid of the 
coins of Akragas (cf. Head, Hist, Nvsn. 106), and had inspired 
^schylos with a nohle passage in the Chorus of his Agamemndn 
(no seqq.). 

Of the other Sicilian cities of purely Oreek origin refounded Coins of 
by Timoledn, a new coinage was at this time issued by Akragas, q!II^^^ 
Gela, and Kamarina. On the small silver coins of Akragas {Hui. dtiee. 
Num. 107) the local types of the eagle and the crab are coupled, 
as elsewhere, with the head of Zeus and the free horse (PI. fig. 9). 
At Kamarina (Hist, Nttm. 113) the free horse is associated with the 
head of her Pallas, at Qela with the bearded head of the homed 
Biver-God and with the figure of a warrior sacrificing a ram. On 
another interesting type of Gela, which has been referred to this 
period {Hist, Nwn, 124), the river Gelas under the form of a buU 
is linked on the obverse side with a female head, corn-crowned 
like that of Ddmdt^, but here, as the legend tells us, the personifi- 
cation of EYNGMIA, the spirit of Good Law.] 

A a 2 


B.C. 317-289. 

Trantient * " T T is ffrievous to think that the freedom and well-beinff 

resulteof I 

Timoledn'e J- which Timoledn brought back to Syracuse and to all 

work of ^ tf 

liberation. Greek Sicily lasted hardly more than twenty years. The 
tyrants could do more lasting evil than the deliverers could 
do good. Seventeen years after Timoleon's death we again 
hear of civil disputes in the Greek commonwealths of Sicily^ 
land of wars between one commonwealth and another. Three 
years later again there came a tyranny which in some things 
was worse than any that Timole6n had overthrown. A man 
in many things like Dionysios^ even more enterprising and 
far more cruel^ made Syracuse again the centre of a great 

Agatho- dominion. This was Agathokles son of Earkinos. About 
him several things are to be noted. Dionysios was a bom 
Syracusan^ and^ after all his dealings with Carthage and 

^ On the authorities for this period, Mr. Freeman exprenes himself as 
follows (Story of Sicily, p. 333) : — "We still haye the oontinuons narrative 
of Diod6ro8 through the greater part of the reign of Agathoklds ; for the 
latter part we have only fragments. At this time Dioddioe no doubt 
largely foUowed the History of Timalos of Tauromenion, who was a bitter 
hater of Agathokl6s. There is no other continuous narrative except the 
short one in the Latin epitomator Justin. But there are many references 
to Agathoklds in the later collectors, Polyainoe and the like, and we are 
getting on so £eu: that we get a little help from the Latin historian Titus 
Livius of Patavium, commonly spoken of as Livy. Polybios himself has 
tome discussion of the acts of Agathoklds, but no narrative of them." 

* From Story of Sicily, p. 253 seqq. 

•'mf^m^l^—i^^^^-ar^^'^ ..^••Ki^^ 


with other barbarians, he was on the whole a champion of crap. in. 

Hellas^ and^ whenever he showed himself in that character, 

he was zealously supported by all Greek Sicily. Agathokl&s^ Agathoklds 


on the other hand, was not a Sjrracusan by birth, and, with 
though he did greater things against the Carthaginians 
than any other Greek, he was never so distinctly as Diony- 
sios the champion of united Greek Sicily. Dionysios too 
lived before, and AgathokUs after, the g^reat victories of 
Alexander in Asia. This made a great difference in the 
position of the two men. Agathoklte saw the Macedonian 
captains founding kingdoms for themselves, and he made 
himself a king to match them. And there was a great 
difference between the kind of tyranny practised by the two 
men. DionysioB was harsh and suspicions; bnt, whUe he 
stuck at no useful crime, he seldom showed himself wan- 
tonly cruel. Agathoklte affected a frank and jovial de« 
meanour, and thus kept the good will of the lower people ; 
but ever and anon he did deeds such as Dionysios never did. 
Dionysios never wrought a massacre; to Agathoklte it 
sometimes seems as if a massacre was really a kind of 

§ 1. Bite iff Agathohlet. 

'< The father of Agathoklte^ banished from Bhegion, Childhood 
settled at Therma (the Baths of Himera) on the northern thdc^. 
coast of Sicily, then a Greek town under Carthaginian 
dominion. Warned by an oracle that the child would da 
great mischief, Karkinos ordered him to be exposed; but 
his mother saved him and persuaded her brother to bring 
himnp>. Afterwards he was received by his &ther, and 

[^ The story is told ftt length in DiodAros, xix. a. For the date of hir 
birth there are two oonoordant data. In Diod. (xxL i4S) AgathoUte -ii 


cHAP.xit when Timoledn was plantiiig new dtlzens at Syracnse, the 
Youth of whole family moved thither. There Agathokl&3 passed his 
klte. yonth in the trade of a potter ^ ; but he was strong and 

handsome^ and he specially won the favour of a leading man 
named Damas ^, whose widow he afterwards married^ and 
received great wealth with her. He was a valiant soldier^ 
and Damas got him promotion in the army.'' 

State of It is not easy to see what was the exact political con- 

^™*""®' stitation of Syracuse at this moment. Both in that ciiy 

and in Sicily generally things seem to have passed through 

strange changes in the few years which had followed the 

death of Timoledn. There are again wars between Sikeliot 

Changed cities and revolutions within their walls. The Punic enemy 

attitude of . . •■. t . ., . - ,. . 

Carthage, app^rs m a strange lignt^ as something of a mediator 
between ciiy and city^ between party and party. This 
fact^ we cannot doubt^ is connected with a change which 
has for some time past been coming over the character of 
Carthage and her people. It was not for nothing that the 
men of the East had made themselves the mightiest power 
of the West. It was not for nothing that they had had 
endless dealings with Hellas in peace and war. The 
Carthaginians of this age were coming nearer to the like- 
ness of their descendants of the next century^ the more 
than equal rivals of Borne in arms and arts and policy^ 
than to their forefathers who had come against Selinous 

stated, on the authority of Timaioe, to have died at the age of seyenty-two 
after a reign of twenty-eight years. Acoording to Polybioe, again (zii. 15), 
Agathoklte was brought by hia &ther to Syracuse at the time of Timole^n's 
colonization (343 B. o.), being then eighteen years of age. Both these 
notioes lead us back to 361 as the date of his birth.] 

\} Diod. six. a ; Justin, xzii i ; Plut. Beg. et Imperat. Ap. (op. de 
8ui laude, 13) ; Polyb. adi. 15. He is said (Plut. loc. dt.) in after-times 
to have had day vessds set on table beside the gold, and to have 
pdnted a moral to the younger generation on his rise from small beginnings 
by means of dillgenoe and valour.] 

[« Diod. xix. 3.] 


and Himera with no object but simple destruction^ with chap.zii. 
no means of compassing destruction beyond the mere brute Hdleniift- 
force of multitudes. They had learned something more Carthage, 
from Greek enemies and neighbours than simply to carve 
Greek legends on their coins. They were capable of taking 
their part in matters of general Hellenic policy^ if not as 
Greeks among Greeks^ yet almost as Europeans among 
Europeans. Even in the days of Dionysios we have seen 
that some Punic commanders had learned the art of win* 
ning allies by good faith and himiane dealing^. Yet in 
his day every Greek had preferred the tyrant to the bar- 
barian. It was due partly to the difference in the tyrant, 
partly to a change in the barbarian, that many Greeks now 
preferred the barbarian to the tyrant. The interference^ 
hostile or friendly^ of Carthage in the affairs of any Greek 
commonwealth is beginning to have much the same air as 
the interference^ hostile or friendly^of another Greek com- 
monwealth. We must not indeed think that the ^Ethiopian 
had changed his skin or the leopard his spots. Canaan 
is still Canaan, and Hellas is still Hellas. But Canaan 
is beginning to put on somewhat of the outer garb of 
Hellas. The Hellenistic states are soon to beg^ their 
course in the East; we are sometimes tempted to look on 
the Phoenician mistress of European lands as their fellow 
in the West. 

On the other hand, we see Syracuse, imder whatever Syraousans 
form of internal government, still carrying on the best Krotdn 
traditions of her earliest masters. The Greek of Sicily did ^^^^ 

*' Bruttians. 

not turn a deaf ear to the call of the Greek of Italy for 
help against the barbarian neighbours who threatened him. 
And those barbarians were none the less threatening at 
the moment because the workings of real, if unseen, kindred 
enabled them to be in the end brought into a closer fellow- 
ship than the Phoenician could ever be. The helpers from 

^ Sea above, pp. 105, 168. 



CHAP. j,n. Sparta and from Epeiros had done little abiding good for 
the Italiot Greeks. The threatened cities^ instead of princes^ 
now tried commonwealths. We hear of a Syracusan con- 
tingent warring to save Kroton from Brattian besiegers ^, 
It was the brightest side of the reign of Hier6n to have 
saved Kyme. That HerakleidSs and Sdsistratos did at 
this stage do something to relieye a Greek city in danger 
of barbarian overthrow may be so far set against the 
misdeeds^ whatever they were^ with which they are some- 
what vaguely charged. 
Hdra- The career of these men^ the way in which ihej rose to 

and Sdsis- power and the way in which they nsed power^ was recorded^ 
tratoB. Qp ^gg meant to be recorded, by our native Sicilian guide. 
But if the narrative ever was written, it has at least not 
come down to us. We are told only that they had during 
the greater part of their lives been guilty of conspiracies 
and slaughters and deeds of the highest impiety ^ If so, 
they must have been still young ; they could hardly have 
done such things while Timoleon was general or counsellor 
of Sjrracuse. Their position is not very clear ; but we may 
safely say that there was no open tyranny in Syracuse at 
this time. There was a strife of parties, parties not very 
well defined, but seemingly not scrupulous in their dealings 
with one another. Herakleides and Sdsistratos were leaders 
of a party which its enemies at least called oligarchic and 
spoke of its chiefs as aiming at tyranny. And we hear 
dimly of a body called the Six Hundred, who are clearly of 
great importance in the commonwealth, but who are not 
spoken of as if they formed an acknowledged senate or 
magistracy of any kind. They were rather a political dub 

^ Diod. xix. 5. 

' lb.; *UpaK\ti9vji Mci "Suffiffrporos, &uZp(s h ivifiovkats Koi ^Srois mi 
fAeyiKois Afftfi^/Mtn y€yoy6r€s r^ vXtiw rov 0iov* wtpi Siv rd learA /Upos ^ ^P^ 
Toinis Karix^i fiifikos. So in c. 10 ; r^v wpos 'H/xurXc/Si^ not "Xwricrparov 
Koivoavlay, wtpi jjr kv rp *pd rai;n;s fiiPkip rd iicard /jjpos 9i^\0Ofi€y. -But 
nothing of thia kind it now to be foand in the eighteenth book. 

The Six 


of wealthy men bound closely together^ such as we know ohap. xn. 
were to be found in other Greek commonwealths^ even in 
other Greek democracies. As such they would be bound to 
an united policy; they would promote each other^s interests 
in elections to magistracies and in suits before the courts 
of justice ^ ; but it does not appear either that they were 
a body known to the law or that they had supplanted the 
authorities which the law did acknowledge. 

The story reads as if the democratic constitution restored SynoiuAii 
by Timoledn had not been formally abolished^ but rather that S'^stm 
its forms were abused in the interest of a compact and ener- ^;™^y 
getic faction. We may take for granted that in these revived cntic. 
Sikeliot commonwealths, made up of men from all parts^ 
among whom the dwellers within the same walls had not 
necessarily any common local feelings, any common ances- 
tral traditions, it was not so easy to carry on the order of 
democratic government as it was in the Athens of the past 
or the Achaia of the future. As for the particular evils 
spoken of, the conspiracies, the murders, the acts of impiety, 
which are laid to the charge of HSrakleid^ and Sfisistratos, 
of these, in the absence of details, we can say nothing. 
Conspiracy is of the very nature of such a society as that 
of which they were the heads; we are left to guess whether 
the deeds of slaughter spoken of were acts of secret murder 
or votes into which a misguided assembly was hurried^ 
At all events the meeting of the assembly was not disused. 
But even at Athens it was sometimes whispered that the 
vote of the assembly did not always answer to the guanine 
will of the people. Besides Sdsistratos and Herakleidte, 
besides Damas himself, the names of Tisarchos, Anthr6pino8, 
and Dickies — the last a renowned name in Syracuse — have 
been incidentally handed down to us as members of this 
dominant faction '. 

1 See Appendix VII. 
t ' The names oome from Biod. six. 6; Polyainoe, v. 3. 8. See 


oHAP.zn. Besides civil dissensions, th^re were also wars among 
^*" yarions cities of Sicily, Greek and Sikel. We may indeed 

among . . 

Sidlian doubt whether it is any longer needful to draw that 
distinction. The old Sikel towns are now marked^ no 
longer as the dwellings of another people, but simply as 
the towns of the inland country as opposed to those of the 
coast \ The coming of Timoledn had made Greek Sicily 
again a system of independent cities ; occasional disputes, 
occasional warfare, followed as a matter of course; they 
were the signs of life and of freedom. Akragas, which 
Timoledn had raised into a new being, had taken up her 
old position of enmity towards Syracuse, and the first 
glimpse that we have of the new state of things shows us 
the first and second of Sikeliot cities again at war. Other 
towns, Leontinoi, Morgantia, Herbita, ^tna, are spoken 
of as commonwealths hostile to Syracuse, perhaps only 
hostile to this or that party in Syracuse, and willing to 
give shelter to banished members of the other. 
Agathoklte Of the war with Akragas we hear neither the occasion 
against ^^^ ^^7 ^^ ^^^ details. It is memorable only as it is now 
'^^'■**"* for the first time that Agathokles is brought on the actual 
scene of our story. Dama« was in command as general; 
Agathokl^ was serving under him. The memory of his 
old affection had not passed away from the mind of Damas, 
and on the death of one of the chiliarchs he procured the 
promotion of Agathokles to the vacant post^. His merits 
might have pleaded for him without any irregular help. 
The tall, hardy, valiant, soldier who marched in a panoply 
of a weight that none other could bear, had already won 

Appendix YIL [Mr. Freeman lias followed the orthography of 

^ Diod. xix. 5 ; IZiaw li^wifuy |y ry /uaoy^iv mvttrHjiraro. 6; Ir r^ 
fiityofffl^ fljpdf 'EpPlrjf ffwdyovffi 9^afur, We hear no more of XuctXol, 

' lb. 3 ; /icrct 82 rovra alptBtls [6 AA/tas] I*' 'AMp&yarra arparriyhs, IvciS^ 
T»v x^ikiApxcnf ra dwi$€a^€, rovror elf rbv kxtirov rSinv icaritmjciy. In JoBtin, 
zzii I, the war is againit .^^tna. See Appendix YIL 


the admiration of his comrades ^ In his new office his chap.xii. 
credit rose^ the credit of one who never shrank from danger 
in battle^ and who was ready and cheerful of speech in his 
harangues to the military assembly'. Damas presently 
died of sickness^ leaving great wealth to his widow. That Marriage 
wealth passed to Agathokles by a marriage not wholly free th^T. 
from scandal^ and made him one of the richest men in 
Syracuse \ Now came the expedition for the relief of He aerves 
Krotdn^ in which Agathokles again served with his former ^lo^ang. 
rank^ The leaders of the army were H£rakleid&9 and 
Sosistratos, but we are a little startled to hear that Antan- 
dros^ brother of Agathokles^ shared with them in theHia 
general's office ^ Of him we shall hear again^ in a char- Antandiw 
acter^ as it has been well pnt, answering to that in which ^trat^goa. 
Philistos stood to the elder Dionysius^ as the counsellor 
and lieutenant of his brother^ and withal as the historian 
of his actions ^. But we are left to guess at the causes 
or chances which^ for the moment at leasts put Antandros 
in a higher command than Agathoklfis. It is certain that 

* Diod. zix. 3 ; 6lik Ktd wp6 rfp mparfias iikv j}r voX^ fX^in^hs fitcl ro fiiytOos 
rdv ^Xwv* kw€rfj9tva€ y^p ly reus i^owkacrims <l>4ptt9 wavowXJa¥ TffXuttx&rrpf rd 
tUy€$ot, Star* fofliva rw SXKonf ZvvaaBai fiqSicn xn<f^ t^ 0^i rwr JrXflur. 

' lb. ; vo\h 8' in /ioXXok yatS/uvot x^^^PX"** wtptwotfyraro i6£a¥, ^lAo- 
Kh9wot /ily ify teat wafid0o\os iv reus yiA-xcus, IraiiAt tk Kak itp6x^pot hf reSt 
^rjfajyoplais. Thia may take in the civil aaflembly as well. So Juatin, zxii. 
9; 'Et mana atrenuoa et in oontionibiia perftMundus habebator. Breri 
itaqae centiuio ao deinoepa tribimaa mllitiim &otaa eat." ''Tribtinaa" ia 
X<A(a/yxov i what ia ** eentnrio *' ? 

' Dioddroa (zix. 3) says simply, AA/uurrof rSff^ TtKtvr^ffarrot /tat r^ 
olffiay KaroXtirSftTOt rp ywcutct, ra^rrpf I77/1C, teat rw wKownorrdrwy th 
IjpiBfUiTo, Justin (zzii. i) adds a bit of scandal which dearly cornea from 
Timaios, that the widow was already " adulterio oognita." 

* Diod. u. s. ; /ierA 8^ ravra Kporcandrais woXtofucov/Urots inr6 B/)cmW, 
ol ^upaMo6<noi lOm/uy AZpdv (wt/a/fOM, Agathoklds was kyvonriihot hw6 rad 
Zifiitov «a2 rmyfUrot M x^^X^^^^^ i^yt/tayiaa, 

* Diod. u. s. ; ^ i<rrpa'Hjy€i fiky yutff Mpcar ''ApTay9pot 6 'AyaOoscKicvt 
dScX^f, T&y 8* 6XMry ^Tx"^ "^^ i^t/ioyiay *Bpaje\ti9rfs iiat XeaataTparos. It ia 
now that he givea hia picture of them. See Appendix YIL 

* Holm, 6. S. ii. aai. 


oHAP. zn. the valiant chiliarch^ the admired of the Syracusan army 
^^^ and people, was not in favour with his other superiors in 
agitation of command. First in every encounter with the barbarians^ 
against the ^^ was, at the end of the campaign, refused by Hera« 
Generals, ^leides and Sosistratos the rewards and honours which 
were the fitting prize of Us exploits ^ Stirred to wrath 
at this wrong, he harangued the people of Syracuse against 
the doers of it. He charged them before the assembly 
with aiming at the tyranny. Nothing came of his accusa- 
tions. The people either did not believe him or else shrank 
from acting on their belief. S6sistratos kept the chief 
influence at Syracuse '. Agathokl^, whether formally 
banished or not, found that the city was no place for him. 
The military merits of Agathokl^ need no insisting on ; 
and his whole public conduct up to this time is consistent 
Agathoklds with the character of an honest citizen* But the truth of 
Syraonsan. what Alkibiades had said nearly a hundred years before ' 
was even truer now than it had been in his day. To the 
son of the man who had moved from Bhegion to Therma, 
from Therma to Syracuse, Syracuse was not what it had 
been to such a son as Hermokratgs or to such an adopted 
son as Timoleon. If Agathokles really had any feelings 
for country or commonwealth, they may well have been 
Italiot rather than Syracusan. In his whole story we 
must never forget that we are not dealing with a bom 
citizen of Syracuse. In the uncertainties of those times 
almost anything might happen, but we are a little sur- 
prised when the next that we hear of the Syracusan nuli- 
Unsuo- tary officer and opposition-speaker is that he is in Italy, in 
attempt on command of some kind of military force, but acting as 
Krotdn. ^ private adventurer, and acting against the city which, 
in the discharge of his public duty, he had just helped 

* See Appendix YII. 

' Diod. ziz. 3 ; ol w9pl Xcaaiarparov khw&arGfCcof, See Appendix VII. 

' See Tol. ii. p. 326 ; vol. iii. pp. 96, 97. 


to defend. He strove^ but in vain^ to take Krotdn. ohaf.xii. 
A serious blow is implied when we read that he escaped to 
Taras with only a few followers ^. There he entered into Agatho- 

kite in 

the service of the Tarantine commonwealth as a mercenary ; Tarantine 
but entering on doubtful and dangerous schemes — their "®'^*^' 
exact nature we are not told — ^he was dismissed from his Diioredited 
post^. He next gathered a following of the exiles of 
whom there were many to be found in Italy^ and again 
directly opposed the ruling powers of Syracuse. Hera- 
kleides and Sdsistratos^ lately the deliverers of Krotdn^ 
were now^ in what quarrel we know not^ warring against 
Bhegion. To the mind of Agathokles the claims of the 
ancestral city may have seemed stronger than those of 
the city of his adoption; he led his band of exiles to the Helpi 
help of Rhggion against the Syracusan generals ^. They agamLt 
were carrying out the traditions both of Hierdn and of ®^^'**"*"' 

Of the military result of this Bhfigine campaign we hear 
nothing. Either the war itself or its conduct must have 
been unpopular at Syracuse; for the next event that is 
recorded is the downfall of the power of HSrakleides^ Sdsis- 
tratos, and the Six Hundred K They were banished^ and Becallel 
Agathokles was recalled. The banished men^ as so often cLuIb. 
happened^ took to arms ; the war is spoken of as a war 
between an existing democracy and its oligarchic enemies \ 

^ Diod. X1T. 4 ; ieara\€^6v€a$<u ri^ rSw Kporeawtarw ir6ht¥ inxtipff^nst 
kiiina€, Kol /i€t' 6Xlyonf cIs Tdpoyra 9iw^if$ff. ['E^lvccrc teems to imply that 
ihe attempt on Krotdn was made from witMn.] 

' lb. ; raxOtU 82 napA rots Tapatrrlyois iv r^ raw /uo$o^ptnf t^cc, moH 
voXXcus Kol wapa06\oi9 kyxttpvy wpi(€<rt, «{$ irwo^tSay f\$€ Mturoro/uar 
Tk^wtp d9oktfO*if KOjt ra^Tffs rip arparijyittSf /r. r. \. 

' lb. ; ovy{i$pMff€ Tohs tnrd, rify IraXior ^vy6Sat, Koi *Fr/yl90is wo\€funh 
fiii^ws {nr6 rSv wtpi rhv 'HpakktiJhiv teat JSMfftorparov kfio^Oifatv. 

* lb. ; ivftra rfji |y lEvpcuto^acus ^uvcurrttas naraXvOtiaris, seat rS^ 9€fi 
^Uoalarparoy ^vy6vTvy, Kar^\0tv c{$ ri^ waTpl9a, From this point we hear 
only of SdaistratoB. Was Hdrakleidte dead 1 

^ lb. ; <iwtinrt<t6vTV¥ 9i toTv lvv6arms itoSXw kvt6(w dyJipSt¥, &s &y r^r 


OHAP. VI, That is to say^ the banishment of the dominant faction had 
changed a democracy in name into a democracy in fact. 
The exiles called in help from the Carthaginians \ Con- 
stant warfare followed^ in which Agathokles^ not yet 
general^ but sometimes in a lower command, sometimes in 
none^ drew all eyes upon him. He had other military 
qualities besides strength and daring; he had the quick 
eye and the ready energy to discern and to do what was 
needful to be done at any particular moment K 

AgathokldB One exploit of his is specially recorded in some detail. The 
scene is Gela^ a city, like Akragas^ restored to a fresh life by 
Timoleon ^. In our perplexing narrative of events without 
visible causes or results^ we see the city in the hands of 
the enemies of Syracuse^ Syracusan and Carthaginian ; but 
the story reads as if the Geloans themselves were allies of 
Syracuse held down by a foreign force. Anyhow Gela was, 
in the military point of view, a post to be attacked by the 
arms of Syracuse. The Syracusan camp was pitched some- 
where on those wide fields on which the camp of Carthage 
had once been pitched^. AgathoklSs, with a thousand 
men, his following, it would seem, in his old post as chili- 
arch, threw himself by night into the town *. Presently 
a much larger force under the command of Sdsistratos, a 
force seemingly in occupation of the town, fell on the 
party of Agathokles, slew three hundred, and put the rest 
to flight. They strove to escape by a narrow path, by a 
postern, one might fancy, in the wall, opening on some steep 

vSkffjios TOis ifnfydai vpds roi^ ds^Ttx^ti^ovs r^s ^fw/eparlas, 

^ Diod. ziz. 4 ; <rvfAfUix<yuvTW rSiy Hafxtfioviav roii vtpi rbv XoaffiirrpaTov 


' lb. ; *A'ya0oK\rjs, irori fAv liiimjs &¥, vorl 9i i<f>' ^ytfwvhs rtrayiUvos^ 

ivfXjfipOrj Zftaariichs cfrai koX <pi\6T€xy(H ix rov vpds tieatrrov rmv KtupSv 

InvotiaSal ri rStv xpi7<r^/<an'« 

• See above, p. 336. * See vol. iiL pp. 563, 564. 

* Diod. ziz. 4; aiiT^s /ilv 9vkt6s vapturivtatv tls rilv w6Xiv furd 
XOduv crparimrw. 


track up the not very lofty hilP. The enemy pressed ohap.xh. 
on; Agathokl^, doubtless guarding the rear, fought most 
valiantly of all, till his strength failed him under the stress 
of seven wounds ^ But his ready wit was untouched. 
He must have been carried outside the gate when he bade Stratagem 
the Syracusan trumpeters to go on each side of the town, ^^^ 
on each side of the long hill of Gela, on the side of the •* ^^^ 
fields and on the side of the sea, and on both sides to sound 
a blast as for a charged Sdsistratos and his followers^ 

* IMod. ziz. 4; Tvy Akkonf IwifiakofiiivMf iikv tpt^uv 8(^ twos otckoG 
r^ov KcX T^y cwrrfpiay 6,wiyvang6Tety, wapad6^vs airo^ 'A7a0o«\$f kx rSgv 
kofMvw ipffCifaro. 

'lb.; airr^ fnkv 7dp XafAvp&rara wdyrwr AyMticdftayos, lirra rpcai/uun 
wtpiimfft, Kot 9td rd trX^tfof rod fivivrot dfutrot rd ffufta waptkdtro, 

' lb.; 9apf^yf§t\€ Koi tms aaXnyiereus Iv* A/Aif>6r€pa rd /*4prf rov 
Tttxovs jrapikB&irrQs <nifubf€iy r6 wo\tfUK6v, ^rjftaiytaf, like ''aignal*' for 
the war-cry. [The only position from which the execotion of such an order 
could have been practicable would be at one or the other end of the 
long city. Bat there could have been no time— oonsidering the shortness 
of the descent down the slope below the walls to the leyel country — for 
such a stratagem to have been of any use. I have carefully studied the 
topography of Gela in the course of repeated visits to the spot» but know 
of nothing answering to the " narrow place " described. Agathoklte would 
have foimd himself either on the Geldan plain or in the river. Neither 
is it very credible that the enemy could have been made to believe in 
a sudden assault from the sea. In short, the whole account of the supposed 
" stratagem " — at least in the shape recorded by Diod6rce — ^must be 
regarded as a childish invention. But this opens up the whole subject 
of Agathoklds* stratagems, of which Dioddros gives such a long array. 
Dr. Rudolf Schubert in his Gesohichte des Agathokles (ai, 43, ftc.) comes 
to the condusion that the whole of these marvellous tales are due to the 
invention of Douris, who had deliberately tried to embellish his narrative 
with theatrical touches and picturesque incidents, many of which are 
manifestly absurd. He instances the blowing of trumpets and singing 
of psans at inappropriate times (of. p. 410, n. a ; p. 414, n. 3 ; and p. 440, 
n. 3). and a whole series of senseless or impossible " stratagems " such as 
the above. Douris' imagery (cf. Plut. Bemetr. 44 and fr. 31) smacks of the 
stage. He is fond of love-stories (Schubert, op. cit. ao) and romantic 
incidents and disguises (op. cit. p* 17; see too Droysen zu Duris u. 
Hieronymus, Hermes, xi. p. 458 ; Melber, Quellen ftc. Polyaens (N. Jahrb, 
f. Phil., SupplementbJ. xiv. 658). We have Plutarch's authority (PericL 
a8) for the fact that Douris habitually lied. To his " History of Agatho- 
klds*' much of the mythical element which undoubtedly exists in the 
received accounts of the tyrant's career may be fidrly traced.] 


CRAP. zn. bewildered by the darkness^ fancied that a larger S jracasaxi 
force was assaulting Gela on both sides. They left ofE 
pursuing Agathokl^ and his party^ and^ parting into two 
divisions, went to keep the wall on both sides. Agatho- 
kl&i could now rest and recover somewhat of his strength \ 
By his happy device he was able to bring off the reinainder 
of his party in safety. With them^ we are told^ he also 
saved seven hundred men of the allies'. This can mean 
nothing else than seven hundred friendly citizens of Oela^ 
who had perhaps invited the Syracusan officer to his 
attempt^ and who in any case held themselves to be safer 
in the Syracusan camp than in their own city when it was 
occupied by Sdsistratos. 

The distinction which Agathokl^ gained by this and his 

other warlike exploits was clearly such as to make him an 

important person in Syracuse^ but not such as as yet to 

raise him to the highest places in the commonwealth. Or 

rather^ it may be that his very distinction hindered him 

Agathokl68 from gaining them. The next mention of him implies that 

of uming his very ability caused him to be suspected of aiming at the 

at tyranny, ^yj^j^y 3^ This seems to have some connexion with the 

fact that S3rracuse had just now a new chief. The Corin- 
thian Akestoridds was now general^ general possibly with 
full powers ^. There is something strange and sad in the 
mention of a Corinthian now. When Timoledn came, no 
great time before, PhiUp was coming, but he had not yet 
come; in the few years that had passed, Philip had come 
and Alexander, and Antipatros and Polysperchdn after 
them. Still, as Carthage looked to Tyre under the lord- 

^ Diod. xix. 4; iv TocovT^ rvx&vrts di^ox^r ol wtpi rdv 'AyaBoKkia, 
fiird, vdarjs AffipaXtias Znc&$Ti<ra» €ts rdy x<kpaKa, 

' lb. ; 06 fi^KOK r€^ a^ abrf «tifxi8d£a» iawrev, dXXd icat rwy fTviiiukxw 
irrcucoaiovs Syipas. 

' lb. 5 ; 96(as kwi$ia$ai rvpawt^ did t^f c^tciv, 

* lb. On this AkestoridlLs see Appendix VII. There is neither beginning 
nor end of him. 


ship of the Persian^ Syracuse yet looks to Corinth under chap. xii. 
the lordship of the Macedonian. It could only have been 
the memory of the last deliverer that led Syracuse once 
more to seek for the healing of her sicknesses at the hands 
of a citizen of her metropolis. But the ways of Akestorid&s 
were hardly the ways of Timoledn. The schemes of Aga- 
thokles are dreaded ; but for fear of disturbance in the city 
it was deemed wise not to slay him openly. Akestorid&s 
bade the suspected candidate for tyranny to leave the city^ 
and set liers-in-wait to slay him on the road. But Aga- Escape 
thokles was richer in devices than his enemies. He had a thokles 
slave who was greatly like him in height and face ; him ej^JJ^i^^ 
he sent forth clothed in his own dress^ mounted on his own 
horse, and harnessed with his famous panoply of war^. 
He himself went along the road in beggar's rags, and went 
safely^ while the slave tricked out in the garb of his master 
met with death at the hands of the liers-in-wait. Again 
an exile, Agathokles took him to the inland parts of Sicily, 
and again gathered together a force ready to follow him in 
any scheme of adventure ^. 

Meanwhile there was another change at Syracuse. Akes- Political 
torid&s passes out of sight without any further account of Syra^iM. 
him. Sosistratos and the other exiles — Herakleides has 
already simk out of notice — were recalled, and peace was 
made with the Carthaginians^. The Six Hundred appear 
again ; but the government is called a democracy, and it is 
plain that the popular assembly acted^ and acted freely. 
Agathokles meanwhile was gaining power and reputation 
in his banishment. By services whose exact nature is not 
described he won the highest favour among the inland 
towns ; his headquarters were at Morgantina, a town hostile 
to Syracuse^ whose citizens, on the strength of that enmity^ 

^ Diod. xix. 5 ; tovt^ dovs riflf waa^owXiay «cu rbv Ivwof, in Si r^iy tff9r,Ta» 

' See Appendix YII. 

' Diod. U.S. ; wpds rovf Kopx^SoWoi/s clp^n/i^ ffvt B*iiivMf, See Appendix VI I. 

VOL. IV. B b 




CHAP. XII. raised Agathokles^ after trial in a lesser post^ to their highest 
command ^. He became formidable to the powers of Syra- 
cuse and to the Carthaginians themselves. In this state of 
things^ where we are not surprised to find any city the 
friend or the enemy of any other^ we may believe that he 
warred against Leontinoi and took it ; we can hardly believe 
an elaborate story of treachery and massacre which at this 
stage of his career could in no way have served his interests ^ 
Agatho- He was presently recalled to Syracuse. The fullest version 

kl^B at- . , 

tacks Syra- ^^ ^^ return represents him as actually leading his f orce^ 
Morgantine and mercenary^ to a siege of Syracuse. By the 
powers within the city, Hamilkar^ now no longer an enemy, 
was implored to play the part of an active ally. The Punic 
host inarched to guard the greatest of Greek cities ^ against 
Greeks and hellenized Sikels, led by a chief who might be 
claimed at pleasure by Rhegion, by Syracuse, and by the 
Therma of Himera. Agathokles soon found that his force 
was no match for Syracuse thus strengthened. But, if not 
in strength, yet in cunning, he showed himself a match for 
the Phoenician himself. He made an agreement with HamiU 
kar, by which the Carthaginian leader promised to bring 
about the restoration of Agathokles, perhaps something 
more than his restoration. Agathokles, so restored, was to 
work for the interests of Carthage, and Hamilkar was to 
supply him with a military force to enable him to do so ^. 

^ **Priino praetor, nioz dux creatur," says Justin, zxii. 2. One would 
like to know the exact ranks in a Morgantine army. Some generations 
earlier they might have talked about a " pnetor.*' 

' See Polyainos, v. 3. 2, and Appendix VII. 

* See Appendix VII. Justin (xxii. 2) remarks, "Ita uno eodemque 
tempore Syracusse et ab boste civili amore defense, et a cive hostili odio 
impugnatse sunt." In all such sayings we must never foi^t that Aga- 
thokles was not a bom Syracusan. 

* Justin, xxii. a ; ** Qua spe impletus Hamilcar sodetatem cum eo 
mutuse potentis jungit, ut quantum yirium Agathocli Rdversus Syracusanos 
dedisset, tantum ipse ad incrementa domesticss potentisB reciperet.*' He had 
just before spoken of Agathoklds as *' peculiaria in ipsum [Hamilcarem] 
officia sua repromittens." This looks like some treasonable scheme of 

by Hamil 
kar*s me- 


The policy of Carthage had greatly changed within the chap. xif. 
last hundred years. Hamilkar knew that the Carthaginian 
power in Sicily was better promoted by bringing Greek 
cities under various degrees of dominion, supremacy, or Syraouse 
influence, than by sweeping them from the earth, liket£4^^ia^ 
Hannibal at Himera. It was a great step when a Punic >^fl^«n««- 
general was accepted as a mediator in the internal quarrels 
of Syracuse. It was something different from the guaranty 
which Carthage had once given to the tyranny of Diony- 
sios ^. That was simply a promise to bring force, if force 
should be needed, to support the tyrant against the citizens. 
Here too something of the same kind is looming in the 
future ; but the immediate work of Hamilkar is peaceful. Hamilkar^a 
He reconciles Syracusan parties. Sosistratos and his Six ^^ndlia- 
Hundred have yielded to his pressure, backed, we may be ^^^' 
sure, by an overwhelming popular demand for the recall of 
the famous captain who, like AlkibiadSs or Gains Marcius, 
had shown how much he could do both for his own city 
and against her. 

But all, Hamilkar among them, agreed in holding it Agat^o^ 
to be expedient to bind the conscience of AgathoklSs by the Great 
the most awful sanctions that the religion of S3rracuse ^*** 
knew of. In the holy place of the Goddesses, in the 
sacred garb, tmder all the solemnities of the Great Oath, 
Agathokl^s bound his soul to do naught against the common- 
wealth, against the democracy, and withal to be a friend to 
Carthage^. The Great Oath on the lips of Agathokles 
went for about as much as it had gone for on the lips of 
Kallippos ^. It went for about as much as an oath in nearly 
the same words went for on the lips of the one man of our 
day in Europe who has walked in the path of Dionysios 

Hamilkar at Carthage^ or perhaps rather in the Carthaginian poBseisionB in 
Sicily. * See vol. iii. pp. 583, 584. 

' Diod. six. 5 ; /aiBlv Irarriw^acaAii rp i^fuucparu^ See Appendix VII. 

' See above, p. 385. 

Bb 2 


cuAP.zu. and Agathokl&s. We who have watched with our own 
t\^^^ eyes " the despot's progress ^/^ can trace with more lively 
pared with interest the exile^ the recall^ the election, the oath^ the eon- 
pol^n. spiracy^ the massacre, the banishments, the assumption of 
princely titles^ the wars in foreign lands^ the victories 
and the defeats, all done, as if of set purpose, to carry out 
the platform of the elder tyranny in all its fulness. Yet one 
thing failed to Agathokl^ at Syracuse. The chosen of 
the people had no need to drive out a lawful assembly from 
its place of meeting. And, when the end came, he died in 
his own land, in the land of his earliest adoption — and he 
died a king. 
Agatho- The oath was sworn ; the new special votary of the God- 

General desses of Sicily now stood forth as the leader of the Syra- 
1^^^^^ cusan people, the man whose wily speech they hearkened to. 
Peace. and whom they were ready to raise to the highest honours 
and the fullest trust that they had to bestow. A vote of the 
people called AgathoklSs to the office of general of the com- 
monwealth, a general trusted with a further special power 
in civil afPairs. He was clothed with something like the 
authority and the duties of an ancient Aisymneies. Aga- 
thokles was to be guardian of the peace of Syracuse till he 
bad brought round all the contending parties, all the many 
classes of citizens from divers places, to true unity and 
brotherhood ^ Such a commission might weU last long; 
it might be equivalent to an appointment for life, even in one 
who should reach the days of Isokrates or of Gorgias. Timo- 
lejn had held it for his highest boast that he had won for 
every man in Syracuse the power of speaking his mind ^ 

^ Grote, X. 602, et seqq. 

' Diod. xix. 5; arparrfy^ KaTtffriBri icai ipi6\a^ r^r dffifvrjs, ft^xP* ^ 
ymjcien dfiovo^aovatv ol <Twfkrj\vB6T€s tls rifi^ v6Kiv, These last words well 
express the mixed population of the Syracuse of that day. I was once 
surprised at finding a " Jastitia pads " at Antivari ; here we have a 
" Conservator pacis *' on a grand scale. 

• iSee above, p. 337. 

^■y^"^HWff^g^g^— ^^Ji±.u^y I ■^^— ^j^^^appw^gsa ayy 


Agathokles sought rather that all Syractise should be of chap zn. 
one mind, and he had his own way of bringing about that 
result. He had on his side most likely some real attach- 
ment to himself on the part of the mass of the people ; he 
could certainly reckon on their hatred to the Six Hundred 
and their partisans. He could further reckon on his old 
soldiers from Morgantia and the other inland towns. They 
had fought for him against the power of Carthage ; but 
the power of Carthage^ as represented by Hamilkar^ was 
now on his side. Five thousand Africans — that is^ five 
thousand mercenaries of Carthage^ of whatever nation — 
were left under the command of Agathokles by the Punic 
general ^. 

§ 2. AgatKoklSi becomes tyrant of Syracuse, 

Agathokles had now only to grasp the tyrant's power. Secession 
But it would seem that before he had committed any illegal n^^S,^ 
act^ some of the party opposed to him left Syracuse, and 
were already trying to establish themselves in some inland 
post of their own. It is the tale of Kasmenai^ the tale of 
Maktorion^ in earlier revolutions ^, the tale of Agathokles 
himself in his shelter at Morgantia '. The name of the 
place is given as Herbita; but Herbita^ royal seat of 
the elder Archdnides^, far away among the Nebrodian 
mountains^ seems a place so ill-suited for the purpose that 
one is tempted to think of the nearer Herbessus. The 
general of the Syracusans proclaimed a march against the 
traitorous citizens who were attacking a town in alliance 
with the commonwealth *. He specially bade three chief 
men of the party opposed to himself^ Tisarchos^ Anthrd- 
pinos^ and Diokles^ to meet him the next morning at the 

^ " Aoceptis ab eo v. millibiis Afiroram," says Jostm (zxii. a). See 
Appendix VII. 
' See Tol. ii. p. loi. * See above, p. 369. * See vol. 11. p. 381. 

* Poljaino% t. 3. 8. Died. zix. 6. See Appendix VII. 



by Aga- 

CHAP. XXI. Timoleonteion to consult or to receive orders for the 
expedition ^. 

We have come to another of those marked events 
in Syracusan history the memory of which gathers round 
the lower ground of Achradina^ the ground adorned by 
the buildings which bore the name of the last deliverer. 
Where Ducetius had sought shelter at the altar, where 
Hermokrat^ had fallen in civil strife^ where the first 
Dionysios had cut down his revolted enemies^ where Dion 
had first harangued the liberated people, where the honours 
of Timole6n had been proclaimed over his monument 
within the city walls, in that same memorable quarter 
did Agathokles strike the first blow in a slaughter far 
more calmly planned, far more bloodily carried out, than 
the defensive deed of Dionysios. The elder tyrant, in an 
hour of fierce strife, slew a few men to win back power 
which, however unlawfully gained, he had actually held. 
The younger, in an hour of peace within the walls, had 
made ready for a slaughter like that wrought by Nypsios 
and his barbarians, in order to grasp unlawful power for 
the first time. In the kalendar of Agathokles his second 
of December had come ^ 

On the appointed day the doomed men, with a follow- 
ing perhaps of two hundred ^, came to the Timoleonteion. 
The whole quarter was occupied by the general of the 
commonwealth and guardian of the peace at the head of 
the mercenaries lent him by Hamilkar and of three thou- 
sand of his own soldiers from Morgantia and the other 
towns of his last war&re. Devoted to Agathokles, ready 
to do anything at his personal bidding, they perhaps cared 
little for Syracusan party politics, but they assuredly had no 

* See Appendix VII. 

* Grote, ch. xcvii. 

* Forty, according to Dioddroi, two hundred, according to Jiutin. See 
Appendix YII. 


love for SdsistratoB and the Six Hundred ^. A multitude chap. xii. 
too of Syracusan citizens, such as Syracusan citizens had Mwaacre 
become^ a mob most likely base and violent enough^ but Timoleon- 
which is described only in the stock phrases used to de- 
scribe any democratic gathering ^, had also come together 
on the memorable spot, as ready as the veterans of Mor- 
gantina, to do ought that AgathoklSs bade them do against 
the oligarchs. The first blow was the arrest of Tisarchos 
and the others. The Guardian of the Peace must have 
affected to look on the crowd of soldiers and bystanders 
as making up a Syracusan assembly. He harangued 
them on the evil deeds of the prisoners and of the rest 
of the Six Hundred, how they had plotted against him- 
self on account of his good will to the people ^. The 
vote came in the ancient shape of a shout; but of no 
mere shout of Yea or Nay. It was a fierce cry calling on 
him to listen no longer, but at once to take vengeance on 
the guilty^. Armed with this fresh commission, Aga- 
thokl^ bade the trumpets sound for a charge ^, and gave 
the word of command to slay the prisoners and to sack the 
houses of the Six Hundred and their abettors *. A shower 
of darts put an end to Tisarchos and his companions^, 
and the whole multitude of soldiers and citizens, armed 
and unarmed, rushed on to the tempting work of plunder 
and slaughter. One military precaution at least was not 

* Diod. zix. 6 ; r<fCrw S* S»roav fiiy rdy 6^$fii¥ tls r/K9X(A/ovy, reus 5' 
6p/»aTs Moi rms trpoaipiirww Mtrwr6r«i¥ wpds rify KariXwriy r^ timoKparlas, 
No special stieBs need be laid od this word ; neither Agathoklde nor his 
followers would hare allowed that they were overthrowini; a democracy. 

' lb. ; «yK>ffcvcAl£aro ko2 rS/y roktrSay ro^ fkSi tcWov icai ^B6vov iyajrnmh 
fUvous reus rw Urxy^"^^^^ hti^a»tiaus, 

' lb.; ^aos Intb r&y i^cucoalofr d^wd^t^Bai 8cd ri^ wp6s r^v 9^ftov 
tCyouiy, What 18 the exact force of dpm(€a$tu f 

* lb. ; wapo^vvofihov 82 rov wKff0ovs mI fioSnrros fiificiri fiiAAccy, dX\' 4/r 
XCV»df IvitfcTHu rots dZuc^aaai rij/y Uiofy. 

* lb. ; rh 9ok€fu/t6¥, as above, p. 367, note 3. 

* See Appendix YII. 

* The darts are from Polyainos (v. 3. 8). See Appendix YII. 


oHAP. xn forgotten; all the gates of the citjr were shut^ so that 

none of the intended victims might escape ^. 
The Mas- The picture of mere havoc, the &mi1iar threefold alliance 
th«Timo- ^^ plunder^ slaughter^ and rape^ is much the same whether 
leonteion. ^j^^ work is done at the bidding of Nypsios or of Aga- 
thokles. But the evil deeds done by the soldiers of N3rp8iofi 
were wholly the deeds of barbarians ; this time it added to 
the grief and suffering that^ largely at leasts the work was 
the work of Greeks agaiust Greeks, of citizens against 
citizens, that it was a work in which the ties of nature 
and friendship and solemn oaths, and the reverence due to 
the gods, were all trampled under foot^. This time the 
deed was not done by night; but the blow came as sud- 
denly as if it had been by night. Men in their houses 
heard a noise; they went down into the streets to learn 
what was happening; unarmed and without resistance, 
they were cut down by the soldiers^. The gates were 
barred, the narrow streets were guarded; every man sus- 
pected of oligarchic politics was of course slain; men too 
slew their private enemies, but with them, as ever happens 
at such times, not a few against whom Agathokles himself 
could have brought no chaige ^. Slaughter was the rule ; 
yet some prisoners were made, those perhaps who came 
under the immediate eye of the Guardian of the Peace ^. 
But it was not only in the streets that the slaughter went 

' Diod. xix. 8 ; itaaai al itvkat r^r woXton kKK*ia$rf<T€af, 
' lb. 7 i *^ ravT* iT6\fiM^ ky tlpvfvif ml irarpcSc wapt»ofiHy'EXXip^€s »df 
EXX^^vttiK, olffcToi jMtra cuyyww, oh <pit&cip, d <nror8cb, oO $€o^ ^rrp€w6fMfott 
h^' oTr tt^x ^^i ^Ao$ <L\Ad Kai vayrcAw? Ix^^ fUrpios 7c r^y i^^H^* ^* ^ 
T^ rSaiif ira(rx6>^TMf r^xi^ ixHivnttv, ThiB can hardly be Antandros, it may 
be TiinaioB, it may be Dioddroe. If Dioddros, it doee him honour. Hiere 
may be a dim general resemblance of Thuo. iii. 82-4. 

' lb. 6 ; 0/ \apiiffTaroi rcur iroXtrwr, &yrom»Tts rdr koB* airrwy ittttvptt" 
fUraif 6k€$pw, ^tw^Sw^ kit rS» oUiofr cit rds 69iAft, i»a$H¥ rrci$8orrcf rhv 

^ lb. 7; moXXol mat rSn^ lufl driow itafi€$kfffUrtii^ irffpovrro, Mfitwot 
/MiBuy rifp alrior rip AwcoKtias, 

^ We get the (arffnfiirras at the end of o. 8. 


Oh. Such slight amoimt of resistance as the destroyers chap xn. 
met with from the tops of the houses only stirred them up 
to attack the houses themselves. Doors were broken open ; 
men climbed up by ladders and slew the defenders of the 
roofs ^. The temples gave no shelter; men put themselves 
uuder the protection of the gods; but there was now no 
cry of " Save the Suppliant */' Some, seeking a way 
out by the barred gates, only fell into the hands of their 
enemies. So did many of those who made their way to 
the walls^ and tried to throw themselves over. Others 
were dashed in pieces ; some, more lucky^ were saved alive, 
and contrived to make their way to Akragas. There the 
exiles, now enemies of Syracuse, found a welcome shelter ^. 
We are surprised to be told that, in one way or another, as 
many as six thousand contrived to make their way out of 
the city *. 

It seems to be implied that deeds of this kind went on 
through the whole length and breadth of the city made 
up of many cities. At least we have no topographical 
distinctions between the fate of one quarter and another, 
such as we have in the pictures of earlier scenes of the 
same kind. The work went on through the whole day and 
through the day that followed. In the night between the 
two slaughter seems to have rested to give other passions 
their turn. Simple robbery, as in the days of Nypsios, 
is hardly dwelled on; perhaps it is taken for granted'. 

^ This is eflpedally attribated to thoae who wished to better themselves 
by the slanghter of the rich ; oi Hi rats rav €vw6poJv <r<payais ol6fity(n rdr 
19Ums tintopias IwayopOdftraa^cu, my ifjufx^^'^^o irpH^ ro¥ lear ainw 6Xt$pcr. 

* Diod. xiz. 7 ; ov /lijy oM roii th ret rtfUrif icaraipvymMnv i) rw tfcoir 
/xcrcia vap€ix^TO Hlv dff<p&K€iav, dXX* i) wp^ Bfobt €(nr4$€ia huearo vp^s 

' lb. 8 ; o/ vX<r0Toi mrkfirfw vp6s robs 'Ajtpaycarnvavtj ta^i icaBrjKo^ffijs 
Ivi/mAc/cu ii^t&Brjaay. * On the numben see Appendix VII. 

' Cf. n. I above. The original order was HuarpA^tiv r^ tcHi<rtts rw i(wco- 
aUn^, Directly after (c. 6) we hear of the «Acoi^i£/a of the mnrderen, and 
how they rushed M r^ dprnay^y. And in c 9 w« come across ol Scavf^pi;- 


CHAP. xn. But now came the wrong on which our narrator is fullest. 
The matrons and maidens of Syracuse passed into the 
power of those who had slain their husbands and fathers 
and had taken possession of their houses ^. By the evening 
of the second day, the objects of Agathokles had been 
gained ; slaughter enough had been done by the hands of 
his followers. He then himself sat in judgement on those 
who had been taken alive. Those who were most bitterly his 
enemies he slew ; the rest he allowed to live in banishment. 

Deino- To one alone^ Deinokrat^^ a man of whom we shall often 

KFAtidfi DAT' 

doned. hear again, he gave, on the ground of former friendship^ 
a free pardon ^. Even Agathokles was human. 

After the arrests, the banishments, the massacre, came in 
due order the plebiscite. A vote of the Syraeusan Assembly 
was of course in form a true plebiscitum, though one may 
doubt as to perfect freedom of voting in an assembly sum- 
moned by the master of eight thousand armed strangers 
TheAB- fresh from the work of blood. But in form at least 
summoned, the Assembly was summoned and came together^ and the 
question laid before it was something more than a simple 
vote of Yea or Nay. Agathokles then made his speech to 
the people. The day had come which he had longed to 
see, the day when Syracuse should be free^. The Six 
Hundred and their oligarchy were overthrown ; all who had 
sought for a power beyond the laws were swept away; he 
himself, the instrument in the work, wished for nothing 
more than to rest from his toils and dwell as a private 
citizen, one among his fellows, in the delivered common- 

k6t€s rd rSfy t}tvxi7X^^^^' ^^^ there is no wrought-up picture of plunder 
M in the other case ; that is reserved for another kind of wrong. 

^ Diod. xix. 8 ; ws npofft^pipovro wapBivois dptpavtus lud yvyau^lv, l^/ioif 
/Hy o^aaus rSw fiorjBovvTwy, ircvraHrvtats 8' 6v' k^owrUw abro^pdropa rw 

' Tb.; rcnn (crfpTjBtvras dffftoiffaSj AetyotcpArrpf fikv d^irc Sect r^v v/>07C7C- 
vrjfUnfv ifHXiaVt 4r.rA. See Appendix VII. 
' Poljainos, v. 3. 7. See Appendix VII. 


wealth^. Then, in plain imitation of Gelon after his ohap.xii. 
return from Himera^ he laid aside his dres& as general^ and 
came down from his hima in the daily garb of a private 

Generals had now to be chosen. Bat the mass of Agatho- 
those who were called on to choose were men whom sole 
Agathokles could trust, men who had had a hand in the ^^^ 
deeds which had just been done; he knew full well that 
they would choose him and none other. A voice soon 
arose — first of all^ it is said^ from those who had enriched 
themselves by the goods of the slain men— calling on 
Agathokles not to forsake them, but to abide and take 
care of the affairs of the state ^. For a while he kept 
silence. Then^ as the cry grew louder^ he consented again 
to take on him the office of general. Dion^ in his better 
days, when chosen to that post along with his brother, 
had asked that, according to the law of S}nracuse, other 
colleagues should be joined with him^. Agathokles, on 
the other hand, improving on the precedent of Dionysius, 
protested that he could accept the office only in the 
character of a '^ single person; '' he could have no colleagues. * 
He could not, he said, make himself answerable before the 
law for deeds that others might do against the law ^. A 
vote was passed, making Agathokles sole general, general 
with full powers, the office under the cover of which 

^ Diod. xix. 9 ; waBofdoF ^cras ri^v v^y vtvoM/Wyoi rw dwaart^ui^ kwt- 

fio^K€ff$al iroT« r&v w6iiwr AwoKvOtls {&arrcv€iy teos &¥ 9a<n. 

' lb.; t6 fikv x^f*^^ iavTov vc/K^<r«a<r«, rd ^ Ifu&Tior fiMToXafiiiy 
dii|7Ci, Twv woKKcMf iavrdv dmHti^ai iva, [Of. PolyainM, v. 3. 7.] See the 
Btory of GMlon in vol. ii. p. 304. 

' lb. ; c^^ yow ol Biawt^opiriie6T«s rd rSay ^jrvx'J'c&rwy kfi6«¥ fail Mara* 
kiv€Ty lovrovf, dXAd ^rpoM^taOai rijjy rw tkuv IvifiiActay. 

^ See above, p. 362. 

* Diod. a. a. ; irpoc94^aa$ai fUy l^^« t^ arpan/ylay, /d) fthrotyt fwr* 
dKkBoy dp^tiv 06 ydp ifwof»iy§a^, 3iy Ay trtpoi wapayoft^awrt, rovrctfr a^^ 
cvy6pxwra \6yoy Avodiddym Mird roi^ v6fuivt. 


oHAF.xii. Dionysios had marched to the tyranny. In the case of 
AgathokISs no farther step was needed. Under the name 
of a constitutional office, he was already lord of Syracuse. 
On the lips of his enemies at leasts he bore no name but 
that of tyrant ^. 
BlackneBB We have had to record many evil deeds in our story, 
thokS* many base ways of rising to power; but the story of the 
procedure. ^^ ^f ^gathokles is surely the blackest of all. Dionysios 
rose by many base tricks and false accusations ; but he was 
at no time guilty of any deed of blood on such a scale, and 
so wholly unprovoked, as this of Agathokles. Nypsiop 
was an avowed enemy, a captain of mercenaries ; Agathokles 
was the general of the Syracusan commonwealth. The 
thing most like his act in all Greek history is the rooting 
out of the oligarchic party at Korkyra by two successive 
massacres at the hands of the Demos. Those were deeds 
foul and bloody enough, and in the second of the two 
massacres treachery was added to bloodshed ^. But even 
deeds like these do not reach to the measure of the crime 
of Agathokles. The massacres at Korkj^a were not planned 
* in the interests of a single man seeking for unlawful power. 
They were a general outburst of popular fury, fury directed 
against men who had provoked it by massacre done by 
themselves on a smaller scale ^. And the slaughter was 
not followed by the rise of any tyranny. In the case of 
Agathokles, a single man stirs up and uses a bloody popular 
impulse to his own selfish purposes. Whatever may have 
been the earlier crimes of Herakleides and Sosistratos, 
their day within the city was past. Agathokles was in 
power; he was holder of the highest lawful office in the 
state, clothed with special authority for the preservation of 
the peace. Military action against the exiles who were 
assaulting Herbessus was an obvious part of his duty as 

* See Appendix VII. » Thuc. iv. 46. 

' In the murder of Peithiu and his nztj oompanions, Thnc. iii. 70. 


general ; it was under cover of that duty that he took the chap. xii. 
first step in treachery and slaughter by the destruction of 
Tisarchos and his comrades. Sicily and Syracuse had 
abeady an evil name for the doings of their tyrants ; but 
Agathokles outdid all that had gone before him. 

Yet it might have been easy to plead that Agathokles Tyranny 
was no tyrant at all. A subtle advocate might say that his Uiokf^ 
worst deeds were done, not in the exercise of an unlawful ^^^. ^^' 

' ^ nysios. 

power, but in the wrongful exercise of a lawful power. It 
might be said that such acts were the deeds of an evil 
magistrate, but not the deeds of a tyrant. Dionysios, 
through the means of his authority as general with full 
powers, had taken to himself the tyrant's badge of a body- 
guard^. Agathokles did not receive that full authority 
till after his massacre, and then he did not assume the special 
outward ensign of tyranny^. But for all practical pur- 
poses he was a tyrant, though a tyrant holding a special 
position among his class. He comes under Aristotle's class 
of tyrants who rose to power by the arts of the baser kind 
of demagogue. Or more truly, in becoming a tyrant, he 
did not cease to be a demagogue. In one Assembly of the 
people, seemingly in that momentous one which voted to 
him the chief power in the state, the chosen general pro- 
mised an abolition of debts and a division of lands among 
the poor ^. We are not told how far he actually carried 
out these promises ; but it is said that by promises to some, 
by actual benefits to others, by a pleasant and conciliatory 
demeanour to all, he won the general good will of the great 
mass of the people. 

* See vol. iii. p. 558. 

' Diod. zix. 9 ; ix^^ TrjkiKavTtiv Swiurrcioy, o^rc 5cd^/ia dv4Ka0€yy oirrk 
iopwp6povs €Tx*^t oM ^wreyrtv^iay If^AoHrcy, avc/> tUiOeun wottiv irxMv 
&mxirrts ol Tvpcufvot, 

' lb. ; k97fyy4?^€T0 yiip *Aya0oieXfjs xard, t^ ituckrfciay icat XP*^ diro«oirds 
vM^aao'tfac «oU roU wivrjci XP^pay 9ofp^ffaff9cu. It was not wonderful then 
that voKXci TW dv6poify Kot ttaraxpioiv dcfuyoi rijv /itrafiokilv vpoat^ayro. 


CHAP. xn. It is significantly said that, as soon as his power was 
confirmed, he left off inflicting death or other penalties 
on any man^. We shall see that, as he rose to power 
by a deed of blood to which the career of Dionysios 
supplies no parallel, so he was ever ready on occasion to 
do deeds of the same kind whenever they were dictated 
by policy or passion, sometimes, it would seem, by mere 
caprice. Most of the bloodiest deeds of Agathokl^ were 
done to enemies in time of war. Yet even within the 
Syracusan city he did not shrink from a massacre when it 
would serve his purpose. Still such cases are exceptional, 
altogether unlike the general character of his home govern- 
ment. As a rule, the lord — the general — of Syracuse was 
mild and g^racious within the walls of Syracuse ; it was the 
would-be lord of all Sicily that shed blood without mercy 
as if bloodshed were his sport '. 
Agatho- At home AgathoklSs in no way affected the outward 
penaes badges of power. Master of a strong military force, 
withbody- trusting at the same time in the good will of large 

guard. ° ^ ° ° 

classes of the mingled people of Syracuse, the general- 
with-fuU-powers needed not the immediate bodyguard 
with which the tyrant commonly surrounded himself. 
That he did not take to himself the diadem is a remark 
suggested to our guide by a later stage of his career; 
here it is out of place ^ Of a merry, jovial, and pleasure- 

^ Diod. xiz. 9 ; dvi) 82 ro^cov y€v6fA€vos, rw /i^v Ifrc <poy€^iv 4 ieok&(ew rtvAs 

p€TO' leat vokkobs fuv titpy^rOv, ohic 6klycvs 8* kvaYytXlats /itrtotpi^m^, "wdms 
82 \Ayois ipikayOpinrois dfiftaycrgwy, oO furptas dvo^j^ hiiyxayty. But a 
foUower of Agathoklds would have said tliat there was no ohange tts roO^ 
parrioy, nothing like "exuere antiquum hominem." He always remained 
the same, slaying one kind of people and beiriending another. 

' On this side of his character Diod6ros enlarges in another place 
(zix. i) ; tls TovTO 9po^K$t Hwd/itcK &!» mX futuipovias &<rr€ . . . tfiptvs 82 
Kol 9^7^ ifxrk^aat ras leard 2i«cA/oy 96\Ht, otitis ydp rfiy vpo rovrov 
Tvpiww lv(T€X4ffar6 ri roiotrroi', oOt€ Tota:6Ttjy itftirtira nard rSav ^vorcroy- 
lUvw iirx!^. He goes on at some length. 

* See above, p. 381, note a. 


seeking disposition, Agathokles had nothing of the harsh ohap. xii. 
and suspicious mood of Dionysios ^. He enjoyed feasts J^^i»*ir 
and drinking-bouts ; and he turned them to his purposes by of Aga- 
bidding to his table those of whom he had reason to be ^ 
doubtful, and, according to the rule of the Latin poet, 
proving them in their cups *. In public he gave himself 
no airs ; he affected no state ; he was easy of access to all ^. 
He kept on the usual assemblies of the people; he came to 
them unattended ; the people themselves were said to be 
his guards^. He addressed the multitude in frank and 
8co£Sng speeches, after the manner of a jester or mounte- 
bank rather than of a king or magistrate ^. 

To the mixed multitude with which the S jrracuse of his day Hii rale 
was fiUed his rule was clearly acceptable. To the men whose J^the 
citizenship dated from elder days, he was naturally hateful ; P®^P^®- 
they were driven either to hide their loathing or to join the 
exiles who had left the city. The Guardian of the Peace had, 
after all, by whatever means, made Syracuse more nearly 
an united commonwealth than it had often been. Agathokles 
had no need either for a rule of constant grinding oppres- 
sion or for that rule of petty annoyance which often stirs 
men's hatred more strongly than grinding oppression. He 
could bear himself as a mild, popular, jovial-hearted ruler, 

* Diod. XX. 63 ; oix 6t*ol<us Aicwcl^ rf rvp^yy^, 6^0$ ydp Ivl roaovrov 
Marwt BtigtiTo rpos dmufras, «. r. \, 

' lb. ; dwtrlBero B* kr ruis virois rd r$s rvpcanriZos A^wita, kouL rSrv rvx^f^' 
Tvif {8carro/y ravtiv6rrfpov kavrhv AntBtUcyvtry &f»a fiiv 8id r^ roiauTijs woXireias 
Brfpufuvos r^K mpct t&v m\XSv twotay, &fia Bl IkMs Ik rp /liBjf KaO* alrrov 
mppvjaka^t dicpt^m mrcvdct t^ iic&aTov duivotar. So Horace, 

"Beges diountar multiB urgere culuUiB 
£t torqaere mero,*' Ao, 

* See above, p. 363, note i. So of Hippias, Thuc. ▼!. 57. a. 

* Diod. zx. 63; Bofwtpopo^fMvos {nr6 vKfj0ovSy th rets itcKkfjcias c^o^ci 

* lb. ; Mipx^y ^ fioi ^i;o-ci yekotrowot^s ical fdfMOS, oh^ iv rats iicickiiaiait 
dttlxf^o Tov ffwinrrtof robs icafirjfiiyovs Mat rana airrw tUditaf &<tt€ rd 
irA$9of noKk&jat c{r yiKom iirrphrtoOai, ita$dir€p rard rww 4$o?<6ycg¥ f ^(^ 
lULTijmoivv $€wp<nhrraf. 


CHAP. xn. who, now and then^ even within his own city, was ready^ if 
needs of state called for such a course, to do some deed of 
slaughter against his enemies which perhaps did not greatly 
displease his friends. 

When we look at the whole sum of his actions, we 
begin to understand a judgement on him which at first 
sight startles us. We do not wonder when Poljbios, 
on the authority of Scipio himself, places Agathokles 
and Dionysios side by side among the foremost men of 
action, as men of a small group who had at once the eye 
to discern and the hand to act ^. We are perhaps amazed 
when we further hear that Agathokles, bloodiest of tyrants 
in his way of gaining power, was mildest of tyrants in his 
way of using it^ Yet of one side of him the saying is 
true. He was, at least in Sicily after Greldn's day, the 
mildest of tyrants. He was also the most treacherous and 
the most bloody. 

§ 3. Wars of Agathokles against Sikeliot cities and 


We are now well pleased to get some glimpses of those 
inland towns which we once used to look on as Sikel, but 
which now play their part on the general field of Sicilian 
history without any visible distinction between them and 
their Hellenic neighbours. We have seen that, earlier in 
his career, Agathokles had won the good will of some of 
them. The massacre by which he rose to power had been 

^ PoL XV. 35. 6 ; Ikb Mat Tl6vX,iov ILeiviwvA. <paat top vpwTOV KaravoKt/jcq- 
Govra 'Kapxffioviow IpomjOivra rofos vvoKafifiavti vpaytMriKcararovi Sofhfos 
ytyoufvai ttat cbv v^ roKfirfpordrovSy €lv(iv Tohs 9€pl *A'Ya$otcK4a ml Aiotniaiw 
Tovs XiKtXi^tnus, 

^ lb. iz. 23. a ; rls y^ 'AyaffoMKia rdr 2{«cAia( rvpayyw o(fX ItrrSprjietf 
8(0Tt, 8($fa$ d/fJiSraTos c7i/cu teard, rdts vpdrras kmfioXAs xat rijv icarafftcfv^ rijf 
Bwatrrtias, fitrdL ravra, vofiiiras fitfiatus tyMityBai r^ IBuctXiarrSfy dpx^, 
iriyro/p i^fitp^rraros ^ic€i ytyovivai Kai vpaoraros. Here again is the 
notion of a change of character ; it would be truer to say that Agathoklte 
was both i//t6raTOi and ijfiffidiTQTos all along. 


largely the work of men of Morgantina ^. After his rise ouap. xii. 
to power, he would seem to have turned against his old 
friends. We hear at least of his subduing many of the 
inland towns without mention of their names ^. 

We now see the effects of this process. Two of the best- 
known Sikel sites, now seemingly counting as Greek towns, 
appear as under the dominion of Agathokles, or at least as 
having their strongholds held by his garrisons. This last 
case, as the experience of Athens herself in this age so often 
showed, did not necessarily imply that all the forms of a 
commonwealth came to an end in the town which was thus 
bridled. It was enough that no open action could be taken 
against the will of the master. Centuripa, on her height Centuripa 
looking out on ^tna, had in this way been brought under the by Aga- 
power of Agathokl^. His soldiers kept most likely that 
one of the five rays of her star which looks to the navel of 
Sicily over the southern plain. But they held Centuripa Appeals to 
against the will of her people, and messages, as in the days 
of Gellias, passed between Centuripa and Akragas \ The 
citizens prayed DeinokratSs and his force of exiles to come 
to their help, stipulating only that they should not simply 
be made to change one master for another, but that 
Centuripa should again become an independent common- 

A large body of the exiles was sent under the command Abortive 
of Nymphoddros on the work of deliverance. They to free 
climbed up under cover of night by such paths as then ^^'^^^^P*' 
led up the mountain-side, and contrived to make their 
way into the town. Of the action of the citizens of 
Centuripa we hear nothing ; but the ofiicers who com- 
manded for Agathokles learned what had happened. They 

[} See p. 374.] 

[' Diod. zix. 9 ; wpoawtXdfirro 8i itai rSiv Iv rp fUifoyti^ x^P^*"^ '<^ 
96\tv¥ rdf vAc/ffTot.] [* Diod. xix. 103.] 

{* lb. ; i^' f TJ^ tAroPQfdap So^^nu t^ S^/*^*] 



CHAP. xn. fell on Nymphoddros and his party ; the captain was slain 
and the whole body was cut to pieces ^. To the mind of 
Agathokles the conspiracy against his authority came as 
an opportunity for a massacre, the first of a long series 
wrought in one town after another that displeased him. 
MasBAore He went, it would seem^ in person to Centuripa; he 
tnripi!!,' rebuked the people for their opposition to him and slew 
all who had a hand in the movement ^ For once a deed 
of blood is recorded without the numbers of the victims. 

While the lord of Syracuse was thus busy at Centuripa^ 
a threatening blow, but one which proved to be only 
threatening, was struck at the very heart of his power. 
Punio ships Fifty Punic ships ^ sailed into the Great Harbour of 
Harboiu?^ Syracuse. Nothing is said of its meaos of defence; the 
story seems to imply that there was none. That is strange 
enough; but it sounds stranger still to hear that a Car- 
thaginian fleet in possession of the Syracusan haven found 
nothing to do but to set upon two harmless merchant- 
ships. One of them, an Athenian, they sank, and cut ofE 
the heads of the crew. This piece of wanton cruelty could 
hardly have been done by the orders of Hanulkar, who 
was striving to win allies and subjects for Carthage by 
a conduct exactly opposite. But men marked that the 
vengeance of the gods did not fail to light on them that 
had done this deed to men who had in no way wronged 
them *. When the fleet sailed out of the Great Harbour, 
some of the ships manned by the offenders were carried far 
north to the coast of Bruttium. There they fell into the 
hands of the captains of Agathokles, who did by them as 
they had done by the Athenians \ 

[^ Diod. ziz. 103.] 

[' lb.; ravTfjs Tip d^opfi^f XafiSfuvos 'AyaBogkfjs kvtitaXtat re rets 
Karropiwiyots, letd t<^s tS^ayras alrtovs ytyw^vai rov ycwrepctr/iov wdrras 
dv«<r^a^c.] [' lb.; wwyr^jianrra ffK6/p€<yat,'] 

[* lb. ; Ttix^ t6 iatfi&ytw abrois kwwif/i^vtr.'] 

[* lb. ; iKa2 rd napark'iaioy ol (wy/nfiirrfs rwv ^oivlicww l-woBoiy ola hpa^ay 


Meanwhile another of the old Sikel sites comes into our chap. xh. 
story. Some way north-west of Centuripa, on the other Revolt of 
side of the Kyanosdros, stood Galaria, the home of a valiant ^* 

people. We have already heard of their gallant, if unlucky 
deeds, in the wars of Timoledn^ And now the men of 
Galaria, of their own free will, called in Deinokrat^s to 
help them to get rid of the garrison which was kept in 
their town by Agathokles ^. He came, with another exile Beino* 
named PhilonidSs, at the head of no less a force than three marches to 
thousand foot and two thousand horse. The aggressions ^f^^^^^ 
and oppressions of AgathoklSs were fast swelling the ranks Galariam. 
of his enemies. The garrison of Gkilaria was driven out ; 
Deinokrates formed a camp near the town', the town 
itself, we must suppose, being left to the defence of its 
own citizens. Agathokles, hearing of his loss, sent a force 
of five thousand men, under two of his captains, Pasiphilos 
and Damophilos, to win back the lost town. A pitched 
battle followed. The force of Deinokrates and PhilonidSs 
was drawn out in order, each captain taking the command 
of one of the wings *. The fight went on for a while on Is defeated 
equal terms, till Phildnid^s fell and his wing gave way. kids/ 
The battle was lost ; Deinokrates was forced to withdraw, 
and Gkklaria fell again — we are not told whether by storm 
or surrender— into the hands of the captains of Agathokles. 
Pasiphilos acted as his master's lieutenant, and chastised 
those who had brought about the revolt of Gralaria. Such 
are the words of our story ^ Is the phrase a mere 
euphemism for another massacre, or are we to suppose that 
the captains of Agathokles were satisfied with whips where 
their master would have wielded his scorpions ? 

But the recovery of Centuripa and Galaria was a small 

[* See p. 317.] [• IHod. xix. 104.] 

[* lb. ; rp6 rijs 96\fn iarparovilktMraif.'] [* lb.] 

[' lb. ; ro^ ahlovs t^ dvpordc'cwf l«dXa<nir.] 

C C 9 


CHAP. XII. matter beside the hoped-for prize of Akragas. It was 

AgHtho- thither that all the energies of Agathokles were now turned. 

against Things had strangely turned about since, a hundred years 

andCwtha- ^^^^0, the commonwealth of Syracuse had sent helpers to 

giniariis. guard Akragas against the Punic besiegers ^. It was now 

on Punic help that Akragas mainly relied for defence 

against the tyrant of Syracuse. Hamilkar kept his camp 

on the great advanced post of Akragas^ the hill^ the all 

but island^ that stands straight in the way of friend or 

Hamilkar enemy advancing from the east. He held the height of 

mos. Eknomos^ the fortress where Phalaris was thought to have 

kept the famous bull and which was strangely thought to 

have taken its name from his unlawful deeds ^. It looked 

down on the boundary stream between the lands of 6ela 

and of Akragas^ the southern Himeras^ whose salt waters 

wriggle to and fro in the broad dale between the Geloan and 

the Akragantine hills. 

Here Agathokles saw that his main struggle must be. 
The scale of the war was growing. It was no longer 
a question of winning or keeping this or that Sicilian 
town for the dominion of the lord of Syracuse ; it was 
becoming a struggle for supremacy^ almost for existence, 
between the great powers of Eastern and Western Sicily. 
The strife of Greek and barbarian^ the strife of Timoledn 
and of Gel6n^ seems to be coming back. Unworthy as was 
Agathokles of the Hellenic championship of his predecessors, 
we find ourselves instinctively fallings we find our guide 
instinctively falling, into the language of the old days. It 
is again the Greek and the barbarian that meet face to face^. 
It may even be that the mouth of the southern Himeras 
suggests the thought of the great fight by the mouth of 
its northern namesake. But memories like these are checked 
by the fact which stares us in the face^ that Agathokl^ 

[» Sicily, iii. 525.] [• Diod. xix. 108 ; see Siofly, i. 463.] 

[* Died. xix. 104, 108.} 

«p^p«^9-. ',' *. — -zrz^m 


encamped between Gela and Akragas^ had on each side of chap. xn. 
him a Greek city which feared Hamilkar less than it feared 
him. The presence^ perhaps only the promised presence^ of 
the Selinuntine contingent on the Phoenician side did not 
hinder the strife of Gelon and the first Hamilkar from 
being truly a strife of Hellas against Canaan. We can 
hardly give that name to the strife of Agathokl^s and the 
new Hamilkar as long as Akragas and Gela are driven to 
call in the help of Canaan^ in self-defence. It is only when 
Agathokl^ has set his foot on another continent that we 
b^n to give him some feeble share of the good will with 
which we watched the champions of Hellas march to the 
banks of Krimisos and of the Himeras of the North. 

The Greek was ready for the strife before the barbarian. March of 
Agathokles marched with his full power till he drew near ^^Ekno?^' 

to the Punic camp on Eknomos. His heart was lifted up ™'''- 

. . * B. a 31 1, 

by the successes of his lieutenants ^. They had won back 

revolted Centuripa and Galaria ; he was himself ready and 

eager to face the full might of Carthage. But the full 

might of Carthage was not there. The Punic force on 

Eknomos was so small that^ when Agathokles challenged 

the enemy to come forth and fight^ he deemed it prudent 

to keep within his camp. The lord of Syracuse deemed 

himself master of the open country without striking a blow ^. 

He had won some plunder^ most likely by harrying the land 

which the Carthaginian allies of Akragas did not dare to 

defend. With less prudence than one would have looked 

for from him^ he marched back to Syracuse in triumph, and 

adorned the chief temples of the city with the spoils of his 

bloodless campaign. 

If Agathokles really so far forgot the realities of his 

position as to think that he could afford to neglect the 

{} Biod. zix. 104 ; ivjfp/Uvos r$ wpoyty^yrffUrn r/irj;.] 
[' lb. ; vofiiffos dKorirl Kfaruv rmr twaiBputr,'] 


CHAP. XII. Carthaginian power, he was speedily awakened from his 

Military * '' The danger from the advance of Agathokles was well 

tioiiB of known at Carthage. It was therefore determined to take 

B.C. 311. to the Sicilian war in good earnest; and Hamilkar was 

sent forth with another of those great fleets and armies that 

we have so often heard of \ This one was notable for two 

things. One was the great number of Balearic slingers^; 

the other was that, as in the expedition in Timoledn's day, 

an unusual number of Carthaginian citizens, many of them 

Fleet de- iiien of high rank, were sent to serve. But a great storm 

a itorm. ^^^ them on their way and sank many ships, specially 

those that carried the native Carthaginians. The blow was 

so heavily felt at Carthage that the walls were hung with 

black as a sign of mourning. Hamilkar saved what he 

could of the fleet, and made up his numbers by levies in 

Sicilian Sicily, till he sat down again on Eknomos at the head of 

forty thousand foot and five thousand horse ^. This was 

much smaller than the armies which the earlier Punic 

generals had commanded; but Punic military skill had 

grown since then, and Hamilkar no longer trusted to 

Agatbolclds the brute force of multitudes. AgathoklSs set out to meet 

Burprises 1 j.j 

Gelft. them, and did one of his worst deeds on the road. He 

cunningly surprised Gela ; he slew many, plundered the 
rest, and marched on *. He must have heard on the way 

* From Story of Sicily, p. 339 seqq. 

[} For the expedition of Hamilkar, see Diod. zix. 106 seqq. Cf. Justin, 
xlii. 3, who calls him ' filiua Giaoonia.'] 

[' Diod. xix. 106 ; BaXiipas <r<l>tv^yriTas x^^ov^*] 

[» lb. 108.] 

[^ lb. 107. He is said to have sUin over 4»ooo. He then forced the 
Burviying Geldana to hand over to him aU their money and all the 


that twenty of his ships had been taken by the Cartha- ohaf. xii. 
ginians in the strait of Messana." 

§ 4. Battle of the Himeras, 

The camps, Greek and Phcenician, were thus pitched on 
two opposite hills, one on each side of the dale of Himeras, 
at a distance of about five miles apart. Hamilkar kept 
his old post on the right bank, on the hill of Eknomos. 
Agathokl^ occupied another point round which, as round 
Eknomos, gathered the memories of the famous tyrant of 
old times. The hill on which the Greeks encamped still 
bore his name ; tradition spoke of Phalarion as the site of 
a fortress of his rearing^. From these heights the two 
armies looked out on one another for many days. Both 
sides shrank from crossing the river. For the tradition of 
the land had handed on an ancient saying, that near that 
spot should many men be slain in fight ^. The voice of 
fate must have been vague; it could have said nothing 
about Greeks or barbarians, about men of Syracuse or men 
of Akragas. There was nothing to raise special hope or to 
strike special fear into either side. Where the risk was 
thus equal, neither army cared to be the first to face it ; 
parties went down to plunder on both sides, but each of 
the main armies sat on its height. Accident at last brought 
on the great battle, in its scale and results one of the 
greatest in the whole strife of Greek and Phoenician on 
Sicilian ground^ but in which it is hard to make our hearts 

gold and silver they possessed, both coined and unooined. The coinage of 
Gela which ceased on the Carthaginian captare in 405 had been revived 
in Timoledn*s time (see Sapplement IV. p. 355). There is now another 
long gap, lasting till after the Roman Conquest, when bronze coins were 
again issued by its mint.] 

\} Diod. xiz. 108. Cf. Sidly, ii. 69 ; Schnbring, Hut. Geogr. Studien 
iiber Altsidlien, plaoes the Phalarion on Monte Cufino, the highest point 
above Licata.] 

[* Diod. xiz. 108 ; ^^/mu Sk learuxoy M rSiw nporipon^ XF^^^^'t ^^* '<<^ 
WfH rdr r&n» rovror vXijto 69$pinMif kv MxV Sia^Aap^Mu.] 





of tho 
[B.O. 310, 

go forth with Agathoklfis as they go forth with Timoleon 
and with Gel6n. 

As when the elder Hamilkar was encamped beside the 
southern Himeras, the active Libyans went forth in parties 
to plunder^. Agathokles was stirred thereby to send 
down his men to do the like. He saw what would oome ; 
he planted an ambush of picked men close on his own 
bank of the river. The Greeks^ perhaps by special orders, 
carried their harryings far and wide; they came up close 
to the Punic camp, and drove off the beasts of burthen 
which were doubtless resting outside the camp, as they 
might have done outside an Eastern town. Presently 
a party, seemingly a considerable party, came forth to chase 
the daring plunderers* They followed; they crossed the 
river; at the right place and moment the liers-in-wait of 
Agathokles rose up ; they fell on the disordered barbarians 
and drove them back to their camp with great slaughter ^. 
Agathokl^ deemed that the moment was come to change 
the skirmish into a battle ; he bade his whole army march 
forth to the attack of the camp of Hamilkar. 

Immediately at the foot of Eknomos, the winding river 
runs much nearer to the hills on the Akragantine side than 
to those on the Geloan. Between the stream and the hill 
is the sit« of the later town of Phinti&s, the modern Licata; 
we may conceive the camp spreading down to the river, 
with Eknonos itself for its akropolis. Suddenly the Greek 
army appeared before its defences. Agathokles was ready 
for any need of warfare; his men began speedily to fill 
up the ditch and to tear up the palisade ^. The barbarians 
were taken by surprise ; but they came to the defence with 
stout hearts, if in no good order. And now came the 
special calling of the native Carthaginians. With true 
Semitic spirit, the noblest of the city gave themselves to 

[1 Diod. xix. 108. Of. Sicily, ii. p. 191.] [« lb.] 


fight for the ditch, as if they had been defending captured chap. xtt. 
Moty a ^ or Carthage itself. The struggle was stubborn on 
both sides ; but the Greeks seem to have had the advantage 
of numbers, and they came pressing faster and faster into 
the camp. 

Success stirred up the spirit of the assailants; the 
Greeks were still pushing forward^ the camp of Carthage 
was all but taken^ when Hamilkar bethought himself 
of a new weapon. It was not by the hand-fighting of The 
the men of the ruling city but by the active and ready giingen 
skill of one of their bands of mercenaries that the lord of j*'*^* *^® 


Syracuse was to be checked in his hour of pride. The 
Spanish sword had for a while made the victory of Gelftn 
doubtful *; it was the sling of the Balearic islanders ^ that 
was to wrest from the hands of Agathokl^ a victory that 
was all but won. A thousand of them were in the army 
of Hamilkar, men trained from childhood in the use of 
their special weapon^ men who had played their part in 
many battles and who had often had no small share 
in deciding their result. A ceaseless shower of stones^ 
launched with unerring skilly stones of a size which the 
slingers of Rhodes could not equals now fell thick and 
heavy on the Greeks who had made their way within the 
Punic camp. Some were killed outright^ many were 
wounded ; the more part had their defensive armour crushed 
in and would henceforth fight at a disadvantage ^. In the 
face of such a storm there was no advance; the Greeks 

[} See above, p. 79.] 

[* See Sknly, u. 198.] 

[' Diod. lix. 109. They are detoribed am /ipwdwt \l$ovt fiAxXtof f/af- 
$6Ttt . , , dfs &v ix vallW wap' alrdis rijs Ir reus a^€y!i6vais yvf4yaaias 5ia- 
wwovfiimj?. These stones "of a mina's weight" would weigh somewhat 
oyer a pound. With regard to the early training of the Balearic iling^tniy 
Strabo (iii. 5. 1) relates that children were refoaed their bread tiU they 
had hit it with a sling (cf. V^get. de re mil. i. 16). The Balearic slings 
were made of rushes.] 

[* Died. ziz. 109 ; rwr 9^ rnKdcrm^ rd 9»^wA{arra rww iwktm ovF^r^i^or.] 


cHAP.xn. who had made their first entrance into the camp were 

driven out discomfited. But the struggle was not oyer; 

even the hope of taking the camp had not passed away ; 

different bands of the soldiers of Agathokles made the 

Carthft- assault at different points. The fight was still going 

forcem^ts'^^' the camp was again in danger of &lling into the 

brought up. hands of the assailants, when the sudden coming of fresh 

reinforcements turned the day in favour of Carthage. 

It must have been the tidings of the loss in the storm 
which stirred up the home government of Carthage to send 
out the second force which reached Sicilian ground at this 
lucky moment for its purpose. We hear nothing about 
the new-comers^ nothing of their numbers, of their leaders, 
or of the nature of the troops, nothing save that they 
did come, and that at once on their coming they took a 
part in the battle which they found raging. They at once 
set upon the Greeks who were attacking the camp; they 
could choose their points, and compass them in on all 
Rout of the sides ^. Their coming also raised the spirits of the defenders 
of the camp; the Greeks^ now forced to strive against 
enemies within and without^ presently gave way and took 
to flight. But flight supplied Uttle safety; five miles of 
level ground with the river to be crossed lay between the 
fleers and their camp. The horse of the barbarians, five 
thousand in number, easily caught them up and slaughtered 
many. The fight too was fought in the middle of the 
dog-days, and^ when the Greeks turned, the summer sun 
of Sicily was coming down on them with his noon-tide 
power \ Fire and water were in alliance ; Himeras, Hume 
Salso, unlike loyal Krimisos, showed himself that day the 
friend of the barbarians. Some fell dead — simply of heat 
and toil. Others, like the Athenians at Assinaros, urged 
by a wild thirst, threw themselves into the stream and 

[^ Diod. zix. 109 ; «^«X^ v^pdirrcarro ro^r ^EWi/ya;.] 
[' lb. ; Ifwb ic&va offfftfs r^s &pas,'} 

AOATHOELUs defeated at the HIUEBAS. 395 

drank eagerly of its salt and baleful waters^. So many chaf.xii. 
died by these less wonted forms of deaths that of the seven 
thousand Greek corpses which the barbarians reckoned, 
they were amazed to find more than half the number 
without wounds. Five hundred only of the Carthaginian 
host was said to have fallen ; yet one would have thought 
that such a strife as the battle for the camp is painted to 
us would have supplied a larger tale of victims. 

Such a blow as this^ even if we prudently take off some- GreatnesB 
thing from the figures, was a heavy blow to any Greek ^j^^^ ^ 
power^ even to such a power as the Syracuse of Agathokles 
had grown into. And it was the more heavy because the 
Syracuse of Agathokl^ was a power to which blows of 
such a kind were specially dangerous. Outside the im- 
mediate territory of Syracuse the dominion of the lord of 
Syracuse was a dominion of simple force. The moment he 
was thought to be weaker than a power which was now 
less hateful than his own, his unwilling subjects were sure 
to fall away from him and to join themselves to the 
conqueror. And he did indeed seem weakened by the 
defeat which he had just now undergone by the banks 
of the southern Himeras. The loss of a great battle, less 
awful and terror-striking than such days as the storm of 
Selinous and of Himera, seemed more distinctly to prove 
a failure of military power. Nothing like it had happened 
since Hellas and Canaan had first met in arms in Sicily. 
Carthage^ and powers earlier and weaker than Carthage, 
had driven back Pentathlos and Ddrieus ; Dionysios, if he 
had gained Punic towns, had also lost them ; his brother 
Leptines had been overthrown by a Punic fleet in a great 
battle by sea. But in all the great fights by land the 
Greek had had the better ; no Greek army that had fought 
its way into a Punic camp had been driven out again. 

[} Diod. xiz. 109 ; dXutcov rov ftiiftaros Svtos,'] 


CHAP. xn. 6el6n and Theron had fought their way into the camp 

by Himera ; Dionysios had fought his way into the camp 

beneath his own wall on the lull of his own Syracuse. 

Timoledn had no Punic camp to stonn ; the gods had given 

MoTementa him his crowning mercy in another shape. But now Aga- 

Sicily thokles^ wielding a power not less than any one of them, 

^^ had failed as none of them had &iled« He had stormed 

k^^ no camp, he had won no battle ; his host had been driven 

in a murderous flight across the whole width of the plain 

between Eknomos and Phalarion. The conqueror had 

ceased to conquer ; it was time that the tyrant should cease 

to rule. To cast aside the supremacy of Agathokles, to 

welcome the less grievous alliance of Hamilkar, was the 

cry which now went up through all the Hellenic cities 

of central and eastern Sicily. 

The enemies of Agathokles knew not that the blow 
which had fallen upon him stirred him at once to deal 
a yet heavier blow back again. They knew not that in 
the very hour of overthrow the thought had come into his 
heart of a deed of daring such as had never before come 
into the heart of man. Nor could his friends as yet have 
seen any deeper into his purpose than his enemies. As yet 
he showed himself only as the defeated general, defeated 
but not cast down, working with all energy and all coolness 
to make up as far as might be for the heavy loss which he 
had undergone. We could be thankful to our collectors of 
anecdotes for some characteristic picture, whether literally 
true or false, of the personal bearing of Agathokles at such 
a moment. But all that we are told is the general course 
Agathoklte of his actions. He got together the remnant of his scat- 
GeU. tered army ; he burned his now useless camp on Phalarion ^, 

and at once marched for Gela. So to do was part of his 
policy; it was equally part of his policy to spread abroad 
a report that he was on his march for Syracuse. So he 

[^ Diod. xiz. no.] 



was to be presently^ but not yet. His object was to go chap, xn 
thither^ to make ready when he got thither^ without let or 
hindrance. To that end it was well to put the enemy for 
a while on a false track. 

The object of Hamilkar was less to make an immediate Hftmilkar 
attack on Sjrracuse than to make ready for an overwhelming g^if with 
attack on Syracuse by bringing all the other cities of Sicily ^.^^ 
into his alliance. The first meeting of his forces and those 
of the enemy after both had rested from the great battle 
showed what was in the minds of both. Three hundred 
Libyan horsemen overtook some stragglers from the army of 
Agathokles. The place must have been in the land of Oela, 
somewhere between Phalarion and the city. The Greeks said^ 
and the Africans believed, that Agathokles was already on 
his way to Syracuse. It did not occur to the Punic officer 
to press on and sup in the Island of Ortygia. The help of 
an Asdrubal was at that moment more needful to Carthage 
than the haste of a Maharbal ^. The thought of the leader 
of the three hundred was that the moment was come to 
win over Gela to the Punic interest. His own party could 
at once do this valuable piece of service ; ia a city which 
had suffered so much at the hands of Agathokl^, the 
Gel6an Apoll6n himself, now released from his Tjrrian 
bondage ^ would not forbid his servants to welcome the 
soldiers of Carthage as their friends. Welcomed as friends Libyan 
they were by the people of Gela; but Agathokles was J^njijJJ^ 
already in the town ; it was seemingly through his cunning ^ ^^ 
that the Africans were received within the gates, but were 
presently surrounded by a band of darters, under whose 
weapons they all perished^. It was open to Agathokles 
at this moment to march imheeded to Syracuse; but he 
reckoned that, if he remained at Gela, the thoughts of his 
enemies would be drawn off thither, and the Syracusans 

\} See JAvy, xzii. 51.] 

[> S«6 Sicily, iii. 563, 564.] 
[> Diod. six. no.] 


CHAP. xiL would be able to carry in their ripe com ^ and whatever 
else they needed^ as in time of peace. With these purposes^ 
Agathokles^ the defeated of the Himeras^ with the remnant 
of his routed army^ shut himself within the long walls of 
Oela^ knowing that^ by so doings he was best keeping open 
the way to Syracuse and the way to lands &rther ott. 

We may curse the tyrant; but we cannot help admiring 
the captain. The daring and enterprise of Agathoklte^ 
guided, as they always were^ by sound reckoning and by 
military skilly never stood out more brilliantly than in this 
hour when skill and daring, reckoning and enterprise, 
seemed all to have failed him. But if, from the mere master 
of the captain's art, we are tempted to look to the man who 
uses the captain's art to the great purposes of the world's 
history, if we strive to think of Agathokl^, like earlier 
captains of Sjrracuse, as an Hellenic and European cham- 
pion, we shall see that character fast dropping away from 
him every moment. The horsemen of Africa had been wel- 
comed by the men of Oela. Agathokles now held Oela, and 
Hamilkar Hamilkar made it his first object to besiege him there. But, 
from Gelft. when he saw how firm a hold the tyrant had on the city, 
how sternly he was bent on defence, how well provided he 
was with all that was needed for defence ^ the Punic general 
turned away from the assault of Gela to win over other 
Greek cities by easier means. 

And the means were easy; he had but to march to 
and fro, to this town, to that castle, dealing friendly 
with all whom he had to deal with, and everywhere 
making proclamation for the cities of Sicily to enter into 
alliance with the Punic deliverer. We have seen how few 
years it may take, when policy turns on the will of 
a single man, for a power that was yesterday worthily 

\} Diod. six. no. The Sicilian harvest* time is in June, which giyei 
the time of year when these events took place.] 



hailed as a deUverer to win for itself the loathing of an chap.xii. 
oppressor. An European state^ set free from the yoke of Hamilkar's 
the barbarian^ may soon come to look on the barbarian ^,|^hrby 
himself as less hateful than the power that set it free. So Sicilian 
it was in Hellenic and Hellenized Sicily when Agathokles 
stood in the place of Timoledn. Not forty years before, 
city after city had opened its gates to welcome the true 
deliverer who came to drive away at once the domestic 
tyrant and the barbarian enemy. Now city after city sent 
forth its envoys to call on the barbarian enemy to free them 
from the man into whose hands the power of Timoleon had 
passed. Tauromenion^ first spot of Sicilian soil to welcome 
the deliverer from Corinth^ had now to mourn and to 
avenge her slaughtered citizens^ to mourn perhaps that the 
son of her second founder could no longer set down the 
story of his people at his father's hearth ^. Katane, freed 
by Timoledn from Mamercus, had either seen, or feared 
to see^ a worse than Mamercus come to reign over her ^. 
Leontinoi had at least to mourn the loss of freedom; she 
had perhaps further to mourn a slaughter 'wrought among 
her hills such as Hiketas had never plotted. Kamarina, 
hard by the tyrant's path from Gela to his own Syracuse, 
perhaps dreaded before all things that the next moment 
might make her as Gela was. From these towns and from 
a crowd of others envoys throng^ to the camp of Hamilkar, 
offering their friendship and hailing the old enemy as a new 
deliverer. The movement spread ; presently more envoys 
came from more distant Messene on the strait, from 
Abaceenum among the northern hills, from this city and that, 
each hastening, out of common hatred to the tyrant, out of 
joy that, as they deemed, his power was broken, to plight 
their good will to one who, barbarian as he was, promised 

[^ TimuM was banished by Agathoklte (Diod. Fr., lib. zzi), but the 
data of the baniahment is unoertain.] 

[* For the defection of Katan4 and the other cities, see Diod. ziz. no.] 


CHAP. XII. so fair K It was the crowning feat of Phoenician art, an 
ancient art preached on a new scale and to new ends, to 
beguile Oreek cities to forget that though Hamilkar might 
be a worthier leader than Agathokles, yet Agathokles might 
give way to a new Timoledn, while Canaan, even with 
Hamilkar as its chief, could never become ought but Canaan. 

§ 5. Agathokle% in Africa, 

Meanwhile the Greek who had turned so many Greek 

commonwealths against him knew his own purpose. He 

had done his immediate work. Hamilkar had turned from 

Gela to receive the friendly greetings of the whole land 

from E^marina to Abacsenum. But, the while he gathered 

his allies, no foe had trodden the road to Syracuse. The crops 

were coming in freely ; no man hindered the reapers. In 

what case he left Gela we are not told ; he tarried there as 

AgatfaokldB long as he had need to tarry. He then marched to Syracuse. 

Syracuse, He repaired whatever was dangerous in the defence ^ ; he 

secured the stores of com; he got together within the 

walls such forces as were needed. But for what were they 

needed ? The thoughts of Agathoklds were not in Syracuse ; 

they were not in Gela ; they were not in Kamarina or in 

Abacsenum. From the height which Gelon and Dionysios 

had fenced in, he could look out over the southern sea, the sea 

beyond which lay the home of the enemy. It was beyond 

those well-known waves, in the land no less well known to 

peaceful traders, but where no warrior of Hellas had ever 

and sets set his f oot, that the potter of Therma, the lord of Syracuse, 

Africft. h^ found his calling for all time. [It was to Libya, to the 

B^"f lot honicland of Carthage itself, that Agathokles now set sail.] 

* '* He left his brother Antandros to command in Syracuse 

[with Erymndn an Aitolian soldier of fortune as his more 

{} Diod, six. no; mi tnatv ^XPV^^ ^ap0pdnrws, kiuetOitoufuvos roht 
^EtKtXiirras wp^s ttfvouMV.'] [* lb. ; rd mfcuniK&ra rw ruxSav jvc^irc^eurff.] 
* From Story of Sicily, p. 243. 

AGATHOKlSs sails to AFBICA. 401 

active colleague]; his two sons Archagathos and H6ra- cbap.xii. 
kleides went with hiro. Many guesses were made as to his 
intended course ; but none knew \ The next day the whole 
fleet was frightened by an eclipse of the sun (August 15, 
B.C. 310 2), but all still obeyed, and on the seventh day of 
their voyage they reached Africa. [The Carthaginian 
ships had followed them but they were beaten off and 
Agathokles was able to land his forces] in the Peninsula Landing 

of Aga- 

opposite to Carthage, a little way south-west of the pro- thokl^s 

near Gfipe 

montory now known as Cape Bon ^/' Bon. 

The Greek had thus the better both in the race and the 
fight. Agathokl^ was able to land his forces without 
further hindrance on the shore of Libya. The place was 

\} For Agathoklds* voyage to Libya and the oalculationa on which it 
was based, see Diod. zz. 1-5 ; Justin, xzii 4, 5 ; and cf. Grote, ch. xoviu, 
and Holm, G. S. ii. 236, 237. Agathoklte amongst other methods for 
raising the necessary funds resorted to some of Dionysios' financial devices. 
He seised the votive offerings of the temples and the jewellery of the women, 
and took possession of the property of orphans, of whom, like Dionysios, he 
seems to have constituted himself the official guardian, promising to repay 
the sums thus taken when the wards came of age. He also levied forced 
loans on the merchants, and contrived a massacre of some of the rich and 
disaffected citizens, followed by«^ confiscation of their goods. He set sail 
from Syracuse with sixty vessels (cf. Polysen. v. 3. 5) and 13,500 soldiers, 
mostly mercenaries. See Died. zz. 11.] 

[* The date of the eclipse as calculated by Baily (Phil. Trans. 181 1, 
p. 238) and other astronomers (cf. Wiese, de Agathocle, p. 95) was Aug. 15, 
310 B.C. Dr. Julius Zech (iiber die wichtigeren Finstermsse, &c., des 
klassischen Alt^rthums, Leipzig, 1853, pp. 34, 47, 48) fize^ the date as 
" Aug. 14, — 309.'' By 309, however, he appears to mean B.a 310 (accord- 
ing to the antiquated French way of reckoning), and thus differs finom 
other astronomers by a day only.] 

[' This is Barth's conjecture (Wanderungen auf den Kustenliindem des 
Mittelmeeres, i. 1 31-133, and see Grote, ch. zcvii.), who supposes that 
Agathoklds landed at a flat inlet west of Cape Bon, where ancient and 
eztensive stone-quarries may still be seen. It is near the eastern entrance 
of the gulf in which Carthage lay. Ct too Haitian, Beise in Tunis, &0., 
ii. 308 seqq., and Tissot, Geographic compare de la Province romaine 
d*Afrique, 174. The modem name is El-Haouria, which appears to occupy 
the site of the Aquilaria of the CSvil Wars (Tissot, 1. 0.).] 

VOL, IV. D d 


cHAP.xn. known in Greek as the Latamiai or stone-quarries ^, some 
^^f^^fif Phoenician name being thus translated into a word so 
thokltein memorable in the topography and history of Syracuse. 
He encamped on a peninsular point, which he fortified 
by drawing a trench from sea to sea^ and drew his ships 
on land. 
B.C. 310. It was no small moment in the history of the world 
when the first European army^ pioneer of so many that were 
to follow^ from the days of Regulus to our own^ set foot on 
the continent from which so many armies had come to lay 
waste European lands and cities. Rome was in the end to 
do the work^ but it was well that the first blow should 
come from Syracuse. Agathokles had done what none had 
done before him^ what^ as far as we know^ no leader of 
Syracuse^ no lord of Syracuse^ had ever dreamed of. He 
stood on the shore of Africa as the conscious avenger of 
Syracuse and Sicily^ as the unconscious champion of 
Europe^ the unconscious teacher of her future champions. 
Well might we wish that such a calling had fallen to one 
more worthy, to HermokratSs or to Timoledn. But it was 
to the tyrant, not to the deliverer, that it fell to lead the 
way on this great enterprise. And, could he but have 
kept his hands clean from fresh crime while that enterprise 
was a-doing, we might have striven, while telling the 
tale of his warfare in Africa, to forget his deeds in Sicily 
before and after. 

He had done, as his historian remarks, a daring deed, 
and he followed it up by one more daring still. With such 
frightful odds against him, rashness might well become 
prudence, rashness at least of that kind which stirs men 
up to the feeling that they have no hope but in their 
own hearts and their own swords. Agathokles would cut 
off his own retreat ; he would make it hopeless for his fol- 
lowers to think of returning except as conquerors. The 

[» Diod. XX. 6.] 

AOATHOELSs BUBNS his ships. 403 

ships of Syracuse had brought them to Africa ; the ships of chap. xii. 
vanquished Carthage should take them back to Sicily. 

The resolve of Agathokles was carried out with much of Sacrifice 
religfious solemnity and somewhat of theatrical display. He ^^ ^^^ ' 
first took his officers into the secret, and found no opposition P®««- 

. . pnonfi. 

on their part. He then sacrificed to the Goddesses of Sicily^ 
to the Mother and her Child^ and called the military 
assembly together ^. Clad in a garment of shining white, 
speaking friendly to all who came immediately in his path, 
the lord of Sjnracuse harangued the invaders of Africa. 
When the Carthaginian fleet was still pursuing them, he had 
vowed to the Ooddesses to light up all his ships with torches 
in their honour^. The patronesses of Sicily had brought 
them safely to the enemy's land ; they must now perform 
the vow. For whatever offerings they made now, the 
Goddesses would repay them, if they strove bravely, an 
hundredfold; for they had caused the victims to foretell 
victory in the warfare which they had undertaken. 

It is not clear whether the somewhat ambiguous words of Barning 

« it 

Agathokles were understood by all his army; but his mean- gj^j g® 
ing was soon made plain enough. A servant brought him 
a blazing torch; another such was given to the captain of 
every trireme. Again calling on the Goddesses, AgathoklSs, 
torch in hand, went on board his own admiral's ship, and 
standing at the stem bade the rest to do as he did. The 
tyrant and his captains, as one man, each set fire to his 
own ship ^; the flames blazed speedily on high ; the trumpets 

[^ For Agathoklds' iacrifice to Ddmdtdr and Kord and the subsequent 
execution of his vow, see Diod. xz. 7 ; and cf. Justin, xxii. 6.] 

[* Diod. XX. 7 ; if^ac rcuV Mxrf xot/<7eus SixcX^av 0€ais A^fJojTpi Kai K6pfQ 

[* lb. ; rSfv btniptrw ris vpoa^veyMv ^fifiivtjv 8$da* i)r Zt^dfuvos, mi rms 
rptijpdpxais dfioiws &wa<Ti vpoarA^as dvaJhwat, rds re $tas iwtKaKifrarOf /ecU 
rrpSrros &pfii^ff€P M r^ vavapx''^ '''P^^PV* ^^^ ^* ^'^ ''^ itpiijvay tcai rots 
AXXoii t6 vapaw\'^<ncm irw«V vopcxfXcvcro. This dedication of the ships 
to the Sicilian Nether Goddesses seems to have been paralleled by an 
earlier episode of Syracusan history. On some Syraousan ooins struck at 

D d a 


cHAP.zn. sounded a war-note; the whole army shouted aloud^ 
^\h**^*^^ praying and vowing for a safe return. The Shophet of 
ships to Carthage on the coast of Sicily had once g^ven his body to 
Goddesses, h^ bumed as an offering to the gods of Canaan. And now the 
lord of Syracuse on the soil of Africa gave the fleet of Syra- 
cuse to be burned as an offering to the Goddesses of Sicily. 
Motiyes There was now no hope for a defeated army; but 

' those for whom Demeter and the Eor£ fought could never 
be defeated. The invaders of Africa must go back as con- 
querors or not at all ; but faithless was he who doubted of 
their going back as conquerors. 

Things did not, as we shall see^ turn out exactly accord* 
ing to these alternatives. And it is added that, beside 
the grander motive that was avowed, Agathokles had other 
and lowlier reasons for getting rid of his ships. With the 
force that he brought, he could not afford to leave a 
detachment to guard them, and to leave them unguarded 
was simply to make a present of them to the enemy ^. 
These more prosaic arguments were perhaps not announced 
to the host in general. But the high-strung enthusiasm 

the time of the sea victory over the Athenians in the Great Harbour 
a design appears which, as I have elsewhere pointed out (Syr. Meds. 131 )» 
clearly refers to the devotion of the naval trophies — in part, no doubt, to 
ships themselves — ^by fire to the Ghthonio Goddess. Upon the type in 
question Persephone in her car is seen holding aloft a lighted torch, towards 
which Nikd flying forward stretches forth an Apkaffrov or I4[>lustre, the 
ornament of the poop of one of the captured vessels. In the present 
instance too, as if foUowing the same ritual procedure, Agathoklds and 
his detains first apply their torches to the stem of the ships (npi^/ov), 
and would naturally have b^un with its projecting ornament or i^Aa<rroir.] 
\} The three practical motives of Agathoklds for his act as given by 
Diod6ros (xz. 7) were, (i) that his soldiers should realise that defeat meant 
annihilation ; (a) that no part of his force should be drawn off to guard 
the ships; (3) that they should not faU into Carthaginian possession. 
Cort^ when with the advice of his captains he destroyed his ships at Vera 
Gruz did so that his troops might know that their only salvation lay in 
God and their own courage, and to be able to employ his seamen for 
military service on land (Bemal Diaa, Historia de 1* Conquista de la 
Nueva Espafia, c. Iviii, lix).] 

darendon^JhBss, Oac^irci. 




(Bf the Editor) 

Scale of Exigliah. Statute Mil«s. 

8 Lon^.Baat of Grtawioh, 


to which the speech and the symbolic action of Agathoklds chap. zn. 
had stirred up his followers soon began to give way. Under 
the fascination of the moment^ all had admired the deed^ 
without stopping to think of the strait in which it left 
them. Now they began to remember where they were^ 
how wide a sea rolled between them and their homes^ and 
their hearts sank again. 

The only way^ their general saw, was to give them March on 
something at once to cheer them^ something in the way of po^ 
victory^ something in the way of plunder. And plunder 
indeed there was easily to be had, plunder such as perhaps 
no other region of the world could have supplied. In the 
immediate territoiy of Carthage war was as little known^ 
the presence of an enemy was as little looked for^ as they 
had been at Sparta till the spell was broken by Epamei- 
ndndas. The march aimed at a town whose Phoenician name 
had^ on Oreek lips^ put on the same shape as the Arkadian 
creation of the great Theban. The Great City — Megale 
Poli9 — was the first object of attack. 

The march lay through a fertile district cultivated to Fertility 
the highest point of the agricultural skill of the time, district. 
It was full of the country-houses^ the gardens and home- 
&rm8, of the richest men of Carthage* There were 
goodly houses with their rich stufE^ stored with the wealth 
of their owners^ gardens and fields well watered with 
artificial streams, and rich with every kind of crop, with 
every tree and plant that served to the enjoyments of 
man. Africa no longer needed to import the wine and 
oil of Akragas; here were vineyards, there were olive- 
groves^, not, we may suppose, of such stunted and un- 

^ Diod. zx. 8 ; 4 8i x^pa 4 iik¥ j{f dft«f A^vros, 4 ^^ ^Amo^por, koL 
rSam iXXeay rw KapniftMv 94ifiipc9v di^irXcav. In ziii. 8i» on the other 
hand (cf. Sicily, ii. 390), he had spoken of the Akragantines exporting 
their wine and oil to Carthage ; o6inf ydp ttar Icc^vovf row x^ovf tiJ( 
Aifi^ vt^vTtvfiivrjt. This last statement refers to the middle of the 
fifth century, bnt that Carthaginian Africa should have been so far behind 


cHAP.xn. heeded growth as we now see in that land, but doubtless 

rivalling the richest fruits of Sicily or of modern Liguria. 

Herds of oxen fed on the pasture-ground; the marshes 

Plunder of hard by nourished troops of horses^. All this wealth, the 

ginian ter- gathering of ages of undisturbed prosperity, lay before the 

ritory. hungry eyes of the soldiers of Agathokles as the spoil 

which was to be the reward of victory. The district 

would seem not to have been systematically plundered on 

the march; such licence might have relaxed discipline 

before a blow had been struck; but enough must have 


been gathered in the mere passage through such a land to 
whet not a little the appetite for more. At last the Great 
City was reached ^. The coming of the invaders was wholly 
unlooked for; the citizens had never seen war, and it 
would almost seem that a garrison was thought needless '. 
Agathokl^ brought up his forces against the walls; the 
town was taken by a sudden assault, and was given up to 
plunder. We can hardly conceive that the surrounding 
district could have any longer escaped. 

Something had thus been done to reward the toils and 
further to raise the hopes of the men who a few days 

the oppodte coast of Sicily in the cultnre of the vine and olive is highly 
improbable^ and from the recent discovery of a vessel with impressed 
oUve^leaves round its border in a Sikel tomb of Mykdnsan date near 
Syracuse (Orsi, Neoropoli Sioula presso Siracusa, 1893, p. ai) it now 
appears probable that olive culture in Sicily goes back at least to the 
twelfth oentury B.C. At the present day this part of the Carthaginian 
ooastland is bare and desolate.] 

\} Diod. XX. 8 ; rd wXrjciov tXtj ^pfi6Zv¥ tinrcay iy€fi€. In the matter 
of horses Northern Africa stiU maintains its Libyan traditions.] 

[* Megalopolis has been identified by Shaw and others with Soliman, 
by Barth with Missua (Sidi-Daoud-en-Noubi), but Tissot (Province romaine 
d'Afrique, 537) rejects both these identifications. He considers that 
Agathoklte in marching on Carthage must have left the impracticable 
Kourbte range on the left and passed through the centre oi the peninsula. 
An " episcopus Meglapditanns " figures among the lists of African bishops, 
but no other mention of Megaldpolis cxicurs.] 

[' Diod. XX. 8 ; rwv (y^ Sid, ri^v &yvoiav inz2 ri)r rw iro\4/My dirtipiatf 
iklyoy inroariarmy xp^^^t «.r A.] 


before thought that they had left hope behind them. But chap.xii. 
they were not to loiter ; they pressed on to reap the spoil March 
of another wealthy Punic town where it is easier to call up th^^on 
their presence than in the unknown Great City. Their course 
must have led them along to the southern shore of the 
Gulf of Tunis, to the city which still keeps the name and 
still deserves the epithet which it bore in the days of 
Agathokl^. White Tunis ^, as it is called in our narrative^ 
whatever it owed its whiteness to then, owes it now to the 
passionate love of whitewash which it shares with the 
other Saracen towns of its neighbourhood^ with Susa and 
with Kairouan. Of its Punic days it contains not a sig^ ; 
of its Roman days we meet with^ we stumble over^ the 
memorials at every step. The Tunis of the days of Aga- 
thokl&9 has vanished ; but the Tunis of the days of C}rprian 
and Gaiseric lives in the columns and capitals^ here lying 
unheeded, there built up by hundreds in the buildings of the 
Saracen city. But the epithet shows that the Tunes against 
which Agathokles marched must have had the same general 
air in the distant view as the Tunis which in the sixteenth 
century bowed to the last crowned and anointed Augustus^ 
and which the later days of the nineteenth have gone far 
to make once more part of the Latin world. Planted on 
the eastern slope of the steep isthmus which divides its 
two lakes, its higher ground looks over the more famous 
of the two^ the lake^ the stagnum of Tunis, home of the 
tall flamingo^ to the thin rim of land, the t€enia of later 
story *, pierced by the narrow neck which joins the inner 

\} rbv Af v«dy Ti^ra Mokodfuyov, See above, p. 96, note a.] 
[' In an article on Tunis in "The Speaker" of April la, 1890, 
Mr. Freeman speaks of the projected destruction of ** the low and slender 
ridge of land which parts the Gulf of Tunis from the Lake of Tunis. In 
the last Roman siege of Carthage we hear of the tania ; in the African 
warfiue of Charles Y. a great part is played by La OoUtta, That narrow 
rim of land is the tania and La Goleiia is strictly the narrow channel by 
which the t€Bnia is pierced, furnishing the only means of approach from 
the Gulf to the Lake.**] 


oHAP.xii. lake to the open bay beyond. And in looking on that 
Tunis Mid fj^^^ j^^ Qf Jau^j ^nd on the neighbouring shore of the 

lake^ men then looked on Carthage. They looked on its 
hills, on its buildings, doubtless gleaming white in the sun 
of Africa, on the mighty threefold wall, on the Bozrah, 
home, BO legend said, of Didd, where the holy place of Saint 
Lewis has supplanted the holy place of Esmoun ^. They 
looked on the further hill beyond the walls, divided now 
between the saints of Islam and a prince of the Roman 
Church, on the furthest hill of all, with its sides honey- 
combed with Punic graves, perhaps with some burrowings 
. even older than the days of Punic settlement^. From the 
high ground within the present inner wall of Tunis, which 
likely enough represents the extent of the Punic city, 
Agathokles might look on the goal of his journey, on 
the richest city of Phoenicia and the world, as a prey which 
lay near indeed to the invaders^ hands. A strange war- 
fare indeed it was, when at the same moment the hosts 
of Carthage threatened Syracuse and the hosts of Syracuse 
threatened Carthage. 
Tanie We have no details of the taking of Tunis, not even so 

Agatho- much as the few words which record the taking of the 
Great City. We hear only that, by some means or other, 
either by storm or by surrender, the town came into the 
hands of Agathokles ^. But there must be some confusion 

\} Mr. Freeman in an article on Carthage, written on the spot (see 
Historical Essays, vol. iv. p. i seqq.), refers to the dedication of a new Latin 
metropolitan church here. ** The Bozrah of Dido, the royal seat of Oaiseric, 
the official dwelling of the Proconsuls of Rome, is now the hill of Saint 
Lewis. It was already crowned with bis chapel when France was a foreign 
power ; since the political supremacy of France has in some sort restored 
Africa to the Latin world it ban been further crowned by the metropolitan 
church of the primate of Algiers and Carthage." Op. cit. p. 1 8.] 
[^ J>febel Khdwi^ihe hollow hill, known aa the Catacomb hill.] 
[' Diod. XX. 8 ; ix^ip^Mraro rijy w6\iv, Dioddros makes Tun^ distant 
2,ooo stadia from Carthage — a patent error. It waa only about 120 stadia, 
or 14 miles, from Carthage ; Polyb. i. 67.] 



in the story when our guide goes on to tell us that the ohap.xh. 
soldiers wished to occupy the two towns which had been A^*^*^ 
taken^ as store-houses for their plunder, but that Agathokles, Tunis, 
following the same policy as that of the burning of the 
ships^ destroyed the two towns and encamped in the open 
country^. What happened is not easy to say; at Tunis 
at least it is certain that he could not even have slighted the 
walls ; for somewhat later in the story Tunis appears as a 
walled town^ held by Agathokl^ and besieged by a Cartha- 
ginian force ^. That somewhat later he had a camp outside 
the town appears from the same account ; but for that there 
may have been many reasons. Discipline might be relaxed . 
in quarters within the city; and it may be that it was 
expedient to spare the people of Tunis as much as might 
be. Carthage was not loved either by African subjects or 
by Phoenician allies. We shall presently see some towns 
joining the invaders out of sheer hatred of their harsh 
mistress^. Tunis too may well have been one of those 
disaffected towns with whose inhabitants it was the policy 
of the invader to keep on good terms. Near to Carthage 
as they were, they may have been well pleased to have the 
protecting camp of Syracuse pitched near their walls, without 
receiving the motley host of Agathokl^ into their own 

*''Agathokl& now made Tunis his head-quarters^ 

[^ But, as Melteer (Oeach. d. Kuth«ger, i. 371) points out, — the state- 
ments are not neoessaiOj inconsiBtent^ — ^it is unlikely that Agathoklte 
oould have found time to destroy the city walls, however muoh these houses 
may have been destroyed by fire within. It does not therefore seem 
necessary to suppose with Holm (6. S. ii. 477) and others that there were 
two Tunises ; one distinguished from the other by the epithet of ** White."] 

[* Biod. XX, 17.] [* lb. ; see below, p. 417.] 

* From Story of Sicily, pp. 243, 244. 

\_* Tunds (of. Grote, oh. zoyii.) was the natural starting-point of an 
enemy in making an attack on Oarthage. The reyolted Libyans in 396 B. 0., 
B^gulus in his first inrasion of Carthaginian territory, the rerolted mer- 
cenaries and native Africans at the dose of the first Punic War, made 
it successively their base of operations.] 


CHAP. xn. throughout the war. The Carthaginians made all things 
ready for def ence, and put two generals, Hanndn and Bomil- 
kar, at the head of their army. This was on the strange 
ground that they were personal enemies^ and would therefore 
each try to excel the other ^. Hanndn was a brave soldier^ 
and did his duty ; Bomilkar was already suspected of aiming 
at tyranny, and was perhaps in league with Agathokl^. 

Defeat of A battle followed^ between Tunis and Carthage ^, which 

the Car- 

thaginians. reversed the fortunes of the fight by the Himeras. The 
Greeks won a great victory^ putting the Sacred Band of 
Carthage to flight, and taking the Punic camp ^. The whole 

\} Diod. XX. 10. Grote shrewdly observes on this (oh. xcvii.), " What 
is more probable, each had a party sufficiently strong to prevent the 
separate election of the other.**] 

[* For an account of the battle, see Diod. xx. 10-13, and op. Grote, 
ch. xcviL, Holm, G. S. ii. 239, 240. The Gartha^mans put into the field 
40,000 foot soldiers, 1,000 cavalry, and a,ooo war^chaiiots. Agathoklds 
had to oppose them a force of only 13,500. It consisted of 3,500 Syra- 
cusans, 3,000 Greek mercenaries, 3,000 Samnite, Etruscan, and Gaulish 
mercenaries, 2,500 troops not more nearly described, 1,000 chosen boplites 
with Agathoklds* guard, and 500 archers and slingers. To make a show of 
a reserve he is said to have equipped his ships* crews with sticks and the 
leathern cases of shields, and to have revived the drooping courage of his 
troops, in the face of such odds, by letting fly a number of small owls which 
he had collected for the purpose. The birds of Ath^nd perched on the 
warriors* shields and helmets and were taken as an omen of victory. How 
Agathoklds could have managed to effect what Dioddros describes is not 
easily inteUigible, and Schubert (Op. cit. p. iii) sets the whole story down 
to the invention of Douris. A piece of numismatic evidence has indeed been 
taken to show that some omen of victory was actually drawn from owls on this 
occasion. On a gold stater struck by Agathoklds some time after his victory 
of 310 and bearing for the first time his name in the form ATAOOKAEOS, 
though stiU without the kingly title, an owl appears before the winged 
figure of Pallas Promachos (Imhoof-Blumer, Num. Zeitschr. iii. PL v. fig. a, 
and p. 43 ; Head, Coinage of Syracuse, 46, 47, but see below, p. 488)-; and 
the same emblem ^>pears beside the head of Athdnd on some of his silver 
staters. It is possible therefore that, though, in the fonn handed down to us, 
the story has doubtless been worked up, there is some substratum of truth 
in it. Grote (1. c.) compares Louis Napol^n*s eagle.] 

p The Carthaginian Sacred Band bore the brunt of the action under 


open country was now in the hands of Agathokl^. The chap. xii. 
Carthaginians conid only keep themselves shut up in their ^[^^ 
city K Their consciences smote them that they had neglected ^^j^J^' 
the due honours of their gods. So they sent sacred em- ^^^^><** 
bassies to their metropolis Tyre^, and caused five hundred 
children of the chief houses of Carthage to pass through 
the fire to Moloch \" 

the Shophet Hanndn. His fidl was the mgnaX for the treaaonable retreat 
of his colleague Bomilkar with the other wing, thus leaving the Sacred 
Band unsupported. The loss of the Carthaginians was yariously given 
(Died. XX. 13) frum one to six thousand, while Agathoklds is said to have 
lost only 200y according to Dioddros ; according to Justin (xxii 6) a ,000. 
Among the spoils of the Carthaginian camp were ao,ooo manacles (no 
doubt an exaggerated number), which they had brought with them to bind 
their prisoners. Trophies of a like kind were taken from the Spanish 
ALrmada, and one of them is stiU preserved in the Ashmolean Museum at 

\} IHod. XX. 13; *Aya$oK\ifS Kapxijfioyiovs vapoX^ois ruerjffas rtixtp^it 
awtiXty. Agathoklds (Justin, xxii. 6) encamped only five miles from 

[' They sent g^reat offerings — notably gold shrines from their temples— 
to the Tyrian Hdraklte or Melkart (Died. xx. 14.] 

[' Moloch, the Phoenician Milk, — so frequent an element in Carthaginian 
personal names, — is here given by Mr. Freeman in Biblical language, as 
the equivalen t of Dioddros' Kp^ot. Milk » king, and is used as an appellative 
of the chief God of various Semitic tribes. The use of this title is in all 
these eases connected with the sacrifice of children, and it is natural, 
therefore, to identify the Kronos of Diod6ros with the Carthaginian 
divinity in whcee name the same appellative forms an integral part — 
namely, Melkart (n'fp "| So)"'* the king of the dty" — ^in other words, 
Baal'Chammftn, the chief Grod of Carthage, whose name is regularly invoked 
in her votive inscriptions. On some of the votive Carthaginian 9tela (cf. 
Baudissin, Jahve et Moloch, p. 45) Baal-Chamm&n has the title " King 
of Eternity.*' The inscriptions of Roman Africa, however, supply the 
most conclusive grounds for identifying the chief Carthaginian divinity 
Melkart or Baal-Chamm&n with the "Kronos" of Dioddroa. On these 
he iM regularly translated by ** Satumus.** So too Servius (ad JEsl i. 729) 
writes, '< Satumus lingua Punioa Bal deus didtur;** and we have the 
direct statement of Eupolemos (ap. Euseb. praep. ev. 9. 17), BafivKewiovt 
ydp A^YCir wp&roi^ y€ifia9ai B^Aor fty cZriu Kp&vw, At ByUos indeed, 
and perhaps elsewhere, as may be gathered from the euhemeristic account 
of Philo, Kronos seems to have been identified rather with £1, << the &ther 
of Baal and son of Heaven ; " but Eduard Meyer does not seem justified in 


CRAP. xn. Moloch was thus appeased, and the guilty conscience of 

the commonwealth of Carthage had found its absolution ^. 

Phoenician craft then set itself to devise the means of 

The brazen repairing defeat by claiming an imaginary victory. Car- 

^ai£^ thage had after all something in the shape of Syracusan 

]sM ships trophies. When Asnithokles burned his ships, their brazen 

shown as -^ ° ^ * ' 

trophies by prows werc left behind, and the fleet which had chased 
ginians. him in vain to his landing-place was at least able to carry 
off these relics and to take them to Carthage '. There an 
use was found for them. Messengers were sent to Hamilkar 
before Syracuse with two stories^ one for the world at 
large^ the other for the private ear of the general. They 
carried with them the Syracusan prows, and they were to 
show them as visible proof of the great victory which they 
claimed for Carthage. The invaders of Africa had been 
smitten by land and sea ; fleet and army had been swept 
away; here was all that was left of them^. Hamilkar 
was to hear another tale. To him the truth was to be 
told ; he was to be bidden at once to send help to Africa; 

his opinion (Art. El in Roecher's Lezioon) that at Carthage too the same 
identification is required. Neither does the fikct that Melkart in another 
aspect appears as the Tynan Hdraklds by any means exclude the further 
equation with Kronos. The Sicilian Ras Melkart, as we haye seen, is 
Hdrakleia — ^but the Hdrakleia of Minds. And Minds takes us back to 
the grimmer notion of "the King." One account of the Cretan cult 
(Porph. De Abst. ii. 5 a) makes the Kourdtes sacrifice the children to 

\} It was said (Diod. zx. 14) that of late Carthaginian citisens in 
offering their vows to Kronos had tried to palm off on him children not their 
own whom they had privily bought and fed up (9/>l^arr«r) for the purpose. 
Two hundred children were now chosen from the noblest Carthaginian honsesi 
and three hundred besides, who were suspected of having been saved by 
this sinful substitution, gave themselves up, or were given up by their 
parents, for the sacrifice (Diod. L c, and cf. Festus ap. Lactantiuni, Inst. 
Div. i. 21 ; Justin, xviii. 6. la ; and see Grote, ch. xcvii.). The statue of 
" £jt>nos ** was of bronze, with his hands, palms upwards, stretched towards 
the ground, so that the victims fell off them into the fiery pit before him 
(l/rTCTvurclrr rdr X'*/"^ hirrhs iyKMXtfUvas kwl ri^ y^r, Sfcrt rdy kitiTtBkma 
rw trai^onf iatoKvXituBai KoUt iriwrtiv tU n X^f""^ irXQ/>cr infp6s). 

[« Diod. XX. 15.] [» lb.] 


to save Cartbage was a greater object than even to capture obaf. xii. 

The wile succeeded for a time ; dismay was spread Dismay at 
to all Syracuse ; Antandros and his counsellors, hardly ^"^*^ 
knowing what to believe, dreaded before all things 
a movement of the disaffected party in the city. The Exile of 
measures that they took were swift and stem, but they 
were mild compared with some of the doings of their 
master. Where he might have slaughtered, they only 
banished. Besides others who were suspected on their own 
account, the friends and kinsfolk of the exiles with Deino- 
krates, men, women, and children, to the number, it is said, 
of eight thousand, were at once driven from Syracuse^. 
A pathetic picture is given of their sorrow, their wailings, 
their mourning for the supposed dead, their clinging to 
hearths and altars at which they were not allowed to 
linger. They went forth, almost like the multitudes which 
a hundred years earlier had gone forth from Akragas and 
from 6ela. But they were better oS than the useless 
mouths that were sent forth from Rouen when King Henry 
of England lay before its walls. Hamilkar gave them Exiles 
protection and shelter. Mildness was throughout his policy, ^^i^ by 
and these banished ones were in some sort sufferers in the Hamilkar. 
cause of Carthage. The exact spot of his encampment 
at this stage is not marked ; it was clearly not far from 
Syracuse, but not immediately under any part of its long 
line of defence. He now marched his army nearer to 
the city. He hoped that the dismay caused by the false 
message and the lack of any seeming help would work on 
the minds of its defenders. From his new position he 
sent a message to Antandros and his colleagues in com- 
mand, calling on them to surrender Syracuse, and promising 
safety for themselves ^. 

[^ The aocomit of their ezpulsioD and reception by Hamilkar is given 
in Diod. xx. 15.] [* Diod. xx. 16.] 


CHAP. XII. We are carried back to the memorable day when Gon- 

Syracusans gylos sailed into the Little Harbour just in time to 

mons to hinder the carrying out of the vote to treat with Nikias ^. 

Buirender. Antandros, Erymndn, and their fellows met in council. 

The tyrant's brother^ a man, we are told^ who had no share 

in the tyrant's energy, was for surrender «. The mercenary 

from Ait61ia had a stouter heart. His words won over all 

the assembled officers to hold out till they should at least 

more distinctly hear the truth ^. Hamilkar, baffled of his 

hope of marching into Syracuse without further effort^ 

brought up his engines for an assault on such parts of 

the wall as they could reach ^. But the true tale of all 

that had been done in Africa was already on the road. 

Straightway after his victory Agathokles had built two 

Vessel vessels of thirty oars. One of these he manned with his 

thok^ ^6s^ rowers under Nearchos^ one of his most trusted friends, 

brings ^^^^ ^j^^j^ them take the news to Syracuse. Winds and 

news of his ^ '' 

victory. wavcs wcre in their fetvour, and on the night of the fifth 
day of their voyage they were close off the harbour of 
Syracuse. Thinking their toils over, they put on wreaths 
and sang the psBan of thanksgiving, and with the morning- 
light they began to row towards the city. But the 
Punic guard-ships were ware of them and gave chase. 
The space between pursuers and pursued was small; it 
became a simple trial of rowing between Greek and Phoe- 
nician ^. If anything could stir the hearts and arms of 

[* See Sicily, iii. 237 seqq.] 

[' Diod. XX. 16 ; &v camytpot <pv(r«i /ttd rrjt rdScA^O T6K/irjs teai wpd^iws 
ivavrlay txui^ Jkifitaiv,'] 

[• lb. ; ^MKopT^^iv lUxpii Ak ir^virrai rdXrfBii,'] [* lb.] 

[' lb.; 6.-^ rrfi tlp^aias kylr€To. Schubert (op. cit. 122) regards the 
"rowing-match*' and what precedes it aa a bit of colouring introduced by 
the inyentive art of Douris. Dioddros* account of the crew putting on 
wreaths and singing pseans at the momeut when their natural object would 
have been to escape the notice of the Carthaginian guardships in the early 
dawn is certainly absurd. The whole is little more than a repetition of 
what has been already said in ch. 6. There too we have the sudden 


either side to yet greater efforts^ it was that, as on the day chaf.xii. 
of the last fight of Athens and Syracuse in the Great ^^^ ^^' 
Harbour^ the besieged multitude within the walls and the Punic 
Punic army without were both gazing at the race. Unable fhips. 
as yet to give any help to their toiling countrymen^ the 
men of Syracuse stood ready with darts in their hands^ 
and meanwhile stirred up the crew to yet greater efforts 
by their cheering voices. But helpers were not lacking to 
the city. On the elder day Herakles had fought for Syra- 
cuse^ and some one or other of the gods of the land were 
near at this moment also. ThePhoenician ship was close upon 
the Greek, when all Syracuse raised one voice of prayer 
and vows to the heavenly powers^. The prow of the 
pursuing vessel was dashing hard against the stem of the 
chase, when its onward course brought it within reach 
of missiles from the shore, and a well-aimed shower of 
Syracusan darts disabled the Phoenician and brought in 
the Greek bark in safety. Men flocked to the shore to 
hear the good news that had been brought to them by so 
narrow a chance and by such gallant striving. Syracuse 
now for the first time heard the &te of her daring lord 
and of his army. For the first time in the world's history EUtion of 
Hellas had smitten Canaan on the soil of Libya, and all ^t newT^' 
thought of yielding to Canaan on the soil of Sicily passed 
away from the heart of Hellas. 

But the Punic leader before Syracuse, the victor by the 
banks of Himeras, had a ready wit to choose his times 
and his ways of attack. He deemed that in the full joy 
of the glad tidings, when the whole city was pressing to 
hear a tale such as none had ever heard before, he had a 
good chance of finding some unguarded point in the long 

purauit of the Carthaginian ships at dawn, and the race (itffvtptl nvts 
dywyiarat) to the shore. Only the spectators, so theatrically arranged in 
ihe second episode, are wanting to complete the parallel.] 

{} Died. XX. i6 ; ol ite ttjs v6K€ws dSwarovrrts fiovfBity rots $€<hs ijvxwro 
w€pi T^i aoftrffnai rw iKarairXc<$rrcuv.] 


CHAP. XII. line of wall which girded in the city*. We hear nothing 
2sa!alt^" of the engines which he had so lately brought ; the 
Syracuse blow to be struck is of the old sort of Lamachos and 
D&nosthenes ; only Lamachos and Demosthenes^ when they 
had gained their footing on the hill^ had not found the 
wall of Dionysios to be scaled. At some pointy hardly a 
point so distant as that chosen by the Athenian leaders, at 
some one perhaps of the less steep paths on the southern 
side^ a body of the choicest men in the Punic army was sent 
up with their scaling-ladders to make their way into Syra- 
cuse. A place was found which the sentinels immediately 
entrusted with its care had &iled to guard. The barbarians 
crept up warily and got possession of the whole space 
between two towers. But the watch that paced the whole 
round of the wall soon came near ^ A fight began ; before 
others could come from the Carthaginian army to give 
help to the endangered climbers^ the attempt was defeated ; 
some were slain^ some were thrust down the hill-side from 
the battlements \ The day that brought the news of the 
victory in Africa beheld another of those many memorable 
hours when Sjrracuse has driven back invaders, Greek or 
barbarian, from her walls. 

This short but stirring campaign of Hamilkar is told us 
without any of those distinct topographical signs to which 
we are used in warfare around Syracuse, and to which we 
shall come again with our next recorded fighting in Sicily. 
Hamilkar draws near to Syracuse ; he draws nearer to 
the wall ; he makes an attempt to scale it. We are left^ 
however, to guess at the exact place of his encampment, 
and the exact place of his assault. But we instinctively 
picture the camp of Hamilkar on the usual camping- 

\} Diod. xz. 1 6 ; irwoXafiiv cTku fUpos ri roO nixovs dipvkaierwJ] 
[^ lb. ; mt iTxcd^ oiutS/v /it<rcimjfiyior Ijlhj iear€ikri<f>6rvy, 1} icard ro 
cvrrfits iipoUa voLpaytwoiUvti Karwv^fft^ 

[' lb. ; oti 8* (Iird rw ^ir<i\£c«ir Mtrcx^^tacu'.] 


ground, of which we have heard so often and of which we chap. xii. 
shall hear so often again^ in the neighbourhood of the 
Oljmpieion and the Anapos. Wherever it was, he deemed 
that it was no longer safe to hold it. He obeyed the 
orders of his government bj sending five thousand men to 
the defence of Carthage^ and for some months made no 
more attempts at a renewed siege of Syracuse. 

Meanwhile the lord of Syracuse and his army were still Agathoklds 
in Africa^ and in full possession of the open country round pii^sM^^ 
Carthage. From his head-quarters at Tunis, he marched ^°^^ 
hither and thither as he thought good. ^' He took by force 
the places round Carthage ^/^ a vague phrase which makes 
us wish for names and details. But the process is dis- 
tinguished from that of winning many towns, which, in the 
case of one starting from so near a point as Tunis, seems 
to imply that by " the places round Carthage " we are to 
understand places very near Carthage indeed. To besiege 
Carthage in any strict sense was not in the power of Aga- 
thokles. He had no fleet to attack her by sea j he seemingly 
had no engines to bring to bear upon the vast walls which 
fenced her in on the land side. But Carthage, like Syracuse, 
had her outposts, and it might well suit the purposes of 
Agathokles to occupy any of them, as so many invaders had 
occupied, and were yet to occupy, the Polichna of Syracuse. 
One hardly knows whether one is justified in conceiving 
that he may even have held the hill of Cape Carthage and 
the hill of the tombs, and that the defenders of the Bozrah 
may have looked out on Greek enemies holding a height 
loftier than their own. While Carthage was in any case 
hard pressed, Agathokles received the surrender of many 
towns, some of which came over to him through fear of his 
power, and some out of hatred towards the Carthaginians K 
Of these towns we would gladly know the names, the 

[^ Diod. zx. 17 ; rd wtpl ri^v Kapxri^mm x^^P^ *<t^ xpAros 9^.] 
[' lb. ; As 8i 8ta t6 irpds Kapx'i^^^^*^ fuaw,'\ 

VOL. IV. E e 


oHAP.xii. positions^ the exact relations towards the ruling city, and 
the character of the population of each. When we see how 
little love there was between Carthage and her neighbours 
even of her own race^ how slight and easily broken was the 
tie that bound them to her^ we wonder the more at the 
wide-spread power which rested on so small a basis of 
physical strength at home, at the perfect peace, the unbroken 
prosperity, which the great city so long enjoyed, while there 
were so many enemies at her gates ready to turn against 
her the first moment that they could do so without danger. 
Agathoklds Carthage was thus straitened and harassed, but not be* 
oamp near sieged. The object of Agathokles was to straiten and harass 
^^^"' her yet further, by winning over, whether by force or per- 
suasion, as many as might be of her subject towns. Our 
narrative now becomes a little clearer and more detailed, 
though there still is much to wish for. Agathokles had 
now done all that his force enabled him to do in the im- 
mediate neighbourhood of Carthage ; it was time to turn 
his arms to more distant points. To preserve what he had 
already won, he made a fortified camp near Tunis ^, doubt- 
less on the side towards Carthage, though the hills on the 
other side, looking down on Tunis and both her lakes, must 
have been at least held as outposts. He left a force to guard 
the camp, and struck south-eastward, towards the cities on 
the sea to the south of his first landing-place. The first 
that he reached was another Carthage, another Naples, a 
Capture of Nea Polis, which he took by storm, but dealt gently, we 
are told, with those whom he had overcome^. He then 
went on to a better-known spot, one which has a name in 
latei^history, and whose look at the present moment may 
not be so very unlike what it was when Agathokles drew 
near to it. Hadrumetum now, by a strange coincidence of 
sounds, bears the same name which Shushan the Palace 

{} Diod. xz. 17 ; irap€fjifio\ifir wKtfclov roO T^mjrot 6xu/wffdfji«ros.'] 

[^ lb. ; ^i\ay$pinrwi ixp^fraro roTf x^P^*^^*^* Neapolis is now NebeL] 


bore on the lips of the old Greek and which the Secasia chap. xu. 
of Pippin^B Lombards bears on the lips of the modern 
Italian. To the Arab and to the Italian Hadrumetum is Hadni- 
now Susa ; its French masters have^ after their manner^ cut 
it short to Sou89e. Sloping down from the high ground 
above to the eastern sea, girded by its white Saracenic walls 
standings in true oriental fashion, free from suburbs, with 
its Arab Kasba on the height and its half-European haven 
at the foot, Susa may now pass as a model of an oriental 
town placed on a site which must have always compelled it 
to have some dealings with the European as well as the 
barbarian world. What Susa is now, Hadrumetum may well, 
in general effect, have been then ; only its houses of Baal 
were hardly marked by such towers as are attached to the 
mosques of Susa and which we could almost conceive trans- 
planted to serve as the bell-towers of Romanesque churches 
in Christendom. From the conquest of Nea Palis, easily 
taken at the first assault, Agathokl^s went on to the longer 
business of an attack on Hadrumetum. 

We hear that he besieged the city; yet at Hadrumetum, Besieged 
as at Carthage, he had neither fleet nor engines for a siege kUsT^ 
in the strictest sense. But he was presently strengthened 
by the coming of a native ally who was, as usual, ready to 
help the newly-come strangers against the strangers whom 
he knew too well. A prince described as Elymas Kiiig of 
the Libyans — ^he sounds like an epSuymos from north-western 
Sicily — came to share in the siege of Hadrumetum as an 
ally of Agathokles *. This union of enemies evidently 

\} Diod. XX. 1 7 ; '£At;/iay rhv fiaaiXia rSiv Aifivwv c Is aviiiMxia» vpofftkA* 
fi€To, The coincidence of (he name with that of the Elymi and of Elymos 
the son of Anchiadi is probably not accidental. On the one hand, Elymian 
traditions (see Sicily, i. 543) connected their migration with the Libyan 
coast ; on the other hand, Libyan tribes, UIlc the Maxyes (the Mashouasha 
of Egyptian monuments), traced a Trojan descent (Herod, iv. 191). At 
the time, too, of the great invasion of Egypt the Libyan tribes appear in 
dose alliance with members of the Thraco- Phrygian race.] 



CHAP. xii. struck no small fear intx) the hearts of the defenders of 
Gartluigi- Carthage. Their course of action was his own on a smaller 
Sona^Mt scale. They left Hadrumetum to defend itself^ as Aga- 
TuDis. thoklfis had left Syracuse, and set forth with the whole 
force that was then at their command to the attack of the 
Greek head-quarters at Tunis. Along the flat ground by 
the north of the lake, the Carthaginian army, supplied with 
engines for a siege, marched to the Syracusan camp, and 
were able to get possession of it. But the town was held 
against them, either by its own citizens or by a Syracusan 
garrison, and the army of Carthage had to besiege a Punic 
city within sight of their own walls, as if it had been Akra- 
gas or Himera. The engines were brought up against the 
walls of Tunis, and many fierce assaults were made on 
them ^. The news of the loss of his camp and of the danger 
of Tunis was brought to Agathokles in his leaguer before 
Hadrumetum. He did not raise the siege or send any force 
to the relief of Tunis. He first tried a stratagem. With 
a body of attendants and a few soldiers he went to a high 
place among the hills which could be seen alike from Hadru- 
metum and from Tunis. It is for Alpine climbers to say 
where among the mountains whose sharp outlines form such 
a feature in the landscape to the south of the lake of Tunis, 
the point, if there be any, best suited to such a purpose may 
Alleged be found. On his chosen height Agathokles caused many 
of Agathih gi'eat fires to be kindled by night ^. The blaze was seen on 
*• both sides, by the besiegers of Tunis and by the besieged of 

Hadrumetum. Fear seized on both. The Carthaginian force 
at Tunis deemed that the whole Greek army was coming 
against them from Hadrumetum. The defenders of Hadru- 
metum deemed that the whole Greek army was coming 
against them from Tunis. From Tunis the Punic force 
fled with speed back to Carthage, leaving their warlike 

[} T>iod. XX. 17; tJ ir^ct 8J fofxoy^s vpoffayayvurtt, aw€x^s irpocBo?idts 

kwoiowro,] [' lb.] 



engines behind them. In Hadrumetum the spirits of the chap.xil 
besieged gave way, and they surrendered their city to SuTrender 

Agathokles. metum.''' 

We can only tell this story as we find it. But there is 
no reason to doubt that Hadrumetum was taken and that 
Tunis was relieved. Agathokles went on with his career of 
conquest. From Hadrumetum, won by capitulation^ he went 
on to Thapsos, which he took by storm ^. He went through Thapsos 
aU the towns of that region, taking some by force, winning '*»™"^ 
others by persuasion, ti]l in the end more than two hundred 
African posts were in his hands. No such success had ever 
before fallen to the lot of any Greek captain in Western 
warfare. The lord of Syracuse seemed to be winning a new 
realm for Hellas ; at any rate he was striking such a blow 
as had never before been struck against the most dangerous 
enemy of Hellas. 

The coast of the immediate Carthaginian territory, at all Agathokl^ 
events the coast to the south-east of Carthage, had thus been inland, 
torn away from Carthaginian dominion. Agatliokles now 
determined to turn his arms inland^ For this course his 
motives are not very clear, unless he hoped to win more 
Africui allies to follow the example of Elymas. We can 
hardly give Agathokles credit for the spirit of discovery 
which certainly mingled with the ambition of Alexander, 
and which led him to go through a large part of Asia in 
the character of an armed explorer. Whatever his motive, 
his design of inland warfare lost him his Libyan ally. 
Elymas now turned against him \ Still he set forth, and 
marched for several days. 

Meanwhile the forces sent by Hamilkar from Sicily cartbaffi- 
to the help of Carthage had reached Africa ». Their ^j^^;^ 
coming and the &lling away of Elymas from the Greek ^rom Sicily, 
side filled the Carthaginians with new hopes of overcoming 

\} Diod. XX. 17 ; e6fpc¥ c2Xc mrd Kfi&ras,'] 
t» lb. 18.] [> lb.] 


CRAP. XII. tbe invader. With the troops from Sicily and such 
other forces as they had in the city^ the Carthaginian 
leaders took the opportunity of the absence of Aga- 
thokles again to lay siege to Tunis. Some of the posts 
which the invader had taken were also won back again. 
Return of Letters from Tunis carried the news to Agathokles ^. He 
to^anL. *^ ^^^ turned back. When he was about five-and-twenty 
miles from Tunis^ he halted. He had somewhat of a strata- 
gem to practise this time also, of a kind exactly opposite 
to his late bonfires on the mountains. He forbade his 
soldiers to light any fires at all at the place of their halt. 
When night came^ he began his march afresh, and with the 
dawn of day he came upon the Carthaginians before Tunis^ 
who in no way looked for his coming. The camp which he 
had made for the defence of Tunis was now in the hands of 
its besiegers. But in the belief that the enemy was far 
away, confidence had risen, discipline and effort had relaxed. 
When the Greek army this time came near to Tunis, some 
of the nominal besiegers were foraging, others were wander- 
ing outside the camp without order. The attack and the 
Defeat of victory were sudden and swift. The Carthaginians were 
nians^^' driven back with the loss of two thousand slain, and of 
many who became prisoners to the Greeks^. Elymas too 
had to pay his forfeit for the desertion of his ally, 
and of The Libyan prince ventured to meet the Syracusan 
* ^*°*' army in a pitched battle, of which we should be glad 
to be able to draw some clearer picture. How far had 
the subjects of a Libyan prince, the ally or vassal of Car- 
thage, learned any of the arts of civilized warfare ^ ? All 

[} Diod. xz. 1 8 ; fiifiXttupopvy aiir^ iropayrytvtifiLkiwv dird rev T^i^p'or.] 


[' It must however be borne in mind that, owing to tbeir contact with 
Egypt, the Libyan tribes, whose physical characteristics proclaim them to 
have been of European stock, had early attained a considerable measure 
of civilization. The Libyan mtos taken by Barneses ILL were in some 
respects superior to those of the West Asiatic peoples ; their rich silver oma- 


that we know is that the followers of Elymas could not orap. xn. 
stand against Greeks and European barbarians trained in 
Oreek discipline. Agathokl6s had the victory^ and Elymas^ 
with a large part of his army, T«« slain 1. 

§ 6. Sdmiliars oisanlt on Syracuse, 

It was perhaps not very long after these successes that 
a ghastly trophy was brought to him which told of another 
successful defence of Syracuse against Punic attacks^ while 
Syracusan armies were so closely pressing Carthage and 
her power in her own land. Some months had now passed b.o. 309. 
since the Punic assault on Syracuse which had been driven 
back on the day when the good news was brought from 
Africa. Hamilkar had not been idle. We are told vaguely 
that^ having now brought all other places into his hands, 
he determined to lead his whole force to an attack on 
Syracuse ^ When we hear that the Syracusan exile 
Deinokrat^ was in his company we seem to gain some Hamilkar 
further light on his course. We may suppose that his head- S^okii- 
quarters were still at Akragas, and that, in fellowship with ^^"- 
the banished Syracusans^ a body whose number had been 
greatly enlarged by the action of Antandros and Erymndn, 
he had been carrying on the work of winning the inland 
towns from the allegiance of Agathokles. The time was 
now come for the great enterprise. It is plain that it was 
planned and carried out on a greater scale and with a more 
serious purpose than the campaign of the year before. It was 
a general enterprise of the enemies of Agathokles, Greek 
and barbarian. Hamilkar is said to have commanded 

menta and bronze vesaela speak of great oomparatiye advance in metaUnrgy 
as early as the dose of the fourteenth century B.C. Already at that 
early date they were capable of maritime enterprise and had wide political 
oonuezioni. The later contact with PhoenioiaDS and the Greeki of Kyr6nd 
must also have left its mark. It is difficult to see on what grounds such 
barbarism should be imputed to them in the text.] 
[> Diod. zx. 39.] 




of HamU- 
kar and 
B. c. 309. 

a handred and twenty thousand foot and five thousand 
horse \ That those five thousand consisted lajrgely of the 
Greek horsemen of Sicily, Alu»gantines and homeless 
Syracusans^ we may infer from the post of their captain 
being held by the Syracusan Deinokrates. The foot too 
marched in two divisions, a Greek and a barbarian 
phalanx ^, an arrangement which certainly does not prove 
the Greek foot to have reached the number of sixty 
thousand, but which certainly marks them as an important 
division of the army. We are tempted to look on the 
campaign as wrought by the hand of Hamilkar under the 
guidance of Deinokrates. And this time the topography, 
a topography with which we have got familiar in many 
campaigns, is now clearly marked enough. It is a well- 
known path that we have again to tread; but each time 
that we tread it there is something that marks ofiE that 
time from the other times before and after it. 

The special characteristic of this campaign would seem 
to be its shortness. We have been used to Nikias and 
Himilk6n abiding through many ups and downs of fortune 
in the low ground by the Great Harbour. Hamilkar's own 
attempt of the last year, if it involved no such lingering 
as theirs, was something more than sa afEair of to-day and 
to-morrow. But this great assault, evidently the outcome 
of no little scheming on the part of Greeks and Phoenicians, 
comes down as suddenly as the lightning-flash and passes 
by as quickly. Hamilkar had full command by sea ; we 
are not directly told that the Punic fleet was in the Great 
Harbour; it at least kept the mouths of both the harbours, 
and hindered food of every kind from going into Syracuse 
by sea. By land he marched, laying waste the fields of the 
citizens and subjects of Syracuse as he went^ His camp 

[" lb. 39.] 
This looks as if it 

P Diod. xz. 30.] 

[' lb. ; rovf 0' M r^s X^P"^ KapmnHfs teara^tipas, 
had been early summer.] 


was pitclied; or was to be pitched^ where so many camps obap. xii. 
had been pitched from the dajrs of Hippokrat^s onwards. 
If it did not^ like that of Himilkdn, actually take in the 
precinct of Olympian Zeos, it was at least hard by; it 
must have taken in the profane ground of Polichna ^. The 
only doubt is whether any camp was pitched at all ; there 
at least was not time for such full occupation and defence 
as we hear of at other times. 

For Hamilkar deemed that he had a work to do. March of 
a joyful entry to make, and withal to do them speedily, q^ Sy„^ 
The prophet of the staff had scanned the signs of the^^^* 
sacrifices, and had pronounced that on the evening of 
the morrow the general would sup in Syracuse^. It 
was most likely Deinokrates who suggested the way 
that was chosen to make the prediction certain, by re* 
peating the attempt of Demosthenes to the letter. We Assault 
must always remember that, when Lamachos first led the Spipoiai.^^ 
attack on Epipolai, it was made from the north side by 
an army fresh from its landing in the bay of Trogilos. 
Demosthenes could reach the same point only by a toil* 
some march all round the extreme western end of the hill. 
Deinokrates seems to hare led his Punic allies by the same 
course without ihe same reason. We are not told what 
was Hamilkar's line of march; one would have thought 
it would have been worth his while, if it were so needed, 
to fetch a considerable compass, in order to assault, like 
Lamachos, directly on the north. On that side Dion 
too had come in on his march from Leontinoi. Neither 
Lamachos nor Didn had needed a camp; yet one might 
have thought that these two memorable marches might 
have sug^^ted to Deinokrates that the true course for an 

[} Diod. XX. 39 ; kwtfidKtro MarakaLfi4c0ai ro^ w€fi rd '0\^itmo¥ r&rQvs, 
mifUtfovt /liy wp6 r^ v6ktttf,'] 

[' lb. ; rov ft&mwt ttpufMArot abrf ttar^ ri^ MffKm/fiv rwr hp&¥ &n rf 
fMMTd rairifp ^liipf^ ^fo^rws Ir 'XopaiuiAaiut 8fi«y4<rcc. See, too, Cicero de 
Div. i. 34 ; Val. Max. i. 7, 8.J 


cHAP.zn. assailant of Syiacose, who designed a storm on the north 

The ex- side, was to forestall the position of Maroellus instead of 

Bdm^the- fep^ting that of Himilkdn. But as the story is told us^ 

"^ it is plain that the camp was^ or was to be, on the site of 

the camp of Himilkdn, and it seems from our account that 

the attack was to be made on the northern side, which 

could be reached from the neighbourhood of the Olympieion 

only by the same roimdabout way by which D^osthen^ 

had reached it ^. 

Yet in striving to follow the march of Hamilkar and 
Deinokrates we miss at every step the guidance of the 
hand which makes us feel as if we had actually trod the 
ground at the side of D^mosthen^. We see why Demos- 
thenes took his masons and carpenters ; had he succeeded, 
he would have had something to build ; we do not see why 
Hamilkar should have taken his five thousand horsemen 
to scale the heights of Epipolai ; still less do we see why 
he should have cumbered himself with a confused multi- 
tude, useless for any miUtaiy purpose, and serving only to 
cause noise and disorder K The only explanation is that, 
SyracusaiiB in his eagerness to filf ul the prophecy, Hamilkar set forth 
garrison of before the camp by the Olympieion had been put into such 
Eury&ioi. ^ gtate of defence as to be a safe shelter for any one. The 
news of what was coming was known in the city, and at 
night&ll three thousand foot and four hundred horsemen 
were sent to the defence of Eury&los^. 

We must again remember the change in the site since the 
days of Demosthenes. Hamilkar had quite another work 
before him from that in which Demosthenes failed. The 
Athenian had before hun only the wall and the detached 
forts thrown up for the purposes of the siege. The Cartha- 

[} See Sicily, iii. 309 seqq.] 

[' Diod. zx. 39; va/njjroAoi^ci 82 irX^^of 6x^o*f in»Todair6v c/rrd; r^f 

$ofi6fiov Si ttai rapax^ dX6yov ytpifiafctf oTnoy.] 



ginian and his Syracnsan guide had before them the finished chap. xii. 
walls of Dionysios meeting in the strong castle which had 
now taken the name of the Broad Nail. That forces were 
specially sent to it at this moment does not prove that it 
was wholly unguarded. It would naturally need an in* 
created garrison at such a moment What is instructive 
is that Eury&Ios seems to be taken for granted as some- 
thing apart from the city in general^. So it doubtless 
still was. Dionysios had^ for military reasons, taken the 
whole line of Epipolai within the same line of defence as 
Ortygia and Achradina; but it was &r from being joined 
on to them as part of a continuously inhabited town. 

While the castle was thus making ready to withstand AuRult on 
them^ the Punic host, still under the cover of darkness, ^*^ 
wound its way round the top of Belvidere to the point on 
the northern side of Epipolai which has become the familiar 
ground for such enterprises. Hamilkar led the van with 
his twofold phalanx, Greek and barbarian ; the horsemen 
under Deinokrat^s formed the rereward. And with them, 
in whatever order or disorder^ came the aimless multitude 
whose presence was to make the attempt hopeless. They 
straggled hither and thither, one striving to get before his 
fellow; they blocked up the narrow paths ; their confused 
cries were welcome warnings to the defenders of Eury&los. 
By the time the real men of war began to make the actual 
ascent, everything was ready for them. To the defenders, 
knowing every step of the ground, the darkness was not 
the same hindrance that it was to the assailants^ Why 
was not Deinokrates, who at least knew the way, not the 
foremost man to lead the storming*party ? Of the de- 
fenders each party had its own work. Some simply stood 
on the height and hurled darts at the invaders as they 
strove to climb up^. Some undertook the more delicate 

[' Thus DiodAros (I. c.) speaks of o2 KOTciXi^^^f f rdv E^pvrfXor Svptueo6ciot,'\ 
[* Diod. IX, 39 ; riwh fikv h rmV i^Kois iarwrts IfidKKw robt Ivi^rras • . .] 


CHAP. XII. task of picking out convenient points of the path, and 
Assatdt on there blocking the way of the climbers ^ Others, as the 
i«pa£ed. climbers began to waver and turn, drove them to other 
points where they had no hope but in their chance of 
throwing themselves from the rocks ^. All was wild con- 
fusion ; no man in the host of Hamilkar knew where he 
was or could tell friend from foe. They fought with one 
another; of the horsemen of Deinokrates all that we hear 
is that some of their comrades were trodden to pieces by 
them. We can hardly believe that the horses shared in the 
actual climb in the darkness. They most likely waited for 
a more favourable moment, and so were able to ride off in 
safety. Deinokrates at all events lived to fight another day. 
Not so Hamilkar. He showed no great wisdom in his 
scheme of attack ; but he at least did his best in the hour of 
overthrow. Leading the van as he did, if any man in his 
army made his way to the top of the hill of Syracuse, it 
was he. He fought as one man might against the de- 
fenders of Euryalos; he called on his men to do as he 
Hamilkar himself was doing. Forsaken by all, left alone to wage 
prisoner, the fight with multitudes, he fell alive into the hands of 
the men of Syracuse. 

In their city, his prophet had told him, he was to.sup on 
the day which presently began to dawn. We are not dis- 
tinctly told, but we may almost take for granted from the 
turn of the story, that the words of the soothsayer were 
known in Syracuse, and that care was taken that Hamilkar 
should have a last meal within the walls. But his fate 
was a hard one. If ever an enemy had deserved favourable 
treatment from his captors, it was Hamilkar son of Oisk6n« 
In him the barbarian had given lessons to the Greek, perhaps 

{} Died. XX. 39 ; rmh Bi ro^ €vicaipovs rw rimtur MtTakafi6rrts, Mtckuw 
T^ Mov ro^f Bapfiipovs.'] 
[' lb. ; dKKoi dk xard rwv ttfttiyam rulis ^^wras fiwrup lovro^r 


in actual humanity, at all events in that enlightened cHAP.xn. 
policy which practically does the work of humanity. While 
Agathokles set city after city against him by treacherous 
massacres, Hamilkar had won over city after city to his side 
by strictly observing the laws of justice and good faith. 
But by this time^ by dealing with barbarians unlike Hamil- Barbarous 
kar, the Greek had sunk to the level of the barbarian, ©f Hamir. 
The doom of Nikias and Demosthenes had been simple ^"^7 

■^ Syraciisans. 

death, death perhaps by their own hands. Hamilkar was 
handed over to all who listed to deal with him as he 
thought good. He was led in bonds through the city, 
every one who liad lost a friend or kinsman in the war 
pressing round him to add some further bitterness of insult 
or of anguish. At last his cup was full ; his tormentors 
became weary of their sport. Death relieved him of his 
sufferings, and by the bidding of Antandros and his col- 
leagues his head was cut from his body ^. The head was Head of 
sent to Agathokles in Africa, a trophy and witness of gent to 
Syracusan victory. The prows of the Syracusan ships had ^|^ 
carried grief and fear to Syracuse ; so well may a genuine 
witness be taught to tell a tale of falsehood. The head of 
Hamilkar told a surer tale ; it was evidence which left no 
room for doubtful disputations. 

We follow the ghastly trophy on its way to Africa. The The war in 


exact position of the armies there at the moment when the 
head of Hamilkar was brought to Agathokles is not cleai*ly 
marked. Sut the whole stress of the war just now lies 
between Tunis and Carthage, and, if we are to take quite 
strictly the phrase of our author which speaks of a Cartha- 
ginian camp, we must understand it of a camp pitched on 
the low ground near Carthage, as the camp of Agathokles 
was pitched on the low ground near Tunis. We think of 

[} The &te of Hamilkar ia described in Diod. xz. 30.] 


CHAP. xn. later leaders of warfare between Europe and Carthage^ of 

Hannibal and Asdmbal and Gains Nero^ wben we hear how 

the lord of Syracuse^ seemingly in person^ rode towards the 

Hamilluir*8 camp of Carthage with the head of Hamilkar, and having 

I16ftd flDOWU 

to Cartha- come within the range of the human yoice^ he shouted out 
gmians. ^j^^ ^^ ^£ ^j^^ ^j^^ which those whom he had left in Sicily 

had dealt to Carthage^ and held up the head of the slain 
Shophet as the witness of his words ^. The sight smote the 
whole Carthaginian host with grief and fear ; but they did 
not forget to pay what slight honours they could pay to 
the dead. At the sight of the head of Hamilkar^ they 
bowed in reverence *, as they would have bowed to their 
living leader. That moment was the highest point of 
the fortunes of AgathoblSs in which we may call the first 
stage of his African warfare. He and those whom he had 
trusted had smitten the ancient enemy in two worlds. The 
Phoenician had been beaten back from Syracuse ; the Greek 
still struck terror into Carthage. Presently^ in Africa and 
Sicily alike^ the caprice of fortune turned against him. 
In his personal career he was at the next moment after his 
great success brought again in a strange way to the brink 
of ruin, and was again delivered in a way no less strange. 
Meanwhile in the land which he had left behind him 
Sicihan affairs were taking a new turn of special interest 
as concerns the relations of the Sikeliot cities to one 

§ 7. The Akragantine Alliance, 

In the night-assault on Syracuse Hamilkar had fallen, 
or rather he would have been happier if he had fallen in 
the night attack itself. Deinokrates still lived; he had 
most likely not shared the dangers of his chief. Among the 

\} Diod. xz. 33. Agatliokldt is demsribed m riding with Hamilkar*! 
head MKifciov rrp waptfifioK^s rSfy vcAc/J«y §ls ^m^s dKo^y."] 

f lb. ; fiafi0apne&s vpoaKw^aairrts, That is to say, they did not simply 
bow bat prostrated themselves in Eastern fiMhion.] 


surviyors of the mingled force, Greek and barbdkrian^ which ohap. xn. 
Hamilkar had led against Syracuse, a dispute now arose. 
After the first moment of utter fear and confusion^ the 
army came together to choose generals. The Carthaginians 
were for the obvious course of acknowledging^ now that 
Hamilkar was dead^ the officers who were next in command 
to him as his successor \ The Greeks, on the other hand^ Breach 
both the Syracusan fugitives and others, chose Deinokrat^, Carthagi- 
not only as their own immediate commander, but, as it^^*^"*<* 
would seem^ as general of the whole army, Greek and bar- aUies. 
barian^. Such a claim was clearly in the teeth of all 
Carthaginian discipline. Its effect was that the remnant 
of the army of Hamilkar parted asunder. From this time 
Deinokrat^ and the exiles appear as a distinct power from Deino- 
the Punic army, with objects and movements of their own. general. 
But we are perhaps a little surprised at the way in wI4ch 
two elements which had hitherto been in close concert, now 
part off in a like way. Hitherto Akragas has been the 
centre and city of refuge for Syracusan exiles. It was from 
thence that Deinokrates had set forth for the deliverance of 
Centuripa and Galaria from the dominion of Agathokles ^. 
It may be that the ill-success of those enterprises had 
lessened his reputation, and the result of the attack on 
Epipolai was not likely to repair it. At this point thelndepen- 
Akragantines began to think that they could do a work by of Akragas. 
themselves without helpers. A chance seemed to offer 
itself for the city of Phalaris and Ther5n to claim its old 
place, or more than its old place, among the commonwealths 
of Sicily. The old instinct of local independence, the special 
instinct of rivalry between Akragas and Syracuse, the abid- 
ing enmity between Greek and barbarian, all began to stir 
once more in their fulness in the hearts of patriotic Akra« 

[^ Diod. xz. 31 ; Ol 8) Kapxt^f^^ot rois 9tvT*ptvcv<ri r$ ficrd rbv arpa' 
[• lb.] [8 See above, p. 385.] 


oBAP.xn. gantmes. Akragae could have no natural love for Phoenician 
allies ; they could be endured only as long as they were 
needed as helpers against something worse. And Syracusan 
exiles could have no charm except as being enemies to the 
powers which at the moment bore sway in Syracuse. They 
were well pleased to believe that all three alike, AgathoklSs^ 
the exiles^ and the Carthaginians, had so worn themselves 
out in their mutual attacks that all would fall back, and 
would leave room for Akrag^ to come to the front. Car- 
thage could not hold up against the warfare of Agathokles 
in Africa; her power in Sicily could not fail to be over- 
thrown or seriously lessened. Syracuse had suffered so 
deeply in the war, she was so straitened for lack of sup- 
plies, that she could no longer, at present at least, maintain 
her place as the first of Sikeliot powers. And if no hin- 
drance was to be looked for in those two more dangerous 
quarters, Deinokrates and his band of exiles were not 
likely to be able either to hinder or to forestall the plans 
of a powerful city, soon it was hoped to become the head 
of a powerful alliance. A wide field, and a tempting one, 
seemed open to Akragantine ambition. 
Liberatin); And Akragantine ambition at that moment took a 
S^L°' generous form. We are carried back to the schemes of 
Olynthos about eighty years earlier, as we have learned 
them in the teaching of the historian of Greek democracy ^. 
The Akragantine and the Olynthian movements are alike 
among those events in Greek history which make us both 
lament and wonder that the true form of a federal system 
was not lighted on by those who were feeling their way so 
near to it. Markos of Keryneia was already bom ; he may 
well have been already of an age for action, but his work 
was never to be done in Sicily. Failing this happy revela- 
tion which Zeus Hellanios already held so near to another 
group of cities, Akragas, like Olynthos, offered all that was 

\} Grote, ch. Izzvi. See Freeman, Fed. Gov. (and ed. p. 149 seqq.).] 


to be had. A perfectly equal alliance could not be; some chap.xii. 
leadership was to be vested in Akragas, but it was to be a AUied 
leadership which should leave every city free and indepen- ^j^^ 
dent^ at all events in its internal affairs ^. None would be 4^*fi^" 


any longer controlled either by barbarian allies or by the hegemony, 
barbarian hirelings of tyrants. The old cry of freedom for 
all Hellenic commonwealths^ union of all Hellenic common- 
wealths against all barbarian enemies^ was again to go 
forth, and the leaders of Akragantine policy hoped, and 
not without reason, that such a cry would speedily bring 
many willing allies to the Akragantine banners. 

For a while they were not disappointed. The work of 
deliverance began; it began alike among the cities that 
were strictly Greek and those which were now fully Greek 
by adoption. Alike from the coast and from the inland 
regions — we need no longer say from the Greek and from 
the Sikel — came appeals to the centre of ^eedom at Akragas 
crying for a helping hand to be stretched out to them that Help de- 
were still in bondage. The city on the height of Atabyrian ^eU 
Zeus had first to hear the petition of her own enslaved ^^"^^ 
metropolis between the mouths of the chilly river. Akragas kite. 
was now held by a very mingled people ; but we may be sure 
that they adopted the traditions of the spot. If Gela could 
not be to the new Akragantines all that Corinth had come 
to be to the new Syracusans, still the name of the mother 
city must have had its charm for a daughter which had so 
long lived in friendship by the side of her parent. A 
message came from Gela craving to be set free from the 
dominion of Agathokles ; how bloody that dominion could 
be no city knew better^. A large force was already 
gathered under the Akragantine general Xenodikos. He 

[} Diod. XX. 31 ; r^v inpartiaty avrSfy voiovfUvoav kv* kKtvOtpua^ rwv 
w^Xcon^ dafUtws SLmurrat {ntwtoiiataOWf 9id re rb vpdf rohs Bapfi6povi fuooi 
leal bid T^v ifjupvTov waaiv iviBvfday r^s odroKOfi/as.] • 

[* See above, p. 390.] 

VOL. IV. F f 


CHAP. xu. inarched at once to Oela ; the friends of Akragas received 
Gela set }^\j^ ^oii his army. The garrison of Agathokles was over- 
powered ; Gela was f ree^ and a large force and great store 
of wealth passed into the hands of the new alliance ^. The 
military chest and the stores of Agathokles of course 
became the spoil of the victors ; the citizen levies of Gela 
would of course enlist alongside of those of Akragas; hut 
are we to think that any of the mercenaries of Agathokles 
entered the service of the new deliverers^ as the accomplices 
of Phayllos and Phalaikos had entered the service of Timo- 
ledn ^ ? In any case the whole force of Gela itself joined 
with all zeal in the cause ; they had been set free themselves ; 
they would go on to set free others. 
Call from The first call to them came from the holy height of 
Henna. We would give something to know the exact 
relation in which the worship of that high place stood at 
this moment to the religious mind of Greek Sicily. By 
this time the name of the Goddesses of Sicily may have 
been as stirring a call to Greek and Sikel as the name of the 
Palici had been to the Sikel only. The combined forces of 
Akragas and Gela struck inland ; the mountain city opened 
her gates to the Akragantine general, and the deliverers 
climbed up by the steep path to set the holy city free, 
liberatioii Next they marched to Herbessus, where the city was held 
and Her- by a barbarian garrison in the service of the tyrant. A 
sharp fight followed ; the citizens rose and gave their help 
to the liberating army. Many of the garrison were slain ; 
five hundred laid down their arms and surrendered^. Her- 
bessus was free, like Gela and Henna. We again ask what 
became of the prisoners. They might be untoward com- 
rades for the liberators, but they would be more obviously 
dangerous if set free to join the enemy, and they would have 
been no small encumbrance if kept as abiding prisoners. 

[' Diod. XX. 31.] [* See above» p. 295.] 

[» Diod. XX. 31.] 



This progress of the new alliance was naturally not ohap.xii. 
pleasing to those whom Agathokl6s had left in command 
and defence of Syracnse. The deliverance of Herbessus 
above all brought the liberating movement dangerously 
near to the immediate Syracusan territory. Something Syracusans. 
was at once to be done to check the march of freedom. ^J22a. 
Herbessus was seemingly left alone ; but a force was sent 
to occupy another inland town further to the west, the once 
Sikel town of Echetla \ If its site is rightly placed^ that 
town lay well for the purpose immediately designed. It 
formed a centre for plundering expeditions on both sides, 
against the lands of Leontinoi towards one sea and of 
Kamarina towards the other. These towns were already 
free; they were among those which had gone over from 
Agathokles to Hamilkar^ when the Punic general had shown 
himself as a liberator of Greek cities. It does not appear 
that they had as yet joined the Akragantine alliance. But 
it was easy to bring them into it. Xenodikos marched to Xenodikoe 
their relief, and drove away the plunderers ^ He next take 
marched — the men of Leontinoi and Kamarina surely ^^*'^' 
marched with him — to attack their head-quarters at Echetla. 
The town^ like aU inland Sikel towns^ was lofty and strong ; 
but the force of the liberators, helped doubtless by the 
citizens of the town, overcame all hindrance; the mercenaries 
were got rid of ; the democracy of Echetla was restored ^ 
A heavy blow had been dealt to the power that now held 
Syracuse; freedom had been restored to an extent of 
Sicilian territory which makes a visible show on the map. 

P Diod. zz. 31. The site of Echetla is uncertain. Dioddros, zz. 32, 
brings it into connexion with the territories of Leontinoi and Kamarina. 
Schubring (Hist. Geogr. Studien Uber Altsicilien, p. 112) seeks it at Yizzini 
or Licodia. From Philinos, cited by Polybios, i. 15, we know that it lay 
on what in 264 B. 0. was the frontier of the Syracusan and Carthaginian 

[' For the continuation of the Akragantine oampugn of liberation, 
see Diod. zz. 32.] 

[' lb. ; roTf voXiroii Tijy hjfMMparicaf dvoimritrri/o^c.] 

F f a 



CHAP. xii. And for a while it remained undisturbed. The lieutenants 
of Agathokles at Syracuse seem to have made no attempt 
against the liberated cities for a full space of two years. 
Three- The next events that are recorded well illustrate the 

warrare in strangely complicated relations among the powers of Sicily 
betw^ at this time. Agathokles was at war with Carthage; 
Sjracoaans, lie or his lieutenants were at war with the Akragantine 


tine aUies, alliance. But Carthage and Akragas had been in alliance 

ihagii^ni. ^^ *^® ^"^^ ^^ ^® battle of Himeras and the sailing of 
Agathokl^ for Africa. We know not by whom Carthage 
was represented in Sicily after the death of Hamilkar; 
but even Hamilkar would hardly have been well pleased 
at the growth of the Akragantine alliance. He was quite 
' ready for the deliverance of Greek cities from Agathokles, 
but he would be himself the deliverer, and he would deliver 
in such a sort as to make the liberated places at least allies 
of Carthage, perhaps with a certain tendency to become 
her dependencies. The independent growth of Akragas^ 
6ela, and their fellows could not be pleasing to any 
Carthaginian commander. But there has been as yet no 
sign of any open breach. The Syracusan exiles under 
Deinokrates had been in alliance with both Carthage and 
Akragas up to the time of the failure on Epipolai. Since 
then we have seen that the Akragantine leaders looked on 
them with a certain jealousy; but we have heard nothing 
of any open breach; indeed we hear nothing of Deinokrates 
and his followers for about two years ; they may likely 
enough have been acting along with the Akragantines. 
But we now come to an open breach and open warfare 
between Carthage and the Akragantine alliance. And it 
is needless to say that warfare goes on between Carthage 
and Agathokles. Sicily in short at this moment fully 
deserves, in its military aspect^ its name of Trinakria or 
Triquetra. A triangular warfare is going on. Agathokles 
is at war with Carthage. He is also at war with Akragas. 


And now Akragas and Carthage, instead of being any chaf.xii. 
longer leagued against him, are at war with one another. 

Of these three wars the only two that are at all active 
are the war between Carthage and Agathokles by sea and 
the new war between Carthage and Akragas by land. 
This last followed as a necessary consequence on the great 
success of the alliance in eastern Sicily. On that side there 
really seems to have been nothing more left to deliver. 
Agathokles was shut up in the immediate Syiacusan 
territory. But the work of liberation could not stop. The 
Akragantine platform of Greek unity and war with bar- 
barians demanded the deliverance of the Greek towns held 
by Carthage just as much as the deliverance of those held 
by Agathokles. Or rather the yoke of Carthage was the 
worse, because the more abiding, of the two. As long as 
Greek life lasted in any shape, an Agathokles might some 
day be exchanged for a Timoledn ; where the Greek was 
held down by the Phoenician, there was but a feeble hope 
even of an Hamilkar. Xenodikos therefore, with his Xenodikos 
countrymen and allies, having freed the lands to the east ^^]j^ ^ 
of Akra£ni£, turned their faces westward on the same g«"^. 

^^ dominion. 

errand. ^' He set forth to free the fortresses and towns 
that were tmder the dominion of the Carthaginians ^.'^ 
These words no longer imply, as they would once have 
done, an advance into the actual barbarian comer, to 
deliver, it may be, Elymians and Old-Phoenicians. The 
barbarian frontier had greatly advanced; even Timoledn 
had allowed it to be fixed at the eastern Halykos^. The 
host of Akragas had therefore not very far to go north- 
eastward before opportunities could be found for the 
liberating work. It may be that they marched as far as 
Selinous, and for a moment restored the Pillars of the 

[* Died. XX. 33 ; KaB6kov V lnvoptv6fieyos, rd re i^povpia Koi rdi v^Xctf 
^XtvBipov T^$ rStv Kapxrfioviuv IvKrracrcas.] 
[■ See above, p. 335.] 


oHAP. xn. Oiante to free Hellas. But work was to be found nearer 
H^rakleia Selinous. The Min6a of Minds, the Herakleia of Euryleon^ 
^^y*®* was a Carthaginian possession. Ras Melkart, under that 
^^' name, was a cherished seat of Phoenician power ^. It is 
clear that Herakleia was now for a while wrested from the 
dominion of Carthage ; and the process is spoken of as one 
of deliverance